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Summary 
 
This thesis offers a critique of neoliberal transformation in South Africa, which process 
results in growing social inequality and political apathy among citizens. Many scholars have 
made political-economic and historical analyses of the neoliberal transition, emphasizing 
structural changes at work at a ‘macro’ level. However, little attention has been paid to 
changes that have taken place in South Africa at the ‘micro’ level – changes to individual 
subjectivity and gender codes. That said, the thesis opens by summarizing the above 
mentioned political-economic accounts of neoliberalism in South Africa, because such works 
are indispensable to understanding how the regime is embedded within and buttressed by 
major global institutions. Yet, to achieve a holistic grasp of ‘neoliberal South Africa,’ more is 
needed. A sociological investigation into the impact of neoliberalism on ordinary people’s 
self-identification uncovers deep cultural reasons for the continued perpetuation of this unjust 
political-economic system. Only if it can be understood why people comply with the system 
in the face of suffering, can effective counter-measures be proposed and implemented over 
time. This thesis is inherently transdisciplinary. The approach rejects the privileging of one 
discipline over others, and likewise cautions against collapsing or dissolving disciplines into 
one another. Instead, recognizing the valuable contribution that each discipline can make to 
critical scrutiny of a particular issue, a form of methodological transversalism is used to bring 
different disciplines into dialogue with one another. Following this interplay of structural and 
subjective analysis, the thesis uncovers the role that consumerism plays in the political 
neutralization of South Africans. Consumer culture, tied as it is to profitable accumulation, 
instigates the neoliberal ‘values’ of economistic calculation, competition, and social 
atomization. This ethos is inculcated in individuals, both at work and during leisure hours. 
Moreover, consumerism derives much of its power from its ‘sexual sell,’ the creation of 
fashionable and ‘exemplary’ models of masculinity and femininity. In South Africa, these 
hegemonic gender models serve to instill competitive individualism while derogating 
indigenous values. The thesis proposes that in order to counter neoliberal hegemony in South 
Africa, and begin reclaiming the cultural autonomy of its peoples, it is important to invigorate 
indigenous communitarian practices and norms. The original contribution of this thesis 
consists in placing the African ethos of ubuntu in transversal dialogue with global ecological 
feminist voices. Both political perspectives reinforce a liberatory alternative vision for a 
future based on principles of embodied relationality, care giving and protection of 
community. 
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Glossary of indigenous terms 
 
amatshipa   lost to the mines 
bakontshana   mine wives 
Bantu    Bantu-speaking ethnic groups in Africa 
bantustans   tribal homelands 
feta kgomo o tshware motho ‘go past the cow and hold the human being’ 
impi    Zulu regiment (isiZulu) 
izikhothane   to lick/mock (isiZulu) 
letsema   intra-communal collaboration 
lobola a gift from the bridegroom’s family to the bride’s in the form of 
livestock, or increasingly, cash (roughly translatable as 
‘bridewealth’) 
mfecane   the ‘great crushing’ or ‘scattering’ 
mmereko/pangela  waged work (Setswana/isiXhosa) 
motho ke motho ka batho ‘one attains humanity through others’ 
ormeek   ‘modern’ non-Maasai masculinity (Maa) 
piny    ‘on the ground’ (Luo) 
polo malo   ‘up in the air’ (Luo) 
tiro/ukwakha   building the umzi (Setswana/isiXhosa) 
tokoloshe   sprite-like figure in Xhosa tradition 
ubudoda   manhood 
ubuntu/botho   being human 
ukumetsha   thigh sex 
umuntu   be-coming human 
umzi    homestead
1 
 
Introduction 
 
Neoliberalism constitutes the most recent manifestation of the capitalist system. It is a form of 
domination-by-deregulation that involves subjugating entire countries under the logic of the 
free market, ostensibly to facilitate ‘development’ through economic growth. Fiscal 
tightening, privatization, public expenditure cuts, tax reform, and liberalization of interest 
rates, exchange rates, trade and investment,
1
 all are supposed to boost a country’s economy 
and so improve the lot of its people in the long run. Under the neoliberal hegemony,
2
 
commodity consumption is promoted not only as a means to growth but also as the key to 
human happiness itself. However, it has been demonstrated amply that free market 
globalization benefits the few rather than the many. Global financial institutions, a handful of 
powerful nations, transnational corporations (TNCs), and the transnational capitalist class 
comprising foreign and local financial elites, reap the benefits. On the other hand, ordinary 
people experience societal deterioration and many environments suffer irreversible 
degradation, which further undermines the capacity of local communities to survive outside of 
the money economy. The German ecological feminist Maria Mies accordingly refers to this 
system as a “gigantic parasite.” 3  It feeds off workers, women, nature, and the erstwhile 
colonies now controlled by the World Bank, the IMF and TNCs. She argues that those aiming 
to “help … construct a reality in which neither women, men, nor nature are exploited and 
destroyed,” have to face up to the fact that capitalism and patriarchal structures of domination 
are interrelated. Conceiving women as inferior to men makes possible the exploitation of the 
former as though they constitute ‘natural resources.’ Women’s work as care-givers to the 
young and those externalized from the ‘productive’ economy goes unremunerated, but is 
crucial to the maintenance of the capitalist economic system. Mies adds that the dominating 
                                                          
1
 John Williamson, “A Short History of the Washington Consensus,” in The Washington Consensus 
Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance, eds. Narcis Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 16. 
2
 The British educator Harold Entwistle points out that “[t]he notion of hegemony is most familiar in political 
history and international affairs where it refers to situations in which one nation exercises political, cultural or 
economic influence over others.” Yet, the Italian marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci “extended its reference to 
apply to relationships between groups, especially social classes.” Thus, “one social class can be thought of as 
exercising hegemony over other ‘subaltern’ classes,” and “[i]n capitalist society the bourgeoisie is hegemonic in 
relation to the industrial working class.” Harold Entwistle, Antonio Gramsci: Conservative Schooling for Radical 
Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 7. 
3
 Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour 
(London: Zed Books, 1998), 38, 224. 
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logic operational in the resourcing of women parallels that at work in the colonist’s resourcing 
of indigenes.
4
  
Because it resources people and nature in these ways, neoliberalism can be said to 
carry various unacknowledged and unaddressed debts. Most political economy critiques, 
following Marx, emphasize the debt owed to the worker. Industrialists extract surplus value 
from workers, making them labor for unnecessarily long hours by lowering the rate of pay.
5
 
Socialist movements criticize this exploitative dynamic and lobby for improved treatment of 
workers, including better salaries and worker protection. Often, though, such movements fix 
on the so-called economic bottom line, and therefore remain as blind as the transnational 
business class is to other kinds of debts incurred by free market ideology.
6
 One such moral 
and material ‘debt’ is owed to peasants and indigenous peoples. The annexation of resources 
that were once a commons and the economic exploitation necessary to sustain neoliberalism, 
detrimentally affect Third World men and women, and so can be said to comprise a 
neocolonial debt. This exacerbates an original colonial debt extracted from the bodies of 
indigenous slaves. In reaction to this theft, postcolonial movements fight for the right to local 
autonomy and self-sufficient livelihoods. The international peasant organization Via 
Campesina, for example, focuses on restoration of the commons and promotion of small- to 
medium-scale agriculture, to counter global agribusiness and restore food sovereignty and 
national autonomy.
7
 Then there is the unacknowledged embodied debt owed to women.
8
 As 
reproductive or caring labor, women are resourced commercially and within the household, 
where they birth and raise new generations of workers and undertake caring, life-sustaining 
work. Household labor goes unpaid because it takes place in the ‘private’ reproductive sphere 
rather than in the ‘public’ productive domain. A postcolonial debt to women extends to those 
in the Third World who, through neoliberal globalization, are denied lands for subsistence and 
“are often especially earmarked for factory work paid at nearly slave wages.”9 Ecological 
feminists strive to eradicate the implicit treatment of all capitalist patriarchal ‘others’ as 
                                                          
4
 Ibid., 23. 
5
 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 3 vols., ed. Friedrich Engels (New York: Cosimo, [1867] 
2007), 637. 
6
 Ariel Salleh, “Ecological Debt: Embodied Debt,” in Eco-Sufficiency and Global Justice: Women Write 
Political Ecology, ed. Ariel Salleh (London: Pluto Press, 2009), 1-40. 
7
 William D. Schanbacher, The Politics of Food: The Global Conflict between Food Security and Food 
Sovereignty (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), xiv. 
8
 Ariel Salleh, “Embodied Materialism in Action: An Interview with Ariel Salleh,” Polygraph 22 (2010): 186. 
9
 Faye V. Harrison, Outsider Within: Reworking Anthropology in the Global Age (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2008), 227. 
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natural resources. Liberal feminists, on the other hand, advocate women’s entry into the 
economic system as equals. New Zealander Marilyn Waring takes a middle way, to argue that 
women’s caring labor should be valued in monetary terms to give a clearer picture of the 
extent of women’s exploitation within the capitalist system. Most economic indices, including 
the United Nations System of National Accounts (UNSNA), exclude women’s work because 
it supposedly is situated “outside … the production boundary.”10 Meanwhile, an unspoken yet 
solidly material intergenerational debt is owed to children, who suffer the ecological fallout of 
passing the environmental ‘buck.’ In addition, child labor is integral to neoliberal 
development even though it largely remains unacknowledged. Hundreds of millions of 
children work in factories under harsh conditions, and children additionally suffer 
abandonment, educational failure, psychological damage and physical abuse.
11
 In turn, a 
species debt is owed to animals, and the Animal Liberation movement aims to sensitize 
people to biodiversity loss and large-scale extinction under free market expansion.
12
 What 
must also be considered is the destruction of thousands of animals each year in the name of 
scientific progress.
13
 Finally, the theft of natural resources from a living ecosystem 
constitutes, in principle, an ecological debt. The drive for profitable accumulation through the 
ever increasing production of consumer items precipitates unsustainable resource extraction, 
unprecedented levels of pollution, and often irreversible environmental degradation. 
Environmental groups like Friends of the Earth accordingly encourage people to turn away 
from consumerism to value life itself.
14
 
As long as these life-depleting debts remain invisible, the capitalist patriarchal 
hegemony of neoliberalism continues. Partly, this is because the global media effectively 
“manufacture consent”15 for neoliberalism, and so debilitate people politically. This parasitic 
system rests not only on global institutions and policies, but on ordinary people’s buy-in as 
consumers as well. The American sociologist William Robinson explains that complicity with 
neoliberalism is constantly encouraged by means of “ideological campaigns aimed at 
                                                          
10
 Marilyn Waring, Counting for Nothing: What Men Value and What Women Are Worth, 2d ed. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2004), 27. 
11
 Ximena de la Barra, “The Dual Debt of Neoliberalism,” in Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in 
Latin America, eds. Richard A. Dello Buono and José Bell Lara (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 42. 
12
 Eduardo Mendieta, “Animal Is to Kantianism as Jew Is to Fascism: Adorno’s Bestiary,” in Critical Theory and 
Animal Liberation, ed. John Sanbonmatsu (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 159. 
13
 Marti Kheel, Nature Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 246. 
14
 Barry Smart, Consumer Society: Critical Issues and Environmental Consequences (London: Sage, 2010), 173.  
15
 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 2002), lix. 
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seduction and passivity.” For him, it is essential to realize that “the culture of global 
capitalism attempts to seduce the excluded and to channel their frustrated aspirations into 
petty consumption and fantasy as an alternative to placing political demands on the system 
through collective mobilization.”16 The economic system paralyzes the majority of citizens by 
trapping them in a work-and-spend cycle centered on consumer rivalry. 
However, not everyone remains co-opted. Over the past decade a diversity of 
movements have arisen that oppose neoliberalism and its social and environmental injustices. 
Activists are calling for alternative forms of globalization and different ways of life. In 
Seattle, protestors took on the World Trade Organization (WTO).
17
 In New York, the Occupy 
Movement decried the fact that 99 percent of the US population is exploited for the benefit 1 
percent of financiers.
18
 The World Social Forum (WSF), founded in the wake of the Battle for 
Seattle, seeks to integrate such movements in a coherent international platform for resistance 
to market economics. Its strength lies in coalition building between interest groups from 
peasants to peaceniks.
19
 Indeed, the need for unity in resistance to neoliberalism among 
grassroots movements is extremely urgent, particularly as the status quo also is maintained 
through the age-old process of divide and rule. The Australian ecological feminist Ariel 
Salleh believes that the WSF counters this tendency by acting “as an instrument for drawing 
together worker’s, women’s, indigenous, and ecological voices.”20  In its 2012 manifesto, 
“Another Future is Possible,” the WSF has formulated the concerns and visions of these 
exploited and marginalized peoples belonging to what Salleh has identified as a ‘meta-
industrial labor class’ – engaged not in production for sale but in caring or reproductive labor, 
subsistence, and community building.
21
 It is called ‘meta’ because it is an outside frame, ‘over 
and above,’ but essential for industrial productivism to function. The WSF document brings 
                                                          
16
 William I. Robinson, “Global Capitalism and Its Anti-‘Human Face’: Organic Intellectuals and Interpretations 
of the Crisis,” Globalizations 10/5 (2013): 666-667. 
17
 Leslie Sklair, Globalization: Capitalism and Its Alternatives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 291. 
18
 Heather Gautney, Protest and Organization in the Alternative Globalization Era: NGOs, Social Movements, 
and Political Parties (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 181. 
19
 Zeynep Atalay, “World Social Forum,” in International Encyclopedia of Civil Society, eds. Helmut K. Anheier 
and Stefan Toepler (New York: Springer, 2010), 1661. 
20
 Ariel Salleh, “Rio+20 and the Green Economy: Technocrats, Meta-industrials, WSF and Occupy,” Rio20.net, 
April 18, 2012. Available at: http://rio20.net/en/documentos/rio20-and-the-green-economy-technocrats-meta-
industrials-wsf-and-occupy/. Date accessed: September 8, 2014. 
21
 Ariel Salleh, “Global Alternatives and the Meta-Industrial Class,” in New Socialisms: Futures Beyond 
Globalization, eds. Robert Albritton, Shannon Bell, John R. Bell and Richard Westra (London: Routledge, 
2004), 201. 
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together manifold issues and articulates a vision for the future, touching on ethics, philosophy, 
human rights and the rights of Earth, production, economic distribution, consumption, 
commoning, governance, power, and political subjectivity along the way.
22
 The emphasis falls 
on activism and critical conceptual reflection, indicating the need to develop a vision for a 
different future by synthesizing intersecting movement concerns. This transversal approach to 
politics entails grasping how all kinds of domination (concerning gender, race, class and 
nature) are interconnected under neoliberalism. As the social movement scholar Hamed 
Hosseini explains, transversal political struggle involves “commitment and openness for 
exchanging experiences and ideas across a variety of local fields of resistance.” 23  The 
immediate question is: how do indigenous Southern African voices contribute to this new 
universalizing perspective? Does this political moment belong to the great philosophers of 
ubuntu such as Mogobe Ramose, Thaddeus Metz, Dismas Masolo and Joseph Gaie?
24
 
In terms of mapping inclusive visions for ‘another future,’ this thesis constitutes an 
attempt at both grassroots transversalism and ‘academic transversalism.’ Regarding the latter, 
it interweaves political economy, socio-cultural analysis, and philosophical reflection on the 
neoliberalization of South Africa. The rise of a neocolonial consumerist hegemony in South 
Africa is identified as a failure of democracy that carries socially and ecologically disastrous 
consequences. Currently, South Africa is a regional hegemon, setting the pace and seemingly 
also the rules for development of the entire continent. The country has long-standing 
affiliations with Washington and Wall Street, the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. South 
Africa recently aligned economically with Brazil, Russia, India and China, to form the 
BRICS; what South African political economist Patrick Bond describes as a sub-imperial 
economic liaison.
25
 Government leaders tout neoliberal-style development as the panacea for 
South African ills – socio-economic and ecological. However, the uptake of free market 
policies has only aggravated human inequality and worsened the condition of local 
environments. Racial apartheid has been replaced by class apartheid and a new kind of 
gendered apartheid. State sovereignty has been lost, while corporations and local financial 
                                                          
22
 World Social Forum, “Another Future is Possible: Texts Drafted on the Basis of the Findings of the Thematic 
Groups of the Thematic Social Forum,” Rio20.net, June 10, 2012. Available at: http://rio20.net/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/Another-Future-is-Possible_english_web.pdf. Date accessed: September 8, 2014. 
23
 S. A. Hamed Hosseini, “Occupy Cosmopolitanism: Ideological Transversalization in the Age of Global 
Economic Uncertainties,” Globalizations 10/3 (2013): 428. 
24
 Mogobe B. Ramose, African Philosophy through Ubuntu (Harare: Mond Books, 1999). This body of literature 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
25
 Patrick Bond, “BRICS and the Tendency to Sub-Imperialism,” Pambazuka News, April 10, 2014. Available 
at: http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category/features/91303. Date accessed: September 9, 2014. 
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elites run amok. Since the 1994 democratic transition, international ruling elites have claimed 
that ‘there is no alternative’ to neoliberalism, but continue to play a very active role in 
facilitating it. Ordinary South Africans also are complicit with this material domination, 
content with the comforts of consumer culture. Alternative cultural and ethical frameworks 
have readily been discarded, and political debilitation of the South African citizenry looms 
large. How to begin addressing this crisis? 
The first chapter of this thesis is political-economic in disciplinary orientation. It 
provides an ‘origin account’ of neoliberalism and details how this system gradually spread 
across the world under the impetus of US ‘modernization’ ideology. Focus falls on the 
Washington-Wall Street policy alliance promoting development through deregulation as a 
cure-all for societal problems. Thereafter, the globalization of neoliberalism is tied to the 
implementation of ‘Washington Consensus’ reforms in the Third World through World Bank-
IMF-WTO mechanisms. Finally, consideration is given to influential academic and activist 
criticisms of neoliberal policy implementation on account of its aggravation of social 
inequalities and its environmental fallout. 
The second chapter is more historical, situating neoliberalism in a specifically South 
African context, and identifying it as a neocolonial phenomenon. First discussed are the 
colonial and apartheid periods in South Africa, and how these endeavors were animated by a 
capitalist economic logic. After this, in reference to seminal political economy texts on South 
Africa’s 1994 democratic transition, the new African National Congress-led government is 
shown to have aligned with neoliberal institutions and businesses previously supportive of the 
apartheid regime. Erstwhile grassroots struggle leaders in the first democratically elected 
government, encouraged neoliberalism for the sake of personal enrichment. They did so in 
spite of their earlier socialist promises of countering the deregulation eroding national 
autonomy, and ending the capitalist exploitation of the black South African majority. 
The disciplinary frameworks adopted in the first two chapters of this thesis risk 
painting neoliberalism as something facilitated exclusively by big government, big business, 
and Big Men. The focus on economic structures per se, invites the assumption that this 
system is beyond the influence or control of citizens. This is sociologically reductionist, and 
so the third thesis chapter turns to the cultural and psychological complicity of ordinary 
individuals – ‘little people’ – in this unjust socio-economic regime. The chapter examines 
why industrialization resulted in worker alienation and loss of subjective autonomy, and how 
consumerism has served as a compensatory mechanism. The desire to consume to regain self-
esteem is fuelled further by the association of display with the heights of ‘individualism.’ 
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Here, the profoundly patriarchal culture underlying capitalism surfaces as constructions of 
gendered ‘masculinity and femininity’ are manipulated to economic ends.  
The fourth chapter reflects more intimately on the ‘South African Dream’ that was 
developed along the lines of the American Dream ideology of hyper-consumerist bliss. This 
homogenizing vision of success and contentment buttresses neoliberal hegemony despite its 
negative impacts, which obliterate any chance of indigenous economic or cultural 
independence. Consumerism has undermined black South Africans’ centuries-long efforts to 
retain indigenous cultural autonomy and livelihoods. The chapter opens with a brief overview 
of South African battles over colonialism and apartheid. From the 1970s, this shifts to the 
conflation of black liberation with consumer competence, as businesses sought a new local 
consumer base. Spending money on commodities became politicized. Soon indigenous 
communal norms and self-conceptions were replaced by competitive individual display and 
narcissistic gender styles exalted in the neoliberal media. The valorization of mainstream 
consumerist visions of gender identity has portrayed indigenous self-definition as ‘backward’ 
and unbecoming of a so-called ‘modernizing people.’  
The central task of this thesis is a consideration of how to apply a transversal analysis 
in order to deconstruct this engineered complex of politics, economics and socio-cultural 
organization that reinforces neoliberalism at every turn. One option is to appropriate now 
virtually defunct indigenous perspectives and practices to help formulate a more socially and 
environmentally attuned ethic. But the simple evocation of tradition will not serve a 
politically sophisticated post-modernizing world. A radical alternative needs to grow in 
dialogue with other parallel struggles for political democracy ongoing around the world. This 
is where the thesis becomes an exercise in political transversalism. Only a grassroots 
transversal dialogue is capable of contesting the homogenizing neoliberal monologue in a way 
that builds social movement alliances bottom up and across the board. To this end, the fifth 
thesis chapter reflects on the threatened status of indigenous African knowledge. The 
discussion, inspired by indigenous thinkers such as Ramose and others, centers on aspects of 
such knowledge that are critical, dialectical, and thus useful to societal critique today. Several 
contemporary formulations of the indigenous ethic of ubuntu are analyzed here. These 
normative statements stand in sharp contrast to the politically dualist, socially narcissistic, and 
ecologically alienated conventions of neoliberalism by emphasizing: 
 embodied knowing; 
 relational livelihood and personhood; and 
 human embeddedness and dependency on nature. 
8 
 
After examining these features of ubuntu, the indigenous voice is brought into dialogue with 
another marginalized yet global ‘minority’ perspective – ecological feminism. The latter 
politics involves an integrated statement of environmental, postcolonial and gender concerns. 
The domain features of ecological feminism closely parallel those of ubuntu: 
 non-dualistic logic; 
 caring and subsistence labor; and 
 material embodiment of humans within nature. 
Ecofeminism is an increasingly prominent voice in the alternative globalization movement, 
and so might lend strength to the indigenous ethic of ubuntu, a world view that has not been 
taken as seriously as it should be. Furthermore, ecological feminists can support ubuntu 
philosophers, in steering clear of anthropocentric and idealist tendencies, and in favoring an 
environmentally embedded and praxis-based livelihood perspective. The Conclusion to the 
thesis provides a general overview of this transversal dialogue and its contemporary political 
relevance. 
I close this Introduction with some reflexive observations on my research 
methodology and authorial positioning in relation to the field. The transversal political 
process described above occurs between distinct activist strands in the international arena. 
Different interest groups from diverse localities are engaging in dialogue with alliance 
building rather than cooptation in mind. Hosseini argues that “common grounds” are created 
“[t]hrough dialogical processes,” but instead of homogenizing movements what is promoted 
are opportunities for “exchanging and accommodating positive elements of cultures, 
ideologies, and traditions in encountering common sources of problems.”26 Thus, a “cross-
sectional consciousness” can emerge between, for example, young African American men and 
Middle Eastern immigrants to the US who experience comparable forms of racial 
discrimination.
27
 
However, as noted above, this thesis involves a second order of transversalism, calling 
for interdisciplinary dialogue between different academic knowledges. A richer dialogical 
exchange between the disciplines would better map out the contemporary socio-economic 
terrain and its emergent crises. Indeed, this approach is of the essence if something is to be 
done about contemporary global crises at the level of academic critique, because as things 
stand the divisions between academic disciplines are unhelpful to understanding the layered 
complexity of such problems. Political economists, often harboring an economistic bias, 
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might neglect culture, subjectivity, and environmental factors when critiquing neoliberalism. 
Scholars of the social sciences might focus exclusively on social or cultural dynamics while 
overlooking how these are tied to economic changes or to ecologies. Philosophers, in their 
turn, might be prone to idealism, keeping their theoretical reflection divorced from events and 
actions playing out in daily life. Many intellectuals also remain anthropocentric, blind to the 
likelihood that in the present conjuncture, ecocentric thought is now unavoidable, as it 
becomes increasingly clear that human beings are fully dependent on a natural environment 
under serious threat. Disciplinary distinctions may help to build expertise in relation to one 
field, but at the expense of a holistic grasp of everyday life. In fact, the German social theorist 
Hans Joas suggests that the divides between academic fields are so entrenched that even when 
scholars from different disciplines are studying the same phenomenon, they still do not talk 
across these divides to one another. He explains that in scholarly reflection on action theory, 
“little notice is taken in psychology, economics and sociology respectively of arguments put 
forward in debates in each of the other fields.”28 Similarly, in an article on the threatened 
status of sociology in a neoliberal world, the Australian sociologist Raewyn Connell identifies 
academic insularity as a major impediment. Connell proposes that sociology should expand 
its horizons, for instance by including work on the relation between economics and cultural 
transformation, and taking seriously analyses emanating from the global South.
29
 Connell 
stresses that for sociology to remain strong, “it must address major questions about the social 
world now coming into existence,” and “[o]ne of these is the relationship of gender dynamics 
to neoliberalism.” 30  Ecological feminist scholars, many of them sociologists, carry the 
argument further into linkages between genders, societies, economies, and ecologies. An 
inherent danger too, pointed out by the marxist author J. D. Bernal, is that the social sciences 
can be “reduced almost to impotence through the fear that they might be used to analyse and 
alter the economic and political bases of capitalism.”31 The environmental sociologists John 
Bellamy Foster, Brett Clark and Richard York argue in direct reference to Bernal’s work, that 
the critical political potential of the social sciences often is neutralized by these sciences being 
“seriously circumscribed by and often directly subservient to the established order of 
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power.”32  This is all the more reason for transversal alliance building between different 
academic disciplines. 
In the spirit of disciplinary transversalism, this thesis aims to construct a more holistic 
understanding of neoliberalism in South Africa. Thus, while in the first two chapters emphasis 
falls on political economy and history, chapters three and four mainly focus on sociology, 
cultural studies, and gender studies. Finally, in the fifth thesis chapter, and against the 
backdrop of insights derived from reflection on neoliberalism through the lenses of all the 
above disciplines, attention shifts on to grassroots transversalism through a conversation 
between ecological feminist thought and African philosophy. Each political voice is 
indispensable to exploring the question of where South Africa is heading, and how its current 
trajectory may be altered – as reflected in the thesis title Whither South Africa – Neoliberalism 
or an Embodied Communitarian Indigenous Ethic? 
A third level of transversalism again comes into play when disciplinary constructs are 
challenged dialectically by political experience. This ultimately historical mode of transversal 
activity, although it lies beyond the scope of this thesis, is critically important because theory 
necessarily must be tested through praxis, and modified should it fall short. In future research, 
the theorizations put forward in this study will be tested at grassroots level. It is envisioned 
that this will entail interviews with government and social movement stakeholders, and 
discussion workshops with South Africans of various demographic backgrounds, to gain their 
reflections on the impact of neoliberalism and its attendant consumer culture. This will move 
this theoretical research study into an activist sphere. 
Now, for a brief note on data collection for this study. The data collected for this 
research thesis mainly comprise published academic texts. For the first chapter, articles, 
chapters and books were selected that provide a standard overview of the political and 
economic dimensions of neoliberalism. With a few exceptions, these texts are written by 
scholars from the global North. In turn, the primary works consulted for the second chapter 
specifically focus on South African history and political economy, and are authored by 
scholars situated in or originally from South Africa or the global South. Particularly important 
to this chapter were articles, chapters and books by South African historians and political 
economists. This second chapter also referenced newspaper articles (print or online), 
published South African presidential speeches, published interviews with South African 
struggle and union leaders, and statements from South African government departments, 
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political parties, social movements and business entities, all available on the internet. For the 
third thesis chapter, texts were selected that explicitly identify the relation between capitalism 
and the emergence of consumer culture, and the link between consumer culture and 
hegemonic gender identities, in the global North. Accordingly, much of the literature used in 
this chapter is authored by sociologists, consumption studies theorists, and scholars of gender, 
from the global North. Some magazines, again from the global North and from the United 
States in particular, also were referred to. In contrast, the fourth chapter of this study drew on 
academic texts predominantly authored by individuals from South Africa, Southern Africa or 
the global South more generally. This is because this chapter focuses on the socio-cultural 
impact of colonization and missionary Christianity, subjectivities under apartheid, and new 
forms of leisure, identity, and gender ideals especially subsequent to the 1994 
democratic/neoliberal transition in South Africa. Other than academic articles, chapters and 
monographs, this fourth chapter also utilized published chronicles of missionaries, British 
parliamentary papers, speeches by colonial authorities, archived market research reports, 
various newspaper articles (print and online), and South African magazine articles and 
features. The final and fifth thesis chapter, because it involves a transversal linking of 
ecological feminism and African philosophy, drew on postcolonial academic studies, articles 
and books by international ecofeminist scholars and activists, and works by African 
philosophers and ethicists. Therefore, about two-thirds of the works consulted for this final 
chapter emanates from the global South, while the remainder of the texts consulted are 
authored by scholars of the global North. Also, a number of works were consulted for the 
purposes of discussing African communitarianism as a practice well predating colonization. 
These texts are authored by, among others, Christian missionaries, and African or Africa-
based anthropologists, archaeologists, and experts in African vernacular architecture. No data 
were collected through interviews or surveys, and thus no university ethics clearance was 
required. Rather, the study is textual and interpretative in its presentation of individuals 
“construct[ing] reality in interaction with their social worlds.”33 On the whole, the research 
aims “to understand how people make sense of their lives and their experiences,”34 through 
the lens of a hegemonic discourse such as neoliberalism. “Discursive practices shape and 
reshape our ways of seeing …  understanding … and even our ways of being.”35 But the 
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assumption underpinning this study is that while individuals adopt and perpetuate hegemonic 
practices, they are capable of interrogating and countering them.  
The ‘development discourse’ underpinned by free market ideology frames and 
damages people’s self-perceptions in the global South, by characterizing their indigenous 
knowledge systems as fundamentally backward. To become ‘modern,’ Africans for example, 
are expected to abandon shared cultural understandings and communal traditions. This 
destabilization of personal identity undermines indigenous confidence, priming such groups 
for exploitation as worker-consumers or as new local governing and business elite enforcers 
of capitalist patriarchal imperatives. The process simply expands the classic colonial 
hegemony. The Palestinian American intellectual Edward Said disclosed similar power 
dynamics in the Middle East, where “[t]he very possibility of development, transformation, 
human movement – in the deepest sense of the word – is denied the Orient and the Oriental.” 
Instead, he argues, ‘othered’ peoples are essentialized under the colonial gaze, dehumanized, 
and portrayed as outside of history, static and unproductive.
36
  
The process of acculturation may become so deeply embodied that all too often, those 
who engage in liberation struggles to overthrow colonial rule, nevertheless hang on to 
imposed Western ideas and lifestyles. African commentators have argued that the indigenous 
bourgeois ruling class emerging in the wake of independence gained ascendance precisely 
through their complicity with the values of their erstwhile colonial oppressors – the 
indigenous majority becoming ever more impoverished.
37
 The argument of this thesis is that 
alternative values and aspirations are urgent today, given the politically numbing culture of 
neoliberal consumerism. It is proposed that the indigenous African ethic of ubuntu contains a 
number of valuable counter-hegemonic practices which can help catalyze this kind of 
transformation, as well as modeling alternatives for activists in the global North. 
With regard to my own social practice and positioning in the text: I am a white South 
African woman with a middle-class upbringing and opportunities, yet I choose to advance the 
indigenous African ethic as an antidote to neoliberalism. In this, my privilege leaves me 
vulnerable to censure possibly as ‘hypocritical’ and perhaps also, for being inexperienced in 
indigenous struggle. As an academic observer of African cultures, I take an ‘etic’ approach, 
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which “involves studying behavior from a position outside the system, examining two or 
more cultures and comparing them, imposing a structure created by the analyst, and using 
criteria that are considered absolute or universal.” 38  On the other hand, when I identify 
synergies between the ubuntu ethic and ecological feminism, as a woman I am motivated by 
an ‘emic’ or insider position, but rely on ‘etic’ categories to draw out convergencies between 
the two perspectives. Finally, the study is undertaken in the spirit of a dialectical 
transversalism that is committed to encouraging a healthy interaction between lived political 
praxis and academic innovation. 
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Chapter 1: Neoliberalism and the Development Syndrome 
 
In a recent article entitled “Where in the World Does Neoliberalism Come From?,” the 
Australian sociologist Raewyn Connell and the Lebanese cultural theorist Nour Dados 
criticize the standard account of neoliberalism for privileging “social experience of the global 
North.”39 This rendition of neoliberalism, they argue, is inflected in either of two ways. On 
the one hand, neoliberalism may be conceived as a “system of ideas.” What is then detailed is 
how Keynes was rejected by prominent economists, whose liberalizing approach was 
implemented by US and British leaders. Liberalization of the global South was promoted by 
powerful institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Alternatively, neoliberalism can be accounted for in reference to changing economic 
mechanisms, resulting from crises of profitability in the 1970s, leading to the increasing 
financialization of economies. Connell and Dados hold that in both inflections, neoliberalism 
is perceived as a creature of the US and Europe, which gets implanted within hapless nations 
in the global South.
40
  
For Connell and Dados, such accounts overlook neoliberalizing moves made within 
South American countries well before the Reagan-Thatcher push, and so neglect Southern 
leaders’ adoption of neoliberalism “as a development strategy.”41 The authors maintain that if 
one focuses on Southern commentators’ own perspectives on their countries, a far more 
“enriched understanding of neoliberalism”42 is to be had. Voices from the global South reveal 
that different countries have idiosyncratic motives for adopting neoliberal policies. They also 
disclose governing elite complicity with foreign institutions and corporations – South African 
political economist Moeletsi Mbeki’s criticism of the “parasitical” indigenous ruling class 
being a case in point.
43
 For Connell and Dados, these pragmatic voices are muffled by the 
circulation of the standard Northern account of neoliberalism among the intelligentsia and 
leaders of the global South. Accordingly, developing countries all too easily are framed as 
victims of neoliberalism even by governments themselves. Thus opposition leaders “paint 
their domestic opponents as puppets of Washington.”44 
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Connell and Dados make legitimate points, but they themselves seem to overlook an 
important body of work generated by scholars situated in the global South. These studies 
begin with the standard Northern account of neoliberalism as a system of ideas and/or an 
economic development, but then shift focus on to the nuanced manifestation of neoliberalism 
within the particular territories. The work of Indian ecofeminist Vandana Shiva and Durban-
based socialist scholar-activist Patrick Bond are cases in point. Indeed, it is useful to give the 
standard account of neoliberalism, before investigating how it unfolds in a specific country. 
The reasons for such an approach include: (1) the globalized nature of the contemporary 
world; (2) the ideological power of the Northern, neoliberal development paradigm in the 
global South; (3) the coercive power of Northern, neoliberal institutions in these terrains; and 
(4) the inherently destructive impacts of neoliberal policies and foreign institutions and firms 
within the global South. The standard account thus provides the backdrop against which the 
nuanced manifestation of neoliberalism in a developing country can be identified and 
analyzed. In other words, when country-specific analyses are examined following the 
generalized account of neoliberalism, they gain perspective through it. This problematizes 
Connell and Dados’s claim that the generalized account causes scholars to “downplay … the 
agency of Southern actors,” and to ignore the fact that “[r]esistance to neoliberalism is not a 
matter of throwing out an alien intrusion, but requires deeper local social politics.”45 The 
present chapter provides an overview of the standard political-economic account of 
neoliberalism, as it is elaborated by predominantly Northern scholars. The focus falls first on 
the Washington-Wall Street alliance that coalesced around a US-instigated idea of 
development, and then shifts on to the rise of the World Bank-IMF-WTO complex and its 
disastrous impact on the global South. It is against the backdrop of all of this that the 
succeeding chapter considers the neoliberalization of South Africa. 
 
Washington-Wall Street policy alliance 
 
American ‘modernization’ ideology 
 
The universalizing, coercive bent of the American vision of development was evidenced as 
early as 1949, when Harry Truman delivered his presidential inauguration speech. As the 
German sociologist Wolfgang Sachs points out, during his inaugural address Truman 
promoted ever increasing production and technological advancement as key to the well-being 
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of all nations, regardless of their economic, political, social and cultural differences, nuances, 
and dreams. Sachs holds that this was the first time that a “world view” was prescribed in 
which “all the peoples of the earth were to move along the same track and aspire to only one 
goal – development.” 46  Such a prescription, although admittedly hubristic, was 
understandable considering the profile that the US developed especially during and after the 
Second World War as the undisputed leader of the ‘free world.’ The country had already 
attained considerable economic power after World War I, going from a predominantly 
“borrowing nation” to one of the few industrialized countries “with its manufacturing base 
intact [and hence] … with money to invest abroad.”47 Then, during World War II the US 
adopted a leadership role in matters of “planning, coordination, and supplying of the Allied 
side,”48 and it emerged from the war as the productive giant of the free world. That is, while 
in the aftermath of the war “the productive capacities of France, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Italy, and Japan [were] reduced by about 50 percent of their immediate prewar levels … the 
United States emerged … with a 72 percent increase in its Gross National Product over 
1939.”49 Further, in the interest of maintaining its ideological and economic preeminence over 
its Western European counterparts, the US implemented the Marshall Plan in 1947. Although 
the Marshall Plan was ostensibly designed to aid in the reconstruction of Western Europe in 
the aftermath of the war, critics indicate that it was motivated, at least in equal measure, by 
US self-interest. The American historian Michael Hogan, for example, argues that American 
policymakers believed that recovery of “powerful trading partners” in Europe was crucial to a 
“dynamic economy” in the US. They also were fully cognizant of the fact that Western 
European markets and natural, industrial and manpower assets were vulnerable to 
appropriation by “a hostile power or coalition,” were the United States not to capture them 
first. Thus, central to the Marshall Plan was the “need to preserve American access to 
                                                          
46
 Wolfgang Sachs, Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development (London: Zed Books, 
1999), 3. 
47
 Catherine Caufield, Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations (London: Macmillan, 
1997), 31-32. 
48
 William R. Thompson, “Global War and the Foundations of US Systemic Leadership,” in America, War and 
Power: Defining the State, 1775-2005, eds. Lawrence Sondhaus and A. James Fuller (New York: Routledge, 
2007), 160. 
49
 Terrence McDonough, “The Construction of Social Structures of Accumulation in US History,” in Social 
Structures of Accumulation: The Political Economy of Growth and Crisis, eds. David M. Kotz, Terrence 
McDonough and Michael Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 117. 
17 
 
Europe’s resources while denying them to potential rivals.”50 In related vein, an attempt was 
made to ensure US economic preeminence on a global scale through universalizing the US 
vision of development, and through advocating free trade as instrumental to its attainment. 
Over time, it became clear that trade liberalization did not in fact transform underdeveloped 
and developing countries into techno-economic Utopias
51
 like the US. However, it 
undoubtedly served US interests as governments were pressured into discarding “nationalist 
economic policies” in order to become part of the new, “worldwide capitalist economy open 
to American investment and export.”52 
Any opposition to trade liberalization and the uptake of a liberal capitalist 
development plan, however legitimate, was framed as suspiciously totalitarian by the 
American regime. In short, the US regarded adoption of liberal capitalist principles as a sign 
of democratization, while it “associated autarkic economic policies with totalitarian political 
regimes.”53 Thus, Truman’s 1949 speech justified the need to develop ‘poor’ countries on the 
grounds that they were, in their current undeveloped state, extremely vulnerable to 
communism – that “false philosophy which has made such headway throughout the world, 
misleading many peoples and adding to their sorrows and their difficulties.”54 The ideological 
impetus necessary for countries to accept the US politico-economic agenda for the world, was 
augmented by its military preeminence. It was the US that dropped the first atomic bomb, and 
subsequent to the end of the war this country actively sought to position itself as the largest 
nuclear power in the world. The American historian Shane Maddock, in his Nuclear 
Apartheid, indicates that Truman cast a blind eye to “Anglo-American wartime agreements 
and collaboration [to] … proclaim … a U.S. nuclear monopoly.” Furthermore, Truman and 
his successors attempted to retain this monopoly when the Soviet Union and Britain began 
engaging in nuclear research in the late 1940s and early 1950s. They did this by on the one 
hand initiating the development of the hydrogen bomb, and on the other hand “working to 
make the British program dependent on U.S. aid and influence.”55 
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In comparison to the large-scale liberalization and laissez-faire economics of the later 
neoliberal era, American economics of the 1950s and 1960s was still largely Keynesian in 
orientation. That is, although the US economy was organized along liberal capitalist lines, 
important emphasis nonetheless was placed on the necessity of state intervention for 
economic stability. This relative conservatism of post-war American economics is well 
articulated by the international social justice advocate Susan George, who comments that “[i]n 
1945 or 1950, if you had seriously proposed any of the ideas and policies in today’s standard 
neo-liberal toolkit you would have been laughed off the stage or sent to the insane asylum.”56 
Yet, after the economic downturn in the US in the 1970s, the deregulation of the market in 
Britain from the 1970s onward, and determined Reagan-Thatcher efforts to make their nations 
more receptive to free market thinking, the rise of this ‘mad’ neoliberal economic framework 
was well underway.
57
 Slowly but surely, state intervention in any form whatsoever became 
regarded as a major source of economic ‘stagflation’ – a situation in which economic 
stagnation is combined with escalating inflation. In the mid-1970s the US descended into its 
most significant economic slump since the Great Depression. The automobile industry was 
badly affected, corporate profits were at a standstill, and inflation was on the rise, all of which 
signaled “a dramatic decline in the international position of the U.S. economy as a whole.”58 
In 1973/1974 corporations attempted to counter the crisis in which they found themselves by 
generating the impression that existing economic problems derived from government 
overregulation alone. This allowed them to frame themselves as the panacea for ills facing the 
American people. If corporations could be freed from burdensome regulation, or so it was 
argued, the US economy would improve drastically. However, the American political scientist 
Stan Luger indicates that rather than stemming from government overregulation, the 
economic slump was actually a “sign … of the end of the American century (the period of 
unparalleled economic prosperity that followed World War II),” and that “[c]oming to grips 
with its unraveling transformed the political agenda to the advantage of corporate lobbyists.”59 
The second major slump that edged the US even closer to fully-fledged neoliberalism 
occurred in the early 1980s. By 1982, among other problems, the GNP of the United States 
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had plummeted nearly 2 percent in real terms, unemployment had risen to nearly 11 percent, 
and “the trade deficit exceeded the largest in U.S. history up until that time.”60  
Accordingly, in the early 1980s US president Ronald Reagan, as well as British prime 
minister Margaret Thatcher, joined the chorus of corporate lobbyists steadily implementing an 
unregulated free market economy. This was done with the ideological backing of increasingly 
powerful innovators in law and economics who viewed “free markets as a governance model 
and adopted economic efficiency, rather than full protection of public health and the 
environment, as a major goal.” 61  Reagan, for example, deregulated the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) as well as agencies responsible for worker security, such as the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Product Safety Council.
62
 In addition, 
the Reagan administration deregulated the US economy more generally through significant 
tax cuts and various acts, such as the Garn-St. Germain Act (1982) that drastically reduced 
regulation and so “revolutionized the banking industry;” the Bus Regulatory Reform Act 
(1982) that allowed firms to set their own bus fares, change bus routes, etcetera; and the 
Shipping Act (1984) that liberalized shipping rates, among other measures.
63
 Through such 
deregulation the US set up a fully-fledged neoliberal regime during the 1980s – “a period 
when global economic connections began to intensify in increased flows of cross-border 
foreign direct investment and world financial markets took off.”64 At the same time Thatcher 
applied herself to the reform of the British economy through, among other measures, the 
substantial deregulation of bank and building society lending, and the abolition of hire-
purchase restrictions and exchange controls. But perhaps the most important form of financial 
deregulation introduced under Thatcher was “the so-called ‘Big Bang’ liberalization of City 
                                                          
60
 John S. Odell, “Growing Trade and Growing Conflict between Latin America and the United States,” in The 
United States and Latin America in the 1980s, eds. Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico (Pittsburgh: The 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 275. 
61
 David Driesen, “Alternatives to Regulation? Market Mechanisms and the Environment,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Regulation, eds. Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 205. 
62
 Kevin Walsh, The Representation of the Past: Museums and Heritage in the Post-Modern World (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 43. 
63
 Anthony S. Campagna, The Economy in the Reagan Years: The Economic Consequences of the Reagan 
Administrations (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), 100. Notably, Campagna, a Keynesian economic historian, 
argues that the Garn-St. Germain “Act … actually exacerbated the problems that later led to massive bank 
failures.” 
64
 Nina Bandelj and Elizabeth Sowers, Economy and State: A Sociological Perspective (Cambridge: Polity, 
2010), 198. 
20 
 
financial markets in 1986 [that] removed limitations on mergers between different types of 
financial firms, lifted trade restrictions imposed by the City (such as minimum commissions) 
and established a system of self-regulation.”65  
In terms of setting a precedent for the liberalization and deregulation of the world, 
then, the United States and Britain led the way proactively. That said, neoliberal reforms had 
been adopted even earlier by other regimes such as Augusto Pinochet’s in Chile and Turgut 
Özal’s in Turkey.66 Yet, these countries were not global hegemons like Britain or the US, and 
so could not introduce any global paradigmatic shift toward neoliberalism.
67
 For the 
Zimbabwe-born British marxist Alex Callinicos, what definitively marked the beginning of 
neoliberal hegemony proper was the fall of communism.
68
 Revolts against communist 
organizations were encouraged by the US, which also pushed “successor regimes in Central 
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to undergo ‘shock therapy’ that dragged 
their economies abruptly from state controlled autarky to incorporation in a highly 
competitive world market.”69 Neoliberal hegemony was strengthened further through the debt 
crisis created by the economic slump of the 1980s, because this crisis forced numerous Third 
World governments to accept neoliberal economic policies and so abandon any notion of 
national sovereignty and protection of domestic markets.
70
 The marxist scholar David Harvey 
argues that neoliberalism in fact involves “[c]risis generation, management, and manipulation 
on the world stage,” which have “evolved into the fine art of deliberative redistribution of 
wealth from poor countries to the rich.”71 These themes are further developed in Canadian 
journalist Naomi Klein’s path-breaking work The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster 
Capitalism. 
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The Washington Consensus 
 
The standard neoliberal framework to be adopted in both ex-Communist countries and the 
Third World found its clearest articulation in a 1989 paper by the English economist John 
Williamson. In it, he coined the term ‘Washington Consensus,’ which refers to the policies 
that Washington, D.C. analysts apparently considered “widely desirable” in the development 
of Latin American countries in mid-1989.
72
 As Williamson indicates in a later reflection on 
the implementation of these policies, both “sympathetic observers [and] … critics” of the 
Consensus regarded it “as offering a policy prescription (and as having broader application 
beyond Latin America).”73 He further contends that the Consensus has indeed found global 
implementation, and in reference to this he praises the neoliberal shift in South Asia and 
China, while expressing disdain at sub-Saharan Africa’s “spott[y] and grudging” progress in 
this regard, which has often taken place “under foreign pressure rather than out of 
conviction.”74 
 The Washington Consensus reforms identified by Williamson were (1) fiscal 
discipline; (2) re-ordering public expenditure priorities; (3) tax reform; (4) liberalizing interest 
rates; (5) a competitive exchange rate; (6) trade liberalization; (7) liberalization of inward 
foreign direct investment; (8) privatization; (9) deregulation; and (10) property rights.
75
 All 
such reforms pointed to a rejection of state regulation of economic matters, and Williamson 
accordingly suggests that “[t]he Washington Consensus was a … response to a leading role of 
the state in initiating industrialization and import substitution [and the] … Consensus said that 
this era was over.”76 
However, it is very problematic to claim that all governments adopted a strictly 
‘hands-off’ approach to economic growth within the new Washington Consensus schema. 
While it may be true that neoliberal reforms in countries of the global South terminated these 
nations’ sovereignty particularly in matters of economics, the US government continued to 
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play an active and decisive role in global neoliberal reform. Further, the national interests of 
the US have actually been promoted by global institutions such as the World Bank and the 
IMF, via their implementation of Washington Consensus prescriptions. As Callinicos puts it: 
 
At a global level, the imposition of neo-liberal orthodoxy at least in part reflected a conscious strategy 
pursued by successful American administrations in order to maintain US hegemony in the post-Cold War 
era: the very name attached to these policies – the Washington Consensus – is symptomatic of the role 
played in their implementation by the institutional complex binding together the US Treasury, the IMF, 
and the World Bank.
77
 
 
Yet, the leverage of the US government in both national and global economic matters derived 
not only from its position as global hegemon, but also from its handling of the termination of 
the Bretton Woods system. In terms of the Bretton Woods Agreement, which was in operation 
from about 1946 to 1973, exchange rates of participating non-US countries were fixed against 
the US dollar, while the US in its turn exchanged dollars for gold at the set price of 
$35/ounce.
78
 This system was criticized widely by proponents of deregulation and 
liberalization, because it restricted many of the participating countries in terms of both trade 
in goods and services, and capital movement. Trade restrictions were lifted steadily, but other 
restrictions remained, which while not “mak[ing] it impossible for capital to flow between 
countries … greatly reduced the ease with which it could do so.” Hence the architecture of the 
Bretton Woods system, characterized as it was by “fixed exchange rates and imperfect capital 
mobility,”79 did not sit well with advocates of neoliberalism and particularly not with those 
who also sought to augment US hegemony. As the Scottish political theorist Peter Gowan 
explains, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in fact was welcomed by the Nixon 
administration, precisely because it wanted “to break out of a set of institutionalised 
arrangements which limited US dominance in international monetary politics in order to 
establish a new regime which would give it monocratic power over international monetary 
affairs.” The new regime would thus form “part of a strategy for restoring the dominance of 
US capitals through turning the international monetary system into a dollar-standard 
regime.”80 This involved nothing short of completely disconnecting the US dollar from the 
gold-exchange standard, so that it could become the global reserve currency. The main 
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implication of delinking the dollar from gold was that the exchange price of the US dollar 
could now be decided by the US government. Also, exchange rates between the main world 
currencies were no longer fixed, which allowed the “US government … alone among 
governments [to] move the exchange price of the dollar against other currencies by huge 
amounts without suffering the economic consequences that would face other states which 
attempted to do the same.” 81  Finally, this new regime aimed at handing the reins of 
international financial relations over to private financial institutions instead of leaving the 
Central Banks in control.
82
 It is because of this alliance between the state and private financial 
firms that Gowan alternately refers to the dollar-standard regime as the “Dollar-Wall Street 
Regime.”83 These changes allowed Wall Street to flourish, which in combination with actual 
increases in productivity and output, led to a situation where “hype and economic reality were 
hopelessly intermingled in the euphoric … belief that the ‘New Economy’ represented 
America’s liberation from the restraints of the business cycle.”84 However, the success of the 
New Economy (1992-2000) was only facilitated through formidable austerity measures 
including “a historically unprecedented repression of real wages.” And the boom was also 
only sustained beyond 1997 because of quasi-Keynesian interference on the part of the 
Federal Reserve Board, which drastically reduced interest rates and salvaged a major hedge 
fund.
85
 Such tight enmeshment of Washington and Wall Street in national and global 
economic governance is given clear description by the British development theorist Richard 
Peet: 
 
Behind the political interests represented by the Washington bureaucracies we discern a more compelling 
power – that of the giant corporations, specifically the New York investment banks. Global economic 
policy employed by an increasingly coordinated governance institution … comes from a Washington-
Wall Street Alliance. The economic world produced by global governance is that envisioned in the 
bankers’ minds – except that a poverty of vision produces a wild capitalism that moves beyond the 
control of even the most powerful of institutions.
86
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In light of this, the sympathy that the US government expressed toward corporations during 
the financial crisis of 2008 is relatively unsurprising. In short, 2008 saw “the greatest 
nationalizations [of major corporations and banks] in world history,” evidencing the 
neoliberal hypocrisy of the United States as well as the United Kingdom. As Alex Callinicos 
argues, “[n]eoliberalism proved to be for dummies – something that the states at the centre of 
the system imposed on others but didn’t practise themselves when they got into economic 
difficulties.”87 Major companies were taken over by the US and British governments, and of 
the five Wall Street investment banks, only Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley survived the 
crash. Further, to ameliorate the effects of the impending economic recession, the Obama 
administration provided a stimulus package of well over 5 percent of the 2008 US GDP, and 
bought “up nearly $1½ trillion of mortgage-backed securities in a determined effort to drive 
down mortgage rates and thereby … help reverse the continuing fall in house prices.”88 In the 
aftermath of the crisis, other governments too have had to continually rescue or write off 
failing companies. Early in 2009, for example, the German banking regulator indicated “that 
the scale of the bank write-offs would be more than €800bn, about a third of Germany’s 
annual GDP, compared to the capital and reserves of its monetary and financial institutions 
amounting to only €441.5bn.”89 
 
World Bank-IMF-WTO implementation 
 
The Bretton Woods system may have come to an end, but the two institutions that had been 
created at the same time as it proved stunningly resilient and indeed instrumental to the 
globalization of neoliberalism. These institutions are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or World Bank. In 
the run-up to the Bretton Woods conference, ideas for a new, post-war economic order were 
being formulated by Harry Dexter White of the US Treasury, and John Maynard Keynes who 
was at the time an advisor to the British Treasury. White wanted a “stabilization fund” which 
would reduce barriers to trade by synchronizing countries’ monetary policies. In addition, he 
stressed the need for a major bank, which would invest both in European countries negatively 
impacted by the war, and in countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia which did not at that 
stage meet “world market standards” – all in order to transform these countries into “healthy 
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trading partners” for the US.90 Keynes, on the other hand, envisioned the creation of an 
international currency union with its own monetary unit, which would operate as a bank for 
all countries across the globe. For Keynes, such a union could comprise a global economic 
government of sorts, but very importantly, would operate in terms of policies that neither 
permit the accumulation of power in the hands of a few at the expense of the majority, nor 
lead to the perpetration of social injustices and other harms. Thus, as the globalization theorist 
Catherine Caufield indicates, Keynes proposed that interest should be charged on overdrafts 
as well as on trade surpluses, because he believed “that imbalances in trade were the 
responsibility of both the debtor and the creditor nations.” 91  Understandably, this was 
something that the US, a major creditor at the time, could not tolerate. So while the 
establishment of the IMF and the IBRD was agreed to at the conference, Keynes’s more 
radical ideas were shunned. The creation of a third institution to manage trade relations 
between nation-states was also proposed and was supported by both Keynes and White. Yet, 
this idea only came to fruition in 1995 with the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
However, what is significant here is that while many people thought that the IMF and 
the World Bank were established on the basis of multilateral consensus, and while many still 
regard them as institutions 
 
designed to regulate international economic relations in such a way that the world would never again 
suffer the threat of total disruption … [t]he historical reality is quite different. Of all the ‘great powers’ 
the USA had been most averse to being ruled by anything resembling an independent institution … [So] 
the USA came to dominate the post-war international economic agenda … [and t]he IMF and the World 
Bank … were set up as US-dominated institutions, as collectivist fronts for US international economic 
policy – arms … of a new world order characterized by a more subtle, effective imperialism.92 
 
Caufield, in her Masters of Illusion, examines how and to what extent the IMF and the World 
Bank in particular facilitate an imperialistic form of globalization, involving the 
implementation of neoliberal policies even in ‘recipient’ nations completely averse to this 
imposed framework. She also analyzes the degree to which such imperialistic encroachment, 
rather than leading to the improvement of recipient countries, generates immense levels of 
social injustice and environmental harm. In short, as discussed in what follows, over time it 
has become clear that Keynes’s vision for the future operations of the World Bank has been 
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turned on its head. Keynes wished for the Bank to loan money “only for proper purposes and 
in proper ways, after due enquiries by experts and technicians, so that there will be safeguards 
against squandering and waste and extravagance which were not present with many of the ill-
fated loans made between the wars.”93 However, for the most part, World Bank loans have 
been motivated by dreams of empire, have wreaked social and ecological havoc because of 
careless planning and reckless implementation, and have largely benefited only the 
extravagantly rich while further impoverishing those truly in need.  
 
Mixed motives 
 
As already indicated, the creation of the IBRD/World Bank was motivated primarily by the 
need to reconstruct war-torn European countries for the sake of US trade interests. That is, it 
was reasoned that by facilitating within them sufficient production and economic growth 
through IBRD assistance, these countries should be able to engage in ‘healthy’ trade with 
America. Also in view was the possibility of developing Third World countries into similarly 
capable trading partners. Yet, after providing a mere four loans – to Denmark, Holland, 
Luxembourg, and France on condition that the latter remove all Communists from its cabinet 
– the Bank’s lending capacity was almost entirely exhausted. In response to this, and at least 
partly because the Marshall Plan “dwarfed the World Bank and made its [European] 
reconstruction role obsolete,”94 Bank president John McCloy promoted a shift in the Bank’s 
primary lending focus from Europe to Latin America, Africa and Asia. McCloy was 
succeeded by Eugene Black, under whose authority the Bank first introduced ‘program loans’ 
that were dispensed on condition that recipient countries adopt neoliberal reforms. These 
loans proved enticing because of their size and quick disbursement, and because they could be 
used for almost any purpose whatsoever, provided the recipient country implements the 
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neoliberal policies dictated by the Bank. During Black’s tenure, however, such program loans 
were made to developed countries alone, the only exception being Iran which in 1957 
received a $75 million “general development loan.”95 But although the Bank was thus not able 
to achieve truly global reach at that stage, it did manage to exercise considerable influence 
over the politico-economic and other affairs of recipient countries. Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, 
chief of the World Bank’s economic advisory staff from 1947 to 1953, indeed emphasized the 
necessity of Bank interference in these countries’ organization on the premise that a “critical 
mass of investment, national economic planning, and programming,”96 were requisites for 
economic growth and augmented trading capacity. 
Toward the end of the 1950s, however, World Bank staff began to acknowledge that 
like any business, the Bank’s expansion depended on enlarging its client base. Yet, there were 
ever fewer ‘creditworthy’ countries judged capable of repaying their loans. Developing states, 
though, scrambled to counter the Bank’s resistance against lending to uncreditworthy 
countries, not least because they could not receive much-needed loans from other private 
lending institutions. International observers placed even more pressure on the Bank to assist 
these states. It was argued that if the Bank wished to uphold its public image as a branch of 
the United Nations, it would have to aid developing countries rather than sitting back and 
watching them collapse. The Bank consequently established the International Development 
Association (IDA) in 1960, to provide financing to countries regarded as credit risks. Given 
this status of recipient countries, then, IDA loans came to differ significantly from traditional 
IBRD loans. Firstly, capital was not raised on the bond market but generated through pledges 
made by member nations on a three-yearly basis. Secondly, IDA loans involved preferential 
interest rates as well as repayment and grace periods. That is, unlike IBRD loans that 
demanded almost market-related interest rates, offered only a five-year grace period and 
required repayment within fifteen to twenty years, IDA loans carried far lower interest rates, 
and allowed a ten-year grace period and a thirty-five to forty-year repayment period.
97
 Black 
had serious reservations about this kind of lending,
98
 but his successor George Woods 
proceeded to actively encourage it. Woods argued that rather than being a stickler for 
creditworthiness, the Bank should realize its leverage in coercing these currently 
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uncreditworthy countries to adopt and consistently implement Bank-style economic policies. 
The promptings of Woods and of other proponents of IDA lending gradually led to a situation 
in which what was increasingly being “talk[ed] about with … member countries [were] 
fundamental policies to govern their day-to-day economic decisions,”99 as Woods himself 
explained. Robert McNamara succeeded Woods as World Bank president in April 1968 and 
became an even more fervent supporter of such lending. After only a few weeks in office he 
announced that the Bank would grant over $11 billion of loans in the coming five years, more 
than the total of all World Bank loans made during the first two decades of the institution’s 
existence.
100
 Through the support of Wall Street, McNamara managed to raise an enormous 
amount of capital within a matter of months. And unlike his predecessors, he was wholly 
committed to remedying the failure of the ‘trickle-down effect,’ which saw local elites rather 
than the needy majority enjoying the benefits of World Bank loans. McNamara clearly 
articulated this aim in a speech delivered in Nairobi in 1973, in which he stressed that while 
GNP has increased significantly, the poor have not really benefited and continue to suffer 
abominably while local business and governing elites enrich themselves. To this he added that 
the elimination of “absolute poverty by the end of the century” should be striven for, implying 
“the elimination of malnutrition and illiteracy, the reduction of infant mortality and the raising 
of life expectancy standards to those of the developed nations.”101 McNamara’s goals may 
have been commendable, and he may have been innovative by focusing on nutrition rather 
than per capita income as a measurement of poverty. However, he remained quite dogmatic in 
his insistence that economic growth alone could eradicate poverty, and was highly 
reductionist in his definition or measurement of poverty itself. As Wolfgang Sachs argues in 
Planet Dialectics: 
 
The trouble with such definitions is that they reduce the living reality of hundreds of millions of people to 
an animalistic description. In an attempt to find an objective and meaningful criterion, the ground was 
clear for a conception of reality that reduces the rich variety of what people might hope and struggle for to 
one bare piece of data about survival … Reducing whole ways of life to calorie levels does, to be sure, 
make the international administration of development aid a lot easier. It allows a neat classification of the 
clientele (without which worldwide strategies would be pointless) and it serves as permanent proof of a 
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state of global emergency (without which doubt may be cast on the legitimacy of some development 
agencies). 
     This readjusted idea of poverty enabled the development paradigm to be rescued at the beginning of 
the 1970s. In its official version, the fulfilment of basic needs strictly called for economic growth, or at 
least growth ‘with redistribution.’ The link to the previous decade’s dogma of growth was thus 
established.
102
 
 
Indeed, reducing all phenomena to mathematically quantifiable entities has been one of the 
hallmarks of the Bretton Woods institutions, and it involves a willful ignoring of cultural 
diversity and with it, the validity of alternative political-economic and socio-cultural 
paradigms. McNamara, by erroneously defining subsistence-oriented, frugal communities as 
‘absolutely poor,’ paved the way for the further strengthening of the World Bank’s hold on 
underdeveloped and developing countries. By beginning to focus on ‘helping’ those who were 
thus construed most needy – and who incidentally comprised the majority in economically 
impoverished yet resource-rich countries – the World Bank could continue to legitimate its 
‘development mission’ indefinitely. Further, it could “cloth[e] self-interest in generosity,”103 
because the overt benevolence of its mission masked both its cruel overlordship in recipient 
countries, and the swelling of its profits through interest payments made by indebted 
governments. As ecological feminists observe, it is through policies such as these, that the 
masculine productivist sector colonizes and exploits the reproductive sector.
104
 
 
Structural adjustment lending 
 
Toward the end of his tenure, McNamara acknowledged that his plan of aiding the ‘absolutely 
poor’ through allocating ever more and larger development loans had failed. The debt of 
Third World countries was spiraling out of control, and the act of pulling subsistence-oriented 
communities into the productive market economy rendered these people destitute. Fear of a 
balance-of-payment crisis was growing and McNamara, prompted by the World Bank’s 
Operations Division head Ernest Stern, now advanced the necessity of structural adjustment 
lending. The IMF had introduced a similar stabilization program somewhat earlier, and 
McNamara’s structural adjustment loans (SALs) would remain closely aligned with it by 
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being offered only to countries already participating in the IMF program.
105
 Through these 
loans and programs, the World Bank and the IMF in time exercised unprecedented influence 
over Third World nations. As Richard Peet indicates, the IMF had already by the mid-1970s 
adopted a “more interventionist stance” by making its loans to Third World countries 
dependent on their governments introducing austerity measures. And while such “neoliberal 
conditionality, together with other related policy moves [like] … capital account 
liberalization,” may have improved recipient countries’ short-term economic outlook, over 
time working-class and unemployed people were pushed into unprecedentedly dire situations 
owing to forced cuts in public spending, among other things.
106
 The World Bank followed suit 
later in the 1970s when, “[f]aced with a distinct rightward shift in political conditions … [it] 
became involved in structural adjustment employing neoliberal policies, increasingly in 
concert with the IMF.”107  
Structural adjustment loans might have been the conceptual offspring of Stern and 
McNamara, but no one disbursed them more readily than the latter’s successor Alden 
Clausen, who was elected by the Reagan administration,
108
 and served as World Bank 
president from 1981 to 1986. Clausen openly abandoned McNamara’s ethical vision of 
poverty eradication and instigated a shift in the Bank’s focus toward economic liberalization 
as an end-in-itself. Such economic liberalization, it was proposed, by default would solve the 
borrowing country’s problems, from “inflation, unemployment, underinvestment, poor public 
services, inefficient public bureaucracies, unsustainable debt burdens … [to] even lack of 
personal freedom.”109  Clausen also adopted an aggressive, “total-immersion” approach to 
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adjustment lending, through enforcing reforms overnight rather than allowing for their 
gradual introduction. In addition, such reforms had a massive “impact … on the citizens of … 
borrowers,”110 as they almost always demanded drastic cuts in public spending, and involved 
riding roughshod over these countries’ cultural and other differences from the industrialized 
global North. 
In their Paths to a Green World, sustainability scholar Jennifer Clapp and 
international relations theorist Peter Dauvergne provide an illuminating discussion of both 
principal SAL reforms, and the main reasons for indebted countries’ high demand for SALs in 
spite of the loss of national autonomy that they require. They argue that institutions such as 
the World Bank, and proponents of economic liberalization more generally, regard SALs as 
critical to restructuring indebted countries’ economies “to promote growth and eventually 
enable [them] … to repay their debts.” 111  Such restructuring involves, firstly, currency 
devaluation and the implementation of a floating exchange-rate system in the interest of 
boosting incomes, production, and the exports through which the country is expected to raise 
the capital required to pay off its loans. Secondly, the country is obliged to liberalize domestic 
price policies and to lift trade restrictions, in order to get the prices of products and services 
‘right.’ Correct, market-competitive pricing, it is argued, can only be realized in the absence 
of government meddling and/or trade protectionism. Thirdly, borrowing countries are actively 
encouraged to privatize state-owned firms, to cut government spending, and to promote 
foreign investment by reducing restrictions on the latter. All of these measures are supposed 
to help diminish inefficiencies that prevent a country from repaying its debts, yet encroach 
significantly on the borrowing country’s capacity for self-determination, economic or 
otherwise.
112
 In short, SALs give the World Bank license to involve itself in “almost any 
[domestic] issue with economic ramifications – from labor law to health policy to military 
spending … [so] with adjustment lending its ‘role in a country tends to become more 
politicized.’”113 
In spite of this, more and more countries have implemented structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs), including the majority of those in sub-Saharan Africa. The reason for this is 
because, although developing countries do receive development aid from large institutions 
such as the World Bank, certain UN agencies, and wealthier governments, such aid is dwarfed 
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both by their ‘official debt’ to these same institutions and governments, and by their debt to 
entities such as export credit agencies (ECAs).
114
 As Clapp and Dauvergne indicate, “[i]n 
2001 total debt service paid by developing countries was US$377.5 billion … of which 
US$261.3 billion was paid in principal repayments and US$116.2 billion was paid as interest 
payments.”115 In short, interest on these loans constitutes almost one-third of the payments. 
This indebtedness has only since increased: between 1990 and 2009, the external debt stocks 
of developing countries have more than doubled, rising from approximately $1.86 trillion to 
$4.07 trillion.
116
 
For countries caught within this debt cycle, there are few alternatives to accepting 
SALs. These loans are quick-disbursing, and unlike many other loan types they may be used 
by borrowing countries specifically to service their debt obligations. Bluntly put, SALs allow 
countries to borrow money from the World Bank to pay off loans they have already received 
from the World Bank and from other institutions and governments. This loan and debt-
payment cycle constitutes a type of “Faustian finance,”117 because while the Bank postures as 
a benign broker supposedly ameliorating countries’ indebtedness by introducing SALs, it has 
in the last two decades generated for itself a “billion dollar-plus net income” per annum 
through precisely such financing.
118
 Thus, it is in the economic interest of the World Bank 
that these countries remain indebted, which explains why World Bank staff members are 
rewarded on the basis of the sizes of the loans they initiate.
119
 And as already indicated, a 
further advantage of developing countries’ continued indebtedness is the politico-economic 
influence that the World Bank, the IMF, and the US are able to exercise over these 
countries.
120
 Such influence becomes prolonged as SAPs, despite being designed “as a one-
time adjustment” for implementation over a maximum of five years, have in several countries 
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extended over two decades.
121
 The Ghanaian political scientist Edward Osei Kwadwo 
Prempeh, deeply critical of structural adjustment lending, contends that SAPs are crucial to a 
“resurgent neoliberal globalization and empire” bent on the “incorporation and integration of 
Africa into an unjust and uneven global economic system on an unequal and subordinate 
basis.”122 
Importantly, the US is the one country that stands to benefit most from the Bank’s 
global influence. As discussed, the US is the Bank’s major shareholder, it is “the only country 
with a veto over amendments to the [Bank’s] Articles of Agreement,”123 and it is the country 
that selects the World Bank president. Further, it possesses immense leverage insofar as 
Congress can at any time diminish or even cease IDA funding, with major economic 
repercussions for the Bank. All of this explains why the US is able to use the World Bank to 
protect its own domestic markets and economic interests without being accused of doing so. 
In the mid-to-late 1980s, for instance, the Bank exhibited immense sensitivity to the economic 
needs of the US by diminishing or stopping loans for steel, copper and oil production in the 
developing world, in sympathetic response to “the United States’ concern about its worsening 
trade deficit.”124 Indeed, when its political demands are not met, the US is not averse to 
reducing its IDA contribution. As the governance scholar Ngaire Woods points out, in 1999 
Congress “passed bills reducing the U.S. contribution to IDA, citing not just … budgetary 
pressures but the World Bank’s decision to continue working on a loan to China even after the 
United States had voiced disagreement with the project.”125 In addition, the unique leverage of 
the US in World Bank affairs also affords American-owned firms numerous privileges. When 
a World Bank project gets implemented, major shareholders in the Bank – of which the US is 
the largest – expect to receive contracts for their companies. 
Other beneficiaries of World Bank-IMF power in developing countries are banks, 
lending agencies, and private firms from the developed North. While banks were encouraged 
by the IMF to lend to indebted countries in exchange for charging high fees to these countries 
for loan rescheduling,
126
 the economic and trade liberalization central to the World Bank-IMF 
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framework allowed for the rise of unaccountable export credit agencies (ECAs) and the 
swarming of foreign firms into the developing world. ECAs provide loans at high interest 
rates for projects undertaken in developing countries, and these loans are backed by the 
government of the developing country in question. This means that the country itself is 
“taking out a loan from the ECA, which then goes to the corporation providing the service … 
turning what appears to be privately held debt into public debt.”127 Unconstrained by any 
binding environmental or social regulations, these agencies frequently provide loans for high-
risk projects involving natural resource extraction.
128
 Jennifer Clapp and Peter Dauvergne add 
to this that debt to ECAs amounts to approximately 40 percent of debt owed by developing 
countries to official agencies. Thus, in addition to their negative environmental and social 
ramifications, ECAs also intensify the debt crisis in the developing world.
129
 In turn, private 
firms, thanks to the Washington-World Bank-IMF push for economic and trade liberalization, 
similarly capitalize upon the abundant natural resources and relatively cheap labor of the 
global South, particularly the compliant labor of ‘Third World women.’ In these endeavors, 
they are aided and abetted by WTO rules.
130
 To clarify, firms routinely enter developing 
countries precisely when the latter have undergone processes of liberalization, frequently 
through the imposition of SAPs. They then benefit from the operation of GATT principles 
followed by members of the WTO. Although the WTO in 1995 replaced the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, it still operates in terms of the original 
GATT principles, the most important of which is the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. 
This principle 
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requires each GATT signatory to accord to all other GATT signatories the same trading conditions as it 
accords to its ‘most favored nation.’ Signatories must also provide so-called national treatment to other 
GATT signatories. This requires them to treat ‘like products’ the same regardless of the country of origin 
or the process of production. The GATT also calls for a general reduction in the level of tariffs and an 
elimination of quantitative restrictions on trade.
131
   
 
Because these requirements involve explicit condemnation of trade sanctions, they allow 
labor exploitation and environmental destruction in developing countries to go unpunished. 
More specifically, trade liberalization allows heavily polluting industries to be established in 
poorer countries, the products of which are then exported to wealthy countries with little or no 
benefit to local populations. In turn, export-oriented production, while crucial to developing 
countries’ debt repayments, often involves “the unsustainable use of local natural resources or 
… dirty and unsafe factories (relying on cheap labor).”132 Another problem with free trade is 
that the unsustainability of current patterns of consumption goes unnoticed, because of the 
‘distancing’ of sites of production where the negative social and ecological impacts are felt, 
from sites of consumption where no trace of these impacts exists. Relatedly, product prices 
hardly ever reflect these products’ actual social, embodied, intergenerational, and ecological 
costs. Finally, to attract transnational corporations (TNCs), developing countries tend to lower 
their environmental standards or fail to enforce standards, enabling corporations to externalize 
environmental costs.
133
 In the light of all of the above, opponents of neoliberalism contend 
that structural adjustment lending, which facilitates economic and trade liberalization among 
other things, serves the interests of corporations rather than those of people in developing 
countries. Doug Hellinger, who worked as a World Bank consultant on urban development, 
accordingly argues that the Bank’s aim is not “to develop Brazil or … Ghana … [but] to 
provide the [US] government’s friends in business with cheap labor, a deregulated 
atmosphere, and export incentives,” with the consequence that “[i]t isn’t a development 
strategy, it’s a corporate strategy.”134  This corporate strategy is bolstered by yet another 
branch of the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which, unlike the 
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World Bank, can sidestep involvement with governments and lend directly to the private 
sector.
135
 
While the IMF has never pretended to be an organization primarily pursuing the 
welfare of Third World populations, and while the public image of the WTO has always been 
that of “an instrument of neoliberal discipline,”136  the World Bank has paraded itself as 
peacemaker, humanitarian agency, and custodian of highly indebted nation-states.
137
 The 
Bank may act in these capacities at times, but such posturing is eclipsed by its principal 
operation – enforcing neoliberal policies on a world scale, in partnership with Washington, 
the IMF and the WTO. In what follows, the discussion shifts to the flawed ways in which the 
World Bank carries out its business, which also call into question the beneficence of its 
mission. 
 
Flawed methodologies 
 
John Maynard Keynes had emphasized that Bank loans should be disbursed for proper 
purposes, but as indicated in the foregoing, many have actually been motivated by the Bank’s 
desire for profits and for increased neoliberal influence over the global South. He also 
emphasized that processes involved in Bank lending should be proper – which he believed 
could only be ensured “after due enquiries by experts and technicians.” 138  However, as 
numerous scholars such as the American political economist Michael Goldman have been at 
pains to point out,
139
 the Bank may make enquiries into the projects it is to fund but these 
enquiries are anything but ‘due.’ They are inherently biased, because Bank supporters are 
usually commissioned to conduct them. They are also highly problematic, because they are 
undertaken within unrealistically limited time frames. Furthermore, the official impact 
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assessment reports related to these enquiries frequently include dubious information in 
support of the loan and omit vital information standing to jeopardize the loan application. 
Catherine Caufield elaborates on the processes that must be followed before a World 
Bank loan can be issued. The project cycle starts off with project identification, based on 
resonance with “the borrower’s overall development plan,” and technical and economic 
merit.
140
 The second step is preparation of loan application documents, including a detailed 
project plan. Were logic to prevail, such preparation would be undertaken by individuals 
native to the borrowing country, because unlike foreigners they would be more intimately 
acquainted with the country’s circumstances and with the lives and needs of its inhabitants. 
However, such preparation is usually carried out by consultants from the global North, and 
the Bank often provides funding to the applicant country specifically to make recruitment of 
foreign consultants during this preparation stage affordable.
141
 Thirdly, the Bank conducts its 
own appraisal of project feasibility, and in this it should give due consideration to the social 
and ecological impacts of the project. Yet, in its appraisal the Bank habitually prioritizes the 
project’s potential for economic returns. As Caufield explains, “[u]nderlying the Bank’s 
obsession with judging projects by their economic rates of return is its desire to gauge the 
contribution of its loans to the gross national product (GNP)” and hence the supposed well-
being of the country.
142
 However, equating GNP with a country’s well-being is incredibly 
problematic, since the quantitative GNP measurement precludes any qualitative 
considerations, and since the measurement includes as positive contributions any monies 
generated through destructive events such as environmental disasters and wars. The British 
environmentalist Jonathon Porritt quite rightly argues that 
 
our single most important indicator of economic prosperity (namely GNP) obscures the reality of what is 
actually happening … [because] as we eat up our ‘natural capital’ or degrade the ecosystem’s capacity to 
renew the kind of natural services upon which we depend, we persist in counting all that destructive 
economic activity as current (benign) income … [and] we also count in many so-called ‘defensive 
expenditures,’ caused by having to deal with some of the externalities of economic growth, be they 
environmental (such as environmental protection and restoration, and damage compensation) or social 
(such as car accidents, poor health and rising crime).
143
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Marilyn Waring points out that in view of the deficiencies of gender-blind economic measures 
such as GNP, prominent ecological economists such as Herman Daly and John Cobb have 
sought alternative measures that allow “‘costs’ … [to] be registered as deficits or depletions, 
not as ‘goods’ or ‘benefits’ in production and consumption.”144 A major problem with the 
World Bank, as Daly has shown, is that many of its economists do not question the validity of 
the GNP measurement, and therefore do not seriously consider the negative social and 
ecological consequences of Bank loans. In fact, Daly was appointed as a senior economist in 
the Bank partly to convince his Ivy League-trained colleagues to take stock of the potential 
social and ecological hazards of Bank-funded projects. This came at a time when the Bank 
was obliged to promote ‘sustainable development’ through its project loans, given the 
pressure being mounted on it by social movements concerned about the worsening crises of 
justice and nature. That is, the Bank and other institutions were increasingly coming under 
fire because it was becoming evident that the neoliberal economic expansion pursued by them 
exacerbated inequality and led to environmental destruction.
145
 However, Daly’s efforts at 
raising the consciousness of Bank employees largely failed. He indicates that the Bank 
continued to prioritize economic factors above all else in the disbursing of project loans, and 
that for this reason it kept 
 
sustainable development very vague … The only part of the Bank that took up the idea that depletion of 
natural capital is a cost was the natural gas section. In the other areas, no attempt was made to apply it. 
We just never were able to get the idea of sustainable development taken seriously … [since] the Bank is 
basically a money pump. It wants to get money out the door and anything that gets in the way of that – 
like careful accounting and environmental review – is frowned upon.146  
 
In his 2004 essay “Imperial Science, Imperial Nature: Environmental Knowledge for the 
World (Bank),” Michael Goldman reveals that years down the line very little has changed. 
Now, the Bank only better conceals its endorsement of socially and ecologically destructive 
practices in the global South. Because the Bank commissions seemingly legitimate but 
incredibly constraining environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and social impact 
assessments (SIAs), it becomes extremely difficult for groups opposing Bank projects to 
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voice their dissent. Admittedly, pressure to reform has been placed on the Bank, one of the 
most notable instances being the 1990 protest against its financing of the Narmada dam 
project in India. This protest forced the Bank into appointing an Independent Review Panel to 
assess the project’s feasibility, and the Bank withdrew from the project when assessors 
revealed immense disparities between the initial, positive appraisal of the project and its 
major, negative downstream consequences.
147
 But this event has done little to truly reform the 
Bank. Instead, the Bank now simply takes more care to inoculate itself against potential 
damning criticism for its funding of socially and ecologically destructive projects. Goldman, 
for example, exposes this inoculating procedure in relation to the feasibility studies 
commissioned by the Bank for the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) hydroelectric project in Laos. To 
conduct such studies, the Bank usually appoints consultants who have frequently worked with 
the firms expected to construct the infrastructure for the project, with the consequence that 
they are likely to emphasize the project’s feasibility in their reports. This was precisely the 
approach taken by the Bank when it first commissioned feasibility studies for the NT2 
project. However, after the project was approved on the basis of feasibility studies conducted 
by an engineering company with long-term business links to a major NT2 stockholder, NGOs 
conducted their own environmental impact assessments and social impact assessments, using 
their findings to contest the project’s feasibility. The Bank then appointed another engineering 
firm to do another set of assessments, yet the validity of these was also challenged by 
international activists.
148
 Finally, the Bank decided to commission a final round of feasibility 
studies, this time breaking new ground by appointing two international NGOs to conduct the 
EIAs and SIAs. 
However, Goldman contends that although this move suggests the Bank’s 
commitment to ecological sustainability and social justice, “important institutional factors 
shape[d] the knowledge production processes” involved in these studies, notwithstanding the 
independence of the two appointed NGOs.
149
 He argues that perhaps the most important 
mechanisms of restriction placed on consultants involved in World Bank-commissioned 
studies are the ‘terms of reference’ (TORs). TORs allow the Bank to specify 
 
                                                          
147
 Michael Goldman, “Imperial Science, Imperial Nature: Environmental Knowledge for the World (Bank),” in 
Earthly Politics: Local and Global in Environmental Governance, eds. Sheila Jasanoff and Marybeth Long 
Martello (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 55-56. 
148
 Ibid., 60-61. 
149
 Ibid., 61. 
40 
 
exactly what kinds of information is needed, a time frame in which the research must be completed (and 
by implication, how long the researcher can be in the field), and by when it will be written up. Ownership 
and circulation are also important dimensions of the TOR: the direct contractor … is given exclusive 
right of ownership over the product as well as the raw data [so that l]egally, one cannot use the data for 
one’s own research, or distribute one’s findings without permission from the contractor.150 
 
Goldman’s interviews with several researchers commissioned to conduct EIAs and SIAs for 
the NT2 project, reveal that the TORs restricted researchers to such an extent that it was 
virtually impossible for them to provide accurate assessments. Firstly, owing to exacting 
stipulations concerning the types of information required, a wealth of information on the 
complexity of ecological and socio-cultural systems in the area was omitted. For instance, one 
researcher’s study of the ecologically sustainable subsistence practices of locals was omitted 
from all reports on the NT2 project, in spite of it providing “a startling image of complexity, 
reciprocity, knowledge, and interdependence.” The reason for this omission, the researcher 
explained, was that these findings did not answer the Bank-formulated research question of 
whether “this particular Mekong river ecosystem [can] hold up under the weight of a capital-
intensive aquaculture investment.”151 Secondly, the limited time frames in which the research 
had to be conducted and the findings formulated, also worked against any thematization of the 
complexity and fragility of natural systems – thematization that of course would have 
challenged the cut-and-dried economic logic which prevails in World Bank funding decisions. 
A team of ichthyologists, for example, argued that they would have needed several years to do 
justice to their task of assessing the potential impact of the NT2 project on Mekong fisheries. 
This is because the fish species would have to be studied both in relation to the annual flood-
dry cycle, and at numerous sites since the Mekong is a system of rivers rather than one body 
of water. Despite this, they were given only between three and five months to conduct these 
studies, and were thus unable to provide an accurate EIA.
152
 Speed was also of the essence in 
the project’s SIAs. The researchers were constrained by a process termed ‘rapid rural 
appraisal’ (RRA), which involves “learn[ing] about the lives of the poor using simple 
techniques such as wealth rankings, oral histories, role playing, games, small group 
discussions, and village map drawings.” Ostensibly, this procedure “permit[s] respondents … 
to provide meaningful graphic representations of their lives in a manner that can give outside 
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researchers a quick snapshot of an aspect of their living conditions.”153  In this case, the 
researchers were tasked with assessing how a proposed dam and reservoir would affect the 
Nakai Plateau people. They were hoping to be given about three days to visit every two 
villages, and approximately three days to write up a report for each village. However, they 
were allocated far less time than that. In addition, time-consuming tasks such as cooking and 
setting up camp were not included in the Bank’s calculations, with the result that the 
researchers could only ever rush into a village, introduce themselves, try quickly to learn 
about the villagers’ lives, and return by helicopter to the capital city to write up their 
reports.
154
 Admittedly, ‘participatory rural appraisal’ (PRA) is now more frequently used. It is 
regarded as “transformative,” insofar as “the goal is to facilitate a dialogue, rather than extract 
information, to help the poor learn about themselves and thereby gain new insights that can 
lead to social change (‘empowerment’).”155 However, PRAs appear to be more co-opting than 
anything else, as they seem to encourage villagers to re-envision themselves in a manner 
favorable to the project’s economic actors, rather than express themselves and how they truly 
feel about the proposed project. Further, PRAs have inherited the unrealistically limited time 
frames of RRAs. As Patricia Feeney of Oxfam points out, a “PRA is normally completed in a 
day … [or] half a day … [and] this very compressed time-scale makes the information 
gathered suspect and unreliable.”156 Another obstacle to an accurate SIA was the inability of 
World Bank staff and contractors to effectively explain to the villagers precisely what the 
NT2 megaproject would entail, and how it would affect their lives. A woman appointed to 
evaluate the efficacy of NT2 public consultations explained that “presenters … described the 
dam project in a language ‘more appropriate to [a US] Army Corps of Engineers meeting,’” 
with diagrams, schemes and power-point presentations to match. Villagers were left 
absolutely clueless, with some even believing that the contractors “had come to present them 
with a simple but appreciated gift: not Laos’s largest dam, but a village water well.”157 Yet, as 
Goldman asserts, it is in the consultants’ and researchers’ interests to accept this state of 
affairs even if they believe the assessment processes to be seriously flawed. If they decide to 
engage in any explicit criticism of the Bank, they risk the termination of their contract – an 
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ichthyologist who challenged the Bank’s push for rapid appraisals of the impacts of the NT2 
project on Mekong fisheries was fired.
158
 Aside from imposing these constraints, the Bank is 
free to include any scrap of dubious information promoting the viability of the project, and 
with impunity to omit any quantity of accurate information that threatens to undermine the 
project – since it owns and controls the circulation of the information gathered and generated 
by the consultants.
159
 
The Bank’s strict control of information flow certainly has not gone unchallenged. 
Activists and locals have attacked its information policies, as has US Congress – which led 
World Bank president Ernest Stern to modify its information policy and set up a Public 
Information Center where documents relating to project loans could be accessed. However, 
the data provided by and regulations in place at the Information Center were highly 
problematic. Much of the data could prior to publication be watered down and bowdlerized by 
the governments that had had a hand in their preparation; many documents would only be 
available for public scrutiny after the project has been approved; and any documents deemed 
important to the approval of the project could only be viewed with the endorsement “of 
individual task managers, from whose decision there is no appeal.”160 Such censorship is even 
applied within the Bank itself. The executive directors, whose task it is to approve or reject 
project loans, are in principle permitted full access to any information held by the World 
Bank, yet their access is constrained by the fact that they must know of the existence of the 
information to be able to request it. This strange bind was emphasized by Herman Daly when, 
in a farewell speech to Bank colleagues, he expressed his frustration with the existing 
situation – one in which “one part of the Bank has to hide things from other parts of the Bank, 
and especially from executive directors.”161 
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Indigenous knowledge 
 
Another problematic feature of information generation by the self-proclaimed “world’s 
knowledge Bank,”162 is that the people directly affected by Bank-endorsed projects are treated 
as objects of analysis rather than as active agents possessing valuable information concerning 
their native land, local ecosystems, and socio-cultural organization.
163
 As Catherine Caufield 
argues, when indigenes are treated as mere objects of analysis, World Bank experts in 
Washington are better able to “translat[e] complex and messy real-life problems into 
numerical terms … [to] be broken down and analyzed,” and on that basis to “formulate 
solutions to problems in countries they hardly kn[o]w.”164  Goldman confirms the Bank’s 
aversion to considering indigenous knowledge and values, when he argues: 
 
While most people affected by the Bank projects are accounted for through processes of census, 
classification, and project incorporation, they become legible and accountable only within the context of a 
specific capital investment and culture of development capital; hence, qualities that have little to do with 
commercial markets are ignored or defined as destructive to the unquestioned goals of (trans)national 
economic growth and sustainable development.
165
 
 
Such an approach rejects the possibility that indigenous knowledge may well be of 
inestimable value to World Bank funding decisions precisely because it is “more suited to the 
cultural and to the peculiar patterns of each nation.”166 Through the use of ‘objectivist’ social 
scientific methodologies the Bank denies local people a voice. The Bank makes it impossible 
for them to challenge the proposed projects, which they would likely do because locals gauge 
feasibility in reference to various non-economic factors such as quality of life, educational 
opportunities, cultural integrity, social cohesion, and concern about subsistence livelihoods. 
The act of reducing living, knowledgeable human beings to digits on a page, or at best to so-
called “development ‘beneficiaries,’” is for Goldman what allowed “the remote environments 
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and societies of Laos … [to be] judged in terms of their value to the proposed capital 
investment, and not the reverse.”167 
Failures resulting from the rejection of indigenous agency and knowledge are 
plentiful. A 2008 study has shown that traditional African smallholder family farming has 
suffered tremendously through being marginalized by Bank-style development and the related 
implementation of neoliberal policies. Many previously prosperous families have been 
rendered destitute due to so-called development, which has also diminished family cohesion 
and undermined cultural integrity.
168
 The resettlement programs frequently tied to projects 
backed by the World Bank similarly destroy traditional, sustainable ways of life. Caufield 
sums up what resettlement actually means in her discussion of the displacement of villagers to 
make way for a new dam and reservoir in Thailand. The reservoir spelled ecological disaster, 
submerging approximately three hundred square kilometers of teak forest and riverine land. 
The consequences for the area’s human inhabitants proved equally catastrophic. No less than 
twenty thousand villagers were 
 
[w]ith little warning … ripped from the villages in which they had lived and farmed for generations; 
given meager amounts of cash as compensation for the loss of their homes and crops; moved to poorly 
prepared sites lacking schools, drinking water, and sanitation facilities; assigned small plots of land of 
dubious fertility; and forgotten.
169
   
 
In view of this and other such cases, it becomes understandable why the anthropologist 
Thayer Scudder argues that “[f]orced resettlement is about the worst thing you can do to a 
people, next to killing them.”170 Despite this, indigenous voices are for the most part muted 
by the Bank and its neoliberal affiliates. Indigenous knowledge is only valued if it bolsters 
the one solution to all possible problems always proffered by the Bank, namely, 
development.
171
 Consequently, most of the Bank’s consultations with indigenous 
populations that stand to be affected by proposed projects remain nothing other than empty 
rituals.
172
 Indeed, as Wolfgang Sachs argues, whenever a new problem – either caused or 
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aggravated by development – has been identified by the World Bank, another development 
strategy has been devised to remedy it. Accordingly, the concept of development has been 
“repeatedly stretched until it included both the strategy that inflicted the injury and the 
strategy designed for therapy.”173 
 
Containing the Third World 
 
The World Bank-IMF-WTO complex undoubtedly has had a profound impact on the global 
South. Although fierce disputes have raged over whether this impact has been predominantly 
positive or negative, from the foregoing it is difficult to deny that the neoliberal type of 
development advocated by this complex has wreaked social and ecological havoc. Under the 
auspices of neoliberal reform, monies have been squandered without benefit to the global 
majority of poor – women in particular; natural resources previously held in common have 
been annexed and exploited especially by extractivist firms; and the Washington-Wall Street 
and World Bank-IMF-WTO institutional complexes, their business affiliates and local elites 
have been made extravagantly rich in the process. Of all the destructive processes entailed in 
such development, perhaps the most damaging has been the push for developing countries to 
pursue ever increasing levels of production-for-export to pay off foreign debt. This type of 
economic activity tends to deplete the environment and criminally exploit the local workforce. 
Yet, countries in the global South hardly seem to have any alternative, given the tyranny of 
the WTO. According to the Filipino sociologist Walden Bello, the Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), which forms part of the GATT-WTO Accord, 
undermines product innovation, and limits profits particularly in high-tech goods 
manufacture, in the developing world. This is because the TRIPS regime offers patent 
protection of a minimum of twenty years and increases the duration of such protection for 
computer chips and semi-conductors. It then allows for the policing of borders for products 
that appear to be in violation of intellectual property rights, “plac[ing] the burden of proof” on 
the so-called violators of these patents.
174
 Accordingly, although South Korea is regarded as 
an “electronics-led developmental state,”175 because of the TRIPS regime Koreans have to 
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pay “exorbitant multiple royalty payments to what has been called the American ‘high tech 
mafia’ [which] keeps [their] … profit margins very low while reducing incentives for local 
innovation.”176 Over and above this economic exploitation and this damper on innovation, 
such electronics manufacture “has brought devastating impacts to the health, well-being, and 
in some cases, the lives of young women and (im)migrant laborers,” and the electronics 
“industry’s ecological footprint has been considerable, with groundwater pollution and 
resource depletion an important part of its widespread legacy.”177 Notably, the TRIPS regime 
is also misused by firms from the global North as it condones their acts of biopiracy, or, “the 
patenting of indigenous knowledge.”178 That is, TRIPS permits Northern firms to hold patent 
rights over life forms or biological resources on the basis of the fact that they have isolated 
parts of these in their development of certain synthesized products such as pesticides. For 
example, as Vandana Shiva explains, W. R. Grace holds “patents for making neem pesticides 
and fungicides” from the Indian Neem Tree (Azadirachta indica), and this gives the firm “the 
right to prevent farmers from saving seed, [and] small manufacturing units from making 
products based on biodiversity using processes which have been pirated from indigenous 
cultures.”179 
The ability of developing countries to export significant quantities of agricultural 
produce to raise money is also jeopardized. Farmers in developing countries are unable to 
compete with those from the global North when it comes to agricultural exports, because 
although “[t]he Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAOA) instituted important 
commitments to reduce agricultural protection in the area of export competition,” 180 
developed countries have found ways to flout these commitments. Bello explains that OECD 
countries have found various means by which to actually “rais[e] the total amount of 
agricultural subsidies … since the Agreement came into force: from $182 billion in 1995 to 
an astounding $280 billion in 1997.” In contrast to this, “farmers in many developing 
countries have had little financial support from their governments … [and] developing 
countries have been penalized by policies that have brought about the ‘negative subsidization’ 
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of their agricultural sector.” Yet, these very same countries are through the WTO bound by 
“clear commitments to give greater market access to Northern farming interests, whose 
runaway subsidization continues to push them to create mountains of commodities seeking 
export outlets.” 181  Bello admits that some agricultural actors in the global South have 
benefited from the AOA, but these are organized lobbies of cash-crop exporters and 
processors. Small-scale farmers are marginalized, and many are driven into destitution 
because of their inability to compete with large-scale agribusiness. The privatization of land 
only adds to the woes of rural farmers; families drift to cities in search of work; rural women 
with children often face a choice between prostitution or destitution. 
Given the stranglehold of the WTO on developing countries, particularly in respect of 
technological innovation and agriculture, it is understandable why many resort to natural 
resource extraction to raise their GNP.
182
 In fact, many developing countries with SAPs in 
place are obliged to exploit their natural resources.
183
 In addition, the World Bank quite 
unashamedly advocates natural resource extraction as key to reviving an economy, even 
following civil war. In a World Bank policy research report on post-civil war development 
strategies, researchers advance that while “a long-term strategy for diversification is desirable 
for peace building … [t]he economy will need the foreign exchange … [and] by far the easiest 
exports to encourage are likely to be those obtained by natural resource extraction.”184 This 
strategy may make economic sense, but it is ecologically as well as socially ruinous. Forced 
resettlements strip people of the environments upon which they, and the generations before 
them, had made their livelihoods and it wreaks havoc on their intricate customary beliefs and 
practices. These multifaceted impacts of resource-extractive industries were powerfully 
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thematized in the South Moluccan government’s statement at a UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Peoples held in 1997. In its statement, the government not only lamented the soil 
and water pollution resulting from mining operations in the Moluccas, but also stressed the 
“social impact of natural resource extraction.” The 1967 Indonesian Mining Act sanctioned 
government appropriation of resource-rich lands, yet such unilateral appropriation “conflicts 
with the customs of the Moluccan people [and t]he forced resettlement which takes place as a 
result … disrupts the indigenous people’s system of traditional law, called adat.”185 The 
German legal anthropologist Franz von Benda-Beckmann has shown that attempts at 
commercializing even Moluccan sago production were undermined by the complexity of adat 
law. This is because adat property rights, as they are employed by the local communities, 
involve “an exceedingly complex system in which different property rights are connected to a 
variety of social units (individuals and groups) with respect to a differentiated set of small 
property units, which inhibits the isolation of differentiated property relations between a small 
number of producers and large amounts of productive resources.”186 In view of this complex 
framework, then, the economic reductionism at work in the appropriation of entire stretches of 
land by a single government solely for economic purposes and on the basis of a certain natural 
resource contained in or upon these lands, is nonsensical to traditional Moluccans. They have 
become painfully aware of the extent to which their complex practices and property rights are 
being undermined by the monopolistic, neoliberal trajectory of contemporary Indonesia. Also, 
they have had to contend with the fact that they now depend for their livelihoods on spice 
production. But even this livelihood is rendered precarious by price fluctuations on the global 
market and the spice monopoly held by those close to the former Indonesian president 
Suharto.
187
 
Examples such as these invalidate the claim that the world’s poor ultimately benefit 
from the neoliberal policies implemented by the World Bank-IMF-WTO complex.
188
 Decades 
ago, World Bank president Robert McNamara acknowledged the failure of the ‘trickle-down’ 
theory, and contemporary analyses continue to corroborate his sentiment. The Washington-
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based Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) engaged in a comparative study of 
the period of economic globalization (1980-2000), and the preceding period dominated by 
Keynesian policies of demand management (1960-1980). Findings indicated alarming 
declines, during the 1980-2000 period, in among other things per capita GDP growth, life 
expectancy (except in the wealthiest countries), education, literacy, and progress in infant 
mortality reduction.
189
 Furthermore, contemporary World Bank researchers themselves have 
admitted to the widening gap between the world’s richest and poorest individuals.190  A 
similarly widening gap is evidenced within countries, indicating that certain individuals and 
groups benefit from the economic liberalization of a country while the majority does not. 
Richard Peet, in reference to numerous studies demonstrating that “booms in foreign 
investment … [and] policies to attract foreign business do more harm than good,” accordingly 
argues that the advantages of foreign direct investment and other liberalizing reforms “accrue 
disproportionately to the foreign investor and the local elite, but not the mass of people in the 
country invested in.”191 The divide between the elite and the poor within cities themselves 
received similar emphasis in a 2010 United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-
HABITAT) study. The study focused on income and consumption inequalities in 109 cities in 
Africa, Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) for the period 1993-2008. In terms of income-based Gini coefficients, of the ten most 
unequal cities in the developing world nine were located in South Africa. On a scale of 0.2 to 
0.8, the most unequal cities were Johannesburg (0.75); East London (0.75); Bloemfontein 
(0.74); East Rand (0.74); Pietermaritzburg (0.73); Pretoria (0.72); Port Elizabeth (0.72); 
Durban (0.72); and Cape Town (0.67). These were followed by Goiana in Brazil, with a 
coefficient of 0.65.
192
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Global wealth: global inequalities 
 
These figures demonstrate the extent to which the global South has embraced the neoliberal 
paradigm and implemented neoliberal policies, particularly the “regional hegemon” of South 
Africa.
193
 The result is unprecedented wealth accrual among local elites and devastating 
impoverishment of the majority. Yet, ruling elites are not mere puppets of Washington-Wall 
Street, the World Bank-IMF-WTO complex, or TNCs more generally. Rather, they form part 
of what American sociologist William Robinson refers to as the new “transnational capitalist 
class,” which is “embedded in … global circuits of accumulation rather than national circuits” 
and “represents the hegemonic fraction of capital on a world scale.”194 They directly benefit 
from the workings of the above mentioned neoliberal complexes and so spur them on, even 
though neoliberal reforms lead to the dehumanization of their countrymen and women, and to 
the destruction of local environments. Against the backdrop of the foregoing general account 
of neoliberalism, the next chapter looks more closely at the political and economic nuances of 
the neoliberalization of South Africa. The post-1994 transformation of South Africa may have 
been guided by neoliberal institutions and policies, yet hinged on various twists and turns of 
history, acts of hypocrisy, and not least the agency of governing elites themselves. 
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Chapter 2: The South African Context 
 
It is tempting to regard socio-economic inequality in contemporary South Africa as the legacy 
of apartheid, the government-sanctioned process of racial discrimination and 
disenfranchisement operational in the country from about 1948 to 1990.
195
 The inequality that 
continues to be experienced by the majority of South Africans, can with relative ease be 
attributed to their historical deprivation of education, occupation, property rights, and life 
chances under the strictures of apartheid. However, such attribution carries the implication 
that inequality can be remedied through a reverse dynamic of deregulation and an ‘opening 
up’ to the world via globalization. While the globalization of social relations may constitute a 
worthwhile goal, this is not the type of globalization that is usually implicit in this neoliberal 
assumption. Rather, what neoliberals are talking about is the globalization of capital, centered 
on policy deregulation and an opening up of peoples not to one another but to the free 
market.
196
 
South Africa has pursued globalization in the neoliberal mold, yet it has led only to 
deteriorating living standards among the poor majority. Durban-based civil society activist 
and academic Patrick Bond argues “that worsening poverty for the masses is an intrinsic 
feature of globalisation, much as it was a corollary of apartheid in South Africa.”197 Critical 
education scholar Haroon Kharem similarly contends that globalization is Eurocentric 
imperialism re-baptized.
198
 In his turn, the globalization specialist Jan Nederveen Pieterse 
claims that globalization “is another round of domination,” and that “[w]hat is common to 
both imperialism and contemporary globalization is the sense of powerlessness and frustration 
on the part of the global majority; only now the dynamics of deprivation are different.”199 
Nederveen Pieterse in fact considers the idea of “contemporary globalization … [as] 
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imperialism, recolonization or dependency by another name” to be “almost a collective cliché 
in the global South.”200 
Given this long-standing equation of neoliberal globalization with imperial 
domination among Southern intelligentsia, it is alarming that shortly after the termination of 
apartheid, South African struggle leaders endorsed free market values so vociferously in 
public. At the July 1998 Mercosur meetings of South American nations, Nelson Mandela 
claimed that “[g]lobalization is a phenomenon that we cannot deny. All we can do is accept 
it.”201 Around the same time, Mandela and then deputy president Thabo Mbeki rebuked a 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) executive committee and a large SA 
Communist Party (SACP) congress for their criticisms of neoliberalism.
202
 Somewhat 
bafflingly, Mbeki shortly thereafter changed tack completely. At a Durban meeting of the 
Non-Aligned Movement he suggested that the market cannibalizes its “offspring,” namely 
developing nations, and so “we are showered with accolades for cooperating in the effort to 
fatten ourselves for the kill.”203 Correlatively, he thematized the loss of national sovereignty 
through neoliberal globalization during a May 2000 address at Georgetown University.
204
 
Still, Mbeki avoided associating growing inequality and liberalizing ‘development,’ 205 
thoroughly confusing many on the South African radical left. Further, he unreservedly 
applauded a new Port Elizabeth-based factory manufacturing catalytic converters for export, 
                                                          
200
 Ibid., 34. 
201
 Nelson Mandela, cited in Patrick Bond, “Global Financial Crisis: Why We Should Care, What We Should 
Do,” Indicator SA 15/3 (1998). 
202
 Patrick Bond, Against Global Apartheid: South Africa Meets the World Bank, IMF and International 
Finance, 2d ed. (London: Zed Books, 2003), 119. 
203
 Thabo Mbeki, “Statement at the XII Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Governments of the Non-Aligned 
Movement,” Durban, September 3, 1998. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has “attempted to create an 
independent path in world politics that would not result in Member States becoming pawns in the struggles 
between the major powers … [and d]uring the years the focus of the Non-Aligned Summits … shifted away 
from essentially political … issues, to the advocacy of solutions to global economic and other problems.” Non-
Aligned Movement, “The Non-Aligned Movement: Description and History,” The Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), September 21, 2001. Available at: http://www.nam.gov.za/background/history.htm. Date accessed: 
October 6, 2014. 
204
 Thabo Mbeki, cited in Uma Shankar Jha, South Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement: Agenda for the 
Twenty-First Century (Delhi: Association of Indian Africanist, 2001), 180. 
205
 Bond, Against Global Apartheid, 120-121; and William Mervin Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the 
Soul of the ANC, rev. ed. (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2007), 139. 
53 
 
even though profits would leave the country and viable local employment was not 
guaranteed.
206
 
The contradictory attitudes of these South African leaders raise the question of 
whether they accepted neoliberalism willingly or under duress. There may have been some 
coercion involved, and this is certainly the perspective that the ruling party promotes when it 
blames current government failures on either apartheid or the unstoppable advance of 
neoliberal globalization that all simply have to accept.
207
 It makes little sense that a newly 
liberated people would willingly shoulder the yoke of yet another form of economic 
domination. Yet several anti-apartheid leaders preached socialism while actively encouraging 
the neoliberalization of South Africa to their personal political and economic benefit. Quite 
likely, both coercion and acceptance were at work, and it is this ambivalent both/and 
understanding that underpins the subsequent analyses. 
 
From colonialism to apartheid 
 
The economic logic of racial domination  
 
Centuries before the 1876-1912 ‘Scramble for Africa’ when the continent was divided among 
Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Italy and Spain,
208
 South Africa had already become 
subject to European colonial domination.
209
 Its allure derived from its strategic position for 
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trade and shipping, lack of tropical diseases, and abundance of arable land and other natural 
resources.
210
 The Dutch East India Company (VOC) occupied the Cape of Good Hope in 
1652, making it the only “European presence in the southern African coastal region” other 
than the Portuguese in Mozambique.
211
 The Dutch reached agreements with indigenous 
groups, gaining possession of the Cape of Good Hope itself. However, the Dutch hold on the 
Cape Colony was constantly challenged by Great Britain, who occupied the Cape on two 
occasions and to whom the Cape eventually was ceded by the Dutch in 1814.
212
 Feelings of 
animosity ran deep, because this ceding was perceived as involving nothing short of “the 
imposition of British [rule] over some 16,000 Dutch colonial settlers, [and] the San and 
Khoikhon (sic) peoples.”213 The disgruntled Dutch, German and French settlers responded by 
trekking inland during the period 1836-1852, where they successfully established the 
Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State.
214
 
The settlers did so with little indigenous retaliation, because native inhabitants had 
been weakened by the mfecane, or the ‘great crushing’ or ‘scattering.’ The Zulu king Shaka 
had already pushed many communities out of their lands in order to consolidate the Zulu 
state. These people then came into conflict with other communities whose lands they had been 
obliged to invade. In short, the mfecane precipitated forced migration and led to community 
fragmentation and rivalries among indigenous populations. Such precariousness enabled 
“white traders, trekkers and missionaries, as well as runaway slaves and servants, [to] move 
… easily into the masterless realm beyond the Orange [River].”215  Novel alliances were 
formed subsequently that crossed racial lines. For instance, through the mfecane the Mfengu 
people had been driven down toward the Cape Colony, and there they allied with colonial 
authorities and settlers in the Frontier Wars from 1846 onward. These wars were fought 
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against the Xhosa over “limited water and land resources,”216 in particular grazing for cattle 
during periods of drought.
217
 The Xhosa offered formidable resistance and their aggression 
and recalcitrance, although largely legitimate, “contributed to a radicalization of the settlers” 
who, to try to subdue the Xhosa, engaged in punishing actions such as “scorched-earth 
tactics.”218 This paved the way for later segregationist strategies implemented by Europeans to 
control indigenous South African groupings. 
Conflicts continued to rage even among the whites. In the late nineteenth century 
Great Britain tried to force the two Boer nations, the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free 
State, into a union with limited powers of self-governance. This precipitated two Boer Wars 
(1880-1881, 1899-1902). The first war broke out after Britain annexed the Transvaal and 
refused to withdraw,
219
 and it ended in British defeat at the battle of Majuba. Peace terms 
restored Transvaal independence but Britain maintained suzerainty.
220
 The second Boer War 
broke out after Orange Free State president Marthinus Steyn finally concurred with the 
Transvaal’s Paul Kruger that war with belligerent Great Britain was inevitable. An ultimatum 
was submitted, accusing Britain “of breaking the London Convention of 1884 by interfering 
in the internal affairs of the Transvaal.”221 A history of meddling led to this accusation. In 
1843 Britain seized Natal, a Boer republic established with considerable difficulty during the 
Great Trek after terrible fights with the native Zulu.
222
 And while Britain officially recognized 
the independence of the other two Boer republics – the Transvaal in 1852 and the Orange Free 
State in 1854 – its officials reconsidered the wisdom of their largesse at the time of the gold 
rush toward the Witwatersrand in the Transvaal. This rethink was instigated particularly by 
the Transvaal Boers’ continued discrimination against the new fortune-seeking British 
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immigrants to their republic, whom they called ‘uitlanders.’223 Ultimately, the accusation 
contained in the ultimatum submitted to Britain was fairly legitimate. Even so, the ultimatum 
went unheeded and the war commenced.
224
 This extremely costly conflict lasted around three 
years and each side suffered over twenty thousand casualties. While this was largely a conflict 
among colonists and settlers, approximately twelve thousand indigenous Africans also 
perished as a result. A peace treaty signed at Vereeniging in 1902 saw the two Boer republics 
lose their independence and become absorbed into the British Empire. The Boers and their 
allies received amnesty, war reparations and a tentative promise of self-governance in the 
future. Very importantly, Britain indicated that it would expect the Boers merely to 
contemplate granting franchise to indigenes, and only once they had attained such self-
governance.
225
 
Eight years later, South Africa became a Union through the amalgamation of the Cape 
Colony, Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In so doing, it also became a member 
of the British Empire. Despite South Africa’s affiliation to the Crown, British authorities and 
the first cabinet of the Union did little to address racial discrimination, even though the first 
prime minister, Louis Botha, was in favor of “racial conciliation.”226 Racial tensions ran high 
and generated conflicts such as the 1922 Rand Revolt. At least in part, this rebellion was 
motivated by the conviction among white mine workers that ‘their’ skilled and semi-skilled 
jobs were threatened by black staff, who had temporarily occupied these positions during the 
First World War when the white men were serving.
227
 White communities of the time also 
feared “a Black Peril,” an imagined catastrophic uprising of the black majority. As a 
consequence of this imagined danger, they felt very uneasy about the “quickening pace of 
black urbanisation and … a radicalisation of black politics on the Witwatersrand” subsequent 
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to World War I.
228
 Despite white miners’ efforts, there was a marked shift against white labor 
after the Rand Revolt. That is, although in 1926 the government legislated that skilled mining 
jobs remain reserved for whites, it did not retaliate against “the expulsion of whites from a 
range of semi-skilled occupations.”229 
Over time, anti-British Afrikaners resistant to the Union and the economic 
empowerment of blacks cultivated a strong Afrikaner nationalist movement emphasizing 
white rule and Afrikaner ascendancy. Increasing numbers of Afrikaners rose in support of 
these ideals, paving the way for the Afrikaner National Party’s 1948 electoral win “under the 
mandate of apartheid.”230 Formal apartheid, usually regarded as the final form of draconian 
domination exercised in South Africa, thus began in 1948 and was maintained even after 
South Africa broke from Britain and became a Republic in 1961. This is ironic, because the 
Afrikaans- and English-speaking South Africans rejected membership of the British 
Commonwealth in the spirit of post-war decolonization efforts, but did not permit 
decolonization of the local black population. The English-speakers, although previously 
critical of Boer racism, had come to “accept … Afrikaner attitudes on politics and race”231 
and stood to benefit from this. 
Formal apartheid involved the “institutionalisation of categorisations emanating from 
colonial anthropology.”232 Its premise was that the races are not equal, and so each should be 
‘allowed’ to develop separately at cultural, linguistic, political and other levels. The 
Population Registration Act of 1950 saw to the classification of every South African as white, 
black, Indian or Coloured. Assessment of ethnicity was extremely arbitrary and to a large 
extent based on the subjective opinion of the assessor. Ethnicity was gauged mainly from 
appearance,
233
 causing such confusion that siblings were placed in different racial categories 
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simply because one had a darker or lighter complexion than the other.
234
 Being placed in any 
of the racial categories carried enormous negative or positive implications in matters of 
residence (the 1950 Group Areas Act); freedom of movement (the pass laws); education (the 
1953 Bantu Education Act); work (labor control legislation); social interaction (the 1953 
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act); and marriage (the 1949 Mixed Marriages Act). The 
crowning legislation was the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, which was tied 
to “Grand apartheid [–] … a macro policy … which sought to create independent ‘tribal 
homelands’ (Bantustans) … [spanning] 14% of the surface area of the country.” It was 
envisioned that these areas would be “the official country of residence of all blacks, leaving 
South Africa with a majority white ‘democracy.’”235 
The bantustans were not only a political expedience. They were also central to the 
apartheid regime’s economic strategy. To clarify, the homelands ostensibly were created to 
allow black populations to develop independently and in their own time, in order for them 
ultimately to ‘qualify’ for independent status. However, the homeland system precipitated 
these people’s destitution. The bantustans contained only 8 to 17 percent of arable land, 
undermining any possibility of agricultural success or even long-term subsistence.
236
  
Consequently, the majority of the income generated ‘in’ the bantustans actually 
consisted of the wages black migrant workers earned in the ‘white’ South Africa. Swedish 
sociologist Bertil Egerö estimates that in 1991, migrant laborers spent much of their wages 
themselves, but even the one-third that did eventually “reach the Bantustan households … 
[wa]s still close to five times the agricultural earnings.”237 At that stage, the economic logic 
behind establishing and maintaining the bantustans was impeccable. Those classed as so-
called ‘productive natives’ resided in white South Africa, gratefully earning a pittance, while 
those seen as ‘unproductive natives’ – women, children, and the elderly, decrepit, and 
unemployed – remained in, or were sent to, the homelands.238 As South African sociologist 
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and anti-apartheid activist Harold Wolpe explains, maintaining the bantustans created a 
migrant labor system that over-exploited fit indigenes while quarantining those considered 
undesirable or unproductive. This ensured capital accumulation but without leading to a 
buildup of black populations in the parts of South Africa reserved for whites. The capitalist 
enterprise may have been introduced in South Africa well before apartheid by British 
colonists, but it flourished in this unprecedentedly segregationist setting.
239
 The South African 
intellectual and activist Neville Alexander suggests that ever since the discovery of gold and 
diamonds in the late nineteenth century, the profit motive, rather than racial bias, has been the 
more powerful driver of socio-economic organization in South Africa. He thinks it a mistake 
to assume “that racial ideology was one of the main motive forces for capital accumulation in 
South Africa.” Rather, particularly subsequent to “the 1870s and 1880s, capitalism was put on 
the agenda very clearly in South Africa [and] those pre-existing social relations were 
transformed in order to maximise capital accumulation and profit.”240 Yet, Alex Callinicos, in 
his turn, is of the opinion that racial exploitation in the interest of capital accumulation was 
visible even earlier in the nineteenth century, especially in Cape and Natal export-oriented 
agricultural concerns.
241
 Thus, apartheid legislators found powerful allies in financial 
institutions as well as in the Afrikaner farming community, which for several generations 
already had reaped the economic fruits of exploiting black workers. Only now, the apartheid 
government literally gave these farmers license to continue doing so, and indeed, sanctioned 
an intensified labor repression.
242
 Industrial capitalists were not in explicit support of the 
government’s racist policies, but the mining magnates nonetheless assisted the regime in the 
wake of the Sharpeville massacre.
243
 This event spurred massive capital flight from South 
Africa, but the mining company Anglo American and one of its subsidiaries responded by 
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raising and organizing American loans for the state.
244
 A powerful American businessman 
also worked to draw investors back into the country.
245
 
That said, in keeping with the mercenary character of capitalism, over the next twenty 
years industrialists and businessmen cottoned on to the fact that racist policies were hindering 
profitable accumulation in the long term. Black unions were gaining power and strikes were 
becoming more frequent. Moreover, and not least important, apartheid prevented black South 
Africans from coming into their own – as consumers. 
 
Black ‘empowerment’ 
 
Semi-legal African trade unions flourished from the mid-1970s onward, significantly 
strengthening the black working class. Workers realized their leverage in disputes with 
employers, and they also grew confident at the sight of capitalist reluctance to continue down 
the apartheid path. As indicated, entrepreneurs were concerned about the economic impact of 
strikes, and were keen to expand their consumer base. In addition, the dearth of white workers 
for whom skilled and semi-skilled occupations were officially reserved, enticed companies to 
“break the colour bar.” Black workers were placed in these positions, swelling the number 
and salaries of gainfully employed ‘natives.’246 The black population also was politicized 
further by the rivalries that erupted between the parties that made up the liberation movement. 
From the perspective of Jeremy Cronin of the South African Communist Party (SACP), such 
politicization, together with the empowerment of black workers, was crucial to bringing about 
the 1976 Soweto uprising. The subsequent political ascendance of the African National 
Congress (ANC), backed by the SACP, instigated even more cohesive political activism, such 
as the township revolts of 1976-1977.
247
 
Alex Callinicos indicates that following the Soweto uprising, “both Afrikaner and 
English-speaking capital swung behind the notion of a black middle class that would act as a 
buffer between the white minority and the African masses.”248 In an effort to create such a 
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socio-economic stratum quickly, the Urban Foundation (UF) was established and tasked with 
addressing the housing issues faced by black people in urban areas. Also, from 1978 black 
individuals were permitted ninety-nine-year leaseholds in urban areas, and some time later the 
government started hinting at the possibility of black companies operating in white areas 
rather than only in the homelands and townships.
249
 Coming into ever clearer focus were the 
profits to be made from a largely untapped black consumer base, in terms of the sale of 
foodstuffs and other essentials, fashion, large appliances, and automobiles. The electrification 
of Soweto, facilitated by government funding and private loans, stood to contribute to this 
vision.
250
 
This effort on the part of businessmen to liberate – or rather liberalize – the black 
population rapidly certainly was not an isolated item. Pressured through increasingly militant 
protests and the rise of a skilled and semi-skilled black labor force, the government also 
started making concessions. South African president P. W. Botha sought to take capitalism in 
a neoliberal direction, and thus encouraged large-scale privatization and deregulation.
251
 
Botha also legalized trade unions in 1979, and consented to the establishment of 
parliamentary chambers for Coloured and Asian minorities in 1983. Understandably, 
concessions such as these were not made “to abolish white domination,” but rather “to create 
and to incorporate a privileged layer of black intermediaries.”252 Even so, they elevated the 
black majority’s hope of liberation and political activism increased exponentially, as 
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evidenced by the massive union-led ‘stay-aways’ of 1984-1986.253 The concessions, on the 
other hand, proved deeply unsettling to white farmers, petty bourgeoisie and even the working 
class. They were becoming aware that their days of privilege were coming to an end.
254
 
Even during the 1986 state-of-emergency involving unprecedented efforts at 
repression,
255
 the Botha regime continued to make concessions. It abolished the pass laws,
256
 
and the ‘colour bar’ was removed from mining, opening skilled positions to black workers.257 
It was becoming apparent that a negotiated settlement was inevitable. Hope for the imminent 
liberation of the black majority was boosted by the 1988 Angolan military failure of the South 
African Defence Force (SADF), as well as by Namibian independence in 1990.
258
 The impact 
of economic sanctions and capital flight on South Africa’s debt burden also sped up 
concessions. F. W. de Klerk, who succeeded Botha as president in September 1989, allowed 
the ANC-aligned Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) to hold demonstrations. He instructed 
the release of all those incarcerated following the 1964 Rivonia treason trial, excepting 
Nelson Mandela. In 1990 he unbanned the ANC, the SACP and the Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC), and a few days later freed Mandela himself. The main apartheid legislation was 
repealed in 1991, and in 1993 the date for the first non-racial democratic election was set.
259
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Importantly though, the de Klerk regime could control the democratic transition by 
making concessions such as the above.
260
 Jeremy Cronin believes that the apartheid 
government and the liberation movement were in a state of reciprocal siege. The government 
had the comparatively stronger military and legislative power to continue repressing the black 
population, but the apartheid regime was suffering under the constant pressure of “mass 
action and mass struggle” combined with “international isolation.” 261  By introducing 
concessions the regime could ‘soften’ the liberation movement, so that the negotiated 
settlement ultimately would entail not ‘socialist revolution’ but ‘national liberation.’ This 
would not scupper the program of the ANC, which was essentially a populist-nationalist 
party, but it would constitute a serious blow to the ‘workerist’ vision of its ally, the SACP. 
From its inception in 1955, the primary goal of the ANC was establishing “‘a democratic 
majority’ rather than a ‘racial majority’ within the government of the country.” 262 
Commendable as such non-racialism is, little was said about the need to undermine capitalist 
domination to remedy social injustices primarily experienced by black people. For instance, a 
socialist interpretation of one of the ANC’s founding documents, the Freedom Charter (1955), 
was quickly rejected by Nelson Mandela. He argued in 1956 that, 
 
[w]hilst the Charter proclaims democratic changes of a far-reaching nature it is by no means a blueprint 
for a socialist state but is a programme for the unification of various classes and groupings amongst 
people on a democratic basis … The breaking up and democratisation of … monopolies will open fresh 
fields for the development of a prosperous non-European bourgeois class.
263
 
 
This bias against socialism and attendant nationalization gathered strength in the four 
succeeding decades. First ANC leaders Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo opposed explicit 
ANC support of the Communist Party’s “general ‘stay-away’ strike in protest … against the 
impending Suppression of Communism Act.”264  Later, in the 1980s, the ANC made its 
business-friendly leanings patent in meetings between party leaders and white corporates, 
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such as when Oliver Tambo convened with Anglo American chairman Gavin Relly in 
1985.
265
 
In contrast, for the SACP it was crucial to effect a socialist revolution by unraveling 
capitalism. Cronin maintains that the foundation myth of the SACP was twofold: “that the 
western working class was on the brink of making the socialist revolution,” and that this 
“prediction seemed to be nearly fulfilled also in South Africa, in the 1922 Rand Revolt.” 
Admittedly, as indicated earlier, this revolt was partly underpinned by racial, as opposed to 
strictly economic, tensions. Still, the white mine workers’ militant struggle against mining 
magnates was unprecedented, and became a touchstone for the SACP. As early as 1924, 
however, the SACP began to realize “that the spearhead of the socialist revolution in South 
Africa wasn’t the white working class.” It therefore stopped looking westward for inspiration, 
and instead established “the connection between national liberation and socialist revolution,” 
so developing what “remains the strategic perspective of the SACP today.”266 For the SACP, 
then, national liberation is a stepping-stone rather than an end-in-itself; the ultimate goal is 
socialism. As trade union leader and anti-apartheid activist Moses Mayekiso explained in a 
1990 interview: 
 
[T]he achievement of national liberation will strengthen the workers’ resolve to get to socialism … [and 
so] the mass struggles have to be conducted … But you must conscientise people, people must know that 
it’s not an end in itself, it’s just one of the steps that we have to pass through. You still have to fight for 
the goal [of socialist revolution], and use what you get today to get to the end of the tunnel.
267
 
 
The SACP enjoyed immense popular support during apartheid precisely because the ruling 
National Party (NP) so demonized communism.
268
 But as Mayekiso indicates, in the 1990s 
the SACP moved to prioritize national liberation, stepping down its more radical demands. 
This was done to prevent a possible break-up of the national liberation alliance between the 
ANC, the SACP, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) founded in 
1985.
269
 This coalition stood “to improve the fortunes of the progressive forces in negotiations 
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with the government and the NP and as a unified force to contest the 1994 general 
elections.”270 COSATU had adopted the ANC’s Freedom Charter in 1987, but as a union 
worker movement it also had strong ties with the SACP.
271
 The shared workerist orientation 
of COSATU and the SACP appeared to inspire formidable anti-capitalist action. There was a 
three-day strike in 1988 against the Anglo American-endorsed Labour Relations Amendment 
Bill that sought to curb strikes and make unions accountable for strike damages,
272
 and a two-
day strike in 1991 against the imposition of a Value Added Tax (VAT) system on essential 
foods and services, and healthcare.
273
 Even so, the strikes aimed to address the problems of 
capitalism rather than dismantle the system itself. Callinicos contends that particularly since 
the early 1990s, “[a]n intellectual consensus … emerged on the South African left … that 
socialism is not on the agenda in South Africa.”274 Instead, the goal became ‘normalization.’ 
The South African historian Colin Bundy argues that this expression was “short-hand” for the 
contention “that South Africa’s not a normal capitalist society because we’ve got apartheid 
and if we can do away with apartheid, then we become normal … like any other capitalist 
society with a bourgeois political framework.”275 Thus, and despite earlier promises of a non-
racial just society, the tripartite alliance sought only to introduce “a more humane and more 
efficient version of South African capitalism.”276 Any concessions to workers would take 
place within the capitalist framework. The 1994 electoral victory of the alliance therefore 
facilitated not liberation but the unfettered neoliberalization of South Africa, to the detriment 
of the majority. Neville Alexander was correct to warn that undoing apartheid would not 
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dissolve “racial inequalities,” since apartheid legislation is simply “the scaffolding” and that 
“the house of racial inequality stands firmly, solidly, on capitalist foundations.”277 
The democratic transition involved the stealthy subsumption of the hoped-for practice 
of ‘democratic socialism’ under ‘social democracy,’ which quite easily could operate under 
the aegis of capitalism.
278
 Even during the transition years of 1990-1994, the business-friendly 
leanings of the ANC became apparent, and socialists realized that its dominance in the 
tripartite alliance made the continuation and indeed intensification of capitalism very likely. 
South African public intellectual Mark Swilling in 1990 advanced that “there are three elites 
in the game – the ANC elite, the old state elite, and the business elite – and those three can do 
business with one another. But they need a strong ANC.”279 The ANC elite, more than the 
leaders of COSATU or the SACP, would be likely to accept the argument that South Africa, 
in the immediate post-apartheid context, would have to deregulate and seek the assistance of 
the IMF and the World Bank to stay afloat.
280
 The bent of the ANC elite – the Big Men – was 
as instrumental in the neoliberalization of South Africa as was the structural situation in 
which the country found itself. Patrick Bond confirms that “the new government’s deviation 
from the liberation movement mandate” could sometimes be attributed “directly to political 
and economic pressures,” and “sometimes to the whims of individuals.”281 
 
The ANC aligns with oppressors 
 
Apartheid regime collusion 
 
As Bond explains in Against Global Apartheid, South Africa is no stranger to economic 
turbulence. Its many financial crises have derived from, inter alia, the rise of finance and 
over-speculation (1865); the Standard Bank-instigated halt of diamond share speculation 
(1881); economic ramifications of the ‘Scramble for Africa’ and a credit crash (1889); 
speculative turbulence accompanying deep-level gold mining and the effect of the 1907 US 
financial crash on diamond exports; chaos in the banking system (1920s); farmers’ 
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indebtedness and traders’ and spectulators’ “disproportionate influence on prices and 
prospects” (1923-1924); and international financial collapse (1930s).282 These crises occurred 
due to the volatility of the capitalist system, but this fact did not lead to any genuine 
questioning of its South African applicability. Rather, particularly because of the influence of 
local mining magnates and foreign investors, South Africa became increasingly enmeshed in 
and dependent on the global capitalist economy after the Second World War. South African 
capitalism entered the “monopoly phase” with the 1950s expansion of mining concerns into 
industry, and the establishment of money markets serviced by financial institutions set up by 
the mining houses. The merging of “bank capital and productive capital,” signaled the rising 
“of the phase of finance capital.”283 These processes necessitated financial regulatory changes, 
giving banks and building societies freer rein. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) was 
boosted as “liquid capital [flowed] out of production and into the money and capital 
markets.” 284  In the 1970s, the skyrocketing price of gold instigated not only “the 
internationalisation of the mining finance houses,” but also enormous “parastatal expansion 
(iron and steel, electricity, oil-from-coal, transport); outward-oriented investments;” and 
improvement of existing national transport and housing infrastructure, which helped “extend 
… urban sprawl.”285 But gold was not enough to finance such expansion and upgrading. The 
government engaged in heavy borrowing, through international capital markets, large banks, 
and other private-sector financiers. The IMF and World Bank were also significant players in 
financing and shaping South African economic policy. The 1976 Soweto uprising did not 
deter the IMF from making loans available to Pretoria. It stopped lending to the apartheid 
regime only when US Congress prohibited any further dealings with this ‘rogue’ state in 
1983. Still, the IMF maintained ties with apartheid-era South Africa, annually sending 
advisors to the country who encouraged “the apartheid government’s shift in the late 1980s 
towards neo-liberal economic strategies.”286 This is what led to the push for privatization and 
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a more concerted export orientation, spikes in real interest rates, as well as the “regressive” 
Value Added Tax (VAT) system against which COSATU and the SACP protested in 1991.
287
 
The IMF also launched an assault on South African workers in 1992, by advocating the 
curbing of real wage growth.
288
 
The involvement of the IMF in South Africa was significant, but the World Bank 
played an even more influential role in the country over the decades. It contributed to the 
infrastructural expansion undertaken by the apartheid regime, without expecting the regime to 
address racial inequality. South Africa was a model borrower, as it repaid a $50 million Bank 
loan received in 1951 by the end of 1953. The Bank followed this up with loans totaling $162 
million, and as Bond points out in Elite Transition, “even in the wake of the 1960 Sharpeville 
massacre … granted [additional] loans worth $45 million.” This, even though notable persons 
such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and ANC president Albert Luthuli “called for financial 
sanctions against Pretoria.”289 The Bank stopped lending to the regime only because the South 
African per capita GDP had risen to a level disqualifying it from further World Bank 
financing.
290
 Even so, the Bank continued assisting South Africa by stealth. It financed a 
massive water project in the Kingdom of Lesotho, a landlocked country situated within South 
Africa itself. The latter stood surety for the $110 million loan for the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project (LHWP). The LHWP was ecologically destructive and socially unjust. It 
entailed damming rivers and excavating mountains in Lesotho, to provide water for wealthy 
white residents in Johannesburg, South Africa. The Bank increased its loan amount to $8 
billion, placing an enormous burden on the small kingdom. Its population also suffered 
abominably. Tens of thousands of people were displaced with the inevitable loss of 
livelihoods, community cohesion and customs, and increase of sexually communicable 
diseases, alcoholism and crime. Arable land was flooded, and even after the 1994 democratic 
transition in South Africa, the population of Lesotho, living in extreme poverty, still had no 
access to this water.
291
 To return to the World Bank’s apartheid-era involvement though: 
while the Bank was obliged to sever formal ties with the de Klerk government, it continued to 
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influence South African policymaking and practice. That it did so with the intention of 
guiding the economic side of the South African transition is testified in Bank president 
Geoffrey Lamb’s pre-1994 interaction with Thabo Mbeki of the ANC. Lamb, a former 
socialist, was infamous for “making neoliberal African economic policies appear to be 
‘homegrown,’” and he and Mbeki appointed “specialist teams to analyse conditions and 
generate policy options in macroeconomics, industry, health, education, housing and land 
reform” for the new South Africa.292 
Throughout its decades of oppression, the apartheid regime also enjoyed US 
government support. Good relations were maintained during the Nixon presidency on the 
premise that this would ensure stability in the country, prevent the spread of communism, 
safeguard US investments, and secure “trade, access to raw materials, [and] South Africa’s 
strategic location.” 293  Later, Ronald Reagan continued to lend support to South African 
president P. W. Botha even in the wake of the latter’s ominous ‘Rubicon speech.’ In this 1985 
address, Botha rejected the “one man, one vote” democratic principle, which he believed 
would “lead white South Africans and other minority groups on a road to abdication and 
suicide.” 294  The US administration regarded Botha and his affiliates as “moderate 
modernizers … opposed by extremists in both the white and black populations who, if 
successful, would bring about a communist South Africa.”295 However, Americans intensely 
opposed Reagan-style ‘constructive engagement’ with the apartheid regime, and in 1986 the 
US Congress passed a Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Bill, overriding Reagan’s veto 
thereof.
296
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By the end of the 1980s, South Africa was feeling the pinch of economic and trade 
sanctions even though it had paid off its debt to the IMF by 1987.
297
 The government 
negotiated a debt standstill with Northern creditors for the period 1985-1987.
298
 Capital flight, 
pressure from business, the loss of IMF, World Bank and Washington support and the threat 
of mass action, pushed the de Klerk regime into freeing leading anti-apartheid activists, 
introducing democratic reforms, and entering into a negotiated settlement. It is ironic that the 
increasing integration of South Africa into the world economy, though helping it to become 
the most successful sub-Saharan capitalist state, also was key to the undoing of the apartheid 
regime, since it made the country vulnerable to economic penalization. Dismantling the 
apartheid system did not, however, imply improved conditions for the economically needy 
majority. Indeed, during the transition years running up to the 1994 elections, and beyond 
this, renewed involvement of the Bretton Woods institutions, Washington, and other capitalist 
enterprises ensured that capital growth would once again be boosted in South Africa, but at 
the cost of aggravating social inequalities and environmental harm, and benefiting only 
corporations and local and foreign financial elites. 
 
Naïve liberator or streetwise neoliberal? 
 
The ANC-led government readily embraced the IMF, the World Bank, and the Washington-
Wall Street alliance, despite their long and morally reprehensible relations with the apartheid 
regime. A May 2000 National Reparations Conference, led by Archbishop Njongonkulu 
Ndungane, resolved unequivocally that the IMF and World Bank should pay reparations to 
black South Africans, given their earlier unflinching support of Pretoria.
299
 Even prior to this, 
leftist movements such as the Workers’ List Party, and large coalitions like Jubilee 2000 
South Africa, had begun to criticize the new government’s willingness to repay the apartheid 
regime’s debt totaling around $70 billion.300 However, as the economist Stephania Bonilla 
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explains, the Mandela administration “actively dissociated itself from the calls of NGOs and 
civil activist groups … to repudiate the [apartheid-era] debt … on moral grounds.”301 Citing 
fear of disinvestment, the ANC-led government instead appointed Reserve Bank negotiators 
and a foreign debt review team simply to reschedule this debt. Such rescheduling involved 
immediate down payment of $500 million, and a clear commitment to settle almost all the rest 
of the debt within less than a decade. The debt servicing costs alone amounted to an 
astounding $2 billion each year.
302
 
Admittedly, the ANC had not inherited an economic utopia. There was the debt 
burden of the apartheid regime’s unrestrained infrastructural expansion and revamping. In 
addition, South Africa was staring down the barrel of three major crises relating to 
manufacture and exports. Firstly, the country had been suffering from an over-accumulation 
of capital,
303
 involving a chronic overproduction of luxury goods since the 1970s. In the 
1950s and 1960s, manufacturers basing their operations in South Africa enjoyed protection 
from foreign competition, which resulted in many flooding into the country to produce top-of-
the range luxury goods for the well-to-do South African whites. However, by 1967 this 
market had become saturated, and the commodity glut was felt most acutely in the motor 
vehicle industry.
304
 Market saturation also led to reluctance to invest in the productive 
economy, resulting in corporate savings being rerouted into “high finance” such as money 
markets and JSE shares, where a higher rate of return could be expected.
305
 The second crisis 
was situated on the opposite end of the continuum. South Africa was not producing enough 
basic-needs goods, and a relentless push to mechanize industry stood to undermine both 
future capital accumulation and employment opportunities. Directing capital into 
manufacturing automation and construction did little to remedy uneven and unsustainable 
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development.
306
 It did nothing to address the shortage of basic-needs goods. And while it 
reduced the staffing costs of industries, automation also eroded profits. Surplus value can be 
extracted from workers but not from machines, because workers’ wages can steadily be 
lowered, forcing them to labor for longer hours to earn the amount required to make ends 
meet.
307
 Moreover, workers are consumers of the products they produce, and of the products 
of other industries. Thus, laying them off also has a knock-on effect on sales. In South Africa, 
even big companies like Anglo American failed to make this connection.
308
 Thirdly, heavy 
reliance on the ‘minerals-energy complex,’ particularly coal production, for export earnings 
constituted yet another problem for South Africa. The prices of primary commodities 
fluctuate radically on the world market. Moreover, the water and energy demands of resource 
extraction and processing are high. For example, as Bond and his colleagues disclosed in a 
2002 essay, while the complex on average contributes about one-quarter of the annual GDP, it 
utilizes nearly half the electricity produced in the country.
309
 Extractive industries depend on 
extreme exploitation of the workforce, and constant downward pressure on workers’ rights 
inevitably leads to work stoppages and financial losses. In short, the minerals-energy complex 
has proven economically vulnerable as well as environmentally destructive and socially 
unjust. But macroeconomic emphasis on export-oriented growth, instantiated by the apartheid 
regime and accepted as the modus operandus by the new South African government, only led 
to further rewarding and aggrandizing of these unsustainable and exploitative extractive 
concerns.
310
 
In short, in the aftermath of apartheid, the ANC-led government found South Africa in 
an economically precarious situation – one so dire that it jeopardized the life chances of the 
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previously disadvantaged black majority for the foreseeable future. Still, no assault was 
launched against neoliberalism and its vehicle of global free markets. Leaders tended to 
accept neoliberal globalization as fait accompli and as something for which there was “no 
alternative.”311 This apathetic attitude, argues Bond, manifested in Nelson Mandela’s show of 
impotence in the face of the devastation of the South African rand at the hands of “financial 
speculators and their local allies.”312  Further, although the new government initially was 
reluctant to accept World Bank loans,
313
 it relented in 1997 in a bid to increase the global 
competitiveness of small- and medium-scale enterprises.
314
 Leftist movements criticized this 
capitulation, well aware of the Bank’s tyrannical track record in the global South. Some ANC 
members who had lived in countries annihilated by World Bank policies, also opposed the 
loan. But the ANC received generous applause from high-profile business leaders and civil 
servants of the apartheid days, known for their feverish promulgation of “free-market 
conventional wisdom from Washington DC as the gospel.”315 All the while money had in any 
case been flowing from the World Bank to South Africa via the Bank’s private-sector 
subsidiary, the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
316
 Even so, the initial coyness of the 
ANC-led government over receiving World Bank loans was not matched by any reluctance to 
accept World Bank policy advice.
317
 Policy-wise, the Bank’s most significant contribution 
was to the ‘Growth, Employment and Redistribution’ (GEAR) strategy.318  GEAR proved 
something of a misnomer, because it resulted in inconsistent economic growth, spikes in 
unemployment, and further inequality. The IMF also remained active in post-apartheid South 
Africa, and the ANC was surprisingly keen on maintaining economic ties with this institution 
as well. In 1993, the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) comprising ANC and National 
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Party leaders, signed a $850 million IMF loan for ‘drought relief’ – a sham as the drought had 
ended over two years earlier.
319
 A 1994 leak revealed that the loan conditions included formal 
obligations to cut state spending, to lower import tariffs, and to reduce wages across the 
board. In addition, a more informal expectation was raised that finance minister Derek Keys 
and Reserve Bank governor Chris Stals be reappointed even though they had been “the two 
main stalwarts of National Party neo-liberalism.”320 These stipulations smacked of IMF-style 
structural adjustment, clearly indicating the neoliberal trajectory of the ‘new South Africa.’ 
 
From RDP to GEAR 
 
The above generated a situation of grave contradiction, because of the incompatibility 
between neoliberal prescriptions and the 1994 election promises, made by the tripartite 
alliance, of employment, poverty alleviation and equitable redistribution. In an unsuccessful 
effort to address this contradiction, the ‘Reconstruction and Development Programme’ (RDP) 
was formulated. This was a contorted policy document suggesting the impossible – that 
neoliberalism and social justice could be pursued jointly. In March of 1994 the ANC adopted 
the RDP as the party’s “most substantive set of campaign promises,” for want of any other 
policy documentation with which to run for election.
321
 Nelson Mandela cited it as “the 
cornerstone, the foundation, upon which the Government of National Unity is going to be 
based,”322 but soon after the election denied that the document prescribes nationalization, 
which it clearly did.
323
 Patrick Bond, who played a role in formulating the RDP document, in 
fact characterizes it as something “beset by enough fragmented voices, multiple identities and 
competing discourses to leave even postmodern analysts confounded.”324 In this respect, he 
contests claims that the RDP document is fundamentally “people centered” and anti-
                                                          
319
 Stefan Andreasson, “The Resilience of Comprador Capitalism: ‘New’ Economic Groups in Southern Africa,” 
in Big Business and Economic Development: Conglomerates and Economic Groups in Developing Countries 
and Transition Economies under Globalisation, eds. Alex E. Fernández Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom (New 
York: Routledge, 2007), 279. 
320
 Bond, Against Global Apartheid, 68, 143-144. 
321
 Bond, Elite Transition, 89. 
322
 Nelson Mandela, cited in Patrick Bond, George Dor and Greg Ruiters, “Transformation in Infrastructure 
Policy from Apartheid to Democracy: Mandates for Change, Continuities in Ideology, Frictions in Delivery,” in 
Infrastructure Mandate for Change 1994-1999, ed. Meshack Khosa (Pretoria: HSRC Press, 2000), 25. 
323
 African National Congress, The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Policy Framework 
(Johannesburg: Umanyano Publications, 1994), 4.2.5.1. 
324
 Bond, Elite Transition, 90. 
75 
 
monetarist,
325
 or that it very clearly can be distinguished from the succeeding GEAR strategy 
which is supposedly “far more neo-liberal.”326 Bond insists that the RDP, on the one hand, 
had strong ‘right-ward’ neoliberal leanings. Among other things, it accepted the independence 
of the Reserve Bank which thus remained “insulated from democratic policy inputs.” It 
argued for the curbing of state spending. It permitted a monetarist stance, and in no way 
opposed the apartheid-era debt burden. And neoliberals welcomed its industrial policy, which 
was littered “with visions of post-Fordist competitiveness.”327 However, other parts of the 
document were far more ‘centrist’ and interventionist. A case in point was the suggestion that 
government must step in to stabilize matters in event of market failure. Such action would 
help safeguard against further entrenchment of racial capitalism, militate against corporations’ 
short-term view, and “facilitate access to basic goods and services, to environmental and 
consumer protection, or to industrial and technological development.”328 Finally, the RDP 
document also included a good dose of ‘leftist’ arguments, cautioning against World Bank 
and IMF interference. It was stated that Southern African countries 
 
were pressured into implementing programmes with adverse effects on employment and standards of 
living … The RDP must use foreign debt financing only for those elements of the programme that can 
potentially increase our capacity for earning foreign exchange. Relationships with international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund must be conducted in such a 
way as to protect the integrity of domestic policy formulation and promote the interests of the South 
African population and the economy. Above all, we must pursue policies that enhance national self-
sufficiency and enable us to reduce dependence on international financial institutions.
329
  
 
Unusually, for a capitalist patriarchal context, awareness of the problem of gender 
discrimination was also indicated, as were needs such as the following: engendering an active, 
critical citizenry; preventing over-speculation and related currency devaluation; routing local 
capital into productive activities benefiting communities; and offering communal housing that 
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is affordable, for which purpose a Housing Bank should be established.
330
 In the end, though, 
when this extremely ambivalent document was ‘translated’ into the new government’s first 
white paper under the supervision of Development Bank neoliberals, all of its progressive, 
socialist-oriented and gender sensitive aspects were dumped.
331
 Leftists subsequently began to 
suggest that RDP actually stands for ‘Rumors, Dreams and Promises.’ Bond contends that 
already in 1994 the integrity of the RDP Office itself was compromised, when the World 
Bank was invited to advise on formulation of urban and rural strategies.
332
 In 1996, the RDP 
Ministry in the Office of the President was closed. The idea obviously had reached its sell-by 
date. Even so, the ANC was never shy to evoke the socialist aspects of the RDP come election 
time – ideologically potent promises never to be fulfilled.333  
However, the neoliberal bent of the ANC-led government was confirmed 
unequivocally in June 1996, with the ‘Growth, Employment and Redistribution’ (GEAR) 
policy statement.
334
 GEAR policies conformed to Washington/IMF/World Bank thinking, and 
over time led South Africa to adopt precisely the type of reforms peddled by the IMF and 
promoted in terms of the Washington Consensus.
335
 Indeed, the only ‘non-neoliberal’ 
individual involved in formulating the GEAR policy, also confirmed its “[c]lose affinity with 
the Washington Consensus … [in terms of] substantive policy recommendations … [and] the 
process through which it was formulated and presented to the public.”336 The 1994 IMF 
Declaration on Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth, otherwise known as the ‘11 
commandments,’ advocated myriad neoliberal reforms which over time saw implementation 
in South Africa. These included “mutually reinforcing … sound monetary, fiscal and 
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structural policies … trade liberalization … increased freedom of capital movements … 
strengthened fiscal discipline … [and] bold structural reform, including labor and product 
market reform.”337 These commandments closely mirror the reforms promoted within the 
Washington Consensus, which is unsurprising as their common goal is neoliberal 
globalization. Recall that the Washington Consensus reforms comprise: (1) fiscal discipline; 
(2) re-ordering public expenditure priorities; (3) tax reform; (4) liberalizing interest rates; (5) 
a competitive exchange rate; (6) trade liberalization; (7) liberalization of inward foreign direct 
investment; (8) privatization; (9) deregulation; and (10) property rights.
338
 Through GEAR, 
the new South African government committed to, and proceeded to implement, all of these 
reforms to the benefit of TNCs and elites and at the expense of local peoples and 
environments. In fact, GEAR completely stood at odds with the socially progressive aspects 
of the original RDP booklet. ANC leader Thabo Mbeki’s denial of this fact at the 1998 SACP 
Congress was most disingenuous.
339
 
 
South Africa’s ‘Consensus’ reforms 
 
There are ten domain features of the Washington Consensus as adopted in South Africa. 
Firstly, in terms of fiscal discipline, the South African government drastically curbed 
public expenditure. For example, the Education Department implemented a ‘rationalization 
strategy’ leading to the virtual decimation of permanent teaching staff, who were replaced by 
inexperienced temporary appointees. While from 1975 to 1996 provincial teaching staff 
numbers grew at 4.9 percent per annum, this rate declined by 1.3 percent in the period 1996-
2000. Also, ‘redeployment’ was pursued to facilitate racial integration among teaching staff. 
Many experienced white teachers were unwilling to move to schools in admittedly dangerous 
low-income areas, and opted for early retirement. On the other hand, talented black teachers 
constantly agitated for transfer to safer, better equipped and organized schools in affluent 
suburbs. As a result, even in contemporary South Africa, “schools in disadvantaged areas 
[tend to] remain populated by black learners and black teachers, the vast majority of whom 
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were trained under a teacher-training college system notorious for poor quality.”340 These 
teacher-training colleges have also suffered under the rationalization strategy, either being 
closed for good, or amalgamating with universities that charge fees unaffordable to many 
aspiring teachers.
341
 Finally, even universities have been adversely affected through cuts in 
government funding, forcing them to merge departments, retrench staff, increase student fees, 
and eradicate entities that are not proving to be ‘cost-effective.’342 In light of this state of 
affairs, which sees “Africa’s intellectual life … destroyed or enslaved,” Italian marxist 
feminist Silvia Federici urges university educators to disclose and criticize the fiscal 
strangulation of education that is part of “the World Bank’s and the IMF’s plan for African 
education and Africa’s future in general.”343 
Secondly, in relation to re-ordering public expenditure priorities, the government 
favors economic entities over social concerns. As Patrick Bond reveals in Elite Transition, in 
the period 1995-2002, state capital expenditure on “economic infrastructure (roads, bridges, 
dams, electricity and water supply) and economic services” such as business enterprises, 
increased from 61.3 percent to 67.6 percent (about $16 billion). On the other hand, for the 
same period expenditure on social infrastructure in what materialist ecofeminists identify as 
the reproductive sector – education, healthcare and administrative services – decreased from 
38.7 percent to 33.4 percent (about $8 billion).
344
 It is no exaggeration to suppose that to a 
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capitalist patriarchal government the economic is twice as important as the social. The 
consequences of neglecting education and healthcare speak for themselves, but the 
repercussions of underfunding administrative services are equally dire. The South African 
elderly may qualify for a social grant, but cannot obtain the South African identity document 
(ID) needed to access it, because of ineptitude or backlogs at the Department of Home 
Affairs. Youth need IDs to do banking, apply for jobs, study and vote, and they face similar 
difficulties in acquiring these documents. Some are driven to such desperation that they 
commit suicide.
345
 Social problems have not provoked the government to reconsider its 
prioritization of expenditure. On the contrary, the South African cabinet, for instance, has 
continued to “ma[k]e far more funding available for the purchase of high-tech weaponry than 
for job creation.”346 
Thirdly, in respect of tax reform, the new government continued with the 10 percent 
Value Added Tax (VAT) system implemented in 1991 by the apartheid regime. As part of a 
1993 credit agreement with the IMF to counterbalance poor mining export performance and 
an increase in grain imports, the Transitional Executive Council in fact committed to raising 
the VAT rate to 14 percent.
347
 Yet, in what appeared to be a progressive move, finance 
minister Trevor Manuel introduced considerable tax cuts. However, the poor did not gain 
anything from this, only “the … privileged middle class, black and white.” This is because 
only those earning R40 000 and above actually benefited from personal income tax cuts, 
leaving the unemployed and those earning less than this amount out in the cold.
348
 The extent 
of this failure to assist the poor can only be fully appreciated when one remembers that over a 
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quarter of the South African population remains unemployed,
349
 and that South Africans earn 
such low wages “that only every third employee is registered as an income taxpayer.”350  
Fourthly, the government liberalized interest rates, and this led to substantial rate 
hikes. In inflation-adjusted terms, the real prime rate rose from 6 percent in 1994 to 15 
percent in 1998, and it spiked again in the period 2000-2002.
351
 Admittedly, in the succeeding 
years the real prime rate gradually was reduced to 5 percent. This was done to encourage 
more borrowing and so spur household spending, and to instigate corporate investment in 
productive enterprises. Only in 2014 has the interest rate been raised again on two occasions, 
and more hikes are on the horizon. South African Reserve Bank governor Gill Marcus cites 
currency devaluation and the need to keep inflation under control as some of the factors 
motivating the decision to raise the repo rate.
352
 Still, South Africans’ current debt-to-income 
ratio, indicating the percentage of total monthly earnings used to service debt, stands at over 
75 percent.
353
 A low interest rate may have encouraged reckless borrowing, but raising the 
interest rate is pushing indebted individuals to the limit, not least because the rate hikes have 
been accompanied by radical increases in electricity tariffs and fuel prices.
354
 
Fifthly, the pursuit of a competitive exchange rate has been one of the most 
devastating reforms implemented by the government. In 1995, the then Reserve Bank 
governor Chris Stals announced the abolition of the financial rand or ‘finrand,’ which had 
been used alongside the commercial rand to attract foreign investment while discouraging 
capital flight. The value of the finrand was 10 to 20 percent higher than the value of the 
commercial rand, and was used only in investment transactions by foreigners. The implication 
of this was that foreigners could invest in South Africa and receive between 10 to 20 percent 
more for their dollar than they would have had they been obliged to work with the 
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commercial rand. Were they to disinvest, though, they would get less dollars back than if they 
were exchanging commercial rands for dollars. If capital flight was imminent, such as after 
the assassination of struggle icon Chris Hani, the value of the finrand would spike in order to 
deter disinvestment.
355
 Neoliberals praised the abolition of the finrand, since they believed it 
had unnecessarily protected the financial system. They anticipated renewed investment 
interest, but many foreigners actually were keen to disinvest the moment the single floating 
exchange rate came into operation.
356
 Certainly, in the immediate wake of finrand abolition, 
foreigners’ investment in government bonds doubled. But when early in 1996 it was rumored 
that Mandela was ill, this “hot money” rapidly flooded out of the country and the rand 
plummeted. In its economically weakened state, the South African government succumbed to 
the pressure of international financial institutions promoting abandonment of the RDP in 
favor of the GEAR policy. GEAR was adopted by June 1996, and “introduced a ‘homegrown’ 
structural adjustment programme for South Africa.” However, its uptake prevented neither the 
further raiding on the rand in March 1998, nor the perpetual downward spiral of the currency 
in the decades following.
357
 The weak rand drove up interest rates to 21.8 percent, and had a 
negative impact on the JSE and Reserve Bank foreign reserves. Consumers also suffered, 
particularly as 2000/2001 saw the doubling of prices of certain goods such as imported 
maize.
358
 Destruction of the rand was facilitated by liberalizing the South African economy 
and market under instigation of US and British neoliberalizers, the IMF and the World Bank. 
Despite this, the neoliberal GEAR policy continued to be regarded as a cure for all South 
African ills. This is unsurprising, though, if one recalls that at the launch of the GEAR policy, 
then deputy president Thabo Mbeki indicated his own liberalizing bent by declaring: “Just call 
me a Thatcherite.”359 
Sixthly, trade liberalization further weakened the country. Rather than reversing the 
unsustainable export orientation of the apartheid regime, the new Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) pushed even harder for export-led growth. Numerous preferential and free 
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trade agreements were signed with the US and the EU among others,
360
 instigating Spatial 
Development Initiatives (SDIs) aimed at linking productive sites in Southern Africa to further 
enhance exports.
361
 The outcomes of these initiatives, however, have been problematic. For 
example, an SDI linking the greater Johannesburg region (Gauteng) to the main port of 
Mozambique, promised to enhance the industrial productivity of surrounding areas and 
integrate regional economies. However, the initiative benefited South Africa far more than it 
did Mozambique in terms of exports, and the more developed areas and wealthier populations 
benefited from related regional development.
362
 Failure to develop and empower rural and 
impoverished areas is a common weakness of SDIs.
363
 In addition, Industrial Development 
Zones (IDZs) have been established at major South African ports, to assist export-oriented 
growth and attract foreign direct investment. Pundits argue that these differ from regular 
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) by having measures in place against labor exploitation and 
the lowering of environmental standards.
364
 There is little to back up such claims, however. If 
the Coega IDZ established at the Port of Ngqura just outside Port Elizabeth is anything to go 
by, IDZs primarily enrich corporations in spite of promises to uplift poor South Africans, and 
wreak environmental havoc despite the stewardship rhetoric which emanates from them. The 
stated purpose of the multi-billion rand
365
 Coega IDZ is to foster investment in export-focused 
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manufacturing industries, which promises to improve local economic and social conditions by 
making employment available to locals and equipping them with new skill sets.
366
 The 
regional media have sold the IDZ to the public, accordingly laying emphasis on the tens of 
thousands of jobs supposedly created.
367
 All the while, silence prevails on the health 
implications of and ecological damage that will result from the aluminium/manganese/steel 
smelting and oil refining operations of key IDZ anchors.
368
 Also, what is not made clear at all 
is that most employment opportunities are temporary and relate to the construction phase of 
each project.
369
 The number of permanent jobs that will be made available at the IDZ pales in 
comparison to the loss of permanent jobs in local sustainable industries, which stand to be 
jeopardized by the ecological fallout of the operations of key IDZ anchors. Local industries 
that likely will be adversely affected are salt works, fisheries, mariculture and agricultural 
concerns, and eco-tourism ventures in the surrounding area. Bond, in a 2011 study of Coega, 
conservatively estimated resultant income loss to be R706 million per annum, and losses of 
permanent jobs to approximate 9,486.
370
 IDZ anchors also will consume most of the Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan electricity supply at bargain prices, while locals are punished with ever 
higher tariffs, the impoverished are denied a lifeline electricity supply, and many rural 
communities have to go without electricity altogether.
371
 In spite of all this, the establishment 
of the Coega IDZ has not been rued. The only negative assessment of the IDZ program in 
general has been its inability to attract sufficient foreign direct investment to warrant the 
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amounts that the government has already spent on these initiatives. It is believed that this 
deficit can be addressed by transforming IDZs into Special Economic Zones (SEZs) run in 
terms of different policies. Critics are concerned that these policies will entail corporate 
welfare, condoning labor exploitation and the lowering of environmental standards.
372
 
Notwithstanding all such efforts to pump up South African exports, to date the value of 
imports consistently has exceeded that of exports.
373
 Evidently, the free trade agreements 
established between South Africa and other nations give South Africa the opportunity to 
engage in more export activities, but they also force open the South African market to the 
flood of other countries’ goods.374 Liberalization of trade has not proved as beneficial as the 
government had anticipated. 
Seventh, the government has engaged in concerted liberalization of inward foreign 
direct investment (FDI), to devastating effect. The first thing to be mentioned is that FDI 
inflow to sub-Saharan Africa is routinely linked to socially and ecologically damaging 
mineral extraction industries, the profits of which are routed out of the host country.
375
 Shell’s 
investment in Nigeria is a case in point, as the profits of this company skyrocket while 
hundreds of fishermen and farmers are robbed of their livelihoods and their communities are 
devastated.
376
 In South Africa, FDI is mainly linked to minerals extraction, and extractive 
industries establish their headquarters here but are foreign-owned. This leads to a situation 
where the FDI outflows from South Africa far exceed FDI inflows to the country. In short, the 
companies send their profits back home, after exploiting the local workforce and pillaging the 
local environment.
377
 Also, the level of FDI inflows itself is misleading, because foreign 
direct investment in South Africa often is carried out by major South African companies such 
as Anglo American, De Beers, and Liberty Life, which in the late 1990s were permitted to 
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‘become’ foreign by moving their primary share listings to London. 378  Despite such 
disequilibrium the government still sees FDI as beneficial to South Africa, and to attract 
further investment it reduced corporate taxes by 18 percent over the period 1994-1999.
379
 A 
final point to be made is that by 1999, the majority of FDI inflows unrelated to mineral 
extraction did not consist in investment in new, productive industries. Rather, they were tied 
to mergers and acquisitions, the most notable of which was the partial privatization of the 
South African telecommunications company, Telkom. The IMF has indicated that more recent 
FDI inflows to South Africa, unrelated to mineral extraction, are attributable in large part to 
the World Bank subsidiaries, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), interested in privatization of municipal infrastructure, 
financial services, private healthcare, and so on.
380
 
Since the 1990s, the new South African government has been bent on ‘sending the 
right signals’ to the global market, one such gesture being implementation of the eighth 
Washington Consensus reform of privatization. Before 1996, consent had already been given 
for the sale of numerous radio stations, and in that year the government announced its 
intention to allow the partial or complete privatization of an entire complex of industries 
ranging from energy, telecommunications and transport to agriculture and forestry. This 
troubled many ordinary South Africans greatly, particularly because privatization so often 
entails downward pressure on wages and working conditions, and concomitant escalation of 
food prices and utility costs.
381
 These fears were realized in the partial privatization of the 
telecommunications service, Telkom, in 1997. Before long, twenty thousand workers were 
retrenched and the cost of previously subsidized local calls rose precipitously. Thus, although 
with the help of taxpayers’ money the company connected nearly three million new lines 
through 2001, two million of these soon were disconnected as low-income earners simply 
could not afford the higher charges.
382
 The disappointing sum raised at Telkom’s Initial 
Public Offering on the New York Stock Exchange in 2003 entailed an estimated $5 billion 
loss, if the government’s late-1990s capital expansion was taken into account. Despite these 
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issues, when the government in 2004 repurchased Telkom’s Texan/Malaysian shares, it 
continued clinging to the neoliberal trajectory initiated by this consortium during the 
preceding years.
383
 The outsourcing of water and sanitation services likewise created 
problems. From the start this venture was guided by a 100 percent cost recovery policy, 
endorsed by the World Bank and accepted by Pretoria.
384
 So although, in the run-up to the 
2000 local government elections, the ANC promised the poor free lifeline-supply water and 
electricity, hundreds of thousands of people nonetheless have suffered disconnections because 
of unaffordability.
385
 Prioritizing profitable accumulation over human lives in this manner,
386
 
also resulted in an enormous cholera outbreak in 2000. Rural communities, unable to afford 
the newly instantiated R51-per-household connection fee, were obliged to resort to 
consumption of untreated water and this led to 130 thousand cholera infections and three 
hundred deaths.
387
 
Deregulation, the ninth of the Washington Consensus reforms, has done further 
damage to South Africa. As discussed earlier, government-endorsed financial deregulation 
precipitated capital flight and facilitated downward raiding on the South African rand, while 
deregulation of the interest rate and trade had similarly negative repercussions. Deregulation 
of the transport industry, initiated in 1987 by apartheid-era president P. W. Botha,
388
 has 
adversely affected many South Africans as well. Botha permitted the use of minibuses as 
taxis, paving the way for the emergence of the South African taxi industry. Competition 
became rife as thousands of aspiring ‘taxi moguls’ received permits without having to 
demonstrate “a need for their service in a particular area or … any degree of financial security 
or competence.”389 Lack of regulation saw slaughter on the roads and fatal shootings among 
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taxi drivers themselves.
390
 The government has made some effort to improve safety standards, 
by initiating a Taxi Recapitalisation Programme (TRP) involving subsidization for the 
purchase of new, roadworthy minibuses. However, by 2010, due to delays and non-
compliance, “the project appeared to be running aground and was perceived by many as a 
fruitless and wasteful exercise.”391 Turf wars between taxi bosses and among drivers remain 
commonplace, resulting in hundreds of deaths and pointed assassinations.
392
 Also, 
competition among drivers who ‘poach’ one another’s routes frequently leads to reckless 
driving and dangerous overloading of vehicles.
393
 The resultant accidents claim approximately 
forty lives per day.
394
 Deregulation of extractive industries also threatens human life. Mining 
houses, exempt from national radiation regulations, have become so careless that some even 
neglect to fence off radioactive areas close to communities.
395
 Wages have also been targeted 
for deregulation by among others, the managing director of the IMF.
396
 Since the 1990s 
workers have been obliged to accept wage increases below inflation.
397
 Although criticized 
severely by the workerist Congress of South African Trade Unions,
398
 the government has 
                                                          
390
 SABC, “Taxi Violence,” SABC Truth Commission Special Report, 2014. Available at: 
http://sabctrc.saha.org.za/glossary/taxi_violence.htm?tab=victims. Date accessed: August 3, 2014. 
391
 Sekanyane Tys Daisy Mashishi, “The Taxi Recapitilisation Programme: Some Perceptions of the Taxi 
Associations in Temba,” UJDigispace, October 2010. Available at: 
https://ujdigispace.uj.ac.za/handle/10210/3850. Date accessed: October 22, 2012. 
392
 Michael Wines, “Cartels Battle for Supremacy in South Africa’s Taxi Wars,” The New York Times, 
September 19, 2006. Available at: 
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=f&rct=j&url=http://travel2.nytimes.com/2006/09/17/world/africa/17africa.html
%3Fpagewanted%3Dall&q=cartels+battle+for+supremacy,+wines&ei=LTOFUO_jL9GKhQf3lICgBw&usg=AF
QjCNECyiJfjZ4JEqYTchOEzoYQBBbIbA. Date accessed: October 22, 2012; and Jane Barrett, Organizing in 
the Informal Economy: A Case Study of the Minibus Taxi Industry in South Africa (Geneva: International Labour 
Office, 2003), 8. 
393
 SAPA, “Taxi was Carrying 55 Children – Police,” IOL News, September 13, 2011. Available at: 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/taxi-was-carrying-55-children-police-1.1136909#.UIUx-G9JP8w. Date 
accessed: October 22, 2012. 
394
 Mandi Smallhorne, “Offenders Must Be Punished,” Mail & Guardian, October 7, 2011. 
395
 Bond, Elite Transition, 221; and Gia Costella, “Greater Intervention Needed to Tackle Acid Mine Drainage,” 
Mining Weekly, March 23, 2012. Available at: http://www.miningweekly.com/article/environmental-risks-and-
hazards-within-the-wits-goldfields-2012-03-23. Date accessed: October 22, 2012. 
396
 Christine Lagarde, “Statement by IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde at the Conclusion of Her Visit to 
South Africa,” International Monetary Fund, January 7, 2012. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr1201.htm. Date accessed: October 6, 2014. 
397
 Bond, Elite Transition, 37. 
398
 Sam Shilowa, Business Day, April 7, 1998. 
88 
 
done little to address this problem. Rather, amendments to South African labor laws have 
been proposed that deter strike action.
399
 Added to this, treatment of striking workers is 
becoming ever harsher, a case in point being the killing of forty-four workers by police during 
the Marikana miners’ strike. The miners were ‘illegally’ protesting low wages for dangerous 
work.
400
 Rather than rallying in support of the miners, many South African media outlets 
indirectly censured them by making much of the negative economic impact of this strike, 
which included multi-billion rand disinvestment.
401
 More critical journalists did, however, 
begin asking the public whether profitable accumulation should be pursued at the expense of 
human lives.
402
 Recently, platinum miners engaged in the longest ever strike in South African 
history. They struck for five months, with unions demanding the tripling of their salaries with 
very limited success. Local and international media again bemoaned the resultant economic 
losses and damage to the reputation of South Africa as a foreign investment option.
403
 They 
did so instead of emphasizing the need to implement regulations for better treatment and 
protection of mine workers. 
Finally, in relation to property rights, the new South African government continued to 
follow neoliberal, Washington Consensus dictates despite promises of land redistribution. The 
RDP aim of redistributing 30 percent of good farmland to previously disadvantaged peoples 
within five years failed miserably. This was principally because Pretoria adopted a World 
Bank-engineered ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ policy.404 In terms of this policy, redistribution 
hinged on the seller’s willingness to part with their land at a price either affordable to grant 
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applicants, or, in restitution cases, acceptable to the Commission on Restitution of Land 
Rights (CRLR) purchasing the property. This approach came with various insurmountable 
problems. First, market prices were, and remain, hugely overinflated. Second, applicants were 
given only a R20 000 grant, making it impossible for them to purchase quality land. Third, 
restrictions were placed on applicants pooling their grants in order to jointly purchase land 
and pursue group projects.
405
 Abie Ditlhake of the National Land Committee argues that 
although the policy carried the veneer of legitimacy, since the Department of Land Affairs 
had consulted with rural communities, these people’s concerns ultimately “were outweighed 
by global imperatives represented by the World Bank and other international interests, and the 
emerging national petit-bourgeoisie.”406 Aside from the problematic policy itself, not nearly 
enough money was allocated for land redistribution.
407
 Frustration with the slow pace of 
reform,
408
 combined with welling anger over substandard and slow housing delivery,
409
 is 
quite likely what motivated the government’s gazetting of the Promotion and Protection of 
Investment Bill late in 2013, hinting at land expropriation without compensation. However, 
the Bill was rejected by both the German ambassador to South Africa and the American 
Chamber of Commerce, and concerns have been raised over it jeopardizing foreign 
investment,
410
 making its implementation doubtful. Thus, notwithstanding the plight of the 
poor, the wealthy and a climate conducive to foreign investment are prioritized at every turn. 
Yet participating foreigners have made it near impossible even for middle-income South 
Africans to own homes. Enticed by the weak rand, they pay exorbitant prices for properties 
and thus drive market sentiment up, leading to overinflation of house prices. Prospective local 
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homeowners receive hardly any protection from the government in this regard, by way of 
regulations or taxes that would deter foreigners from purchasing South African properties.
411
 
 
Big Men: little people 
 
In 2000, Thabo Mbeki publicly conceded that the Washington/IMF/World Bank-style GEAR 
strategy had failed South Africa. In an address on 24 May, he asserted: 
 
Notwithstanding some specific problems in some developing countries and especially African countries, 
there are many among these countries … that have responded positively, even under very difficult 
circumstances, to the prescriptions of both the prospective investors as well as the multi-lateral 
institutions … In our country, we have been assured that our economic fundamentals are correct and 
sound. We have developed a stable and effective financial and fiscal system. We have reduced tariffs to 
levels that are comparable to the advanced industrial countries. We have reformed agriculture to make it 
the least subsidised of all the major agricultural trading nations. We have restructured our public sector 
through privatisation, strategic partners and regulation. We have a … sophisticated system of labour 
relations that is continually adjusting to new developments. We play an active role in all multilateral 
agencies in the world. Yet, the flow of investment into South Africa has not met our expectations while the 
levels of poverty and unemployment remain high.
412
 
 
Mbeki indicates here that South Africa followed the Washington Consensus reforms, but that 
this did not facilitate the desired growth and social upliftment. Even so, and despite worsening 
poverty and severe environmental degradation, fourteen years on South Africa remains on a 
neoliberal trajectory. This can be attributed in part to the stranglehold of major institutions to 
which South Africa is indebted, most notably the World Bank and the IMF.
413
 The relatively 
recent economic alignment of South Africa with Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICS), 
may signal a move away from the tyranny of the dollar-regime, but not an end to the 
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exploitation of people and the environment under the capitalist imperative.
414
 South Africa is 
identified as beneficial to the other BRICS countries precisely on the basis of its in situ 
mineral wealth.
415
 Yet, staying on the neoliberal course may also be the doing of self-serving 
governing elites, insensitive to the growing poverty of ordinary South Africans – at least half 
of whom have to survive on under $2 per day.
416
 Those critical of GEAR and requesting a 
return to ‘leftist’ RDP values have been charged with disloyalty.417 And social movements 
refusing to continue supporting what they see as an irremediably neoliberal ANC, risk the 
charge of “heretical” politics.418 Sacralization of the ANC remains a lingering problem. 
Moreover, the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy, aimed at bringing 
previously disadvantaged South Africans into play professionally and thereby eradicating 
racialized poverty, has only served a small minority. To clarify, preference is given to 
previously disadvantaged South Africans in job applications, and certain black South Africans 
have benefited hugely by being placed in managerial positions and allocated business 
partnerships and shares, as companies receive incentives for this from the government.
419
 This 
new executive class constitutes the South African nouveau riche, the ‘black diamonds’ who 
engage in near unfathomable levels of conspicuous consumption while the majority of black 
South Africans fall by the wayside. Those in the new black business class, giving a new face 
to an old elitism,
420
 increasingly distance themselves from the economically disempowered 
and shield themselves from what they perceive as the poor menace. Together with their new 
comrades, rich whites, they seek “insulation from crime and segregation from the vast 
majority [through a] … residential ‘arms race’ – private security systems, sophisticated 
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alarms, high walls and razor wire, [and] … gated communities.”421 Government leaders are 
not shy about economic indulgence, either. Recently, president Jacob Zuma unflinchingly 
spent R246 million of taxpayers’ money to upgrade his private Nkandla residence, which 
involved construction of “palatial” proportions in one of the poorest areas of the country.422 
He did so in spite of his earlier call for business executives to curb their spending in view of 
“the challenge of high income and wage disparities that create resentment and limit our social 
cohesion as South Africans.”423 These Big Men – South African government and business 
leaders – undermine the struggle for social and ecological justice. They are, as Patrick Bond 
puts it, polishing rather than breaking the chains of global apartheid.
424
 The democratic 
transition in 1994 did not dismantle the capitalist underpinnings of South Africa, and so racial 
apartheid has simply been replaced by class apartheid. Each new neoliberal development adds 
yet another page to the country’s chronicle of domination. 
That said, neoliberal hegemony hinges not only on the dictates of big government, big 
business, big institutions and Big Men, but also on buy-in from the many ‘little people’ – 
ordinary men and women. This is because, as Maria Mies, drawing on the work of Rosa 
Luxemburg,
425
 explains, capitalism cannot be sustained unless there is an ever expanding 
consumer base for manufactured products. Most people in overdeveloped countries, as well as 
the middle and upper classes of the global South, invite its perpetuation by orienting their 
identities primarily around consumption. Even the destitute tend to fall under the sway of 
visions of the high life, with some resorting to crime in an effort to obtain the commodities 
that promise prestige.
426
 Mies, in fact, is of the opinion that the “area which has been almost 
totally left out for political struggle in the West has been … consumption.”427 She maintains 
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that unionists, many feminists, as well as other groups opposing the economic status quo 
focus critical attention on governments, corporations or the economy, without considering 
“their own role in the exploitative system” as consumers.428 The same can be said of anti-
neoliberal protest in South Africa. The National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa 
(Numsa) broke new ground in 2014, by indicating the need to form “a united front against 
neoliberalism,” through allying with diverse interest groups ranging from LGBT activists to 
land sovereignty advocates.
429
 Still, for the moment critique remains focused on the non-
socialist actions of corporations, neoliberals, and the complicit ANC government, rather than 
involving acutely self-reflexive questioning of each individual’s endorsement of the 
hegemony through commodity consumption.
430
 The next chapter heeds Mies’s attention to the 
role of consumerism in the perpetuation of neoliberalism, particularly in relation to how it 
molds gender identity. 
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Chapter 3: Global Political Economy and Identity 
 
Big government, big business, big institutions and Big Men all had a role to play in bringing 
global free market ideology to South Africa. However, neoliberalism could neither have been 
so effortlessly established nor continue so unhindered, were it not for ordinary people’s 
acceptance of it. This chapter, drawing on scholarship predominantly from the global North, 
describes how people come to embrace neoliberalism through consumer culture; an 
immersion so deep that they readily ignore its social and ecological fallout. In short, it 
presents a standard account of the rise of consumerism and the changes this brought about in 
hegemonic gender ideologies. This provides the backdrop against which the nuanced 
manifestation of these processes in South Africa are identified and analyzed in the next 
chapter. People may be disempowered in the workplace, but are declared ‘sovereign 
consumers’ during their leisure hours. Further, thanks to a barrage of advertising, men and 
women are made to believe that they even will attain heightened “sexual status through 
consumerism.”431 Writing on masculinity, the American scholar Paul Hoch maintains that 
establishing individual and group gender identity “has eclipsed Christianity as an ontology for 
directing activity.”432 In the neoliberal setting, this ontology is most perverse, since pursuit of 
the ‘exemplary’ masculinity and femininity of the day rests on commodity acquisition rather 
than on human achievements or actions. A ‘real man’ is projected as someone who owns 
high-tech goods, not someone who protects others. An attractive woman is someone who 
dons the latest fashion, not someone who cares for family or community. Status is achieved 
by buying, not doing; by going with the economic flow rather than resisting it. Thus, in 
contrast to their workerist predecessors, a majority of contemporary men and women have 
become so blinded by the neon lights of commodification that they relinquish any meaningful 
sense of subjective autonomy, or occasion for genuine social relations and pointed political 
action.  
 
Industrialization and the theft of subjective autonomy 
 
Today consumerism is a ubiquitous phenomenon, but the precise moment and causes of its 
rise are debatable. The Canadian anthropologist Grant McCracken regards certain late 
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sixteenth-century practices as instrumental to the rise of consumerism. He focuses on 
Elizabeth I’s conspicuous consumption to signify her majesty, and her noblemen’s ruinous 
spending as they competed with one another for the attentions of their royal benefactress.
433
 
British economic historian, Neil McKendrick, on the other hand, cites as key to the rise of 
consumerism the eighteenth-century English demand for exotic items imported from India 
and elsewhere; the proliferation of fashion knowledge; the commercialization of pottery; and 
an increase in newspaper advertising among other things.
434
 The French historian Rosalind 
Williams again identifies nineteenth-century France as birthplace of the consumer revolution. 
Williams acknowledges earlier motivating factors, such as Louis XIV’s cultivation of 
subservience by transforming his subordinates into rapacious consumers. Yet, she emphasizes 
that later events facilitated a more broad-based shift toward consumerism, such as the 
1889/1900 ‘mass culture’ expositions in Paris, precedents for the department store and the 
trade show.
435
 In her turn, Maria Mies discusses how in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century Europe, women became framed as creatures that belong in the home, not only 
because they were expected to raise a new generation of workers, but also because they were 
supposed to operate as “agent[s] of consumption.” For her, “housewifization” and 
consumerism went hand in hand.
436
 Thomas Princen, an American political theorist, 
demonstrates the direct correlation between the industrial drive for efficient production and a 
rise in consumer activity. As he explains, the increasing bodily and psychological alienation 
experienced by workers in the factory, as their movements became subject to ever greater 
mechanization under the auspices of Taylorism, precipitated a desire to become re-
empowered via the purchase of goods. The American historian Gary Cross, too, emphasizes 
the intertwining of industrialization and consumerism. He points both to structural concerns 
of supply and demand relating to industry, and to worker acceptance of radical changes in the 
conception and utilization of leisure time. A common thread running through Princen’s and 
Cross’s arguments is the decline of people’s subjective autonomy – something identified in 
the present argument as fundamental to the rise of consumer society and the political 
debilitation of workers. Princen and Cross each highlight how individuals were stripped of 
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subjective choice over their lives through industrialization, and primed for so-called 
empowerment through purchase of the products of this very system. 
 
Early battles over selfhood 
 
In The Logic of Sufficiency, Thomas Princen argues that prior to the radical societal 
transformation brought about by the Industrial Revolution, the productivity of factories was 
hampered severely by what was termed a “backward-bending supply curve for labor.”437 
Workers considered autonomy over their time as a fundamental right of sorts, supplying their 
labor to factories only for durations of their own choosing. They did so in spite of the wages 
thereby forfeited. This attitude persisted even when factory owners, in an effort to ‘straighten 
out’ the supply curve, began offering higher wages. Workers continued to value their 
subjective autonomy, and hence self-governance, over any economic enticements. This 
orientation was, however, countered through calls for greater discipline by various societal 
institutions and industries, and more decisively, through the process of land enclosure carried 
out in England from the middle of the eighteenth century onward. Enclosure marginalized the 
majority of people by robbing them of lands on which to subsist,
438
 and in so doing made 
them increasingly dependent on employers who could then exploit them at will. Even so, this 
dramatic transformation of labor culture was vehemently contested at first, obliging factory 
owners to “suppress wages … install … bells and whistles and clocks … add … timesheets 
and timekeepers, hire … informers, and impose … fines and physical punishments.” 439 
Worker obstinacy indicated a particularly autonomous ‘working rationality.’ And for Princen, 
this testifies to the fact that people are averse to being reduced to automatons operating on 
clock time, and that they are capable of satisfaction through meaningful social relations and 
“real working” rather than “purchasing and consuming.”440 
In Time and Money: The Making of Consumer Culture, Gary Cross identifies a similar 
tussle over subjective autonomy between capitalists and workers about a century-and-a-half 
later. In 1910, workers in the US began demanding shorter hours, or, an eight-hour day, since 
automation increased labor productivity, and therefore should have resulted in a reduction in 
labor time. Absenteeism and worker turnover rose, as workers were unwilling to sacrifice 
time spent with family for more earnings. These short-hour agitators enjoyed a temporary 
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victory in 1919, when the eight-hour day was generally adopted in industrial Europe and the 
US. Around this time, blue-collar workers, who routinely received less ‘perks’ than white-
collar employees, also began to demand paid vacations. Yet, just as the process of enclosure 
undermined workers’ ability to remain autonomous in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
the American Depression and the 1937 recession crippled the short-hour movement. This 
economically dire and psychologically devastating period instigated a renewed focus on 
production, rather than on the “distribution of time and money” across the board. Even 
American unions accepted the minimum wage and relaxed their expectations concerning labor 
time reduction.
441
 Vacation hours, too, were abandoned during the Depression, “when fear of 
unemployment provided a cost-free form of creating ‘loyalty.’”442 From 1929 to 1933, US 
unemployment increased over eightfold, and the social and psychological effects of this wore 
people down even further. Therefore, when a job opportunity presented itself, the worker 
chose money over time. Cross is careful to insist, though, that the worker’s choice was 
motivated by fear of destitution and an absence of any viable alternatives, rather than by an 
explicit desire for more purchasing power.
443
 The Second World War prevented the revival of 
the short-hour movement for analogous reasons to the Depression, and the idea that 
purchasing power, not free time, constitutes the just reward for hard work, continued to gain 
momentum.
444
  
This idea received persistent attention at an institutional level during the Depression, 
the recession, and the war, since commodity sales were tied to economic recovery and growth. 
Of particular importance was the fact that, with the exception of the Second World War, these 
moments of economic turmoil were attributed to saturation of American consumer markets. 
Accordingly, the reasoning went that further recessions could be averted by targeting workers 
as consumers. That is, to avoid another glut, adequate demand had to be created to meet the 
steadily increasing supply of commodities. For some industrialists, this idea was 
contradictory. This is because, while, on the one hand, factory owners required disciplined, 
constrained workers, on the other hand, workers would be expected to transform into 
rapacious, unrestrained consumers after hours. Skeptics worried that encouraging a lack of 
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restraint outside of work would breed ill-discipline on the factory floor.
445
 Moreover, for 
workers to consume ‘better,’ they needed more time off work, and this stood to undermine 
industrial productivity. Henry Ford, however, contested that by increasing workers’ wages 
and granting them a two-day weekend, the problem of overproduction would be solved. In 
short, by encouraging workers to spend their free time consuming goods, greater demand for 
commodities would be generated. Also, once workers got hooked on consumerism, their 
desire for purchasing power would lash them to their workplace, and in fact increase their 
discipline and productivity.
446
 Significantly, Ford and others even promoted the idea that 
“workers should be encouraged to be consumers of the very products they produced.”447 This 
may indicate a benign democratization of consumption, but still it demonstrates the 
willingness of industrialists to doubly exploit individuals, in their capacity as producers and as 
consumers of goods. Nonetheless, for workers to become successful consumers, they would 
have to receive both higher wages with which to purchase,
448
 and more leisure time in which 
to purchase. 
 
Economic recovery and free time 
 
Allowing workers more free time was warranted technically speaking, given the efficiency 
gains deriving from technological innovation in the workplace. Through automation, 
production occurred at a faster rate, and more output was obtained from every unit of input. 
Moreover, the general activities and even the individual movements of workers became 
increasingly mechanized, resulting in greater efficiency. Thomas Princen points out that 
augmenting efficiency was framed as critical not only to economic recovery but also to 
America’s quest for global supremacy. Foremost among the efficiency proponents was the 
engineer, Frederick Winslow Taylor. Scientific management, or Taylorism, became employed 
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in factories to manage production with optimum efficiency,
449
 and entailed implementing 
mechanisms such as the differential piece rate system. This involved identifying the shortest 
possible time for each work task, and then demanding that workers accomplish the task within 
this time. Those capable of completing the task in time were well paid, while those who could 
not were paid so little that they had to find another job. Taylor, discussing scientific 
management in general, and its implementation at Ford’s factory in particular, 
 
famously likened … scientifically managed workers to ‘trained gorillas’ who could be made as 
productive as possible through the organization and discipline offered by his system … Taylorism 
promised industrial capitalists that they could displace self-directing, skilled laborers from production via 
the division of the production process into a series of micro-tasks … executable by less-skilled, less-
expensive, more readily interchangeable and controlled industrial workers.
450
 
 
Understandably, while scientific management improved efficiency and thus opened up the 
possibility of more free time to workers, the new work ‘ethic’ proved particularly alienating. 
Firstly, alienation derived from the exacting mechanical rhythms imposed upon workers’ 
bodies. Secondly, the segmentation of work was deeply alienating. The worker could never 
again skillfully craft an entire object, but rather was condemned to robotically assemble 
merely one or two pieces of a product. Alienation and profound disempowerment also 
stemmed from the fact that, within Taylorism, only the efficiency experts – not the workers – 
were deemed competent to judge whether or not a job was done well or fast enough. The 
experts constituted the ‘thinkers,’ and the workers simply the ‘doers.’451  
So workers became trapped in demeaning jobs, and quite understandably, they had to 
find other paths toward empowerment and self-fulfillment outside of work. To a large extent, 
short-hour movements of the early twentieth century pushed for free time in which to care for 
children, engage with family, and undertake other personally meaningful activities. However, 
Gary Cross argues that already in the early decades of the twentieth century, various 
institutions were going out of their way to dictate precisely how workers should spend their 
free time. Attempts were persistently made to organize and orchestrate leisure. In the 1920s 
and 1930s, for instance, companies focused on shaping the leisure time of their employees. 
The company town was a prime experimental site, as it geographically fenced workers in – 
something impossible for factories situated in cities and towns where freer movement and 
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various forms of recreation were to be had. George Pullman, one of the late nineteenth-
century founders of the company town, recognized the depoliticizing value of controlling his 
workers’ leisure. To maintain order among an ethnically diverse workforce, he went about 
prohibiting any indulgence in urban leisure or in alcohol, and furnished “healthy institutions” 
in their stead. In this way, he could “mold docile and cooperative workers, to prevent strikes 
and labor organization.” 452  Ironically, the Chicago unions in the late 1930s similarly 
organized recreational activities for workers, in order to encourage union solidarity.
453
 
However, there were also less mercenary attempts made to organize free time, in the interest 
of personal improvement, fulfillment and rejuvenation. The French socialist Albert Thomas, 
head of the International Labour Office (ILO) from 1919 to 1932, vehemently opposed 
government, corporate and union organization of people’s leisure, but also rejected a laissez-
faire approach to leisure which would make it vulnerable to market co-optation. Instead, he 
advocated the formation of ‘voluntarist’ organizations that, with indirect government 
assistance, could offer edifying leisure activities, including ones that bring people closer to 
nature.
454
 The American educator Eduard Lindeman likewise opposed both coercive and 
laissez-faire approaches to leisure. He held that ‘democratic leisure’ should be well thought 
out, specifically because of the obliteration of human creativity through automation in the 
workplace. In relation to this, Lindeman argued that 
 
[i]n pre-machine cultures education for adults was … inherent in their work … For millions of our people 
that opportunity is lost … as machines make their inevitable way into all lines of production. Trades and 
crafts and vocational skills are steadily supplanted by automatic machines; those who operate the 
machines need to learn only a few neuro-muscular coordinations, and when these are acquired 
occupational learning stops … The lesson is plain enough: those who cannot secure education from their 
work may open new channels for the exercise of the mind during their hours of leisure.
455
 
 
Still, industrial leaders for various reasons were all too keen to imbricate leisure with the 
marketplace, and usher in a paradigmatic transformation in which leisure becomes the 
ultimate occasion to spend. These included figures such as the American economist Harold 
Moulton, who felt that there really was no limit to the American people’s needs, and the 
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social scientist Louis Walker, who believed that leisure could be made “usefully consumable” 
not by reducing daily work hours but providing workers with weekends and longer vacations 
in which to spend.
456
 
In the decades after the Second World War, the majority of US and European workers 
began to receive paid vacations. Employers allowed this in order to cultivate company loyalty, 
as attested by the fact that the length of the paid vacation often was directly proportional to 
the length of time that the worker had been employed.
457
 This practice in fact remains 
commonplace in many countries across the world. However, as already indicated, another 
reason for introducing a two-day weekend and the paid vacation was to occasion spending. 
Supply had to be met with sufficient demand, otherwise the market would become saturated 
and the economy would go into recession once again. Workers went along with this strategy, 
shedding their disciplined demeanor and donning the mantle of voracious consumer when 
leaving their places of work. They learned that one works not to gain time to spend with 
others, but to gain time to spend spending money. This marks a radical break with the 
approach to time held by those who had rebelled against the straightening out of the supply 
curve for labor, and those who supported the short-hour movement. It is necessary to consider 
how and why this came about. 
 
The compensations of consumerism 
 
Structural considerations 
 
The ideological prodding of those seeking to conflate free time with consumption, together 
with post-Depression “pent-up material needs,” may have inclined people toward 
consumerism as the primary leisure activity.
458
 However, at least equally important is the fact 
that commodity consumption allows workers to feel empowered, or, to purchase the dignity 
denied them at work. Ironically though, this involves them rewarding the very people who 
have stripped them of their dignity in the first place. Thus, industrialists profit not only from 
treating workers like robots, but also from parasitizing the insecurities that such alienation 
produces in them. Princen argues that it is therefore no coincidence that the notion of 
‘consumer sovereignty’ was first promoted by the very agencies that had engendered the 
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“efficiency revolution” in factories. He explains that as businesses began to shift focus from 
production to sales, the Taylor society began investigating how scientific management could 
be used to shape consumer demand. The idea of a sovereign consumer to whose dictates the 
market supposedly bows became the “mantra” of government leaders and businessmen. It also 
proved irresistible to the majority of people, who as workers were ordered around, but who as 
consumers ostensibly could reverse this subjugation by giving the orders in the 
supermarket.
459
 With the rise of a capitalist patriarchal society based on ‘exchange value,’ 
many people began searching for fulfillment “through consuming the products of other 
people’s work, not through the process of work itself.”460 Over time, this search has become 
so chronic and all-consuming that people strive to accumulate ever more goods to boost their 
self-esteem in spite of their increased indebtedness.
461
 
Cross in fact maintains that the introduction of installment credit or hire purchase was 
absolutely crucial to the making and perpetuation of the consumer society. Credit rather 
cruelly allows individuals to prolong their dream of consumerist empowerment. Mid 
twentieth-century proponents of credit money may have claimed that defaults are rare, that 
credit provision improves the economy, and that credit does not create wants.
462
 Yet, these 
claims have been refuted systematically as the decades have passed. For one, it has become 
obvious that installment credit accrues enormous defaults with dire national and sometimes 
even global economic consequences – evidenced by the disastrous 2007-2009 subprime 
mortgage crisis in the US.
463
 In addition, the idea that credit does not fuel unmanageable 
desires, is undermined by the fact that, as early as the 1920s, young working women were 
battling to keep up with their debt repayments and to curb their impulse to continue buying 
clothes and fineries on credit.
464
 To sum up, despite its dangers, the installment credit 
mechanism became increasingly popular, especially in the wake of the Second World War – 
so much so that by the 1950s and 1960s, approximately two-thirds of American households 
were indebted in some or other way.
465
 In view of this, the behavioral economist George 
Katona is quite correct to tie the rise of the mass consumption society to credit, when he states 
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that the “rapid increase in the use of installment credit is partly a consequence of a mass 
consumption economy and partly a factor promoting its growth.”466 
Advertising is another important structural factor operating to keep the dream of the 
‘sovereign consumer’ alive. Already in the early decades of the twentieth century, advertisers 
were promoting consumers’ use of installment credit, by disseminating messages aimed at 
reversing the predominantly negative attitude to indebtedness held by people at the time.
467
 In 
later years, credit providers also found advertising agencies particularly useful in enticing 
people to take on credit cards. In the period 1972 to 1999, the amount spent on credit card 
advertising in the US alone rose from approximately $16 million to $876 million.
468
 Of 
course, over and above these functions, advertising is used to frame superfluous wants as 
indispensable needs. Katona, a supporter of advertising, gives the contorted argument that 
advertised products do in fact meet people’s needs, even if people only gradually come to 
recognize the use value of these products. He maintains that the air conditioner is a case in 
point. This technology had come into use in cinemas and offices shortly after the Second 
World War, but Katona’s own quantitative studies at the time revealed householder disinterest 
in the product. When asked about what they would acquire for the home given unlimited 
funds, people never mentioned air conditioners.
469
 But over time, due to advertising, they 
became ‘indispensable’ in the home, resulting in the unfortunate reduction of more 
ecologically sensible practices of home insulation.
470
 Despite Katona’s defense of the 
advertising-manufacturing complex, this case confirms the Canadian economist J. K. 
Galbraith’s conviction that “[o]ne cannot define production as satisfying wants if that 
production creates the wants.”471 Advertising supports ever increasing levels of production by 
framing commodities as indispensable goods. And how consumer goods are represented often 
eclipses the gritty reality of the human and environmental exploitation that their manufacture 
involves. Instead, commodities are framed “either as immaculate conceptions or as linked to a 
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mythical history,”472 especially by way of branding and celebrity endorsements. Ultimately, 
the power of advertising is such that contrived wants become construed as absolute 
necessities,
473
 not for physical survival but for securing and maintaining identity. 
 
Marching to the commodity beat 
 
The mechanisms discussed above contributed to the emergence of the consumer society and 
the dream of consumer sovereignty, but people also had a decisive role to play. Cross 
highlights the correlation between structural and individual agency in consumerism, when he 
argues that “working people actively participated in the formation of the consumer society 
even as they were being manipulated by it.”474 In a similar vein, the British sociologist Don 
Slater advances that people concomitantly “march [and] … sleep … to the beat of the 
commodity.”475 Why they would center their lives on commodity consumption rather than 
anything else constitutes a hugely contentious issue. 
Some have pointed out, quite legitimately, that since time immemorial people have 
valued certain objects because they symbolize power (e.g. a tribal headdress) or are of 
sentimental value (e.g. heirlooms).
476
 Also, someone may become attached to an object they 
habitually use, even if it is of negligible social or economic worth. However, possessive 
acquisitiveness today, is unprecedented in terms of its extent and type. Grant McCracken, for 
example, points out that the “consumer revolution” diverges markedly from the ethnographic 
history of homo sapiens, insofar as perhaps for “the first time in history, a human community 
willingly harbored a nonreligious agent of social change, and permitted it to transform on a 
continual and systematic basis virtually every feature of social life.” 477  Never has the 
consumption of goods, and the goods themselves, been prioritized by people quite to such an 
extent. Yet, as organization theorist Yiannis Gabriel and sociologist Tim Lang indicate, even 
more striking is that these mass-produced goods are extremely innocuous, and as such hardly 
warrant the significance with which they become imbued. There exists a marked difference 
between the type of goods previously valued, which were unique, rare, and often of special 
socio-cultural or spiritual/religious significance, and those reified under consumerism, which 
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are identical except for infinitesimal differences,
478
 available en masse, and mundane. Gabriel 
and Lang believe that this rather warped valuation of objects in contemporary societies has to 
do with the ‘virtual’ fusing of identity with goods: 
 
that identity becomes vitally and self-consciously enmeshed in stories that are read by consumers into 
innumerable, relatively mundane, mass-produced objects … [which] are not so much carriers of meaning, 
as carriers of vivid and powerful images, enabling us to choose them consciously from among many 
similar ones, promising to act as the raw material out of which our individual identities may be 
fashioned.
479
 
 
Advertising uses striking imagery and concerted branding to help make mundane, factory-
line, virtually identical objects, intensely alluring. Yet, all that these objects actually can offer 
people are vacuous forms of pseudo-individuality and pseudo-distinction, as the Frankfurt 
School theorists pointed out long ago.
480
 In relation to this issue, the British economist Peter 
Bowbrick casts a critical eye on the illusion-producing operations of the branding of certain 
products, which makes them more expensive than materially identical ones sold under ‘lesser’ 
labels. A case in point being Levi jeans, which “are valued differently to identical jeans with a 
different label,” and which for many consumers are irresistible precisely because of their 
astronomical price.
481
 Gabriel and Lang, in their turn, go so far as to argue that prices, like 
advertisements, endow commodities with voices – animating them as it were. So an expensive 
pair of jeans may interpellate a potential purchaser in the following way: “I am pricey, I know 
it and I invite you to find out for yourself if I am worth it.”482 
Quite possibly, the reason why people fall for this is because they reify relatively 
undeserving objects, believing them to hold the promise of something meaningful. 
McCracken offers an interesting argument in this regard. From his perspective, commodities 
act as ‘bridges’ to what a person wants to become or wants to be perceived as. Thus, products 
seen through a shop window, whether or not they are even eventually purchased by the 
voyeur, invite the latter to “contemplate the possession of an emotional condition, a social 
circumstance, even an entire style of life, by somehow concretizing these things in 
themselves.”483 And if an object is purchased but fails to deliver what the individual expected 
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from it, he/she always may reframe the object simply as one of the many components of the 
“bridge to displaced meaning,” such that the acquisition of this one component “has the 
quality of rehearsal to it.”484 Alternatively, the individual may reject the acquired object as a 
sham, proceeding to focus on another, supposedly authentic, object promising really to yield 
meaning. This cycle is endless, and the individual is obliged to ‘trade up’ constantly, 
incurring ever more debt along the way.
485
 Gabriel and Lang similarly contend that 
consumerism is addictive because the individual purchases commodities not necessarily to 
demonstrate who they are at the moment, but rather to represent who they desire to become.
486
 
Desire, however, is both fickle and insuperable.
487
 
These explanations point to the crucial role that commodities play in identity 
construction today. The issue of identity accordingly has become the Rome of consumption 
studies.
488
 This contemporary correlation between consumerism and identity may have 
resulted from the rupturing of the erstwhile association between work and identity formation, 
following the Industrial Revolution in general, and the emergence of Taylorism in 
particular.
489
 As discussed earlier, it is near impossible for contemporary workers, who are 
treated as mere cogs in a great machine, to access through work the sense of self-fulfillment, 
achievement, and creative outlet that pre-industrial craftsmen enjoyed. The Frankfurt School 
philosopher Max Horkheimer powerfully illustrates this when he differentiates “between a 
craftsman of the old type, who selected the proper tool for a delicate piece of work, and the 
worker of today, who must decide … [simply] which of many levers or switches he should 
pull.”490 
Especially from the late nineteenth century onward, work became alienating and 
disempowering, and workers learned to live for their leisure time. After hours, they could 
seek, firstly, reconciliation or some sort of compensation through the consumption of the 
products of others’ labor, and secondly, re-empowerment through exercising authority as 
‘sovereign consumers’ in the malls and in the markets. This consumptive impulse seems to 
apply to blue- and white-collar workers alike, despite claims that office workers do not 
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experience the same degree of alienation as their counterparts on the factory floor. It must be 
remembered that they, too, constitute ‘human resources’ used and abused by corporations to 
generate profits.
491
 Moreover, to ascend the career ladder white-collar employees often have 
to adopt false identities which, as Don Slater argues, do not fit any “inner sense of 
authenticity.” They have to sell themselves by adopting prepackaged personalities, so much 
so that the white-collar ‘person’ becomes nothing more than “a calculable condition of social 
survival and success.” 492  Also, because of the intense competition that working within 
advanced capitalist institutions involves, workers increasingly become antagonistic toward 
one another. They are radically atomized in workplaces constituted as competitive terrains. 
Each employee is pitted against the other in a fight for economic survival and career 
advancement. 
This hyper-competitive, hyper-individualistic orientation then infuses people’s 
behavior during their leisure time. Consumptive leisure becomes yet another site of struggle 
for hierarchical position or status. The early American sociologist Thorstein Veblen 
elaborated on people’s practice of inferring the economic and social standing of others from 
the clothes that they wear and other objects they display. The assumption is that consumer 
goods are “good prima facie evidence of pecuniary success, and consequently prima facie 
evidence of social worth.” Thus, financial clout and social status are considered directly 
proportional to the extent to which the individual’s clothes/objects are “in excess of what is 
required for physical comfort.” 493  Further, for every individual, decency is framed in 
reference to the consumerist lifestyle enjoyed and ‘shown off’ by individuals of a higher class 
or economic standing, obliging him/her to incur unnecessary debt in pursuit of this idealized 
style of life. Correlatively, insofar as decency is for members of almost every economic 
stratum equated with the lifestyles of those with greater purchasing power, the lifestyle they 
can afford to sustain is, by definition, never adequate to the aim of decency. This precipitates 
an irrational squandering of resources even among the very poor. As Veblen explained, 
“[v]ery much of squalor and discomfort will be endured before the last trinket or the last 
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pretense of pecuniary decency is put away.”494 This perpetual cycle of status competition via 
conspicuous consumption was thematized by the classical German sociologist Georg Simmel, 
in relation to fashion. For him, fashion offered a mechanism of class differentiation, trapping 
people in a chase-and-flight cycle in which they pursue the image of higher classes while 
differentiating themselves from lower ones.
495
 Thus, the cycle involves both a drive for 
imitation and the pursuit of distinction/differentiation. Imitation provides ontological reprieve, 
because it gives the person “the assurance of not standing alone in his or her actions,” and 
permits the “transfer [of] not only the demand for creative activity, but also the responsibility 
for the action from ourselves to another.”496 At the same time, imitation of the elite few 
allows the individual to feel distinct from the less well-to-do majority. Fashionable items 
constantly change, and donning the latest pricey wares confers immediate distinction in our 
“thing-minded” 497  society. As Simmel put it, “fashion is nothing more than a particular 
instance among the many forms of life by the aid of which we seek to combine in a unified act 
the tendency towards social equalization with the desire for individual differentiation and 
variation.”498 
The observation that consumerism is socially divisive has been contested by some 
scholars, who instead argue that it provides an opportunity for relatively isolated individuals 
to share experiences with others. Often cited are the ‘pseudo-communities’ of the theaters and 
of the food courts in shopping malls.
499
 However, the forms of community provided in these 
spaces entail no long-term commitment or meaningful interaction between individuals. For 
one, in such communities “[s]ocial membership is reduced to identities one puts on and takes 
off at whim.”500 Further, the “sociality” found in malls may afford the intensely lonely with 
an opportunity to be around other shoppers and interact with clerks, but does not imply 
genuine affection or social resonance. The American sociologist Rob Shields argues, for 
example, that relations between shoppers and clerks usually involve only “pro-forma 
greetings and salutations, a banal … interaction between scripted roles of shop assistant and 
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the shopper.”501  Also, it is conceivable that when entering malls, individuals may adopt 
personas quite different from their regular selves. This militates against genuine social 
interaction; people can “change amongst a veritable dramatis personae of masks,” and every 
“momentary identification corresponds to a role in a given social ‘scene’ – a scene dominated 
by a group and the group ethos.”502 
Notably, the consumer’s striving for individuality is as fraught with problems and 
contradictions as their search for community among other shoppers. As indicated, the project 
of individual differentiation is problematized by the need for the individual to conform to 
some or other group image in order to be regarded as fashionable. What further undermines 
the logic of individual differentiation is the fact that the range of items available to someone, 
through which he/she seeks to differentiate him/herself from others, is also available to 
everyone else. Tailor-made artifacts mainly are a thing of the past, and factory-produced 
commodities of a certain type are only infinitesimally different from one another. Given such 
homogeneity of commodities, and the fact that the consumer can only choose from “one 
among fixed options,” the oft-valorized idea of consumer choice is also inherently misleading. 
Ultimately, the consumer’s activity merely is a matter of “selection”503 from “a set menu … 
chosen by consumer capitalism.”504 
The idea of consumer choice, flawed as it may be, helps to frame consumption as an 
act and expression of freedom conceived in a political sense.
505
 That is, ideas of choice and 
sovereignty, together with a strong emphasis on consumer rights in neoliberal capitalist 
societies, lead to the equation of consumerism with democratic freedom. In supposedly 
democratic, neoliberal states, consumerism and private property are emphasized as 
fundamental rights, so individual liberty becomes reconceptualized as “freedom to participate 
in the market, i.e., freedom to consume.” 506  This is accepted by people even though 
commodity consumption only involves bounded choice; even though in market research 
consumers are stripped of subjecthood becoming mere objects of rational planning;
507
 and 
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even though corporations actually generate consumer wants rather than meeting consumer 
needs.
508
 As Slater powerfully argues, in many instances, when it is claimed that people’s 
needs are met, these are 
 
needs that emerge at the end of an impossibly long gauntlet of mediation by inequalities in material and 
symbolic power, by cultural intermediaries, by the ‘impersonal steering mechanisms’ of the market, by 
the instrumental rationality of corporate planning – a gauntlet so long that those needs that do emerge 
from it are battered to a pulp that is virtually unrecognizable by those to whom they putatively belong.
509
  
 
The French philosopher Jean Baudrillard, who regards consumerism as “a fundamental 
mutation in the ecology of the human species,”510 takes this argument concerning the lack of 
consumer freedom even further. He contends that commodities constitute a control 
mechanism, which operates to ensure neoliberal order – that “categories of objects … quite 
tyrannically induce categories of persons” whose behaviors align with the status quo.511 It is 
possible to contest that at least some people do utilize commodities in a subversive manner. 
For example, an individual may interpret a mainstream film in a manner entirely contrary to 
its intended, ‘dominant reading,’512 or he/she may modify or disfigure a prized, branded item 
of clothing in an act of rebellion. However, such forms of resistance stand to be co-opted 
and/or commodified by manufacturers, a case in point being the production of ‘already-
ripped’ jeans catering for and thus containing young people’s rebellious inclinations.513 In 
fact, the environmental sociologist Michael Mayerfeld Bell believes that ripped jeans, whether 
store-bought or personally effected, constitute conspicuous waste and therefore complicity 
with, rather than resistance to, the neoliberal consumerist status quo. As he contends: “Who 
but the environmentally powerful could afford to deliberately rip their clothes and be so 
confident about their social status as to wear them in public?” 514  People’s fixation on 
commodity acquisition is politically neutralizing, since it involves them focusing on “relative 
trivialities, compared to matters of life and death, political and civil rights, or the future of the 
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planet.” Attention is given to “which product or service to select,” rather than to larger issues 
such as “whether to and how to consume.”515 Along similarly critical lines, American literary 
and cultural theorist Fredric Jameson suggests that today, the creation of culture itself has 
been reduced to the production and reification of commodities.
516
 A genuinely creative and 
free act would be people deciding for themselves what they actually need, how many 
commodities should be produced to meet those needs, and how natural and other resources 
should be allocated, utilized and distributed in the process.
517
 But this is denied within the 
neoliberal consumer society, and instead freedom to consume is made compulsory within 
both the public sphere and the domain of subjectivity itself.
518
 Publically, Margaret Thatcher 
and her acolytes framed consumption as the pinnacle of “active citizenship,”519 in so doing 
transforming it from a choice into a politico-moral imperative. Then, as the 60s counter-
cultural philosopher Herbert Marcuse explains, at the level of one’s private life any rejection 
of consumerism – in reference to which one is supposed to build one’s identity and be 
recognized in society – is tantamount to a rejection of oneself.520 
This invites consideration of what type of identity consumerism actually affords 
people. As discussed earlier, alienation and subordination in contemporary work have obliged 
individuals to pursue identity construction through other means, most notably commodity 
consumption. The Polish-born social philosopher Zygmunt Bauman admits that the consumer 
market offers a person at least some sense of certainty, by allowing him/her to make 
individual choices concerning product acquisition, while guaranteeing that these choices will 
receive social approval.
521
 Don Slater agrees that consumer culture is reassuring to 
individuals, because it “‘technicizes’ the project of the self by treating all problems as 
solvable through various commodities.” So, rather than perceiving herself holistically and 
coming to terms with imperfections and aging, a woman may view her body in a grid-like 
fashion, with every imperfection in a given area having a purchasable cure. 
Emotional/behavioral issues also are technicized and their solutions commodified, in the form 
of self-help books and therapy. Advertising provides guidance on products, “allow[ing] us to 
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orientate ourselves to the social meanings of things in a commercial world.”522 In so doing it 
operates much as religious leaders did in the past, who too ‘guided’ the faithful through the 
trials and tribulations of life,
523
 and kept them docile and politically debilitated in the process. 
Consumerism has become the new religion – “sacred times [are now] … essentially consumer 
moments.”524 
These reflections disclose the sheer depth of contemporary individual commitment to 
and belief in consumerism as a meaning-giving or even salvific practice. Such devotion may 
be attributed to a combination of factors, including economic crises, Taylorism, installment 
credit, advertising, and the promise of consumerist freedom. In the succeeding pages, 
however, focus falls on the manufacturing of gender, because ‘ideal’ types of masculinity and 
femininity are potent catalysts for individual consumer activities. Gender is intimate and so its 
social constructedness is very easily forgotten. By focusing on gender construction through 
consumerism – something both coerced and willingly taken up – it is possible to begin 
comprehending why humans forfeit subjective autonomy, morally and politically meaningful 
relations, and quite frankly their grip on reality, to climb into the hamster wheel of 
conspicuous consumption. 
 
Manufacturing the gendered self 
 
Gender constitutes a valuable site of analysis, because it is constructed and practiced on a 
day-to-day basis, and can transform quietly or be reconceptualized explicitly in light of 
societal changes. Gender styles are dictated by the societies people inhabit, such that people 
sexually assigned as male or female are expected to exhibit a highly specific and proper range 
of behavior. Men are supposed to be ‘masculine,’ and women, ‘feminine,’ with each 
stereotypic category framed in reference to societal needs. As the Australian sociologist 
Raewyn Connell puts it: 
 
People engaging in everyday conduct – across the spectrum from conversation and housework to 
interaction styles and economic behaviour – are held accountable in terms of their presumed ‘sex 
category’ as man or woman. The conduct produced in the light of this accountability is not a product of 
gender, it is gender itself. We make our own gender, but we are not free to make it however we like.
525
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This constant interplay between a dominant societal discourse and individual gendering 
makes the latter a rich object of analysis. Dominant gender types reinforce political, 
economic, and cultural aspects of daily life. So too, change in any one of these aspects of 
society is likely to be reflected in prevailing gender norms. But at the same time, rather than 
being simply passive, gender identity can also facilitate change. The individual’s self-
reflexive capacity to remake his or her gender can have a profound societal impact. The 
subsequent analysis emphasizes the transformations of feminine and masculine models as a 
consequence of the emergence of the neoliberal consumer society. For femininity, this era 
may have involved a relatively seamless transition, but changes demanded in the 
conceptualization and practice of masculinity have been radical. The following is an overview 
of what consumer and gender studies theorists from the global North have to say about the 
increasing imbrication of consumption with ‘the heights’ of femininity and masculinity. Their 
insights shed light on why contemporary individuals dedicate themselves so wholeheartedly 
to consumerism at the expense of all else. 
 
Consumption-oriented femininity in the global North 
 
To date, most studies of compulsive shopping have found that far more women than men are 
afflicted by this ‘disorder.’ Some marketing experts attribute this to the fact that in most 
societies, shopping has always been ‘a woman’s role;’ others add that women like to shop, 
because they derive a sense of self-worth from finding bargains for their families and 
themselves.
526
 Certainly, the anthropological record lends some support to the idea that 
women are commonly the societal gatherers. A gatherer would experience pleasure if, for 
instance, she happens upon a booty of foodstuffs well exceeding her and her clan’s 
requirements and expectations for that day.
527
 However, according to the American 
sociologist Ronald Faber, compulsive shopping is considered a disorder precisely because it 
goes beyond the logic of subsistence. It consists in a relatively “irresistible urge to buy or 
shop which leads to spending far more time than intended and/or purchasing more than can be 
afforded or needed.”528 Yet, given that consumerism entails insatiable acquisitiveness often in 
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relation to unnecessary items, perhaps it should itself be identified as a pathology, with 
compulsive shopping being merely an extreme manifestation of the general disorder. This 
parallels the contention of consumer psychologist Rajan Nataraajan and management scholar 
Brent Goff that compulsive shopping is not essentially anomalous behavior, but situated at the 
extreme end of the continuum of consumer behavior in general.
529
 It is wrong to pathologize 
women as compulsive shoppers, because this recasts mainstream consumerism as normal and 
indeed benign – which it is not. Daily, women are subjected to media messages aimed at 
transforming them into consumers of unnecessary goods. Even so, not all of them behave 
accordingly all of the time. Raewyn Connell, for example, points out that most women at least 
some of the time shop for necessities for their families, and that such domestic consumption 
involves a great deal of hard work and little consumer-oriented gratification. As she puts it, 
“[h]ousewives do not spend their time lolling on couches and scoffing chocolates.”530 
Still, the British media and cultural theorist Bill Osgerby, commenting on 
transformations in femininity in the global North, advances that since the Second World War, 
large-scale urbanization resulted in people shedding small-town conservatism and traditional 
gender roles. Many women gained psychological and economic empowerment through war-
time employment, and this could not be reversed easily.
531
 The post-war economy required 
ever greater numbers of consumers for an ever increasing array of products. In the decades 
after the war, and at least partly through second wave feminist efforts in the global North, the 
housewife archetype made way for the liberated ‘New Woman’ archetype. She was 
supposedly free of the household, husband and children, and could equal any man in the 
affairs of business and consumption alike. Urbanization also drew black women out of 
subsistence provisioning and into the housewife role. Yet, as professional opportunities 
increasingly became available to them, these women too began aspiring to consumptive 
femininity and were encouraged in this by white advertisers especially.
532
 In fact, the 
American feminist bell hooks contends that black women have become so immersed in what 
she deems “compulsive consumerism,” that they will “lie, cheat, and steal to be able to ‘buy’ 
                                                          
529
 Rajan Nataraajan and Brent G. Goff, “Compulsive Buying: Toward a Reconceptualization,” Journal of Social 
Behavior and Personality 6/6 (1991): 307-328. 
530
 Connell, Gender in World Perspective, 80. 
531
 Bill Osgerby, Playboys in Paradise: Masculinity, Youth and Leisure-Style in Modern America (Oxford: Berg, 
2001), 51-52. 
532
 Susannah Walker, “Black Dollar Power: Assessing African American Consumerism Since 1945,” in African 
American Urban History Since World War II, eds. Kenneth L. Kusmer and Joe W. Trotter (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2009), 400-401. 
115 
 
all that [they] … desire.”533  At least in part, she attributes this problem to the fact that 
“constant consumerism is such an encouraged societal norm.”534 Osgerby indicates that this 
new ‘exemplary’ femininity was embodied in the American feminist, Gloria Steinem. Her 
looks, charm and dress drew the attention of the media, and she became emblematic of a new 
kind of liberal feminist who, while fighting for women’s rights, could revel in “a 
consumption-driven lifestyle and an embrace of fashionable stylishness.”535 This version of 
the New Woman came to represent a ‘commodity feminism’ aligned with corporate interests, 
implicit in which was the assumption that women’s emancipation can be had through 
careerism and conspicuous consumption.
536
 The New Zealand media theorist Hilary Radner 
decries this hyper-individualism as a debilitation of feminism. She argues that this brand of 
feminism, readily glorified in the mass media, “seems to reply to the women’s movement 
precisely by containing its demands.” It entails “the inscription of this position … within an 
institutional structure that remains largely patriarchal and the representation of this position as 
the capacity to act as a consumer.”537 
Today, Hollywood actresses and celebrity songstresses supposedly embody this 
‘empowered femininity,’538 defined in terms of money, beauty and media hype. Yet even their 
beauty all too often is manufactured, be it through plastic surgery and cosmetics, or digital 
editing and lighting techniques – making these women literally impossibly beautiful. 
Nonetheless, they remain the promoters of what Connell terms the “exemplary … 
femininities” of our time, 539  and every second of their luscious, consumption-oriented 
lifestyles is painstakingly documented in the media and produced as a desirable dream for 
ordinary women. Popular women’s magazines abound with advertisements featuring these 
women and product lines endorsed or owned by them. They set “impossible physical 
standards,” yet what is suggested is that any woman can become like them through 
acquisition of the products in question.
540
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Radner has analyzed how women attempt to achieve this idealized femininity, 
principally oriented around the flawless body. Working out constitutes an avenue that 
Hollywood actress Jane Fonda was quick to ‘capitalize’ upon. In the highly publicized Jane 
Fonda’s Workout Book, a woman’s body is broken down into component parts to be 
disciplined into shape through exercise.
541
 But this is not enough. The body must also be 
rendered feminine through appropriate attire – a costly endeavor, given the price of 
fashionable items and the relentless shortening of fashion cycles themselves.
542
 And aside 
from cosmetic surgery, which Fonda herself eventually underwent, facial imperfections to 
which the media alerts hitherto oblivious women can be ‘corrected’ using a mind-spinning 
array of cosmetics. World-renowned feminist Germaine Greer argues that even young girls 
are subject to the demeaning gaze of the media. They too are trained into psychological 
dependence on cosmetics, as any imperfection ostensibly signals a failure in femininity.
543
 
These industries ply girls and women with dubious products, certain only of their escalating 
profits. And women, while they occasionally may enjoy getting ‘made up,’ will never achieve 
the feminine perfection promised to them. This type of femininity is an economic ruse. 
Rather than achieving subjecthood, the women of neoliberalism remain objects of a 
predominantly male gaze. This so-called exemplary femininity, centered on an outer-directed 
“to-be-looked-at-ness,”544 is not a recipe for autonomy. The British media theorist David 
Gauntlett drives this point home when discussing contemporary women’s magazines. 
Magazines such as Cosmopolitan and Glamour may adopt a women’s liberation register, by 
thematizing women’s pursuit of autonomy and independence in their editorials, articles and 
features. But the image they sell to women and the products they tout barely provide any exit 
from objecthood within the system of capitalist patriarchal social relations. He believes that 
although these magazines “celebrate women’s opportunities to play with different types of 
imagery [and thus] … encourage a degree of playfulness … they would never encourage 
women to step outside their carefully imagined boundaries of the ‘sexy,’ the ‘stylish’ and the 
‘fashionable.’”545 Radner, in reference to Vogue magazine, similarly advances that even if 
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women’s magazines do cultivate subjectivity in women, this only allows them to become 
‘display subjects.’546 These magazines push them to define themselves in terms of outward 
appearance, and to constantly compare themselves to other women.
547
 This in turn, generates 
feelings of inadequacy readily parasitized by product and lifestyle advertisers.
548
 
It must be remembered however, that women’s reactions to mainstream media also 
involve choice. The images of femininity encountered in magazines and other media 
constitute a “bounded collection” from which women select a recognizable mainstream 
identity.
549
 Still, they actively buy into and act upon an idea of femininity that is inherently 
image- and consumption-oriented.
550
 Quite possibly, what has facilitated this extreme 
outward-oriented shift in femininity is the perverse assumption that appearances are reality, or 
that looks by default will transform into accomplishments.
551
 This might explain why many 
women spend so much time obsessing over, shopping for, and fixatedly enacting, the 
exemplary femininity of the day – a femininity of consumption. Here, time collapses into 
spending money on achieving the feminine-self as a commodity-in-itself. 
 
Consumption-oriented masculinity in the global North 
 
So why have men transformed themselves into image-oriented consumers? After all, they are 
neither anthropologically nor traditionally associated with this kind of consumption. They are 
supposed to be ‘the hunters,’ not the gatherers; men are constructed in capitalist patriarchal 
societies as providers, not shoppers. Nonetheless, given the need to expand the consumer base 
once society shifted to a consumer orientation, men as bosses and workers simply had to 
change. Industrialization and workplace automation precipitated such change, because 
alienated workers could not continue primarily identifying themselves with and through their 
labor. In Creating the Modern Man, American scholar Tom Pendergast suggests that in turn, 
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this workplace alienation was intensified as proprietary capitalism gave way to corporate 
capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Now workers were further 
reduced in status. Ultimately, given Western men’s long-standing practice of basing their 
identity/masculinity on their work, such occupational denigration “brought sweeping changes 
to the culture of masculinity.” 552  Slowly but surely, as Pendergast demonstrates through 
analyzing half a century of men’s magazines, men’s self-identification with work gave way to 
a consensual masculinity decidedly biased toward consumerism. In addition to clothing 
fashions and automobiles, the commercialization of sports and sporting goods ensured that 
most men became co-opted into the merchandising machine.
553
 
The consumerist redefinition of masculinity required a radical shift from the dominant 
‘breadwinner’ ethic of the Victorian value system. The new masculinity involved a man 
defining himself in reference to narcissistic conspicuous consumption rather than honesty and 
self-denial. What is critically important here, politically speaking, is that appearance and 
personality become more important than motives and actions. As Pendergast elaborates it, 
Victorian masculinity involved a man basing his self-worth either on his work skills, or on 
entrepreneurship exemplified in the ‘self-made man.’ It also entailed a man providing not 
simply for himself but as a relational commitment to his family. In terms of this hegemonic 
model of masculinity, success depended on having the right values and acting in the correct 
way, rather than hinging on showmanship. This archetype thus 
 
referred not to a static figure but to an entire narrative of becoming. The self-made man was someone 
who started with little and, through the diligent application of habits and values, became something and 
someone much richer. The narrative of the self-made man was thus a narrative of ascent; it took a man 
higher.
554
 
 
This version of the capitalist patriarchal hegemony was tied to an ontology of sorts, in which 
austerity, courage, duty, transparency and determination were key to being a man, and to 
becoming a better one at that. What held similar ontological potency was providing for one’s 
family. As the American sociologist Michael Kimmel indicates, to be a man the individual did 
not have to be sporty, fashionable, particularly intelligent or even physically powerful. Rather, 
the “non-negotiable” qualifier for masculinity was being an effective provider as a 
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consequence of workplace success.
555
 With masculinity principally equated with provision, 
for most of the nineteenth century men bought for their families rather than for themselves. 
The ideological power of the provider ethic also explains men’s initial reluctance to 
participate in the emerging consumer society. Bill Osgerby accordingly maintains that around 
the turn of the century, a man’s “participation … in the new universe of consumerism … 
[still] was driven not by personal gratification but by the needs and desires of his family.”556 
Yet, Kimmel believes that the Victorian model of masculinity did constitute a stressor, 
given the immense responsibility for the happiness of several people that it placed on one 
single self-denying individual’s shoulders.557  Added to this, from the last decades of the 
nineteenth century onward, partly because of increasing circulation of advertisement-bearing 
men’s magazines, hegemonic masculinity became challenged by a more self-gratifying, 
individualistic and consumer-oriented model of masculinity. The new masculinity was 
powerfully alluring, and the tension between it and the Victorian model played itself out in 
various media, particularly in men’s magazines. In the late 1890s, the two dominant men’s 
magazines in the US, Munsey’s and McClure’s, continued advocating the breadwinner 
archetype and ethic of the self-made man as a way “to cope with the modern world.” 
Concomitantly, however, they represented new ideas of masculinity related to consumerism, 
in part because of their growing reliance on advertising revenue.
558
 This profound sociological 
tension was even more palpable in the Saturday Evening Post, a magazine edited by George 
Horace Lorimer who tenaciously clung to the propagation of the hegemonic model of 
masculinity while having to accommodate, purely for economic reasons, “an onslaught of 
advertising that offered images quite contrary to Victorian masculinity.”559 In short, economic 
considerations largely underpinned the touting of consumption-oriented masculinity. Still, the 
agonistic negotiation of masculinity reflected in these magazines, and perplexity over this 
issue among male readers, indicate that the new masculinity was not simply taught to a docile 
readership. Finally, the Depression also dealt a severe blow to hegemonic masculinity, 
particularly because work-based identity construction – already jeopardized by workplace 
automation – was now entirely impossible for the thousands of men who had lost their jobs. 
What made matters even worse for them was that their wives, for whom they were supposed 
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to provide in order to be men, went out and secured jobs.
560
 The Depression taught many men 
that being self-denying and virtuous did not protect one from the ravages of the economy. 
Honesty did not necessarily pay. The decline of the Victorian model of masculinity had 
begun. And in contrast, even though more than one-third of the American population was 
unemployed during the Depression years, the new consumerist masculinity propagated 
through advertising survived relatively unscathed. That is, while the new consumer economy 
suffered considerably,
561
 the idea of reorienting masculinity from Victorian ideals toward 
individualism and consumption flourished. This is evident from the continued popularity, 
even during the Depression years, of Collier’s magazine which promoted consumerist ideas of 
masculinity instead of the virtues of Victorian manhood.
562
  
For Pendergast, consumption-oriented masculinity remained resilient because it 
“allowed men to understand themselves through their personality, their physical vitality, and 
their ability to enjoy their leisure time.” It allowed them to consider “themselves … successful 
in these terms despite the difficulties they may have been facing in other areas of their life.
563
 
Osgerby corroborates this idea when he cites the skyrocketing sales of Esquire in the very 
midst of the Depression – a costly ‘men’s-only’ magazine which actively promoted leisure-
oriented consumption.
564
 Crucially, this magazine made explicit associations between leisure 
time, consumerism and masculinity, and promised to help fashion readers’ masculinity in 
reference to this new constellation. In a promotional text for the magazine titled “The Art of 
Living and the New Leisure,” editor Arnold Gingrich argued that the increased leisure time 
afforded men through the New Deal did not constitute a “right” of the worker so much as it 
comprised a “duty” to engage in leisure-oriented consumption. Further, he claimed that most 
men had no idea how to use this leisure time, but that Esquire would guide them in this, 
including in how to dress and what to do, consume, imbibe, and play.
565
 Gingrich thus sought 
to organize the leisure time of Esquire readers in line with the new consumer economy. This 
also stood to draw more advertisers to the magazine’s pages. The magazine also addressed the 
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discomfiting association of shopping with effeminacy. Its heterosexual masculinism received 
emphasis through inclusion of features on dangerous sports and contributions by 
‘swashbuckling’ authors such as Ernest Hemingway. 566  But at the same time, what was 
actively advanced was the idea that shopping has always been the domain of men. The 
argument went that when out shopping, women buy the things their men demand, and when 
they shop for themselves it is actually to prettify themselves for their men. The implication 
was that men are the masterminds behind all of woman’s shopping ventures. Further, women 
were deemed “woefully inept in the art of good living,”567 and derided for such failings as 
their apparent inability to cook. Finally, Esquire’s routine sexual objectification of women 
through voluptuous illustrations concretized the magazine’s ‘maleness.’568 Esquire became a 
staple for servicemen during the Second World War, and the magazine reflected the “ideals 
they were fighting for – not simply the virtues of democracy, but also the comforts and 
pleasures of modern consumerism.”569 Here again, consumption and political liberty became 
hopelessly confused with one another. 
Admittedly, during the Second World War, it looked as if Victorian masculinity might 
reclaim hegemony. In this life-threatening circumstance, the nuclear family was infused with 
new value, and the rate of marriage increased as dramatically as the divorce rate declined.
570
 
However, after the war, disillusionment with the nuclear family set in again. Many war-time 
marriages had been spur-of-the-moment affairs, and from 1940 onward had allowed new 
fathers to avoid the draft.
571
 In 1946, with all of this behind the American people, the divorce 
rate more than doubled.
572
 And importantly, while consumerism lessened during the war it 
was not extinguished. Consumption-oriented men’s magazines remained popular, and the 
war-time economy actually generated more consumer goods than military equipment.
573
 The 
author of a Time feature, for instance, gloated that the US had during the war supplied its 
people with guns and with butter, and if not always with adequate butter then at least “‘with 
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plenty of fur coats to wear between meals.’”574 Consumerism proved resilient and increased 
prodigiously during the post-war economic boom. This, together with the escalating rate of 
divorce indicating disillusionment with the nuclear family archetype, obliterated any hope of 
salvaging the traditional model of Western masculinity. 
The new, consumption-oriented model of masculinity was becoming hegemonic. 
During the war, True magazine, which sought to make its readers “conceive of themselves as 
consumers,” included questionnaires on consumer and leisure choices in several of its 
editions, and even went so far as to frame fashion-consciousness and self-exploration through 
consumer goods as antifascist activities.
575
 Like Esquire, its inclusion of sexually prone 
women shielded it from the charge of effeminacy, as did its framing of women’s shopping as 
an activity principally dictated by men.
576
 Both of these strategies continued to be used by the 
men’s magazine industry after the war.577  
Another highly significant indication of the post-war hegemony of a consumerist 
manhood, was the radical shift of black men’s magazines toward a resonant vision of black 
masculinity. Pendergast demonstrates that prior to the war, black magazines promoted 
masculinities not at all associated with consumerism. These ranged from a black masculinity 
of the white Victorian mold in the Colored American Magazine, Alexander’s and the Voice of 
the Negro, to associating masculinity with engagement in the fight for civil rights, typified by 
editorials in W. E. B. du Bois’s Horizon magazine.578 What constituted a rift between black 
masculinity and consumerism, was the fact that white companies did not see the black 
population as a meaningful consumer base, and consequently were reluctant to advertise in 
black magazines. Yet, black magazines needed white advertising revenue, and so began 
actively courting potential advertisers. To this end, Opportunity put out a call for advertisers 
in 1931, in which black buying power received significant emphasis.
579
 Black magazines 
frequently featured black celebrities, especially sports stars, and no secret was made of their 
consumption-driven lifestyles.
580
 In this way, black men were slowly brought round to the 
idea of associating the height of masculinity with consumption. However, this new 
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masculinity was fully embraced only in Ebony magazine, launched in 1945. Its founder 
impressed on the world that black Americans are as capable of consumption as their white 
counterparts, and white advertising proceeded to stream into the magazine. Like white men’s 
magazines of the time, Ebony associated masculinity with consumerism, leisure, appearance 
and personality. Less and less attention was paid to race, and highly sexualized black women 
received greater thematization. A “sunny outlook” on life rather than political radicalism was 
demanded from readers.
581
 Politically inclined readers over the years were guided to equate 
active consumerism with black liberation. Even figures such as Huey P. Newton, leader of the 
militant Black Panther party from 1966 to the early 1980s, drew direct associations between 
black people’s political subordination and them “suffer[ing] from inadequate participation in 
consumption.”582 Black masculinity, too, became commodified and with this, time that could 
potentially have been spent on political organization collapsed into spending money on 
achieving ‘manhood.’ 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the hegemony of this new consumer-oriented masculinity 
consolidated around the phenomenal public response to Hugh Hefner’s Playboy magazine. 
The success of the magazine indicated that very many men had become far more comfortable 
conceiving of themselves as consumers. Correlatively, the popularity and publicity of the 
magazine allowed it to exercise widespread discursive influence on American men. It became 
something of a “national institution.”583 When Playboy and other men’s magazines promoting 
“sex and materialism,” such as Gentlement’s Quarterly (GQ) and For Him Magazine (FHM), 
hit the shelves in South Africa from the mid-1990s onward, they proved similarly influential 
in inflecting ideas of masculinity in this domain.
584
 The feminist writer Diana Russell 
considers these magazines a “manifestation … of US cultural imperialism … [and] a serious 
problem for South Africa to deal with,” as they “reflect the … materialism … misogyny, and 
homophobia prevalent in US culture.” 585  In Playboy, masculinity was equated quite 
unselfconsciously with appearance, personality and taste in matters of consumption. The 
threat of effeminacy was neutralized through unprecedentedly explicit sexualized images of 
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women,
586
 and men’s superiority to women in what were ‘erroneously’ perceived as feminine 
activities, such as cooking and interior decorating, received emphasis.
587
 In short, the 
‘playboy’ was permitted to manifest aesthetic and other sensitivities in matters of commodity 
consumption, precisely because he was reassured of his virility through his voyeuristic 
consumption of photographs of female nudes. Further, insofar as he was encouraged to 
“equate … satisfaction with hedonistic consumption” of goods and women, rather than with 
work or family, the playboy operated in reference to “two central fantasies of … modern 
consumer culture” – that one is free to do what one pleases in consumer society, and “that 
happiness inhere[s] in material things.”588 
The decisiveness of this hedonistic turn in the mid twentieth-century capitalist 
patriarchal culture exposed the weakening of the erstwhile dominant masculinity tied to the 
nuclear family and work. Paradoxically though, men had to work harder than ever before to 
afford increasingly expensive consumer items. In fact, as Don Slater points out, some scholars 
believe that the incongruity between attitudes required at work and those needed for 
consumption stands to undermine the process of economic modernization.
589
 Paul Hoch 
explains that while “our whole social apparatus for buying and selling incessantly trumpets 
the commodities it claims are the sine qua non of the masculinity required for the ‘playboy’ 
life of leisure and conspicuous sexual consumption … our production system still insists that 
men orient to the more traditional masculinity of work … discipline and control.” 590 
However, the sociologist Daniel Rossides sees a relatively unproblematic correlation rather 
than a profound contradiction between hard work and consumerist masculinity. When 
discussing the American feminist Barbara Ehrenreich’s argument that Playboy magazine 
signals American men’s flight from commitment, Rossides asserts that the breadwinner ethic 
may have weakened substantially, but that men still are willing to work hard. But now they 
are willing to work hard mainly for themselves.
591
 In other words, diligent work constitutes a 
means to the end of buying commodities promising to augment a commodified masculinity.
592
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In the words of the great American sociologist Robert Bellah: “an emphasis on hard work and 
self-support can go hand in hand with an isolating preoccupation with the self.” 593  The 
neoliberal economic machine is kept going precisely due to the ‘symbiotic’ relationship 
between work and leisure-oriented consumption, and between such consumption and the 
‘exemplary’ constructed models of masculinity and femininity of our time. 
While the Victorian model of masculinity placed immense pressure on men because of 
the responsibility and self-denial it demanded,
594
 the new hegemonic masculinity is equally 
stressful. The sexual objectification and visual consumption of women may be central to this 
increasingly global conception of masculinity, but its consumerist focus cultivates in men 
themselves an “outer-directed” individualism, demanding constant adaption to retain 
‘manhood.’ 595  Paradoxically, although men keep their dominant position as voyeurs of 
women, they too have become objects of the gaze. This shift may evoke fears over blurring 
lines between homo- and heterosexuality, especially since many men experience pleasure in 
being looked at.
596
 Men also are now obliged to keep up with fashion trends in order to retain 
their status as men, and in effect the consumer economy feeds off their insecurities, profiting 
from constantly shifting goalposts. This instability was previously unknown, since in earlier 
versions of manhood, “certain … tests … made it easier to ascertain if one were a true man: 
the duel, courage in war, and … the possession of willpower as well as the manly virtues of 
‘quiet strength’ and of an acceptable moral posture.”597 Finally, the consumerist orientation of 
the new masculinity pushes men to earn large amounts of money or incur debt to remain 
‘men.’ Given increasing job insecurities that come with global free markets, “the ‘worker’ 
aspect of masculinity [thus] creates many problems for men attempting to construct healthy 
gender identities.”598 These precarities now affect every neoliberal economy in the global 
North. In the global South, the social changes described here are even more extreme. 
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Consumer culture: political debilitation 
 
Focusing largely on capitalist patriarchal societies in the affluent world, this chapter has 
indicated the link between consumerism and the loss of subjective autonomy. By the 
twentieth century, media advertising had persuasively coerced individuals to use their free 
time in ways that support the existing economy. Against this backdrop, the rise of 
commodified models of femininity and masculinity discloses the extent to which women and 
men have become almost ontologically trapped within the neoliberal framework. However, 
rather than being merely passive victims of these structural shifts, people gave fuel to these 
changes – particularly where the reframing of gender was concerned. Today a global 
hedonistic turn in behavior and gender identity involves profound loss of autonomy and 
militates against political mobilization. Indeed, many people come to believe in the idea of 
‘consumer sovereignty,’ and accordingly, to equate consumption with political expression. 
Also alluring are the pleasures to be had from personal display and the related construction of 
prototypical media images of masculinity and femininity. There is pleasure in looking, in 
being looked at, and in fashioning oneself in reference to the commodities at one’s disposal, 
superficial as these may be. Ultimately, then, structural and individual agency are involved in 
buttressing the neoliberal hegemony. As Raewyn Connell argues of the construction of 
masculinities, they “are neither programmed in our genes, nor fixed by social structure, prior 
to social interaction … [but] come into existence as people act … [and] are actively produced, 
using resources and strategies available in a given social setting.”599 The implication is that 
for consumer-oriented processes of identity and gender construction to occur, and so for 
neoliberalism to go uncontested, people actually have to ‘take up the offer,’ as Connell puts 
it.
600
 The next chapter shows that people in South Africa are choosing to do just that, thus 
marginalizing alternative modes of life and different models of gender. In effect, what is 
taking place is the globalization of neoliberal consumerism as a monolithic way of life.
601
 It is 
both ironic and tragic that repeatedly colonized nations, such as South Africa, so easily 
succumb to this neocolonization, and so quickly discard their own cultural creativity. 
  
                                                          
599
 Raewyn W. Connell, The Men and the Boys (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 2000), 12. 
600
 Ibid., 162. 
601
 Ibid., 39-41. 
127 
 
Chapter 4: The ‘South African Dream’ 
 
The first and second chapters of this thesis described how international political pressures and 
domestic policy decisions, respectively, led to the adoption of neoliberal economics in South 
Africa. But it was not only the actions of Big Men that led to the hegemony of free market 
values; the pursuit of media-promoted consumer-based lifestyles by ‘little people’ completed 
this so-called ‘development’ paradigm. This took place despite African people’s earlier 
resistance to the capitalist system undermining traditional communities, fragmenting ethnic 
identities, and refashioning ideas of gender. Certainly, structural changes underpinned by 
segregationist legislation sped up urbanization and made communal lifestyles difficult to 
maintain. Still, this societal shift could not have been possible without some kind of 
endorsement from the South African citizenry. These same citizens had for many years fought 
for what ‘black’ leaders had promised them – a fair, humane, and explicitly socialist, 
reorganization of their country. Now many rapidly succumb to the homogenizing consumerist 
aspirations promoted under neoliberal hegemony. The neoliberal turn of the African National 
Congress (ANC) in post-1994 South Africa was dealt with at length in the second chapter, so 
it is treated only in broad brushstrokes here. What is explored in this chapter, are the reasons 
why indigenous South Africans, despite being discriminated against by European or ‘white’ 
rulers for hundreds of years, so easily fell in the post-liberation era for the consumerist 
trappings of yet another system hatched by their erstwhile oppressors. The historian and 
Africanist William Beinart emphasizes the avidity of indigenous consumerism at the expense 
of more autonomous grassroots African frameworks. As he argues, “urbanization by no 
means rules out ethnic identification, [but] South Africa may be distinctive in the degree to 
which African people have lost rural ethnic roots.”602 He proceeds to correlate this loss of 
traditional culture with the uptake of the global consumer ‘monoculture’ – to borrow an 
ecofeminist term from Vandana Shiva
603
 – as individuals became gradually “sucked into 
modes of living that demanded new forms of consumption.”604 Indeed, in a rather short space 
of time the consumer ethic radically influenced South Africans of all races, gaining even 
greater impetus as they ‘took up the offer’ of neoliberal gender identities. As in the global 
North, in South Africa the new ‘exemplars’ of masculinity and femininity strengthen the 
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neoliberal hegemony by “setting standards, claiming popular assent and discrediting those 
who fall short.”605 Rich indigenous ideas of relational personhood, no less than traditional 
African patterns of living, for the most part have been quashed beneath these new gender 
identities and the lifestyles to which they are linked. 
South Africa is an ethnically diverse nation, and the analyses that follow interweave 
discursive and behavioral changes from among peoples of several ethnic groups. The changes 
these different groups underwent did not occur simultaneously though, since their access to 
property, work and consumption, unfolded over decades. Class interaction over the years has 
involved many dynamics, including domination, negotiation, voluntary cross-cultural 
assimilation, and so on. There was a leveling out of economic opportunities in the late 1990s, 
but only within the middle class and elite strata, producing what has been called a black 
bourgeoisie. The subsequent discussion focuses particularly on the socio-cultural 
transformations experienced by black South Africans – the country’s majority, some 80 
percent of citizens
606
 – consisting mainly of Xhosa and Zulu individuals. As the majority, they 
constitute the primary agents of change in South Africa. An attempt is made to trace the 
recent postcolonial history of how this majority changed, losing their cultural uniqueness and 
specificity while ostensibly gaining greater access to worker and political rights, and 
consequently, to opportunities for consumerism. 
For hundreds of years, indigenous South Africans resisted the encroachment of 
authorities upon their autonomy. The country has a long history of domination and retaliation, 
stretching back to at least the middle of the seventeenth century. The discussion to follow, 
however, hones in on people’s resistance to becoming a ‘standing reserve’ of labor for 
capitalism. Significantly, this opposition implies possession of an alternative vision of life and 
self. The question is: how was such resistance gradually overcome, through processes of war, 
disease, and enclosure? Consideration is given to why South Africans became depoliticized, 
and their ideals and gender styles homogenized, through consumerism in the post-apartheid 
era. 
 
 
 
                                                          
605
 Raewyn W. Connell, Masculinities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 214. 
606
 At mid-year, Statistics South Africa estimated the ‘Black African’ population group to comprise 80.2 percent 
of the total South African population of around fifty-four million. Statistics South Africa, “Media Release: Mid-
Year Population Estimates,” Statistics South Africa, 2014. Available at: http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/?p=2990. 
Date accessed: October 8, 2014. 
129 
 
Consumerism and the loss of indigenous autonomy 
 
Battles for autonomy from 1800s on 
 
In 1806, the British occupied the Cape for the second time, and saw that little development 
had taken place during the time that the territory had been under Batavian, that is to say, 
Dutch rule. The Cape had experienced a recession, as the market for Cape produce was 
extremely limited, and the 1799 Frontier War had ruined many farmers. Their troubles were 
compounded by Xhosa raids on their livestock, and the drawn-out rebellion of their Hottentot 
servants who colluded with the Xhosa.
607
 Notably, although the British shared the settlers’ 
view that the Xhosa were no more than “savages,”608 they were disdainful of the settlers 
themselves. So, while the Afrikaners saw themselves as civilized and therefore felt entitled 
“to rule the land and its backward indigenous tribes,”609 the British considered them “a rural, 
isolated, relatively backward people … [with] no books, paintings or innovations on which … 
[they] could pride themselves.”610 
For UK-based South African historian Saul Dubow, this underdeveloped condition of 
the Colony, and the prejudicial British assumptions relating to both the indigenous 
populations and the Afrikaners, are crucial to understanding the nature of the approach to 
settlement that the British adopted subsequently.
611
 In short, their aim became that of 
industrializing and commercializing the territory, necessitating the ‘civilization’ of its 
inhabitants in order to shape a competent work force. In relation to this, the historical 
geographer Alan Lester focuses on the early to mid nineteenth-century colonization of the 
Eastern Cape Xhosa. He elaborates on how the British sought to ‘civilize’ these indigenes in 
such a way that they could accommodate themselves to a capitalist mode of production and 
consumption. This involved riding roughshod over indigenous patterns of life centered on 
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rural, communal living and largely subsistence-oriented work. Admittedly, the disruptive 
impact of these British endeavors on Xhosa subjectivity has come under dispute. Some 
acquisitive rather than needs-based behavior on the part of the Xhosa is reflected in early 
accounts of this people’s “enthusiastic propensity” for trade in articles quite unrelated to 
subsistence.
612
 It is argued that rather than focusing on staples, much trade engaged in by the 
Xhosa was in cattle, beads, iron and copper – items allowing for the accrual of prestige and 
wealth.
613
 Yet, many of these articles did serve to safeguard the Xhosa’s traditional way of 
life, and most importantly, their independence. Cattle, for instance, generated social respect 
and served as bridewealth, while iron and copper could be used for fashioning agricultural 
tools and weaponry. Such uses ran against British intentions to coerce traditional communities 
into relinquishing their independent lifestyles and submitting their bodies to exploitative labor 
under a colonial master. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, under capitalist patriarchal productivist economies, an 
intimate correlation exists between exploitative types of labor and diminution of worker 
autonomy and status. The related idea that individuals should be made to feel inferior to more 
readily become ‘productive,’ was manifest in early to mid nineteenth-century Cape colonial 
thought. The Cape colonist John Mitford Bowker articulated this inferiority-productivity 
relation as follows: 
 
Savage nations must be taught to fear and respect, to stand in awe of a nation whose manners and 
customs, whose religion, it is beneficial and desirable for them to adopt … [W]e must prove to these 
people that we are their superiors before we can ever hope for much good to be done among them, by 
conquering them if no milder means are effectual … Could the missionaries persuade the [indigenes] … 
to become a nation of cotton growers … conquering them would perhaps be unnecessary.614 
 
For Bowker, then, a sense of cultural, and even racial, inferiority was essential to improving 
or disciplining Xhosa subjectivity. Most striking is how this ‘civilizing mission,’ although at 
base an aggressive process of subordination and racism, was articulated as an act of 
generosity, and even salvation. Indeed, in light of the patronizing tenor of colonial discourse 
on civilizing the indigenes, it is unsurprising that the missionaries came to play such an active 
role. Briefly, although the missions established at the Cape at least in part were driven by 
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genuine humanitarian sentiment, a historical complicity with colonial authorities is 
indisputable. To clarify, although Lord Somerset, governor of the Cape from 1814 to 1826, 
was an advocate of colonial militarization, he believed that with the help of missionaries the 
Xhosa and other rebellious groupings could “be made more amenable to long term cultural 
transformation.”615 This thought was radical for the early nineteenth century, as it involved 
neutralizing, rather than expelling or annihilating, indigenous groups in the interest of colonial 
stability. With co-optation in mind, Somerset encouraged missionaries to acquaint Xhosa 
chiefs with agricultural processes and the ‘gift’ of civilization.616 Subsequent Cape governors 
persisted in these efforts, but given the enduring recalcitrance of the Xhosa, neutralization was 
pursued more frequently among other ethnic groups considered more culturally malleable. In 
1829, under the administration of Andries Stockenström, selected Khoi and mixed-race 
families, having been granted property rights and freedom from pass laws under Ordinance 50 
of 1828, were established at the Kat River and tasked with developing this land. The 
settlement was presided over by the Dutch Reformed Church, but very soon the community 
requested the leadership of James Read of the London Missionary Society (LMS). He set up 
schools and played an important role in facilitating the inhabitants’ agricultural successes, 
which were considerable.
617
 The Kat River constituted a model settlement, but the Khoi in the 
rest of the Colony were characterized as lacking a work ethic and prone to alcoholism – 
obliging employers to discipline them through wage docking among other means. In fact, 
their ‘masters’ asserted that Ordinance 50 had been passed prematurely, as the Khoi clearly 
had not yet developed the necessary restraint to deserve such freedoms.
618
 
To return to the Xhosa: endeavors to civilize this people persisted, in spite of or 
perhaps because of, a hardening of racial attitudes after the sixth Frontier War (1834-1835). 
This war was ignited by settlers continuing to illegitimately seize Xhosa cattle and land.
619
 
The Xhosa retaliated in an unprecedentedly aggressive manner, pillaging and razing hundreds 
of farms, seizing thousands of livestock, and killing numerous settlers and Hottentots.
620
 
During the war, colonial troops seized the Xhosa land between the Keiskamma and Kei rivers, 
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and Colonel Harry Smith was put in direct command of this conquered territory, renamed the 
Queen Adelaide Province. He was impatient to correct Xhosa subjectivity, particularly 
because this people could not be driven out of the new province. Smith proceeded to tell the 
Xhosa inhabitants of the Queen Adelaide Province “that they wished to become ‘real 
Englishmen.’” What he and Cape governor Benjamin d’Urban had in mind was “nothing less 
than the mass cultural transformation of the Xhosa, who were now, whether they liked it or 
not, British subjects.”621 It was believed that this could best be effected through institutional 
mechanisms such as churches, schools, magistrates, and the police. Again, missionaries were 
expected to instruct the Xhosa in religious values as well as industry, agriculture, and the fair 
treatment of women among other ‘civil’ behaviors. For instance, in religious life, so-called 
irrational superstitions were to be stamped out; in agriculture, a subsistence orientation was to 
be discouraged to make the Xhosa more industrious; and in ethical conduct, the gendered 
division of labor needed to be corrected. The practice of women tending the land, and boys 
herding the cattle instead of attending school, while adult Xhosa men enjoy a leisurely 
existence, was repugnant in colonial eyes.
622
 Colonists also advanced the striking idea that if 
the Xhosa adopted European clothing styles, discarding their “trash of brass, beads, wire, 
clay”623 and so on, this would “signify the systematic neutralising of Xhosa otherness.”624 
Tensions did exist between missionaries and the colonial authorities, particularly over 
the issue of forcing ‘civilization’ upon the Xhosa. In contrast to Harry Smith, some advocated 
a humanitarian, patient approach, which they believed would yield results precisely because 
the Xhosa could not stand being dictated to.
625
 Others felt that imperial expansion had been 
carried out unjustly, and that the indigenes, realizing this, were now bent on resisting any 
further colonial advances. As the Wesleyan reverend John Beecham explained it in 1838:  
 
The natives have had to surrender their lands without receiving for them adequate remuneration … [B]ut 
the moral wrong … committed … has been aggravated by the fraud practised upon their ignorance in the 
price … given for the lands first ceded by them. A few beads, or other trinkets, or something equally 
worthless, have been the consideration paid down for lands and possessions of incalculable value … [Yet, 
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t]he natives have soon discovered, that their means of subsistence have been diminished … [and so are] 
goaded by hunger and stimulated by revenge.
626
 
 
However, such critical reflections did not automatically imply that these missionaries were 
content to leave the Xhosa to their own cultural devices. For them, it was a moral imperative 
to ‘gift’ this people with Christianity and civilization. This is testified by the fact that although 
the Queen Adelaide Province was retroceded in December 1836,
627
 the missionaries remained 
active there. In fact, the reasoning went that because the indigenes were wronged by colonial 
authorities, it was an “obligation to confer upon them all the benefits of knowledge, 
civilization, education and Christianity”628 as a form of recompense. The moral tenor of the 
missionaries’ gradualist civilizing approach was palpable in an 1837 survey of missionary 
labors in South Africa. Here reverends John Choules and Thomas Smith unfavorably 
contrasted the heathen Xhosa with ‘their’ converts. They described tribal chiefs as “foremost 
in every species of wickedness;” claimed that traditional spiritual leaders are “children of the 
devil, and enemies of all righteousness;” and even generalized that the heathen Xhosa are 
subject “to the corruptions of their own hearts, unchecked by the thought of judgment to 
come.” These offenders were then juxtaposed with the Xhosa converts, who Choules and 
Smith claimed have flourished, free from the ‘neglect’ they had previously suffered.629 
Despite the patient approach taken by these missionaries to change the Xhosa, they 
continued to face an uphill battle. Most indigenes remained reluctant to accommodate 
themselves to the values of ‘Western civilization’ and to Christianity especially. Aversion to 
Christianity was alarming to Beecham and his followers, because for them other aspects of 
civilization could only be embraced subsequent to genuine conversion to the Christian faith. 
They believed that trying to civilize indigenes first through agriculture and clothing, and only 
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later through Christianity, was like putting the cart before the horse.
630
 Yet, with a strong 
indigenous culture behind them, the Xhosa had little use for the Christian god and clung 
tenaciously to their own cosmological framework.
631
 For the most part, they accepted only 
those aspects of this so-called civilization which facilitated their continued independence – 
cases in point being agricultural innovations such as irrigation systems and the plough. The 
historian Christoph Strobel corroborates this, arguing that success stories of Xhosas 
converting to Christianity, and with this to ‘civilization,’ were over-optimistic and “failed to 
consider African motivations to join the missions,” such as those relating to self-
preservation.
632
 
The seventh Frontier War (1846-1847) was precipitated by tribal tensions, drought and 
consequently, repeated Xhosa incursions into the Cape Colony. In its aftermath, colonial 
authorities got another opportunity to force civilization upon the Xhosa. The latter were 
defeated decisively and left more weakened than ever before. The erstwhile Queen Adelaide 
Province was recaptured, renamed British Kaffraria, and placed under Harry Smith’s direct 
military command. Smith believed that work would aid in the civilization of the Xhosa and 
also alleviate the labor shortage in the Cape. He proceeded to use Xhosa men, women and 
children as indentured labor. The South African Xhosa genealogist Jeffrey Peires maintains 
that there was special demand for eight- to ten-year-old children, evidenced in “enthusiastic 
letters from farmers desirous of helping to civilise the Xhosa”633  by taking on the more 
impressionable youngsters. Over time, these abuses aggravated the Xhosa. Desperate to 
reassert their autonomy, they bought into the Xhosa prophet Mlanjeni’s promise that his 
medicines would make them impervious to British bullets. Mlanjeni had sworn that the 
warriors’ ritualistic application of the roots of certain plants, combined with invoking their 
ancestors and the prophet himself, would preserve them: “The guns of the British would shoot 
hot water, their bullets would do no harm, and their gunpowder would fail to ignite.”634 
Around the same time, other leaders such as the Ngqika chief Sandile, agitated against the 
missionaries as well, affronted as he was by the latter ‘taking his people from him.’ He and 
other chiefs began to regard the missionaries as “threats to African sovereignty and agents of 
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empire,”635 and actively engendered this perspective among their subjects. Ultimately, such 
agitation precipitated the eighth Frontier War (1850-1853), which proved devastating to the 
Xhosa who were left with sixteen thousand dead and their subsistence base ruined.
636
 
Notably, during this conflict, many supposed Christian converts, as well as about a quarter of 
the coloured residents of the Kat River settlement, joined in the rebellion against the colonial 
forces.
637
 For Alan Lester, this signaled the final effort, “not just by the Xhosa, but by all of 
the groups facing proletarianisation in the eastern Cape, to escape their forcible incorporation 
within a pervasive settler capitalist system.”638 
Their decisive defeat at the hands of colonial authorities was compounded by further 
droughts and destitution, not to mention the related indignity of being dragged into the cycle 
of wage slavery. This difficult situation contributed to the Great Xhosa Cattle Killing of 1856-
1857 – a most shocking, tragic rebellion of the Xhosa against losing their traditional 
infrastructure and being reduced to mere laboring bodies. During the time Xhosa herds were 
being decimated by cattle plague (rinderpest) introduced by imported stock, two young Xhosa 
girls, Nongqawuse and Nombanda, claimed they were approached by ancestors. These told 
them that the Xhosa people must kill all their remaining cattle, and burn all their crops, to 
purify themselves as “the whole community will rise from the dead.”639 While people were at 
first skeptical, the majority nonetheless followed through.
640
 Many reasons for the Cattle 
Killing have been proposed, but it is generally accepted that the pressures placed on the 
Xhosa through colonial advances, together with the rinderpest scourge, caused them to turn to 
their ancestors for aid. Their sacrifice of absolutely everything they had, then, constituted “a 
sign of willingness to accept a new purity of existence, if only an idealised precolonial order 
was restored.” 641  The literary and postcolonial scholar Jennifer Wenzel confirms this, 
contending that “Nongqawuse’s prophesy and the colonial project of civilization were 
competing millennial visions of a world remade.”642 The Cattle Killing proved disastrous for 
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the Xhosa people. An estimated half a million cattle were killed, thousands of people starved 
to death, and tens of thousands more were displaced and had to make their way into the Cape 
Colony to find work. 
 
A shackled people 
 
This devastating event was a coup for both missionary Christianity and Africanized forms of 
this religion, which operated as psychological refuges for this ruined people.
643
 It was also a 
boon for the steadily industrializing Cape Colony. George Grey, then governor of the Cape, 
described the situation as follows:  
 
So complete was the state of destitution to which the followers of the prophet[ess Nongqawuse] had 
reduced themselves, that one of the greatest chiefs, who had … immense herds of cattle, had not a single 
head left; … one of the leading chiefs had been obliged to work upon the roads; whilst in many parts, the 
country was covered throughout the day by crowds of women and children digging for wild roots, as the 
only means of subsistence left them … Wisely used, the existing crisis may produce permanent 
advantages for the whole of South Africa. A restless nation, who for years has harassed the frontier, may 
now to a great extent be changed into useful labourers.
644
 
 
The drive to turn weakened indigenous populations into tools useful to the colonial capitalist 
economy continued through subsequent decades, and was reflected in the writings of, among 
others, Bartle Frere, who was governor of the Cape in the late 1870s.
645
 The discipline of 
these indigenous populations was ensured further through pass laws restricting their 
movement within the Cape Colony. This was deemed necessary “until such a time as a 
favourable reformation of Xhosa subjectivity could be achieved.”646  
However, the right moment to drop the pass laws apparently never came. Controls on 
the movement and occupations of South African indigenes were implemented for more than a 
hundred years. Racial discrimination persisted, even after the Boer wars when South Africa 
became a member of the Commonwealth, and even after the First World War, during which 
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time black South Africans had assisted the country immensely by standing in for absent white 
workers in semi-skilled and skilled positions.
647
 Black South African ability to regain 
autonomy, or at least gain a voice in contemporary affairs, was eroded through their loss of 
residual franchise privileges in 1936-1937. This rendered them “third-class citizens, with few 
rights to live in the cities and no opportunities to purchase land outside of designated 
‘reserves.’”648 Later, the apartheid regime’s homeland system, based on this British system of 
native reserves, also undermined any chance of indigenes escaping wage slavery within the 
rapidly industrializing economy. Although the creation of both the reserves and the 
homelands was motivated by the objective of controlling the influx of Africans to the cities,
649
 
enforcing this settlement pattern was also economically advantageous.
650
 
Briefly, as already discussed in Chapter 2, the apartheid government legitimated the 
maintenance of homelands with the argument that, through providing indigenous peoples with 
their own areas they could develop independently at cultural, political, economic and other 
levels, and ultimately gain independence. This argument markedly contrasted with the earlier 
colonial contention that it was imperative to turn the indigenes into properly British subjects 
rather than leaving them to their own devices. All this aside, the homeland system without 
doubt facilitated the growth of the South African capitalist economy, while undermining black 
people’s potential to organize resistance. In short, those living in the homelands on a 
subsistence basis were accustomed to satisfying only limited needs. Thus, although male 
migrant workers actually were paid a pittance, they continued laboring willingly, as their 
meager earnings still were enough to support their families and even acquire a few more cattle 
back home.
651
 Rural women left behind in the homelands were equally exploited. They 
received absolutely no remuneration for maintaining the subsistence base, for raising the new 
generation of migrant workers, or for caring for the sick or aging workers ejected from 
industry.
652
 The costs of the rapidly industrializing ‘white’ economy quite literally were 
externalized in this way. The cultural anthropologist Anne-Maria Makhulu has recently added 
to this argument that indigenous identity and solidarity were undermined through the 
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homeland system. By generating distance between migrant workers and their families, the 
migrants’ behaviors and subjectivities could be refashioned to suit capitalists. Apartheid’s 
migrant labor system, she intimates, made possible “the regulation of private behavior and the 
refashioning of African subjectivity [by] … eviscerat[ing] potential spaces of intimacy such 
as home and family – domains generally deemed central to the achievement of self-
definition.”653 There is some irony in this. The apartheid regime purportedly maintained the 
homeland system for South African indigenes to remain socially and culturally independent, 
and separate from white South Africa. Yet, the ‘Western’ socio-cultural ideals to which 
migrant laborers were exposed in white South Africa tended to erode the indigenous, non-
consumerist aspirations they had shared with their communities back in the homelands. And 
when they returned home, they carried these new aspirations along with them, disrupting 
indigenous societal structures and perspectives. 
 
Economic growth and the ‘black consumer’ 
 
Makhulu’s argument that the connection between miners and rural existence became severed, 
is both challenged and confirmed by the South African sociologist T. Dunbar Moodie in his 
seminal work on black miners, Going for Gold: Men, Mines, and Migration. Moodie does 
indicate that indigenous mine workers gradually were sucked into consumer-oriented urban 
lifestyles. Yet, he contends that at least up until the 1970s, the “common motif [of] … variant 
strands of migrant culture … was commitment to the independence and satisfactions of 
patriarchal proprietorship over a rural homestead.”654 That is, many rural men decided to work 
on the mines specifically in order to accrue the necessary capital to become men of stature at 
home. Upon their return, they could purchase cattle and still have sufficient means to sustain 
their umzi or homestead.
655
 Admittedly, some men were “‘lost to the mines’” (amatshipa), 
abandoning their rural existence and ruining themselves in the attractions of consumer culture, 
urban prostitutes, and alcohol.
656
 However, for the large majority, rural life remained 
preferable to urban existence. It is salient that the Tswana and the Xhosa, for example, drew 
                                                          
653
 Anne-Maria Makhulu, “The Question of Freedom: Post-Emancipation South Africa in a Neoliberal Age,” in 
Ethnographies of Neoliberalism, ed. Carol J. Greenhouse (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 
141. 
654
 T. Dunbar Moodie (with Vivienne Ndatshe), Going for Gold: Men, Mines, and Migration (Johannesburg: 
Witwatersrand University Press, 2001), 21. 
655
 Ibid., 106. 
656
 Ibid., 15, 141-142. 
139 
 
sharp distinctions between urban work and work in the rural setting, by using different words 
to describe each. Mmereko (Setswana) and pangela (isiXhosa), were used to designate work 
for ‘white’ bosses or for wages, while tiro (Setswana) and ukwakha (isiXhosa), referred to the 
regenerative, meta-industrial building of a home, a family life and a community in the 
traditional, rural setting.
657
 As Moodie shows, a similar privileging of rural over urban life is 
evidenced in the lyrics of a song routinely sung by Sotho men leaving their mountainous 
homes for the Johannesburg mines: “Lesotho, I now leave you with your mountains where I 
used to run … I am going to the white man’s place – with electricity. I am leaving all the dark 
places here but I still prefer the mountains of Lesotho.” 658  Moodie suggests that it was 
precisely because many mine workers, particularly the Mpondos, were not fully 
proletarianized, and thus were quite capable of surviving without wages, that there was so 
much rebellion on the mines during the 1940s.
659
 
However, various forms of government interference in rural life made it increasingly 
difficult to sustain the umzi ideal. Even before the establishment of apartheid, ‘betterment 
schemes’ were introduced in the Bantu reserves, partly in an effort to encourage indigenes to 
adopt “‘rational’ and ‘scientific’ farming methods” to supposedly counter escalating levels of 
destitution. These schemes involved fencing off land to designate agricultural, pastoral and 
residential areas, and thereby greatly interfered with traditional patterns of life. These 
schemes also enjoined indigenes to cull their cattle. Authorities blamed rural livestock 
numbers for the difficulties experienced by these people, rather than admitting that their 
desperate condition largely stems from land dispossession.
660
 Apartheid-era resettlement 
schemes exacerbated overcrowding in the homelands, by pushing those not working in the 
‘productive’ white economy back into these areas. The urban unemployed as well as peasant 
communities – “‘black spots’” that had ensconced themselves “in the midst of white-owned 
agricultural land,”661  were prime targets for removal. The resultant strain this placed on 
limited resources in the homelands, combined with the allure of working on the mines 
especially subsequent to the introduction of bonus reengagement schemes,
662
 inexorably drew 
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black South Africans into white areas. Urbanization also increased as black miners moved 
into more skilled, better-paid positions, became emboldened further by unionization, and 
successfully agitated for considerable pay raises as gold, freed from the dollar, led to a tenfold 
revenue increase between 1970 and 1980.
663
 Over time indigenes of the agricultural class also 
settled in peri-urban areas. These relatively autonomous peasant farmers had shared 
agricultural land with whites through rental agreements, sharecropping, labor tenancy or wage 
labor, but were forcibly removed, privately evicted,
664
 or deterred by labor exploitation.
665
 In 
principle, they were permitted full urban existence in 1986, with the abolition of influx 
control legislation that before had made it virtually illegal for farm workers to seek 
employment in cities and towns. Rural women, too, moved into urban areas. Some feared that 
distance between themselves and their migrant husbands might cause these men to fall for city 
women and abandon their families. Others were motivated by the growing difficulties of 
sustaining a rural life in an increasingly monetized economy, and found work as domestic 
servants in cities and towns. However, Moodie advances that most women remained very 
suspicious of complete reliance on the money economy, and especially on the wages of their 
men, in an urban world completely lacking in a culture of sharing.
666
 A rural woman indicated 
that this amounted to a clash in ethics, when she told anti-apartheid activist Marianne 
Alverson that while she and her sisters in the country would share whatever meager foods 
they could lay their hands on –  commoning, “in town, no one will share even the head of a 
fly.”667 
Nonetheless, more and more people were drawn toward cities and towns, settling in 
townships, and in even greater numbers in ‘squatter camps’ on the urban periphery. Squatting 
was precipitated by the apartheid government severely curtailing any further development of 
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black township housing from 1970 onward, in an effort to curb black urbanization.
668
 Shack 
housing, made from corrugated iron sheeting, sprang up in parts of the homelands bordering 
white South Africa, and around white cities and towns where legislation could be averted for 
some time at least. The latter became an attractive option as the state steadily shifted 
responsibility for the removal of illegal squatters onto the shoulders of private landowners.
669
 
Yet by the late 1970s, the apartheid regime itself had come to terms with the fact that black 
urbanization was inevitable. Consequently, it allowed for the establishment of the Urban 
Foundation (UF), funded by South African big business, aimed at addressing housing issues 
faced by blacks in urban areas.
670
 In its turn, the government conceded ninety-nine-year 
leaseholds to blacks in urban areas, invested heavily in black urban infrastructure, and offered 
home-ownership subsidies.
671
 Rather than indicating any humanizing of apartheid, though, the 
government’s change of tack must be seen against the backdrop of factors other than 
mounting moral outcry and related political protest. Firstly, the costs of maintaining the 
homeland system, in terms of homeland development and the provision of relatively 
affordable public transport for migrant laborers, were incredible.
672
 Secondly, the 
manufacturing and service industries were becoming reliant on skilled black labor, 
particularly as white workers were transitioning into purely managerial positions. Thus, these 
industries began criticizing the migrant labor system for destabilizing and demoralizing the 
valuable black workforce, and hampering its productivity through fatiguing commuting.
673
 
Thirdly, it was recognized that by permitting and indeed hastening black urbanization, the 
commodity glut that had plagued the white consumer market since the late 1960s could be 
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alleviated.
674
 The idea was that the urbanization of black workers would generate both a stable 
industrial workforce and a hitherto untapped consumer base. It was imperative to bring more 
blacks into the work-and-spend game. Not enough of them were equipped to consume 
competently, given their “insufficient (or nonexistent) disposable incomes, high rates of 
un(der)employment and weak or nonexistent infrastructure, particularly in the heavily 
populated rural areas (i.e. the ‘consumption fund’ necessary for mass consumption did not 
exist).”675 In contrast, if black urban settlement were to be encouraged, and the electrification 
and other infrastructural development of settlements pursued, it would become possible to 
cultivate a black population that would “require commodities ranging from low-cost housing 
through to expensive clothing, furniture, basic foodstuffs and the like.”676 William Beinart 
indicates as much, maintaining that as the installation of prepaid electricity meters escalated 
from the 1980s onward, the “demand for consumer durables and electrical goods [including] 
… television” increased, with the latter device in its turn opening individuals up to the new 
world of consumer culture and related forms of leisure.
677
  
More than two decades on, it has proved impossible to change the face of the urban 
landscape in South Africa, particularly with respect to curbing the mushrooming shack 
settlements. Already by the 1980s squatter camps around cities and towns were a fixture, and 
by the early 1990s it was commonplace for the owners of formal township houses to erect 
rental shacks in their back yards.
678
 Shack dwelling proved enticing because it meant that 
people could live in close proximity to work, yet for far less than the rental costs of formal 
township housing.
679
 In the post-apartheid era, squatter camps have grown exponentially. This 
is a major concern to the current South African government, which considers them harmful to 
the international image of the country. The government’s dislike of this settlement pattern was 
evidenced in the sudden decision to begin ‘slum clearance’ prior to the 2010 football World 
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Cup.
680
 Ironically, this endeavor has damaged rather than improved South Africa’s 
international image because of bloody confrontations between police and evicted residents, 
which have provoked the ire even of world-renowned political philosopher Noam 
Chomsky.
681
 Indeed for millions of South Africans, there really is no alternative to squatting. 
Aside from proximity to work and urban amenities, it allows them the opportunity to partake 
in the growing black urban culture centered on consumption-oriented activities and identities. 
The photobook Shack Chic: Art and Innovation in South African Shack-Lands, discloses that 
an entire universe of consumerism may be concealed behind the rusty old door of a 
dilapidated corrugated iron domicile. So in a roundabout way, although the black housing 
crisis has not been solved, the consumer glut has been addressed significantly through the 
large-scale quasi-urbanization of millions of black South Africans, who are becomingly 
increasingly ‘consumerized.’ In what follows, consideration is given to additional factors 
playing important roles in South African people’s submission to the global neoliberal 
hegemony. 
 
Conflating freedom with narcissistic display 
 
Developing the ‘South African Dream’ 
 
The adoption of a consumerist orientation by newly urbanized black South Africans may have 
been inevitable, given the erosion of their old value systems as they moved away from the 
countryside and its umzi ideal. Equally, it can be argued that assuming a new, consumer, ethic 
constituted a ‘backlash’ of sorts against being deprived of amenities during the apartheid 
years. Freedom from apartheid perhaps could be confused with the enjoyment of quality 
services and leisure activities denied under the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act. 
Likewise, while highly-paid and skilled work officially remained reserved for whites, the 
acquisition of consumerist trappings might have signaled liberation. Sociological thinkers like 
Thomas Princen point out that workers subjected to the Taylorist system in the US went 
shopping to overcome the alienation and meaninglessness they experienced on the factory 
                                                          
680
 Andy Clarno, “A Tale of Two Walled Cities: Neo-Liberalization and Enclosure in Johannesburg and 
Jerusalem,” in Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 19, eds. Diane E. Davis and Christina Proenza-Coles 
(Bingley: JAI Press, 2008), 168-169. 
681
 Noam Chomsky et al., “Open Letter to James Nxumalo, Senzo Mchunu and Jacob Zuma,” Mail & Guardian, 
October 4, 2013. 
144 
 
floor.
682
 Similarly, it is conceivable that black South Africans turned to consumerism to 
overcome alienation from mainstream society under legislated apartheid. Consumption has 
played a dominant role in recouping black dignity, making the concern that Africans would 
work less if they earned more,
683
 seem unfounded. 
However, some accounts of the process of turning indigenous South Africans into 
consumers, risk eliding the challenges involved in priming a new black consumer base. The 
obstacles extended well beyond commonplace structural ones, such as the economic 
discrimination faced when applying for hire-purchase and credit.
684
 The obstacles even 
extended beyond the problem of getting mainstream consumer products into township stores. 
There were also cultural barriers, brought to light in studies conducted by the National 
Development and Management Foundation of South Africa (1969) and the Bureau of Market 
Research (1974, 1995). By the late 1960s, capitalist entrepreneurs realized that economic 
growth depended on cultivating a black consumer base, and this required providing black 
South Africans with higher salaries. This is evidenced in the proceedings of a 1969 National 
Development and Management Foundation seminar on the ‘Urban Bantu Market.’ The South 
African Breweries managing director Richard Goss, in his opening address, advanced that 
cultivating the black consumer base is a basic for all South African businessmen. He argued 
that, by “whetting the Bantu’s appetite for certain goods … by generating in them the urge to 
want to buy them,” it will be possible to mold them into voracious consumers and increase 
their productivity in the workplace. Their desire to acquire consumer items would provide 
them with “an incentive … to earn the where-withall (sic) to satisfy their demands.”685 This 
sentiment was echoed by many other speakers, including Wally Langschmidt, managing 
director of Market Research Africa. He added that, instead of pursuing export-oriented 
expansion, South African industry should, given the “vast non-white market here … make a 
greater effort to increase the purchasing power of … non-whites by trying to give them higher 
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wages.”686 But aside from this requirement, as well as the need to make credit more freely 
available to black South Africans, what also was necessary for the consumer revolution to 
take place was a grasp of what these individuals actually wanted. How to advertise, reaching 
out to them in such a way that they learn to want more things, and how to get them to choose 
one brand over another.
687
 
 
Grooming for affluence 
 
The remarkably cynical proposals above were some of the primary objectives of the Bureau 
of Market Research, University of South Africa, whose landmark studies “aimed at 
constructing portraits of [black] consumers [to] … ensure that copy-writers are better able to 
communicate because they can visualise their audiences more clearly.” 688  A study was 
conducted under its auspices by the South African market researcher Alice van der Reis in 
1974, who interviewed 291 Sowetans. Van der Reis revealed that the large majority of them, 
regardless of their age or level of education, expressed interest in beautifying their homes 
mainly through enlarging them, furnishing them tastefully, or kitting them out with some 
prestigious, durable consumer items such as washing machines and refrigerators.
689
 The need 
for ‘showing off’ intensified the more urban Africans became exposed to the growing culture 
of consumerist display in their surroundings. Also driving this desire for outward trappings of 
the good life was the fact that “[t]he urban African … likes to be regarded as being one or two 
up on his country cousin.”690 Georg Simmel’s and Thorstein Veblen’s arguments concerning 
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the role of fashion and consumer items in the establishment and maintenance of class 
differentiation, come to mind. 
However, urban African consumer interests required diversification, and there was a 
growing battle among brands for this new consumer base. Print, radio and television 
advertisements were identified as significant catalysts of commodification, but many 
campaigns failed miserably because little attention was paid to the historical and cultural 
backgrounds of black target audiences. For example, the Xhosa, who had suffered fatal 
droughts throughout much of their history, were not at all charmed by the Fanta soft drink 
slogan: ‘It’s fun to be thirsty!’691 As the South African advertising researcher Robin Morris 
also points out, a Ford motor company advertisement proved similarly insensitive. This 
entailed a Ford Husky van being described as ‘The bus you’ve been waiting for.’692 Thus, it 
held no appeal to African audiences, given the fact that for years they had been forced to live 
miles from their places of employ, beholden to unreliable transport. Unusual advertisements, 
to which most people would not give a second thought, also proved disturbing to some new 
consumers. An extreme example was the reaction to dancing teaspoons in an advertisement 
for the tea brand Teaspoon Tips. Some TV viewers wondered if witchcraft was at work, and 
would not touch the brand thereafter.
693
 
Despite cultural ‘differends’ inhibiting effective marketing strategies, the interests of 
newly urbanized black men and women were undergoing drastic changes, especially as they 
became more educated and obtained better-paid jobs. Van der Reis’s study, for example, 
revealed that the higher the respondent’s level of education and hence his/her salary was, the 
greater his/her appetite was for an array of ‘Western’ consumer items and leisure activities. 
This attests to a correlation between education, income, and consumerist refinement, at least 
in newly Westernized societies.
694
 Another factor implicated in the emergence of engrossing 
consumer interests was age. Survey respondents, mostly under thirty years of age, were 
immersed in the work-and-spend cycle. Van der Reis describes these “socially sophisticated 
respondents [as] … superficial rather than serious in their pursuits and tastes … [and as] 
interested in the latest fashions, beauty care … cinema … [and] social news of film stars.”695 
Already five years before this study, business directors recognized that the young were more 
amenable to a consumption-oriented identity and more willing to discard indigenous self-
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definition than were older men and women. For example, Alan Tiley, a prominent advertising 
agency director, commented that indigenous cosmologies and tribal identities are “by and 
large … disappearing in modern urbanisation and a young Bantu girl of today will know more 
about stopping ladders in stockings than [about] a Tokoloshe.”696 The urban tendency to reject 
indigenous African frameworks as passé was demonstrated amply in Alice van der Reis and 
commerce researcher Luke Mabaso’s much later study of the consumerist behaviors and 
perspectives among black Gauteng youth. Urbanized respondents strongly opposed certain 
indigenous socio-cultural norms wholly accepted by their parents, such as the extended family 
living in one household, the slaughtering of animals to placate ancestors, the importance of 
religion, and the legitimacy of witchdoctors. On venerating the ancestors, one respondent 
commented: “‘How do you slaughter for someone who is no longer alive.’” Similar 
incredulity was expressed toward witchdoctors, who one respondent asserted, should be 
gotten rid of. Christianity was not spared criticism either, with young urban respondents 
judging it to be a money-making, hypocritical racket. Young women interviewed in the same 
study even questioned the logic behind circumcision rites, while some young men argued 
against the practice of paying bridewealth (lobola) in contemporary times. “‘If people are 
educated, why should one pay for the other.’”697 Of greater concern to them was the necessary 
education to secure well-paying jobs that would make them competent consumers. They 
unanimously expressed the wish “to be … successful and prosperous in a professional career 
or in their own business … [and] dreamt of living in a beautiful home with their nuclear 
family, in a leafy suburb with all the trappings of wealth around them.”698 
Even more significant is the intensity that marked the approach of young South 
Africans to consumerism; the extent to which they had become seasoned in this practice and 
acquainted with the mechanics of branding and advertising; and the degree to which 
consumerism had become tied to identity construction. No longer content with acquiring a 
few durable consumer items for their homes, such as a refrigerator or a washing machine, 
young women envisioned purchasing “‘all the electrical gadgets that make the kitchen look 
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like a laboratory.’” 699  Members of both gender groups expressed greater fashion-
consciousness than their parents, who nonetheless themselves had copied American fashion 
trends as best they could.
700
 These young people’s interest in Italian and French fashion 
actually seemed to “rebel against the fashion statement of the previous youth group.”701 Some 
were also critical of advertising tricks, such as a firm simply repackaging a product, yet 
marketing it as something ‘new and improved.’ Lastly, these study respondents identified 
prosperous, successful people such as movie stars and business tycoons as their role models. 
The young men in particular expressed a desire to become like these figures not because of 
their wealth per se, but because of the consumer items this gave them access to, such as cars, 
technology, and a “‘high lifestyle.’” Van der Reis and Mabaso found that many young men 
even went so far as stating: “‘[W]e admire criminals, such as drug dealers. We know they 
make their money in a shady way, but they spend the money in style.’”702 The ease and speed 
with which African ‘tradition’ is being replaced by a consumer identity and ethic are striking 
– even people’s diets changed. The historian Diana Wylie points out that by the late 1980s, a 
kind of “cultural racism” took root in diets, as well-to-do young men and women scorned the 
foodstuffs on which their parents were raised. A Xhosa university student, for example, 
“swore [to her] that he would eat only ‘quality’ food like cultivated spinach, as opposed to the 
wild greens his parents had enjoyed.”703 
To sum up, then, within the post-apartheid context, urbanized black men and women 
have adopted a “globalized culture” of consumerist norms.704 The tragic paradox of all this is 
that through establishing the ‘South African Dream,’ contemporary white and black South 
Africans have discovered something in common, but at the cost of more socially and 
ecologically attuned indigenous ways of life. In 1969 at the National Development and 
Management Foundation seminar discussed earlier, businessmen were encouraged to refrain 
from stigmatizing black South Africans as non-human or sub-human. On the ground that like 
whites, they possess consumer rationality. As Alan Tiley advised: “In advertising to the 
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Bantu, treat them as human beings and you will be surprised how they will react – like you or 
me.”705 William Beinart corroborates this attitudinal shift, suggesting that “[f]or an increasing 
number of people the aisles of the new cathedrals, the supermarkets, … gave access to a 
common society of consumption.”706 It is still puzzling, though, how this transition toward a 
neoliberal consumer-self took place in such a short space of time and with so little opposition 
– and this after centuries of resistance against colonial- and apartheid-style domination. The 
idea of consumerism as an expression of empowerment, freedom and even unity, together 
with the various economic and political changes thematized earlier, certainly all facilitated 
this shift. But what must be considered as well, is how such factors operated upon, and more 
importantly were fuelled by, changing constructions of gender. The subsequent analysis is 
guided by the idea that “[g]ender constructions are embedded in a dialectic … How men and 
women see and represent themselves, and how gender relations are organized and promoted, 
are shaped by larger socioeconomic, cultural, and religious transformations,” yet “[a]t the 
same time, notions of gender have an impact on the course and receptions of these 
transformations.”707 It turns out that new gender constructions were both a product of the 
consumerist turn in South Africa, and a catalyst for the depoliticization of South Africans. 
 
The regressive politics of hyper-gender 
 
Given Africa’s rich and diverse ethnic histories, it is unsurprising that multiple masculinities 
and femininities continue to exist on the continent, each identity modulating in response to 
external and internal pressures. Some have argued that Africa constitutes “an important site 
for studying the social construction of gender, since … African gender identities have been 
particularly fluid and contentious, heavily articulated with wealth, age, seniority and ritual 
authority.”708 There is no denying that long-standing indigenous conceptions of gender roles 
still play some part in the social construction of ‘masculinity and femininity’ today, especially 
in more rural areas. Cases in point are the veneration accorded male elders, and the frequent 
association of womanhood with wifely obedience and pastoral industriousness. However, of 
interest here is the extent to which the power of these conceptions is diminishing as 
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urbanization increases, exposing people to consumer-oriented gender identities glorified 
within the neoliberal media. It is generally accepted that major changes occur in masculinity 
and femininity in the global South when countries undergo development, since development 
also imports neoliberal gender regimes.
709
 Yet, it is impossible to account for gender 
transformation in the global South in its entirety within any one text. This is understandable, 
given the vastness of cultural diversity and the sheer number of different ethnic groups, not to 
mention the differing paces of economic development and modernization. Thus, in most 
cases, where in-depth study of changes in masculinity or femininity is undertaken, focus falls 
on a particular ethnic group or clearly delimited geographic area. For example, gender 
changes accompanying development have been documented in Namibia and Nigeria,
710
 and a 
study of transformations in Maasai notions of masculinity has shown that even in this 
marginal community, the previously dominant pastoral masculinity has been supplanted by an 
‘ormeek’ masculinity centered on “the practices and fashions of modernity.” 711  Similar 
changes have been wrought in South African gender identities, and although these changes 
have had some positive effects, they have also homogenized and depoliticized a previously 
diverse and rebellious body of people. Accordingly, these individuals are losing track of 
alternative notions of what it means to be a man or a woman today. Through this reduction in 
the horizons of possibility, people’s potential and willingness to resist the neocolonization of 
neoliberalism, and its attendant consumer culture, fade proportionately. 
 
South African femininity and consumption 
 
From a liberal feminist perspective, the ‘civilizing’ or Westernizing impulse of Christian 
missionaries, colonists and later, the architects of economic modernization, was a rather good 
thing for gender relations in Africa. Admittedly, these authorities imposed the Western model 
of the nuclear family, which did not reverse women’s subordination. The nuclear family 
model, promoted to entrench qualities indispensable to the construction of an industrious male 
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workforce, led to proletarianization, the male breadwinner ethic, and the growing economic 
dependence of women. That said, attempts to mold indigenous peoples into nuclear family 
units, directed critical attention toward the patriarchal excesses of traditional African life. A 
notable problem was the practice of women slaving away in the fields while their men idly 
look on,
712
 assured of the fairness of this arrangement by their payment of bridewealth for 
these women. Historical geographer Alan Lester points out that it was actually very important 
for missionaries’ wives to accompany them into Xhosaland, even if it meant quickly marrying 
before entering this terrain, “so that they might themselves provide the Xhosa with models of 
more proper gender relations.”713  
Both the criticism of patriarchal practices, and introduction of technology like the 
plough,
714
 may have helped ease the labor burden of some African women. Even so, the 
principle of patriarchal dominance was perpetuated in the nuclear family setup from colonial 
Victorian through to apartheid times. For example, the apartheid-era practice of granting 
urban housing only to male African household heads, both instigated the formation of black 
nuclear families, and entailed rejection of black women’s entitlement to independence, 
residence and property rights. In fact, within the urban setting there was only one form of 
femininity, that of housewife and mother.
715
 This is unsurprising, since a misogynist/racist 
orientation was evident already in the colonists’ diminishment of white women and blacks on 
the basis of ‘inferior’ brain size. Misogyny also marked the conservative Afrikaner view of 
white women as properly belonging in the kitchen.
716
 Similarly, within the anti-apartheid 
liberation movement, women were expected to support fighting men, rather than take an 
active stand themselves. The early ANC denied women formal membership, the implicit 
masculinist expectation being that they should take care of the home while their men make 
                                                          
712
 Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa, 18-19; and Lester, Imperial Networks, 84. 
713
 Lester, Imperial Networks, 84. 
714
 Ibid. 
715
 Ida Susser, Aids, Sex, and Culture: Global Politics and Survival in Southern Africa (Malden: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), 205; and Debby Bonnin, Georgina Hamilton, Robert Morrell and Art Sitas, “The Struggle for 
Natal and KwaZulu: Workers, Township Dwellers and Inkatha, 1972-1985,” in Political Economy and Identities 
in KwaZulu-Natal: Historical and Social Perspectives, ed. Robert Morrell (Durban: Indicator Press, 1996), 160. 
716
 Lester, Imperial Networks, 170; Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa, 187; and Hannah E. Britton, 
Women in the South African Parliament: From Resistance to Governance (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2005), 13. 
152 
 
history.
717
 This did not, however, stop women from independently engaging in landmark 
popular protests, such as the 1950s riots against pass laws.
718
 There were also some 
independent women activists such as Lilian Ngoyi, Winnie Mandela and Dorothy Nyembe.
719
 
From around the 1960s, black South Africans were being groomed for competent 
consumption. In this, recognition as human beings deserving the same rights as whites subtly 
intertwined with the practice of consumerism, and correlatively with white ideals of beauty, 
fashion and femininity. A particularly troubling manifestation of this, exposing the extent to 
which black women had internalized a self-rejecting racial bias, was their belief that success 
or social status depended on approximating to a certain “degree of refined ‘whiteness’ or 
lightness of skin.” 720  A fair-skinned African nurse depicted in a 1970s skin-lightening 
advertisement, for instance, was almost unanimously described by a sample group of black 
female and male respondents as “educated, wealthy and attractive.” 721  The pursuit of 
‘Western’ fashion and lifestyles, particularly American ones, was also evident by this time.722 
But it was only after the democratic transition of 1994, when women’s rights became 
constitutionally enshrined, that black women could begin celebrating their freedom not only 
from racial oppression, but also from their erstwhile patriarchal oppressors – the men in their 
families and homes. The responses of black women to questions concerning gender equality 
and marriage, posed in a 1995 case study, evidence this. The young women interviewed 
boldly articulated their disdain for marriage and its related gender hierarchies by arguing, for 
instance, that “‘today’s woman does not care for marriage; we believe in our independence,’” 
and that “‘the woman of the 90s is very career conscious.’”723 Preference for independence, 
career and financial success was strengthened in subsequent years through black women’s 
entry into professional/mid-management occupations, in part thanks to affirmative action 
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policies that identified them as some of the most disadvantaged individuals under apartheid. A 
Department of Labour report indicated, for example, that by 2002 there were more black 
women than either black men or white women in the “professional category” of 
employment.
724
 White women also benefited from affirmative action policies, but not to the 
same degree as black men and women since they were not regarded as having been oppressed 
to the same extent.
725
 Yet they, too, had suffered beneath the ideological constraints of a 
patriarchal Afrikaner mentality, buttressed by the conservative ideology of the Dutch 
Reformed Church. Only in the 1960s and 1970s were they granted access to employment 
opportunities enabling them to pursue economic and sexual independence from men.
726
  
Ultimately, what these new professional opportunities did afford South African 
women in general, was the economic wherewithal to approximate the liberated ‘New Woman’ 
archetype exalted in the US and Western Europe. Freed from housewifely and motherly 
burdens through their economic independence, they now could equal men in work and 
consumption alike. Here, commodity feminism also took root, promising feminine affirmation 
through competitive neoliberal careerism and the associated conspicuous consumption and 
display of goods. Among urbanized South Africans, this mold of femininity is hegemonic 
today and routinely reflected in the articles of popular magazines. The online October 2013 
edition of Bona not only gives tips on how to get a “summer body,”727 but also focuses on 
celebrity hairstyles to mimic, such as those donned by the extremely ‘Westernized’ black 
American songstresses Brandy and Ciara.
728
 Its August 2014 print edition dedicates numerous 
pages to the latest fashion and cosmetic must-haves such as ‘hair relaxers.’ Further, the 
cynical commercial appropriation of ‘black is beautiful,’ evidenced in the same magazine, is a 
rather poignant reversal of a lost historical moment. Here, women are enjoined to embrace 
their blackness, but still through utilizing products such as Karazel ‘BB Cream’ – a product 
promising to even out the individual’s skin tone and so “reveal” their “natural beauty.”729 
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Also included is a feature in which incredibly Westernized, fashion-conscious women in the 
media industry are interviewed. However, they were not identified for interview because of 
their own achievements, but because they are or have been in relationships with some of 
South Africa’s most famous men – well-known actors, DJs, musicians, and soccer players.730 
When women are praised for their own sake, it is often because they have become managers 
of large corporations, such as Khensani Nobanda who is a general manager “[i]n the male-
dominated industry of beer.”731 Perhaps from a liberal feminist standpoint, women such as she 
have finally achieved recognition and equality.  
All of these anecdotes affirm the profoundly patriarchal bearers of neoliberal 
capitalism. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the New Woman model of 
femininity, oriented around career attainment and status consumption, is highly deceptive. 
The ideal types of beauty represented in glossy magazines and on the silver screen are 
unattainable without digital enhancements and/or cosmetic surgery, skin bleaching, hair 
straightening, and other harmful processes. To feel socially valued, women pursue 
“impossible physical standards,”732 and in addition must keep up with constantly shortening 
fashion cycles. African women, if they want to look like Halle Berry or Beyonce Knowles, 
are encouraged to spend small fortunes on skin-lightening creams and tablets and hair 
straighteners,
733
 many of which carry considerable health risks including cancer.
734
 Further, as 
the African womanist scholar Yaba Blay contends, the very fact of striving after the white 
‘look’ of figures such as Berry or Knowles through skin-lightening treatments, betrays a 
“most egregious attack” on the identity of black women whose skin color is after all “the 
immutable mark of [their] … Blackness.” Still, she argues that rather than simply criticizing 
black women for falling prey to white ideals of beauty, what must also be recognized is the 
extent to which a public climate of masculinist contempt instigates black women’s aspirations 
in this regard. Women are “bombarded with 60ft billboards for skin bleaching products,” and 
prominent black men, including entertainment icons like Kevin Hart, Lil Wayne, Neyo and 
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Kanye West, make no secret of their preference for lighter-skinned black girls.
735
 Regarding 
hair straightening, the Malawian blogger Sitinga Kachipande similarly argues that many black 
women do “not want to get caught with village hair,” because urbanized Africans associate 
unstraightened hair with the undesirable state of “being ‘rural.’” The media perpetuate this 
bias, as do companies in terms of “preferences in hiring.”736 In fact, this white aesthetic is 
even inculcated in black toddler girls when their mothers “add … European textured hair 
extensions to their hair.”737 
The hegemonic mold of femininity is physically and ideologically toxic. It is also 
disempowering, because equating femininity with a ‘white’ physical beauty both endorses 
racism and promotes the patriarchal conception of women as little more than objects of the 
male gaze. So while South African magazine articles and features aimed at a female 
readership may adopt a register of women’s liberation, emphasizing women’s right to 
financial independence and sexual freedom, their underlying theme remains that of becoming 
attractive, both for the sake of narcissistic pleasure and to draw the attention of jealous 
women and admiring men. The pinnacle of femininity consists in becoming a “display 
subject” par excellence.738 Women, men, the media and recruitment patterns reinforce this 
mindset, inhibiting possibilities for alternative formulations and expressions of personhood. 
For the most part, the consumption-oriented display femininity, initiated in the global North, 
is also vociferously engendered and ardently pursued in South Africa. This draws many 
women into an actually self-demeaning, politically neutralizing work-and-spend cycle. 
Neoliberal globalization penetrates our very body cells. 
 
South African masculinity and consumption 
 
In their collection of essays published in 2003, perhaps a first in its critical treatment of 
African masculinity,
739
 social historians Stephan Miescher and Lisa Lindsay emphasize the 
tendency in Africanist scholarship to treat “the male subject … as given, serving as a 
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backdrop in the examination of women’s experiences.”740 Within South African studies such 
an approach is understandable, given the post-1994 proliferation of discourses on Aids and 
rape, which take men’s patriarchal dominance for granted.741 However, in overlooking the 
construction of masculinities in relation to “political, economic, religious, occupational, or 
other transformations,”742 such an approach remains simplistic. Several recent studies remedy 
this shortfall, focusing on topics as diverse as Zulu masculinity during the liberation struggle 
(Waetjen 2004), the existence of multiple masculinities in post-apartheid South Africa (Reid 
and Walker 2005), and the social construction of masculinities in various African countries 
against the backdrop of economic globalization (Shefer et al. 2007). Drawing on these and 
related works, an attempt is made here to trace changes in South African masculinity more or 
less diachronically, highlighting continuities and disparities between successive hegemonic 
masculinities. Gay masculinity will not be treated here, because it lacks the hegemonic power 
of ‘straight’ models of masculinity in South Africa. In addition, it has already received 
systematic treatment by Aids activist Mark Gevisser and by constitutional court justice Edwin 
Cameron in Defiant Desire: Gay and Lesbian Lives in South Africa (1995). 
In view of the track record of resistance to colonial domination, it is unsurprising that 
the hegemonic masculinity of those times was of a ‘heroic’ or ‘warrior’ mold. Archetypal 
traits of ‘the real man’ were an ability to lead and defend his people and to demonstrate 
“military might” and “bravery.” This was exemplified in the personage of Shaka Zulu who so 
fiercely resisted the British.
743
 Equally important was a capacity to define and hold hierarchy 
in the home. As the South African gender studies scholar Robert Morrell and his colleagues 
explain, the “power and prestige [of] … male homestead heads … synchronised powerfully 
with a martial masculinity that was at the heart of Zulu cultural expression.”744 A similar 
masculinity was operational and indeed necessary among the Xhosa, who had to do battle 
against the British and settlers during nine Frontier Wars over the span of one hundred years. 
Their adversaries came to respect them as ‘real men’ precisely on the basis of such traits as 
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bravery. For example, one nineteenth-century colonial Captain enthused that a Xhosa warrior, 
if encircled, would “stand up like a man and throw his last assegaai.”745 This heroic model of 
masculinity would be taken up in modified form during the anti-apartheid struggle, by 
proletarianized black men. But it remained weakened for quite a few decades subsequent to 
the Great Cattle Killing of 1856-1857. Recall that this event rendered thousands of Xhosa 
destitute, making them dependent on work offered by colonists and settlers. It marked the end 
of much indigenous resistance against white authorities. The next hegemonic form of 
masculinity was shaped within migrant labor practices. 
In his landmark study on migrant masculinity as it developed at the South African 
mines, Dunbar Moodie shows how a new model of masculinity became constituted in 
reference to “two worlds,” so to speak. On the one hand, it was influenced by the world of 
difficult and often emasculating labor for white men. On the other hand, it also was based in 
the world of the patriarchal rural homestead (umzi), where subsistence-oriented practices and 
age-old indigenous traditions held sway.
746
 This made for a complex constitution and 
articulation of what it meant to be a man, particularly because of the infantilization of black 
men in their places of work, even at a linguistic level. Briefly, at least up until 1970, it was 
commonplace and indeed socially acceptable for whites to refer to black laborers as ‘boys,’ 
regardless of their age.
747
 The same usage applied on the mines, and so there were ‘boss 
boys,’ ‘machine boys,’ ‘hammer boys,’ and so on. 748  Black men had to accept this 
designation, and except for ‘boss boys,’ they had to operate in extremely subservient roles. 
This was incongruous with traditional notions of masculinity tied to recognition of seniority, 
autonomous action and unquestioned patriarchal rule. Nonetheless, allowing themselves to be 
derogated in this manner at the mines, concomitantly made it possible for these men “to attain 
or retain manhood at home.”749 In short, at the mines they earned the economic wherewithal 
to be ‘big men’ at home, able to afford lobola and so gain a wife, purchase cattle, improve 
their homesteads, and help others in need.
750
 The rural homestead life was being eroded by the 
betterment schemes implemented by the government, which involved dictating land use in the 
homelands. The subsistence base was becoming ever more precarious, and the umzi ideal was 
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sustainable only as long as men were willing to go out to earn. What is intriguing, though, is 
that the danger and hardships of mining were considered so extreme that working on the 
mines, rather than in any other occupation, became regarded as a legitimate passage to 
manhood. Moodie explains that for Mpondo men, “the mines were a testing ground for true 
manhood,”751 and if they dared opt for a job in town or on the docks, others would reproach 
them, saying: “‘You are not strong, you are not a man. Why do you not go to the mines?’”752 
An exceedingly peculiar phenomenon pertaining to migrant existence, dealt with at 
length by Moodie, was the fluidity of categories of gender when husbands and wives endured 
long periods of separation. Miners were inclined to take young male ‘mine wives’ 
(bakontshana), whom they courted with gifts and with whom they engaged in thigh sex 
(ukumetsha). These ‘wives,’ in their turn, offered their ‘husbands’ domestic services 
traditionally only ever undertaken by women. These arrangements did not lead to 
stigmatization of either miner husband or mine wife as homosexual. In fact, mine wives, when 
old enough, quite unproblematically could move out of the effeminate, subordinate role they 
had previously adopted and assume the dominant role in a new mine marriage.
753
 Also, the 
extra money and commodities gifted by their ‘husbands’ went a long way toward accelerating 
their passage to full manhood in the homelands.
754
 For instance, they could afford wives and 
cattle far more quickly than others. On the other hand, the women left at home assumed the 
role of household heads, taking charge of the affairs of the umzi and demonstrating such 
strength and endurance that in the eyes of the community they were able to have ‘manhood’ 
(ubudoda).
755
 In the long run, though, the homestead system crumbled as increasing numbers 
of people were pushed into the homelands from ‘white’ South Africa. This, together with 
constricting betterment schemes, explains Moodie, “destroy[ed] … the resilience of country 
lifestyles as individuals [were] … resettled on land … insufficient for rural proprietorship.”756 
Wives became more and more dependent on their husbands’ wages, many women sought 
their own employment opportunities in towns and cities, and the pace of urbanization 
increased. Full proletarianization and the attendant need to find new ways of demonstrating 
manhood were imminent. 
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A most interesting aspect of the subsequent hegemonic form of masculinity was its 
hybridity. It became centered on enactment of a ‘heroic’ or ‘revolutionary’ model of 
masculinity, but also involved a yearning for the opportunity to embody the ‘breadwinner’ 
model. The disintegration of the rural homestead made black men dependent on wages paid 
by whites. Emboldened by unionization, though, they began agitating for better treatment 
with increasing militancy. Their demand was not only for better treatment as workers, 
implying higher wages, fair working hours and promotion policies. It was also for treatment 
as adult human beings, deserving of recognition, dignity and equal rights. From their 
perspective, being a man involved being able to ‘have a say’ in societal affairs as much as it 
involved being able to protect and provide for one’s often extended family. In view of this, 
the apartheid setup doubly undermined manhood. It denied black men “the accoutrements 
normally associated with citizenship,” and prevented them from “perform[ing] … the roles of 
men … including providing protection of women and children.”757 The national liberation 
movement criticized this state of affairs, and promoted ‘a heroic or revolutionary masculinity’ 
which would help men to right these wrongs. This masculine model gained even more 
political impetus when the ANC and SACP were banned and certain of their leaders killed.
758
 
Earlier great men were evoked: comrades were called upon to “‘pick … up the spear’ that had 
been dropped when Bambata and others had been defeated in the last armed rebellion before 
the Union, in 1906.”759 The “martial reputation of Zulu manhood,”760 developed on the basis 
of the legendary exploits of King Shaka kaSenzangakhona, was thematized as well. So potent 
was the idea that the struggle was inseparable from a reassertion of masculinity, that guerilla 
training became a legitimate passage to manhood and for some even replaced traditional 
initiation rituals.
761
 Nelson Mandela himself asserted that it was his military training in 
Algeria that had made him a man.
762
 The anti-apartheid struggle and the idea of reclaiming 
long-denied masculinity were inextricably linked. 
That said, the struggle was framed as a fight for equal economic opportunity, and in 
this respect was closely tied to a breadwinner conception of masculinity. This much was 
demonstrated, for example, by black men and women’s persistent calls for quality education, 
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precisely to “ensur[e] a better life in terms of either higher status and bigger salaries, or easier 
and ‘good’ jobs” that would provide “high salaries, responsibility, status,” and other benefits 
facilitating family stability.
763
 That black men must be given the economic opportunity to be 
competent breadwinners was articulated by striking workers as well. During the 1973 Durban 
strikes which risked considerable punitive action, an African worker stated this plainly 
enough: “We’re going on strike. There is nothing left for us to do. There are people working 
here who’ve had to bury their children because they don’t get enough money to look after 
their families.” 764  Admittedly, economic uplift, full urbanization, and the attendant 
breadwinner model of masculinity, would also allow these men to regain patriarchal 
dominance over their dependents.
765
 This was possibly an appealing prospect for them, given 
how within the context of labor migrancy, their role as household head stood to be 
undermined by their wives. The women had after all proved themselves perfectly capable of 
‘manhood,’ by singlehandedly taking charge of the rural umzi and in many cases making the 
homestead thrive.
766
 So men may have formulated their demands in terms of the need to be 
able to care for their families, but these envisioned caring relations probably would remain 
“inherently hierarchical and controlling.”767  
From the transition years to the present, many black men have been granted the 
economic wherewithal to approximate the breadwinner model of masculinity. However, 
within the South African context as much as the American and European ones, men’s self-
identification as breadwinners constitutes a precarious enterprise. It largely depends on a 
husband’s gainful employment, which is under constant threat within a neoliberal 
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economy.
768
 It also hinges on the continued dependence of his wife, who by implication 
should earn only a secondary income if she is employed at all. However, the gender 
transformation that has taken place in South African workplaces, especially in the wake of the 
adoption of a Constitution strongly emphasizing women’s rights, has undermined this idea of 
the subordinate wife, and thereby problematized the breadwinner model of masculinity.
769
 
Further, the breadwinner model is a stressor in itself, since it centers on the husband not only 
preventing starvation but catering for the more frivolous desires of his wife and children. He 
is also expected to increase the family’s status through constant acquisition of various 
accouterments to display.
770
 Admittedly, the specter of a more commodity-dependent 
manhood did loom around the umzi during the time of labor migrancy, as returning migrant 
workers were known “to buy prestige goods such as bicycles and certain types of western 
clothing” in order to demonstrate their importance. But such display was accompanied by 
their power to “dispense patronage and largesse to their neighbors and family,” and acquire 
cattle and other necessities to sustain a rural lifestyle. Therefore, for the most part, being a 
‘big man’ was not about consumerism and the insular urbanized world of a nuclear family, 
but about being “a responsible man [who] … always contribute[s] to the common good.”771 
This type of manhood, common to many sub-Saharan ethnic groups subscribing to relational 
communitarian values, was very much tied up with the idea that to be fully human – to be a 
real person – a man has to care for others rather than acting only in self-interest. It was really 
only in the 1960s and 1970s, when black urbanization escalated and the rural infrastructure 
faltered, that consumer commodities began to play a more central role in family life and in 
ideas of manhood. It became a matter of each nuclear family to itself, and the family’s status 
began to depend more and more on keeping up with the Joneses, so to speak. Already in 1969 
advertising executives were pointing out that urbanized black families are engaged in a 
“continual struggle to achieve status.” To this end, many “employ their own domestics … run 
large American motor cars [and have] … homes that could quite easily fit into a normal 
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European suburb and not look out of place … [with] the interior[s] of many … just the same 
as European homes.”772  
Alongside the breadwinner model of masculinity, gradually there developed a more 
individualistic consumption-oriented one. In present-day South Africa, the two models 
perhaps hold comparable sway and men may identify with both at the same time, or transition 
from one to the other depending on the situation at hand. Yet, the consumerist model is 
proving increasingly potent. The more hedonistic consumerist bent manifested itself as early 
as the 1970s. This was a time when heroic and breadwinner masculinities prevailed, but fully 
proletarianized, urban youth began to display increasing individualism cultivated in reference 
to showy consumer items. The Zulu chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi actually criticized ANC-
aligned, militant youths for what he saw as self-serving consumerist weakness. He warned 
that these young people scorn rural life as backward, possess “swanky clothes and flashy 
cars,” and “will build big houses and grow fat” instead of working in the interests of rural 
people and the working class.
773
 University of KwaZulu-Natal historian Thembisa Waetjen is 
correct to argue that such criticism signaled significant intergenerational conflict.
774
 Older and 
rural men continued to identify their manhood with both revolution and paternalistic care for 
family and community, while the younger generation, although extremely militant, were 
becoming ever more focused on gaining access to the wherewithal to construct their gender 
identities around neoliberal, display-oriented consumer activity. The right to consume became 
unduly glorified, because it had become tied up with black men’s struggle for political and 
economic recognition. In the post-apartheid era, this idea of equating liberation with “the 
comforts and pleasures of modern consumerism” 775  was not problematized by erstwhile 
struggle leaders either. ANC stalwart Cyril Ramaphosa’s appearance on the cover of Tribute 
magazine in July 1996 in trout fishing getup, entrenched the link between political freedom 
and a new masculinity predicated on consumption, leisure and appearance. William Beinart 
explains that Ramamphosa’s “enthusiasm for this activity, as well as malt whiskey, previously 
prerequisites of wealthier whites, was much touted as emblematic of new ideological and 
social aspirations.”776 One could add to this that it was also emblematic of the flourishing of a 
new masculinity oriented around hedonistic conspicuous consumption and consumption-
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oriented leisure – one virtually unrealizable by anyone but the nouveau riche. 777  This 
unaffordable new masculinity is beginning to hold hegemonic sway. It is embodied by the 
contemporary black elites – dubbed ‘black diamonds,’ 778  and engendered through the 
disproportionate attention given to it within top-selling black and multiracial magazines. In an 
online November 2003 edition of Drum magazine, for example, one article celebrates the 
plush parties held by Leonardo DiCaprio and Kanye West.
779
 Another features Soweto stylist 
Bobo Ndima, owner of the label Boys of Soweto, who vocally supports the practice of 
township men “us[ing] the platform of style and fashion to express or extend their self-
worth.”780 An August 2014 print edition of the same magazine features the stylish millionaire 
music promoter and self-described “playboy” and “sexual athlete” Prosper Mkwaiwa. Of all 
possible moments he chose August – Women’s Month in South Africa – to declare that he 
had slept with over a thousand women, sometimes without using protection. He claimed his 
outrageous exploits to be condoned by the fact that he never cheated on any one of these 
women, but rather had sex with one, after the other, after the other.
781
 This manipulated type 
of masculinity, conceivable only within the neoliberal universe of the reified commodity, then 
gets reinforced by women who frame romance in entirely materialistic terms. They do this by 
turning themselves and sex into “consumer product[s] to be paid for by dinners, jewellery, 
cell phones and expensive jeans,” and by only pursuing men who can demonstrate, through 
their own conspicuous consumption, that they can cater for them in this way.
782
 Alarmingly, 
as the South African clinical psychologist Graham Lindegger and psychology graduate Justin 
Maxwell point out, these women’s consumerist attitudes put them at great risk of HIV 
infection. Many are willing to sleep with rich men known for their promiscuous behavior, 
provided they are in exchange furnished with the “‘3 C’s – cell phones, clothes and cars.’”783 
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The new exalted masculinity is risky in other respects as well. To conform to popular 
media images, men across the world engage in high-risk behaviors such as excessive smoking 
and drinking, reckless driving and sexual promiscuity.
784
 The incredible violence perpetrated 
by those frustrated by their economic deficiencies, preventing them from ostensibly being 
‘real’ men and so attracting women, has also been thematized in recent South African 
scholarship. Importantly, though, these studies do not perpetuate “the dominant view of men 
as perpetrators.” Instead, they involve careful investigation of the “particular vulnerabilities” 
that cause men to commit violent acts in the first place.
785
 Earlier work paid attention to 
matters such as the relation between juvenile delinquency and the redundancy of the ‘shock 
troops’ or foot soldiers of the anti-apartheid struggle.786 And more recently, figures such as 
South African multicultural sociologist Kogila Moodley have identified men’s perpetration of 
crimes such as robbery, as a response to their inability to achieve through non-criminal means 
“the conspicuous consumption and obscene high life of … black and white elite … celebrated 
by the media ad nauseam.”787 Some men are willing to kill for this lifestyle and the manhood 
it promises. The South African anthropologist Isak Niehaus, having interviewed convicted 
rapists, is convinced that men who rape are not simply monsters bent on “express[ing] … 
masculine domination and entitlement” in any traditional patriarchal mold. Rather, their 
actions must be seen against the backdrop of the fact that “after [more than] a decade of 
democratic governance, few promises of prosperity have materialised,” yet men are obliged to 
aspire to a hegemonic masculinity only accessible through money. Consequently, he proposes 
that rape should be understood as “a violent attempt to symbolically reassert – and sometimes 
even … mimic – a dominant masculine persona.”788 In short, powerlessness; and indeed, in 
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most cases there exists “a significant disjuncture between masculine ideals and the real-life 
situation of rapists.”789 
This does not absolve men who rape or commit other crimes of all culpability, but 
indicates that the current hegemonic models of masculinity are dysfunctional and destructive. 
They sustain neoliberal economic orthodoxy by trapping men in a work/rob-and-spend cycle, 
generating enough frustration to precipitate horrific acts of violence including rape, torture, 
and murder. The dysfunctional aspects of consumption-oriented masculinity are now 
conspicuous in the township youth subculture of izikhothane, inspired by ‘fashion shows’ that 
Zulu migrant workers used to hold in their hostels.
790
 However, the migrants only ever 
paraded around in expensive designer clothing. Contemporary izikhothane practitioners go 
much further, by parading and then burning expensive consumer items, often in front of the 
less fortunate. The destruction of these commodities does not symbolize a revolt against 
consumerism, but a desire to prove excessive wealth, consumer competence and so masculine 
virility. Strikingly, many participants cannot personally afford to keep up with this behavior, 
and consequently force their parents into indebtedness. It has been reported that some 
practitioners are willing to “hit … their parents [or] … blackmail them by threatening to stop 
their studies … in order to have the money.”791 Young people who do not have the economic 
means to join in are ridiculed, particularly because within this context, being a man depends 
not on being a kind or helpful person but on “what label you are wearing and how many gold 
teeth you have.”792 Frustration with financial inability to keep participating in this subculture 
has pushed at least one teenage boy to suicide.
793
 And absolutely no thought is spared for the 
poor. As one izikhothane practitioner emphasized: “I’m tired of hearing … we’re not being 
responsible by burning money, or that we could have given it to the poor instead … If I want 
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to destroy banknotes, who can stop me? It’s not our job to give money to the poor.”794 A 
greater rupture with the indigenous African notion of a real man as someone who “always 
contribute[s] to the common good,”795 is barely imaginable. Yet, as one contributor to the 
South African City Press newspaper advanced, engagement in mindlessly excessive 
consumption is also commonplace among our political elites. It is clear that they too believe 
that their freedom from the chains of apartheid, and their attainment of the status of Big Men, 
are best demonstrated through ‘bling.’ To the contributor, this dysfunctional, unethical 
tendency toward consumerist fetishism means that black South Africans are still enslaved. As 
he/she put it: “We’ve always had chains around our necks. Now they just have diamonds in 
them.”796 
 
Challenge gender: change the world? 
 
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated the dysfunctional character of hegemonic 
consumerist models of masculinity and femininity in South Africa, and suggested the extent 
to which these buttress the neoliberal hegemony. The transformation of South Africa into a 
consumer society has dire implications for cultural and ecological integrity, political 
mobilization, and the possibility of imagining alternative ways of life. Still, indigenous South 
Africans’ vehement resistance against earlier colonizing endeavors suggests that opposition is 
possible. The question is: can change be facilitated by remolding gender,
797
 away from a 
neoliberal, consumerist focus? As Stephan Miescher and Lisa Lindsay ask: “What kinds of 
political, economic, religious, occupational, or other transformations are linked to gender 
changes?”798 Alternatively, can a non-neoliberal future be encouraged by “developing more 
egalitarian sexual and non-sexual cross-gender relationships,” in terms of which individuals 
may pursue masculinity and femininity but without this entrenching dominating or 
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exploitative relations?
799
 Or should the aim be to look beyond gender as such, focusing 
instead on the common humanity of men and women and how humanness can be developed 
through embodying a communitarian ethic? What has been suggested here is that neoliberal 
hegemony is maintained through people constructing themselves principally in reference to 
consumerist gender types. Their preoccupation in this regard blinds them to, or causes them to 
ignore, the atrocious dominations integral to neoliberalism. The concluding chapter advances 
a view that the embodied communitarian ethic of ubuntu offers an antidote to this social 
disorganization. Here is an orientation, in which human beings and life systems are clearly 
valued over money and commodities. Furthermore, the indigenous perspective of ubuntu can 
be reinforced in dialogue with thought streams such as ecological feminism. A promising 
normative convergence between these two grassroots political visions affirms that another 
kind of global future is possible. 
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Chapter 5: Voicing an Indigenous Ethic 
 
“Africa has been emptied of its content, and what has been imported is empty too.”800 So 
declared the Burkinabé scholar and politician Joseph Ki-Zerbo – deeply critical of African 
infatuation with and submission to the ideals, knowledge systems, institutions, and products 
of capitalist colonization.
801
 Ki-Zerbo emphasizes the sheer power of this economic form and 
its cultural hegemony in Africa, at the same time as characterizing it as fundamentally 
superficial and destructive. However, as the Congolese philosopher Valentin-Yves Mudimbe 
rightly points out, it would be incorrect to assume that absolutely everything Africa has lost 
was “civilized and beautiful.”802 Certain African thinkers such as the Senegalese Cheikh Anta 
Diop were undoubtedly guilty of this assumption, one that invites a problematic 
“aestheticization” 803  or essentializing “hypostasis of African civilizations.” 804  Such an 
assumption can also encourage African academics to reject all imported attitudes and ideas as 
inapplicable to African problems – even though ironically they may find themselves squarely 
situated in Euro-American academic fields using registers of the ‘Western’ philosophical, 
anthropological, or sociological traditions. This may create problems for scholars in other 
postcolonial settings as well, not only because they may fall prey to this tendency, but also 
because they may be misrepresented as having done so. The Indian political psychologist 
Ashis Nandy, for example, has been criticized for romanticizing tradition defined as non-
Western, indigenous Indian culture on the one hand, and dismissing the ‘West’ on the other, 
while yet identifying himself as a critical thinker.
805
 Yet, this overlooks the both/and approach 
adopted by Nandy, whereby he uses Western registers but not without being critical of any 
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tradition, including his own. As he puts it, “each … concept … is a double entendre: on the 
one hand, it is part of an oppressive structure; on the other, it is in league with its victims.”806 
It should be possible to deal carefully with the insuperability of such dilemmas by 
drawing sensitively and responsibly on both indigenous and modernist knowledge-making to 
tackle contemporary African problems. Conversely, a parallel appropriation can be applied in 
reverse, for African insights may well help to solve problems in the wider context of the 
global North. But controversy abounds on whether indigenous/traditional African knowledge 
is sufficiently critical, dialectical and therefore philosophical enough to address complex 
contemporary problems. From the second half of the twentieth century onward, numerous 
African political, social and moral philosophers asserted the relevance of indigenous African 
thought to a more humane and ecologically sensitive global development trajectory. 
Moreover, the Beninese neo-marxist Paulin Hountondji contends that it is essential to unite 
the best of European thought with the best of indigenous African thought. He believes that 
this can be done without “making an absolute of the internal rationality of these traditions.” 
For him, it makes very good sense to explore African traditions not merely for personal 
edification “or justification, but in order to help us meet the challenges and problems of 
today.”807  The Ghanaian philosopher Kwasi Wiredu is another who argues that Africans 
should feel free to appropriate valuable ideas from any culture, East or West, that in 
combination with “indigenous philosophical resources” can address contemporary issues 
effectively.
808
 
Wiredu’s approach is sound, and extremely important for countering the prevailing 
hegemony of neoliberalism. Building on his culturally open stance, an attempt is made later in 
the chapter to bring indigenous African ethical thought into a conversation with global 
materialist feminist ideas. The rationale for this particular dialogue is twofold. Women across 
the world, and indigenous peoples in the global South, each experience remarkably 
comparable forms of marginalization, disempowerment and exploitation under the 
international capitalist economic regime. Both groupings have been constructed as inferior to 
the ostensibly universal norm of the Western man. In each case, social diminishment by race 
or gender is believed to be justified by the subject’s limited capacity for rationality. In fact, 
both groups are considered ‘closer to nature,’ and thus their labors have been exploited freely 
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as natural resources in the process of capital accumulation. Institutionalized racism and 
sexism creates ‘others’ as less than fully human, objects to be overseen and guided by a 
master. Women writing on the ecological dimensions of feminism have made a particularly 
important contribution, by demonstrating the ideological common ground between the 
exploitation of nature, of women and of indigenes as resources, and challenging such 
exploitation. The second rationale for treating indigenous and womanist perspectives together 
is that both reflect the practical attainment of life-affirming reproductive or meta-industrial 
skills.  
However, the advocates of postcolonial and feminist politics have not often 
recognized the significance of such convergencies. Initially, women developed a feminist 
movement in the belief that emancipation hinges on becoming as economically and 
professionally powerful as their erstwhile capitalist patriarchal oppressors. Finding 
themselves in a comparably subjugated position, indigenous peoples equated black liberation 
with mainstream forms of economic and professional empowerment. At the same time, 
radical counter-modernist political identities were formulated, as exemplified in the Negritude 
movement and in cultural feminism. Ecological feminism and the African ethic of ubuntu 
constitute a further phase in this unfolding consciousness, moving to a materially grounded 
stance that is politically reconstructive. The global neoliberal project is refused on account of 
the human and environmental exploitation it entails, and contemporary Africanist 
philosophers valorize 
 embodied knowing; 
 relational livelihood and personhood; and 
 human embeddedness and dependency on nature.  
Ecofeminism overlaps with ubuntu insofar as it emphasizes 
 non-dualistic logic; 
 caring and subsistence labor; and 
 material embodiment of humans within nature. 
These resonances between the indigenous African ethic and ecological feminism speak to the 
fact that both are sociologically positioned to recognize the material limits of natural 
resources. Ecofeminist actions are carried out by ordinary care-giving women who have to 
discern contrived wants from “everyday needs,” and who accordingly develop “an intimate 
biocentric understanding of how people’s survival links in to the future of the planet at 
large.”809 That is, although women are encouraged to participate fully in consumer culture, 
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ecological feminists argue that the household care-giving labor which most women engage in 
for at least part of their lives, is simply incompatible with a narcissistic individualist consumer 
ethic. Like subsistence-based indigenous peoples, the knowledge base of care-giving women 
is “materially embodied” and relational.810 
In terms of social theory, this process of engaging in transversal analysis helps guard 
against the pitfall of thematizing either ecological feminism or the indigenous African ethic of 
ubuntu as an uncritical exercise in ‘identity politics.’ To explain: the American feminist 
philosopher Nancy Fraser famously argued that identity politics uses the ostensible 
uniqueness of a social perspective with the aim of achieving political recognition. Fraser saw 
this practice leading participants “to drastically simplify and reify group identities,” 811 
overlooking the need for distributive economic justice and refraining from interacting with 
others, even to the point of xenophobia.
812
 However, Fraser’s liberal pluralist dilemma 
suggests that humans live only in a world of ideas. The first premise of a materialist 
ecofeminism is the sociological interlock of all dominations – gender, race, class, and species. 
Moreover, this movement advocates the global indispensability of reproductive labors and 
communal care giving regardless of gender, race or class.
813
 As Ariel Salleh points out, the 
traits required for our common “collective emancipation … represent natural human 
capacities which have not been historically objectified and valued in the formation of an 
oppressively specular and exclusively ‘masculine’ culture.”814 In this critical realist vein, “it is 
crucial to rediscover, revalue and reintegrate in culture these hitherto neglected dimensions of 
experience if a real social alternative is to be made.”815 Likewise, the indigenous African ethic 
of ubuntu, as formulated currently, does not involve uncritical simplification, because it is 
acknowledged as a normative framework based on values shared among various sub-Saharan 
indigenous peoples.
816
 Furthermore, ubuntu thinkers reject outright any traditions condoning 
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physical or psychological abuse.
817
 The ubuntu ethic is underpinned by a logic of sharing, 
which condemns privileging individual gains over the common good. Finally, insofar as the 
ethic of ubuntu stresses the dignity of others regardless of ethnic identification, emphasizes 
that to be fully human one must help others, and prioritizes human interdependence, it cannot 
be said to foster insularity or xenophobia. Indeed, when placing the indigenous African ethic 
in dialogue with ecological feminism, the universally life-affirming politics of each 
transcends and unifies postcolonial, gender, and environmental concerns. 
 
The threatened status of indigenous African knowledge 
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis considered the loss of South African indigenous autonomy, 
particularly from the 1800s onward. Emphasis fell on how colonial authorities and 
missionaries sought to legitimate imperialist behaviors by demeaning indigenous peoples for 
their supposed irrationality and deficient beliefs and practices. This placed Europeans in an 
ideologically superior position, as ‘possessors of rationality’ and true beliefs required for 
effective governance. Aristotle, in fact, was one of the first to hierarchize humans in his 
discussion of the scale of nature or Great Chain of Being. This schema graded all living 
creatures from invertebrates to humans, and argued that climate generates temperamental and 
physical differences of ability between the races. Aristotle’s theorizations were not explicitly 
racist, but they were appropriated in this way by the Romans. The latter knew the importance 
of deeming other races inferior, as this allowed them to frame slavery and imperial expansion 
as ethically unproblematic. The colonized peoples were considered ‘naturally’ lesser beings, 
in need of the rule of Roman law.
818
 Racist ideology has been employed in efforts to justify 
domination ever since, and the racial imaginary was entrenched fully in Eurocentric thought 
by the eighteenth century. This is affirmed in the attitude of G. W. F. Hegel, who deemed the 
Western Christian tradition the most advanced.
819
 Philosopher David Hume supported racist 
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claims with his view that no eminent individuals had emerged from among ‘non-whites.’820 
Immanuel Kant also held an explicitly hierarchical view of the races.
821
 The contemporary 
American philosopher Lee Brown is quite correct to point out that these attitudes, particularly 
given the prominence of their bearers, “helped fuel racialism and served to marginalize any 
intellectual activity by those of obvious African descent.” Popular stereotypes of the 
‘irrational animal’ and ‘backward civilizations’ went unquestioned, despite the fact that “there 
is no causal link between the amount of melanin in an individual’s body and in the ability of 
an individual … to engage in abstract reasoning.”822 Small wonder, then, that nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century missionaries and authorities perpetuated the vision of the colonizer as 
having logos while “conced[ing] only mythos to the colonized.”823 The colonized were not, in 
this view, seen as capable of governing themselves or rationally calculating what is best for 
them. This gave Europeans the ostensible “‘right’ to invade” their territories and to control 
them.
824
 The myth that the African is ‘animal and not properly human,’ grew in momentum. 
As ecofeminists point out, women likewise were accorded a status as ‘closer to nature.’ 
Ironically, by according pure reason to themselves, Western men were the ones operating in 
terms of mythos – in this case the myth of rational superiority based on skin color or body 
form. 
Be that as it may, ethnophilosophers who began writing about traditional African 
societies in the first half of the twentieth century, aligned themselves with, rather than against, 
the indigenous peoples. Many of them remained guilty of assuming that African thought is 
“pre-reflective.” 825  The Belgian missionary Placide Tempels propagated the view that 
Africans possess an ontology centered on ‘vital forces’ arrayed in hierarchical fashion, that 
could be augmented or diminished and that inhered in all life forms. He contrasted this 
ontology with European ideas of ‘being’ and ‘existence,’826 and indicated that unlike Western 
belief systems such as Christianity, African beliefs were never really subject to 
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systematization, critical reflection or the demand for proof.
827
 Further, he argued, it was the 
job of non-Africans to properly systematize African beliefs: 
 
We do not claim … that the Bantu are capable of formulating a philosophical treatise, complete with an 
adequate vocabulary. It is our job to proceed to such systematic development. It is we who will be able to 
tell them, in precise terms, what their inmost concept of being is. They will recognize themselves in our 
words and will acquiesce, saying, “You understand us: you now know us completely, you ‘know’ in the 
way we ‘know.’”828 
 
Other ethnophilosophers, such as Marcel Griaule who chronicled knowledge of the Dogon 
elder Ogotemmêli, disputed such ethnocentric claims by demonstrating, for instance, that 
Africans do possess a philosophical vocabulary and systematize their thought.
829
 Even so, for 
contemporary African philosophers such as Paulin Hountondji, generally speaking the 
‘apologetic’ literature of ethnophilosophy hardly improved on the knowledge produced on 
Africa by missionaries and colonial authorities. The fact was that they all treated indigenous 
traditional societies “as a voiceless face under private observation, an object to be defined and 
not the subject of possible discourse.”830 Further, Hountondji agrees with Aimé Césaire that 
works such as Tempels’s were actually politically debilitating: that attention to so-called 
Bantu philosophy was a diversionary tactic drawing attention away from the fact of colonial 
exploitation.
831
 As Césaire suggests, Tempels’s ethnophilosophy was surreptitiously 
propagating sentiments that condoned indigenous exploitation, such as the following: 
 
Since Bantu thought is ontological, the Bantu only ask for satisfaction of an ontological nature. Decent 
wages! Comfortable housing! Food! These Bantus are pure spirits, I tell you: ‘What they desire first of all 
and above all is not the improvement of their economic or material situation, but the white man’s 
recognition of and respect for their dignity as men, their full human value.’ In short, you tip your hat to 
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the Bantu vital force, you give a wink to the immortal Bantu soul. And that’s all it costs you! You have to 
admit you’re getting off cheap!832 
 
In view of this, it is quite understandable why Hountondji and others criticize 
ethnophilosophy. He contends that such writing merely fed “the curiosity and other 
intellectual and even non-intellectual needs of Western readership,”833 and helped colonial 
authorities to subject, impoverish and mute indigenous populations. Further, he condemns 
ethnophilosophy for its gross oversimplification of African traditions, which strengthened 
racist ideas concerning the ‘primitiveness’ of Africans. That is, the ethnophilosophical 
assumption of ‘unanimism,’ according to which “everyone agrees with everyone” in African 
cultures, entirely eclipsed the plurality and complexity of traditional African societies.
834
 
According to Hountondji, this same oversimplifying tendency is unfortunately also evidenced 
in home-grown anthropological theorizations of their countrymen. These scholars are for the 
most part entirely “co-opted into a Western, or West-centered discussion” while “[t]he rank-
and-file of the people remain excluded” from this discourse.835 
However, Hountondji’s sustained attack on ethnophilosophy for ignoring the plurality 
and complexity of traditional African societies, does not imply that he grants indigenous 
knowledge the status of philosophy proper. Rather controversially, he argues that there was no 
such thing as African philosophy until around the middle of the twentieth century, when 
intellectuals of African ethnic and geographical origin began writing down critical reflections 
on philosophical problems. Somewhat ironically, for Hountondji, indigenous knowledge is 
not philosophy because it is oral rather than written. The critical reflection that one can 
exercise on a written text is not possible to exercise upon an oral tradition. The latter favors 
fundamentalism: “the consolidation of knowledge into dogmatic, intangible systems,” leaving 
“the mind … too preoccupied with preserving knowledge to find freedom to criticize it.”836 
Hountondji also maintains that philosophy is scientific, and this precludes any ‘artistic’ works 
such as traditional “fables, legends, myths, proverbs, biographies, autobiographies, etc., 
[which] are ‘literary’ genres in the ordinary sense of the word.”837 These works are not mere 
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“wordplay” to him, but not serious modes of critical philosophical reflection either. They are 
relatively autonomous, independent of specific historical facts, and not dialectical in the sense 
that a philosophical work is. In contrast, argues Hountondji, a truly philosophical work 
constitutes only a momentary part of a continuing debate concerning a specific issue or 
experience, and involves the dialectical process of “refer[ring] to antecedent positions, either 
to refute them or to confirm and enrich them.”838 Hountondji has been criticized for so rigidly 
delimiting the ‘philosophical.’ However, even his critics have been forced to look very 
circumspectly at indigenous African knowledge. 
Hountondji has forced Africans to assess the philosophical value of indigenous 
knowledge, and to recognize in the process that it cannot simply be retrieved from obscurity 
and revived as is.
839
 However, the Kenyan philosopher Henry Odera Oruka objects that 
although “[w]riting is a good way to store thought, and so to store philosophy,” “philosophy 
is thinking, and one can think even if one is incapable of or has no facilities for writing.”840 
Others, such as the American philosopher Richard Bell, criticize Hountondji for insisting on 
writing as a philosophical criterion while regarding Socrates – a non-writer – as philosopher 
par excellence.
841
 Oruka, in addition, identifies and elaborates on the thought of selected 
sages who, rather than espousing dogma “possess the philosophic inclination,” undertaking “a 
critical assessment of their culture and its underlying beliefs.”842 The Ghanaian philosopher 
Kwame Gyekye similarly emphasizes the value of Akan proverbs as products of “acute 
speculative intellects.” The proverbs “become philosophically interesting when one sees them 
as attempts to raise and answer questions relating to the assumptions underlying commonly 
held beliefs and make a synthetic interpretation of human experience.”843 Kwasi Wiredu, most 
notably in his Philosophy and an African Culture, likewise emphasizes the importance of 
appreciating the philosophical aspects underlying “folk thought.”844 Yet, at the same time, 
Wiredu stresses the need to redirect energies away from an exclusive focus on “search[ing] 
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for the correct conception of African philosophy.” His advice is to “get along with the task … 
of modern philosophical thinking” by actively addressing the problems of today.845 In all 
these criticisms, emphasis comes to rest on the critical value and contemporary applicability 
of aspects of indigenous African knowledge. This casts doubt on the legitimacy of 
Hountondji’s rejection of indigenous knowledge as unphilosophical tout court.  
A final controversy concerning African culture centers on the apparent differences 
between ‘universalistic’ and ‘particularist’ currents. Wiredu and Oruka have been identified 
as proponents of the universalistic approach. This entails understanding philosophy as “both 
(i) a fundamental outlook on human life and nature in general and (ii) a critical evaluation of 
what is given in one’s cultural and natural environment.”846 Others, such as Hountondji, have 
been identified as proponents of a more particularist current. This is exemplified in his 
argument that something is philosophical only if it constitutes a specific response to a 
particular event taking place at a certain time. A properly philosophical work, therefore, is 
“intelligible only as a moment in a debate that sustains and transcends it.”847 To proponents of 
the particularist current, African philosophy must be “more closely bound to the political 
struggles and intellectual history of contemporary Africa.”848 It must avoid the universalistic 
tendency by becoming ever more endogenous, both in content and in the audience it seeks to 
address. To clarify, for Hountondji “[t]heoretical discourse is undoubtedly a good thing … 
[but] in present-day Africa we must at all costs address it first and foremost to our fellow 
countrymen, and offer it for the appreciation and discussion of Africans themselves.”849  
Even so, Hountondji himself cites Aimé Césaire’s argument that one can lose oneself 
either through “dilution in the ‘universal’” or “fragmentation in the particular.”850 This makes 
any absolute privileging of either the ‘universal’ or the ‘particular’ problematic to say the 
least. Perhaps a more sensible approach, suggested by the African American philosopher 
Stephen Ferguson, involves accepting that there is actually no contradiction between the two 
and that they are both inseparable and reciprocal. That 
 
                                                          
845
 Ibid., xi. 
846
 Henry Odera Oruka, Practical Philosophy: In Search of an Ethical Minimum (Nairobi: East African 
Educational Publishers, 1997), 171. 
847
 Hountondji, African Philosophy, 83. 
848
 Bell, Understanding African Philosophy, 28. 
849
 Hountondji, “An Alienated Literature,” 156. 
850
 Aimé Césaire, Lettre à Maurice Thorez, 1956, cited in Paulin J. Hountondji, “An Alienated Literature,” in 
The African Philosophy Reader: A Text with Readings, 2d ed., eds. P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 147. 
178 
 
[t]he truth of particularity resides in its dialectical relationship to universality. Though particularity and 
universality are distinct categories, they must of logical necessity be seen as a pair. The relationship of 
particularity to universality is not an either/or proposition. Hence the call for particularity is not merely an 
act of transferring the citadel of philosophy from Mt. Olympus to Mt. Kenya, but a recognition that world 
philosophy is not located [exclusively] in Europe.
851
 
 
In what follows, this line of reasoning is adopted to argue for the global relevance of aspects 
of indigenous African knowledge that counter mainstream modernist Western thought. The 
latter is underpinned by dualistic constructions, hyper-individualism, and the socially and 
environmentally disembedded imperative of economic competition. The aim of this chapter is 
to affirm that indigenous African knowledge – given greater philosophical coherence by 
contemporary Africanist thinkers – can be used to formulate an ethical alternative to 
neocolonization. This is because indigenous knowledge centers on embodied knowing not 
dualistic divisiveness; a relational personhood not narcissistic gender identities; and human 
community and dependence on nature. Not rivalrous exploitation of others and the 
environment. An embodied communitarian African philosophy is now, more than ever before, 
globally relevant, and resonates with the alternative visions of care-giving, meta-industrial 
labor – those people marginalized in conventional theorizations of labor yet exploited in the 
global economy. These alternative perspectives must be taken seriously and brought into play 
within the global North and the South alike, given the current pervasiveness and power of 
neoliberal ideology. 
 
Ubuntu 
 
Africa has a multiplicity of philosophies and cultures. Because of this, Richard Bell has 
identified any talk of a “singular” African philosophy as a “stumbling block,” and as 
involving nothing less than “the chasing of a chimera.”852 In speaking of ‘African philosophy’ 
or an ‘African moral theory,’ it is important to remain sensitive to diversity and cautious of 
the trap of essentialism or uncritical universalism. For example, the Africanist thinker 
Thaddeus Metz and Botswanan philosopher Joseph Gaie admit that “one is expected to note 
the diversity of the continent, with more than 50 countries and at least several hundred ethnic 
groups and languages,” but they contend that it is still necessary to treat “underrepresented 
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ideas from below the Sahara desert” in a unified manner, given the need for a powerfully 
coherent alternative ethic on a global scale. They believe this approach to be fairly 
unproblematic, since the ideas treated are those held in common by many indigenous African 
cultures.
853
 In their article “The African Ethic of Ubuntu/Botho,” Metz and Gaie adopt this 
approach by discussing several strands of traditional African moral thought under the unifying 
rubric of ‘Afro-communitarianism.’854 Their aim is to provide “a theoretical reconstruction of 
themes that are recurrent among many peoples below the Sahara desert and particularly in 
southern Africa.”855 In another paper Metz follows this same method by exploring ubuntu as 
an African moral theory. Through constructing a normative ethical theory on the basis of 
commonly held traditional values, argues Metz, it may be possible to situate ubuntu as a 
compelling alternative to mainstream moral frameworks,
856
 which problematically prioritize 
possessive individualism. 
In fact, the importance of legitimating indigenous ethical thought is evidenced by the 
South African philosopher Mogobe Ramose’s censuring of Metz, for claiming that no one has 
made a concerted effort to analyze and formulate a normative African ethical model. To 
counter this claim, Ramose cites the work of both Kwasi Wiredu and the Congolese 
theologian Benezet Bujo, who had done such systematizing work.
857
 All of these philosophers 
– Metz included – though differing in approach and sometimes antagonistic toward one 
another, contribute to clarifying an indigenous ethic diametrically opposed to the neoliberal 
mores. The following discussion, while drawing on these figures, contributes further 
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coherence to the alternative indigenous ethic of ubuntu by identifying and elaborating on three 
interlocking principles central to it, namely embodied knowing, relational livelihood and 
personhood, and human embeddedness and dependency on nature. 
 
Embodied knowing 
 
Dualistic conceptions of the human being and of existence more generally, can be traced back 
to ancient Greece. Among others, Plato indicated a vast chasm between essence and truth on 
the one hand, and the appearances and routines of everyday life on the other. Such 
disembodied, non-relational thought was perpetuated through the Judeo-Christian tradition 
which unequivocally split mind from body, making the true self or identity ultimately 
independent of physical existence. Here, identity encompassed in the soul is not lost at the 
death of the body. The French physicist, mathematician and philosopher René Descartes 
promoted this idea of “substance dualism” in his famous dictum, cogito, ergo sum – ‘I think, 
therefore I am.’ Descartes virtually severed the relation between mind and body, associating 
“mind with thinking substance, and body with extended substance.”858 In his Meditations on 
First Philosophy (1641), he indicated that his argument for ‘substance dualism’ supports the 
Christian belief in an afterlife: 
 
Now the first and most important prerequisite for knowledge of the immortality of the soul is for us to 
form a concept of the soul which is as clear as possible and is also quite distinct from every concept of 
body … [W]e cannot understand a body except as being divisible, while by contrast we cannot understand 
a mind except as being indivisible. For we cannot conceive of half a mind, while we can always conceive 
of half of a body, however small; and this leads us to recognize that the natures of mind and body are not 
only different, but in some way opposite … [T]hese arguments are enough to show that the decay of the 
body does not imply the destruction of the mind, and are hence enough to give mortals the hope of an 
after-life.
859
  
 
On the basis of such arguments Descartes became regarded as the father of dualistic thought, 
and there followed the formulation of even more mechanistic dualisms. Dualistic constructs 
such as logos/mythos, reason/emotion, man/woman, civilized/savage, and man/nature, 
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likewise generate the illusion of difference, distance and independence of ‘thinking man’ from 
his ‘other’ – woman, indigene, animal, and all the biological and ecological processes that 
constitute life. Adapting an argument made by Maria Mies, and by the American ecofeminist 
theologian Elizabeth Dodson Gray in Green Paradise Lost, the economist Julie Nelson pairs 
the dualisms of living consciousness versus inert material, and economic versus moral. She 
notes that the latter leaves “[m]orality … to the humanists, while mainstream economists 
pursue ‘objective’ study based on an assumed analogy between economic ‘laws’ … and the 
‘laws’ of physical science.”860 This creates a superficial separation of capitalist patriarchal 
processes from their material fallout in the form of social discrimination and environmental 
destruction. Contemporary African philosophers have shown the sinister operation of dualistic 
thought in the colonial subjection of Africans and destruction of their traditions and 
livelihoods. They also have gone some way toward highlighting the bad fit of dualistic 
economic thinking to daily life. As Valentin-Yves Mudimbe summarizes, the colonizing 
structure, “a dichotomizing system … emerged, and along with it a great number of … 
paradigmatic oppositions … developed: traditional versus modern; oral versus written and 
printed … subsistence economics versus highly productive economies” – all of which 
“trivializ[ed] the whole traditional mode of life and its spiritual framework.”861  
Kwasi Wiredu problematizes the hegemony of substance dualism more systematically 
than any other African thinker. He argues that the Western body/mind split “presupposes a 
mode of conceptualization that ill-coheres with traditional African thought habits which are 
frequently empirical.” 862  For Wiredu, while contemporary Africans certainly discuss 
existential matters in dualistic ways, this is more than likely indicative of their uncritical 
embrace of Christian patterns of thought.
863
 It must be noted that the European philosophical 
community, particularly the British empiricists John Locke, David Hume and their intellectual 
descendants, fiercely contested Descartes’s rationalism. Yet, the dualistic thrust of his thought 
was taken up in the dominant ideology, particularly since it gave credibility to the Christian 
faith and served to legitimate colonization of ‘lesser’ heathen races. Many 
indigenous/traditional African perspectives conflicted with Christian cosmology. For 
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example, in contrast to the dualistic Christian position that the spirits of the deceased, and god 
himself, reside somewhere ‘beyond’ the Earth, in the Akan conceptual scheme as well as that 
of the Central Luo spirits remain immanent in quasi-physical form.
864
 Such beliefs compelled 
adherents to live ethically and with reverence for the ancestors on this Earth, rather than 
fixating on some heavenly plenitude beyond it. In Wiredu and other African arguments 
against substance dualism, emphasis falls on the strongly material inclinations of African 
village societies. There “the spirit-body divide has always been suspect,” “embodied grounds 
of knowledge” are prioritized, and 
 
the village stands for an original point of departure in epistemic matters, and … in it, we find the anchor 
for the settled belief in the obduracy of bodies; the unavoidable fact of a physical universe that is 
confronted day in and day out by one and all.
865
 
 
Indigenous African thought does contain “metaphysical or magico-religious speculation” on 
existential matters, but favors materialism.
866
 This frustrated Christian missionaries terribly. 
As the Kenyan philosopher Dismas Masolo explains, missionaries admonished the Luo for 
insisting that their dead go to piny, a realm within the compass of the Earth. This idea was 
demonized and the Luo instead were taught the law of substance dualism – that that their dead 
go to polo malo – “above” to the heavens.867 
Such indigenous African perspectives suggest a far more pragmatic, embodied stance 
on matters of life and death than that entailed in the missionary framework. Ironically though, 
it was the Africans who were deemed lacking in logos and being in possession of mythos 
alone. According to Mogobe Ramose, the logos/mythos dualism was used to frame the 
African as a savage. It was posited that the African is “defective in its ontology, that is, a 
being without reason;” the African “cannot qualify as a human being.”868 Armed with such 
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reasoning, colonial authorities gave themselves the “‘right’ to invade,” 869  and gave 
missionaries the right to convert, without ever running the risk of being accused of 
dehumanizing Africans as they were not thought properly human to begin with. With rare 
insight, Ramose contends that the same line of reasoning was used to justify European men’s 
discrimination against women, similarly regarded as incapable of the rational calculation 
required for self-governance.
870
 Mudimbe, in his turn, points out that this perspective 
indicated the colonists’ own shortcomings. They “postulate[d] … a clear distinction between 
prelogism and Cartesianism, primitiveness and civilization,” yet failed to realize that their 
dualistic thinking constituted “a refusal to face and think the implicit, the unthought … 
negated in their own cultural experience by the sovereignty of a history which was a 
mystifying socialization of the cogito.”871 They proved incapable of recognizing aspects of 
humanness denied within their hyper-rationalist framework, indicating their own limited 
reflexivity rather than any on the part of Africans abroad or women at home. 
The colonizing mindset produced further ‘evidence’ for the African lack of logos and 
civilization by advancing that, just like women, ‘natives’ became too emotionally involved in 
matters. This placed both indigenes and women on the negative side of the reason versus 
emotion dualism. Emotional judgment and an ethic of care were fundamental to both 
groupings in their approach to social interaction and decision making, and in fact, this usually 
involved rational calculation as well. A very masculine gendered fear of emotionality and care 
made both of these ‘othered’ groupings highly suspect to those trained to disdain everything 
but coldly objective, instrumental rationality. The Senegalese cultural theorist Léopold 
Senghor provides important criticism of this highly schooled rationalism. He indicates that it 
is always imparted in combination with the injunction to “distrust the imagination and 
particularly the emotions: everything that distracted or beguiled rational thought.” 872 
Admittedly, under the auspices of the Negritude movement, Senghor tended to essentialize 
“[e]motive sensitivity” as a distinctly black/African characteristic.873 In contrast, some of his 
contemporaries, such as the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, saw it rather as an attitude 
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that anyone can adopt toward the world.
874
 More recently, materialist ecofeminists have 
recognized empathy to be learned through the labors of caring for bodies and for 
environmental nature. Senghor’s contribution remains important within African philosophical 
thought. Perhaps most notable is his argument that emotion is a “manner of thinking” or “way 
of knowing,”875 which should not be seen as inferior to reason. Ubuntu theorist Mogobe 
Ramose corroborates this, arguing that “African philosophy … [does] not subscribe to the 
radical opposition between reason and emotion,” and that “[u]nderstanding thought as a 
system means recognising it as a whole-ness which includes not only the indivisibility but 
also the mutual dependence of the ‘rational’ and the ‘emotional.’” 876  The Afro-French 
philosopher Frantz Fanon, in his admittedly vitriolic Black Skin, White Masks, suggests that 
the indigenous African schema, precisely because it is not dominated by dualistic thought 
patterns, allows a person to be “in the world,” thus affirming “the bond between Man and the 
Earth.”877 Senghor, Ramose and others problematize dualistic constructions and reframe the 
emotional response as part of proper judgment taking place within an ecologically embedded 
social world. Through doing so, they draw attention to the shortsightedness of the reason 
versus emotion dualism, and they reveal the false split “between the rational mind and the 
disorderly life of the body and the emotions.”878 Feelings, intuitions, and the other senses,879 
no less than the ‘rational’ and the visual, form part of human being and human interaction 
with others and the world. So language is often incapable of expressing what a person 
experiences or even what they communicate to another. As the Dutch Africanist philosopher 
Bert Hamminga explains, when shaking someone’s hand  
 
you should feel this hand carefully … [as t]he hand speaks. You should ‘hear’ it. And one might need 
pages of words to write what some hand sometimes said. The body speaks … [and] learning to speak with 
your body is at least as demanding as learning to speak with your mouth and vocal cords.
880
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The masculinist, disembodied, hyper-rationalist approach to life reflected in the celebrated 
contributions of Western thinkers like Plato, Descartes, and Sir Francis Bacon no less, is 
readily apparent in capitalist, colonial and missionary discourses, and now neoliberal ideology 
as well. The American ecofeminist philosopher Carolyn Merchant, in her celebrated historical 
work The Death of Nature, identified an intimate connection between the rise of abstract, 
disembodied thought particularly as it manifests in Western science, and the emergence of the 
capitalist state.
881
 French philosopher Pierre Hadot, acknowledging Merchant’s work, reflects 
on Francis Bacon’s vision of a scientific establishment where nature is mimicked and 
experimented upon and overcome, just like a shackled woman.
882
 He argues that “this project 
of dominating nature” led scientists to conceive the physical world as exploitable matter,883 
and this kind of thinking became pervasive in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. As Hadot 
puts it, “from the time production began to be industrialized and the flourishing of technology 
became universal … man’s relation to nature was gradually modified in depth.”884 Through 
dualistic constructions, neoliberal pundits justify the exploitation of the majority of the 
world’s population and natural resources for the sake of enriching the select few. Dualistic 
thinking invites some humans to conceive of themselves as independent of ‘nature’ rather 
than as part thereof. The capitalist patriarchal hegemony would have them forget that they 
too, are organisms needing healthy physical environments. As the British ecofeminist Mary 
Mellor explains it, the contemporary system 
 
has cut itself free from the ecological and social framework of human being in its widest sense. Its ideal is 
‘economic man,’ who may also be female. Economic man … has no responsibility for the life-cycle of 
those goods or services [he consumes] any more than he questions the source of the air he breathes or the 
disposal of his excreta … ‘Economic man’ is the product of an ahistoric, atomised approach to the 
understanding of human existence.
885
 
 
In contrast, an indigenous African ethic, taking as its inspiration lived dependencies and 
reciprocities integral to traditional village life, is rooted in a materialist and thus a highly 
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relational standpoint. This grounded ethic affirms a holistic vision of human be-ing, with the 
consequence that social relations and human ecological interdependence become primary in 
the conception of personhood. The ontological project of becoming a person through others, 
is diametrically opposed to the pursuit of narcissistic and rivalrous consumer masculinities 
and femininities under neoliberalism. 
 
Relational livelihood and personhood 
 
The Ghanaian-American philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah argues that “[o]ne of the 
reasons people act the way they do is because they have the theories of the person that they 
do.” 886  Within neoliberal societies, people are encouraged to understand and fashion 
themselves in reference to consumer competence and artificially exalted gender identities. For 
those who are gendered men, this feeds back into a cycle of economic one-upmanship. But the 
pervasive gendering of young women as sexual objects equally calls them to act in egocentric, 
narcissistic and self-regarding ways. Africanist thinkers suggest that an indigenous African 
understanding of personhood radically contrasts with this neoliberal hegemony and its 
atomization of the individual. This implies that indigenous people who harbor or adopt an 
alternative conception of personhood are likely to act very differently to ‘the Western model.’ 
The same can be said of people in other parts of the world, whose alternative value systems 
contrast with neoliberal mores, and so inspire entirely different approaches to life. 
In terms of an indigenous African ethic, personhood is not something that one has by 
virtue of being a homo sapiens. Instead, it is carefully qualified in reference to ethical 
conduct. Mogobe Ramose explains that while being a homo sapiens “is an existential datum, 
personhood is a title conferred upon this datum,”887 and one only achieves such personhood or 
“humanness through and together with other human beings.” 888  This rich conception of 
personhood is summed up in the ethical maxim motho ke motho ka batho – ‘one attains 
humanity through others.’ Kwasi Wiredu similarly emphasizes that personhood or humanness 
is not innate to the human being, but acquired through social interaction involving a reciprocal 
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process of obligation. He insists that “a human being deprived of the socializing influence of 
communication will remain human biologically, but mentally is bound to be subhuman.”889 
He goes on to argue, in a supremely ecological relational way, that “no human society or 
community is possible without communication, for a community is not just an aggregation of 
individuals existing as windowless monads.”890 Wiredu suggests that humanness derives from 
social relations and the duties associated with it. This materialist claim counters any 
masculinist idea that humanness is underpinned by rationality alone, which would abstract 
“the essence of humanness wholly from any tradition, language or culture.” 891  Most 
indigenous African understandings envisage the development of humanness through 
interaction with others, through work, through the sharing of ideas, and through fulfilling our 
obligations.
892
 This is an ethical endeavor impossible in the absence of social participation. 
Given this, personhood depends on contributing to the physical survival of others; and their 
willingness to participate in one’s own ethical growth. 893  Accordingly, an indigenous 
conception of personhood, as Dismas Masolo argues, is “grounded in the empirical fragility 
of human biology, which requires of the person a great degree of dependency on the specific 
and deliberate actions of other members of the species in order to grow, develop, and 
flourish.”894 This suggests a nurturant attitude akin to that promoted by care ethicists and 
ecofeminists – and indeed Mary Mellor speaks of women’s labor as putting in “biological 
time.”895 In the West, care-giving activities have been treated as the province of women, 
remaining unvalued and marginal to the capitalist economy until the twentieth century when it 
began to monetize an emerging ‘service sector.’ 
In honoring our species condition of interdependence, one is able to recognize the 
dignity of others both as beings aiding you in the development of your personhood, and as 
beings in the process of developing themselves. This embodied idea of dignity is rooted in a 
holistic relational ontology. As such, it departs radically from the neoliberal notion of a 
‘decent’ life, measured in terms of individual economic success and competitive consumer 
display. Recall that sociologists such as Thorstein Veblen show how in the consumer society, 
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self-esteem is not based on dignity but on a socially manufactured idea of decency. Today this 
is benchmarked by commodified paraphernalia to indicate an individual’s purchasing 
power.
896
 Decency is too often about self-aggrandizement at the expense of others, whose 
expected role it is to look on. This conception, integral to which is an ontology of mutual 
antagonism, stands completely opposed to Kantian and indigenous African understandings of 
human dignity as underpinned by recognition of others as ethical beings. For Kant, the task is 
to help others become autonomous, while in terms of an indigenous African schema, the point 
is to help one another belong. In both cases, though, dignity rests on reciprocity rather than 
enmity. 
Here, relationality is crucial to the project of a homo sapiens becoming a person or 
achieving humanness.
897
 The Nigerian philosopher and poet Ifeyani Menkiti argues that 
engaging “in communal life through the discharge of the various obligations defined by one’s 
stations … transforms one from the it-status of early child-hood, marked by an absence of 
moral function, into the person-status of later years, marked by a widened maturity of ethical 
sense.”898 However, the Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye is critical of Menkiti’s rather 
rigid qualification of personhood. He interjects that communal membership is not enough for 
its development. Echoing Kant’s view that personal maturity depends on the capacity to judge 
independently cultural norms or traditions usually accepted as givens, Gyekye argues that 
achieving personhood also hinges on responsibly practicing critique of wider communal 
values that are unjust or discriminatory.
899
 In this, he promotes a more moderate 
communitarian view. This perspective avoids the potential danger of communal tyranny 
exercised in the name of received tradition. Further, it guards against falling into an 
individualistic libertarian rights-based discourse, where rights constitute “essentially self-
protection mechanisms that can be respected by simply leaving other people alone,” and 
where “rights-based duties to others are limited to reciprocal non-interference.” 900  The 
fundamental importance of obligations and caring relations is recognized, but room is also left 
for individual autonomy and expression. In fact, Mogobe Ramose claims that practicing 
generosity and care is individually edifying. He argues that genuine self-fulfillment rests on 
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embodying relational virtues, as this affirms one’s humanity and testifies to the achievement 
of one’s full human capacity.901 If you do not approximate these virtues, you do not have 
botho (humanness), and as such, you are nothing more than a species of animal,
902
 or “a thing, 
a non-human being.”903  
This developmental and obligations-oriented conception of personhood or humanness 
implies that the hyper-individualistic, rights-based bent of the neoliberal society dehumanizes 
people. Radical atomization in the workplace and in leisure-oriented consumption ruptures 
human relational orders, and causes people to contort themselves into self-regarding 
‘exemplary’ men and women. With the global spread of neoliberal hegemony, a commodity-
based aesthetics is in operation, where ‘masculine virility’ and ‘feminine mystique’ are 
‘demonstrated’ by superficially augmenting physical beauty and flaunting clothes and objects 
“in excess of what is required for physical comfort.”904 By the standards of an indigenous 
African ethic, commodification-dependent men and women such as these would be framed as 
anything but exemplary, powerful or beautiful. Quite literally, they have turned themselves 
into ‘things’ fundamentally lacking in botho or ethical maturity. True beauty resides in a fully 
formed person who cares for others. The American philosopher Barry Hallen evokes the 
alternative vision as articulated by the Yoruba: 
 
‘True beauty is a good moral character.’ In other words, when human beings are concerned, physical or 
bodily beauty is purely external and therefore of relatively superficial consequence. What matters most in 
rating a person as attractive or unattractive is the inner beauty that may be manifested by their moral 
character. This means that a person who, physically, is decidedly unattractive can still be referred to in 
discourse as extremely beautiful, in fact a virtual paradigm or model of ‘beauty.’905  
 
Human embeddedness and dependency on nature 
 
The communal orientation of African traditional life, and how this contrasts with capitalist 
societal organization, was given lucid articulation by the anti-apartheid activist Steve Biko 
when he said: 
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We regard our living together not as an unfortunate mishap warranting endless competition among us but 
as a deliberate act of God to make us a community of brothers and sisters jointly involved in the quest for 
a composite answer to the varied problems of life. Hence … our action is usually joint community 
oriented action rather than the individualism which is the hallmark of the capitalist approach.
906
 
 
Because of this communal emphasis, most indigenous African concepts of law and justice are 
antithetical to neoliberal counterparts. The former are underpinned by emphasis on 
community, while the latter stress individualism. In line with this, Mogobe Ramose 
juxtaposes law in traditional African contexts, which is group- and obligations-oriented, with 
what he refers to as “Western legal thought,” which predominantly is property-based, 
individualist- and rights-oriented.
907
 Correlatively, the American philosopher Richard Bell 
maintains that the indigenous African approach to justice to be encouraged is nurturant, 
restorative, compassionate, and non-retributive, departing from the focus on punishment, 
incrimination and reprisal within “Western legal jurisprudence.”908 It may be added that such 
an approach to justice might also militate against the problematic vigilantism plaguing 
particularly rural and peri-urban communities today, manifesting in suspects being 
‘necklaced’ or beaten to death by community members.909 For Bell, the post-apartheid South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) constituted an embodiment of 
restorative, non-retributive justice, since even those who committed atrocities were pardoned 
by their victims or by the relatives of the deceased.
910
 Notably, the TRC was chaired by 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the hearings both drew on Christian themes of forgiveness 
and used religious language.
911
 This intimates that more positive aspects of Christianity may 
have become integrated into an ubuntu framework in this instance, manifesting in what has 
been described as Tutu’s “ubuntu theology.”912 
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In reference to social relations, the Nigerian philosopher John Bewaji suggests that an 
indigenous ethic emphasizing communality may produce interpersonal exchanges which 
contrast jarringly with the type of interaction that free market ideology encourages, and which 
is centered on “mutual antagonism” and “a constant struggle for possession and delimitation 
of space.”913  Mogobe Ramose corroborates this, arguing that consensual and cooperative 
human interaction is very difficult, if not impossible, in neoliberal societies. He argues this 
because the neoliberal ideology is informed by a “metaphysics of killing in the name of 
competition,” involving “the survival of the fittest through the acquisition and possession of 
money … [as] the goal of human existence.” 914  The communal ethic of ubuntu/botho 
undermines such individualistic and economistic neoliberal impulses through the claim: “I am 
because we are.” 915  The Cartesian cogito ergo sum, the legacy of which culminates in 
detachment from others and supposed independence from life processes, is countered in an 
indigenous ethic by an “existential cognatus sum, ergo summus [I am related, therefore we 
are].”916 Dismas Masolo clarifies this communal orientation as “a state of social and moral 
order, visible in the practices of mutual dependence as indicators of … concern … for and 
commitment to … the creation or sustenance of a common good.”917 In this type of order 
human beings clearly are valued over money, and so a culturally distributive rather than a 
capitalist accumulation logic is followed. 
The indigenous ethic of ubuntu, as articulated by contemporary African political, 
social and moral philosophers, may seem somewhat idealistic. Indeed, their treatment of 
ubuntu does not often stray too far from philosophical or discursive reflection, inviting 
accusations that they reify, essentialize, or quite simply fabricate, a concept that was never 
actually lived. However, anthropological findings evidence the practice of a communal ethic 
for thousands of years prior to colonization. Quite likely, such ethical thought actually 
developed on the basis of indigenous subsistence-oriented ways of life. Maria Mies confirms 
that even in contemporary Africa, whereas indigenous men often are drawn into salaried 
work, women “still play … [a] most crucial role in subsistence production,”918 and in such 
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labor a reciprocal rather than competitive logic is followed. Understandably, though, broad-
based subsistence practices were disrupted irremediably after common resources were 
annexed by colonizers, myriad wars broke out,
919
 plagues such as smallpox hit in the 1890s, 
rainfall declined between 1895-1920, and cattle plague struck indigenous herds.
920
 Yet, there 
is considerable evidence of inter- and intra-communal cooperation among Southern African 
indigenes before this. Temporary depletion of a natural resource, specific areas inhabited, and 
other factors such as population fluctuations, strongly influenced subsistence patterns and 
agricultural methods. Internal collaboration was crucial given the need for provisioning 
adaptations in response to environmental changes.
921
 Further, the interdependence between 
men, women and children was explicitly recognized, each undertaking different duties to keep 
the group alive. John Campbell, a British missionary to South Africa in the 1810s, reported 
that in settled indigenous South African communities men milk the cows and provide military 
protection, women cultivate the fields and build the houses and animal enclosures, and either 
men or women make clothing depending on the particular ethnic group.
922
 Generally their 
sons herd the cattle.
923
 In later times, gender-allocated roles changed or were moderated. The 
British-born James Walton, a specialist in South African vernacular architecture, indicates 
that in more recent Nguni communities, huts were constructed by both genders, men doing the 
heavy lifting and women the plastering of the walls and floors.
924
 What archeologists have 
identified as a constant among Southern African indigenous communities for centuries, 
though, is the association of men with herding and women with cultivation.
925
 At any rate, 
each member of the indigenous subsistence community was indispensable for the well-being 
of all. Elders played a key role, providing moral guidance to the community and regulating 
any “[a]ggressive and avaricious behaviour” on the part of younger members.926 
Collaboration with other communities also was required. The British anthropologist 
John Reader suggests that subsistence-oriented communities could not risk destruction of 
their infrastructure, expend unnecessary energy, or become dispersed through warfare or 
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conquest. Equipment such as spears and bows and arrows, though employable in war, still 
were items “used in acquiring food … [and] were neither so numerous nor so easily replaced 
that their availability as provisioning tools could be risked in conflict with the neighbours.”927 
Fear of weakening the community through dispersal of its members even caused the Iron Age 
Tswana to impose “heavy sanctions against building proper dwellings at [distant] cattle-posts 
or … cultivated lands as this was seen as a centrifugal force that threatened group unity.”928 
However, since subsistence specializations developed because of climatic variations, 
neighborly peace was also necessary for trade in essential items. According to Reader, already 
over four thousand years ago “a cultural landscape of subsistence specialists mirrored the 
ecological landscape.” That is, “[h]unters, gatherers, fisherfolk, pastoralists, and 
agriculturalists occupied distinct niches – each group dependent to some extent upon the 
others.”929 The need for inter-communal cooperation was self-evident.930 Even as pastoralists 
with expanding herds became more powerful than people in other provisioning niches, they 
still 
 
required the services of craftsmen for iron tools and pots … depended on agricultural communities for 
supplies of essential carbohydrates, and needed to maintain good relations with [surrounding] populations 
… who would absorb people from the pastoral populations which the grasslands could not support and 
provide relief during … drought years or following heavy losses through cattle disease.931 
 
Campbell documented an intriguing trade relation between even the Bushmen and the 
Coranna, Matchappee and Morolong communities, testifying to significant inter-ethnic 
collaboration. The honey-gathering Bushmen had an implicit agreement with their pastoral 
neighbors. The Bushmen claimed possession of the beehives in the mountains on the basis of 
them having right of access to the bees, which fed only on flowers. Their neighbors, who 
possessed cattle and sheep, saw this as a fair settlement since their animals ate the grass. They 
willingly purchased honey from the Bushmen, and if the Bushmen found that a hive had been 
raided in breach of the agreement, they would be “sure to carry off the first cow or sheep they 
meet.”932 
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That said, when pastoralists drifted further south in search of grazing,
933
 they 
happened upon the prime grasslands of Southern Africa. Their cattle thrived and carnivorous 
pastoralists began accumulating surpluses. Some became richer than others, and far wealthier 
than agriculturalists or hunter-gatherers, as “cattle converted expanses of otherwise worthless 
grass into items of wealth that could be owned, controlled, and inherited.”934 This led to 
previously unknown class divisions, and intense territorial conflicts ensued.
935
 For dominant 
clans seeking territorial expansion, cattle became currency to acquire wives, gain subjects’ 
loyalty, and symbolize power. The importance of cattle was given architectural expression as 
well. Archeological digs of Later Iron Age settlements reveal that “cattle … were kept in the 
middle of communal villages,” and esteemed individuals “were often buried beneath these 
central cattle byres.”936 This is known as the Nguni-Sotho settlement pattern, and is typical of 
many Bantu kraals.
937
 The Bantu ‘cattle culture’ may have led to societal stratification 
particularly between different clans, but in principle intra-communal collaboration (letsema) 
remained a priority. Still, rivalries among prominent male community members may well 
have emerged at that time, and with it the draw of personal aggrandizement at the expense of 
others. Perhaps to counter such a tendency, traditional maxims emphasized prioritizing the 
common good over individual affluence. One such maxim, feta kgomo o tshware motho (go 
past the cow and hold the human being),
938
 reflects the need to value humans over wealth. In 
view of the great value attributed to cattle within Bantu culture, this maxim understandably 
demands incredible sacrifice. Mogobe Ramose argues that maxims such as this, if actualized 
“in practice … will be the antithesis to the timocracy that has now superseded democracy in 
our time.”939 He defines timocracy as tyrannical “rule by money” concealed beneath the 
veneer of democracy, which in contrast should entail consensual rule by people.
940
 Because 
such maxims are not permitted expression in the contemporary era of global neoliberalism, 
havoc is wreaked upon people and environments in the name of profitable accumulation 
benefiting the elite few. 
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Indeed, for Ramose, timocracy and its consequences spell ecological destruction. 
Poverty is considered ‘unnatural’ because ‘by nature,’ all human beings should be able to 
share common natural resources. For the same reason, the hyper-exploitation of labor to 
enrich the few is unnatural and unjust, according to Ramose.
941
 He considers the growth rate 
of money to be another unnatural idea. It is absurd “that money, as an artificial cow, is 
supposed – in principle – to give birth to a fully-fledged calf every day,” because “a cow 
which gives birth to a fully-fledged calf every day is anything but natural.”942 Phenomena 
surely are supposed to follow growth cycles rather than mechanically forced ones, and 
biological rather than clock time. In fact, Ramose argues that an indigenous African 
perspective on existence is both communal and holistic. It opposes “the fragmentation of be-
ing” and instead promotes an understanding of “be-ing … as a perpetual and universal 
movement of sharing and exchange of the forces of life.” Neither individual identity nor 
universal “‘order’” can “be once established and fixed for all time,”943 since everything exists 
in dialectical reciprocation. Admittedly, there is a dialectical tradition spanning from the 
sixth-century Greek philosopher Heraclitus to the twentieth-century Frankfurt School,
944
 and 
further via the work of the French philosopher Jacques Derrida and psychoanalyst Jacques 
Lacan. In fact, although he has rightly been accused of racist thinking for identifying the 
Western Christian tradition as the height of civilization, G. W. F. Hegel too promoted the 
primacy of community and social interaction while cautioning against social atomism.
945
 Yet, 
this is a minority tradition in the West and remains so. However, ecofeminist scholars 
interested in alternative ways of knowing point out that the conceptualization of dialectical 
reciprocity and fluidity is incompatible with both the reductionist methodologies introduced 
by Baconian science, and the capitalist drive to monetize all of life as units of a certain 
value.
946
 Ramose and others claim that such dialectical ways of knowing are prevalent in 
Africa. The idea of mechanically measuring space is anathema. A rural African may tell a 
group of travelers that the village they are trying to reach is not far, knowing that it actually is 
far in terms of measurable distance. Their aim is not to deceive but rather to “make it not far” 
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for the travelers by giving them “courage (power)” and hope.947 Equally, the use of straight 
lines was unpalatable to the Iron Age-period Sotho-Tswana, for example. Missionaries in fact 
deemed them primitive and heathen because they built oval huts rather than square or 
rectangular homes.
948
 Strictly specifying times for human interaction is frowned upon as well, 
and locals were scorned by their colonizers for living in ‘African time,’ denoting tardiness.949 
Ramose affirms ‘African time’ on the basis of the fact that “human beings make time and they 
are not made by time … [and so] it is both natural and logical to live time” rather than to live 
“in time” with the economic orchestrations of the capitalist system. 950  Finally, while 
disrespect for the concept of private property is criminalized within Western legal 
jurisprudence, this concept contravenes the ‘natural right’ to share resources for sustenance.951 
In rural African communities, people have been “more concerned about using land than 
owning it,” and so if land is not cultivated rights of use are forfeited and allocated to 
another.
952
 
Because of its emphasis on the common good, the indigenous African ethic described 
above has been likened to Western humanism and tied to socialism.
953
 These associations also 
have been encouraged by the dominance of marxist theory in African political philosophy 
from the 1930s onward.
954
 Two of the founders of African socialism – Kwame Nkrumah of 
Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania – promoted socialism as the obvious alternative to 
capitalist tyranny because of its overlaps with indigenous African frameworks.
955
 Still, it is 
argued that significant differences exist between Western humanism and socialism, and the 
indigenous African ethic variously identified by theorists as African humanism, ubuntu/botho, 
or Afro-communitarianism. Richard Bell contends that, on the one hand, Western humanism 
emphasizes “education and civilization” in the interest of emancipation, and is a tradition 
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based “on ancient Greek ideals such as balance of the arts and sciences, [and] cultivation of 
individual virtues.” On the other hand, ‘African humanism’ centers on the individual’s “place 
in the larger order of things: one’s social order, natural order, and the cosmic order.” This is 
because it derives from the long-standing practices of communities who recognized that they 
depend on one another and had to live frugally with limited “means … and natural 
resources.”956 Some have objected that, in this case, the communality and frugality practiced 
by indigenous African communities constituted a ‘forced choice’ necessary for survival. 
Archeological evidence cannot prove or disprove such accusations. Evidence exists for 
ecologically sensible resource use, provisioning practices, and settlement patterns during the 
Iron Age,
957
 even subsequent to the rise of pastoralism.
958
 However, whether such 
‘precautionary’ ecological practices were motivated by necessity or genuine concern for the 
environment as an end-in-itself, cannot be confirmed. Similar suspicions have been raised 
over the supposed conservation practices of Native Americans.
959
 
However, ubuntu theorists reject the charge that human communality among Southern 
African indigenous groupings was purely instrumental.
960
 Bert Hamminga in fact argues that 
the three principal African goals are survival, procreation, and togetherness, but that “the first 
requirement is considered to be togetherness.”961 The ontological force of togetherness is 
evident in the African conception of the community as a tree, where ancestors constitute the 
roots, adult humans the trunk, and their children the branches, leaves and flowers. To them 
not a single part of this tree, which is one “body … can meaningfully survive cut off from the 
rest.”962 At work here are ontological, ethical and epistemological factors rather than mere 
instrumental considerations. Ramose confirms that the communitarian ethic of ubuntu bears 
ontological and epistemological import, since it is inextricably linked to the project of be-
coming human (umuntu).
963
 To stress its onto-epistemological nature, Ramose insists that 
ubuntu should be written in hyphenated form, as ubu-ntu, and translated as human-ness rather 
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than humanism. He explains that “ubu- as the generalized understanding of be-ing may be 
said to be distinctly ontological … [w]hereas -ntu as the nodal point at which be-ing assumes 
concrete form or a mode of being in the process of continual unfoldment may be said to be 
distinctly epistemological.”964 In turn, be-ing and be-coming human or acquiring personhood 
(umu-ntu), shares the root (-ntu) of ubuntu but focuses in on the ethical mode of being human 
(umu-). So the thinking, speaking, embodied “[u]muntu is the specific entity which continues 
to conduct an inquiry into be-ing, experience, knowledge and truth.”965 Such knowledge and 
truth can be sought only with others. Significantly, Ramose extends this onto-epistemological 
understanding of personhood from the interpersonal to the environmental. For him, a holistic 
and dialectical understanding of existence 
 
applies also with regard to the relation between human beings and physical or objective nature. To care 
for one another, therefore, implies caring for physical nature as well. Without such care, the 
interdependence between human beings and physical nature would be undermined. Moreover, human 
beings are indeed part and parcel of physical nature even though they might be a privileged part at that … 
The concept of harmony in African thought is comprehensive in the sense that it conceives of balance in 
terms of the totality of the relations that can be maintained between human beings amongst themselves as 
well as between human beings and physical nature.
966
 
 
In light of these profoundly embodied and materialist dimensions of ubuntu often absent from 
abstract and lofty Western -isms, trying to compare African human-ness with Western 
humanism is for Ramose like “holding in … [one’s] right hand a green pumpkin that … [one] 
insists should be compared with the green apple in … [one’s] left hand.”967 
That said, any embodied, communitarian indigenous ethic stands to be crushed 
through neoliberal globalization. The potency of capitalism was noted by Kwame Nkrumah as 
early as 1970, when he criticized the Ghanaian bourgeoisie for its neocolonial complicity with 
monopoly capital and abandonment of social responsibility.
968
 Frantz Fanon also condemned 
the post-independence indigenous bourgeoisie and elite for throwing “a superstructural mask 
over [their] class interests.”969 In related vein, the Congolese philosopher Ernest Wamba-dia-
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Wamba has criticized the modern African nation-state as a farce, because “national 
independence was won on the basis of the abandonment of emancipatory politics rooted in the 
large masses of the people and their needs and aspirations.”970 The same evidently holds true 
for South Africa and its people, as the post-apartheid ruling elites push the neoliberal 
capitalist agenda. They have abandoned social responsibility in favor of personal enrichment, 
and allowed transnational corporations to annex and pillage local environments in the interest 
of profitable accumulation. Here, destitution of the majority and ecological breakdown 
intersect. Many ordinary South Africans also have succumbed to the neoliberal hegemony, 
particularly in relation to deep felt aspirations of their sexual self. Dismas Masolo believes 
that individual resistance is broken down by the potent “engineered psychology of the 
indigenous consumer.” People come “to believe that things processed in and put out as 
finished products of metropolitan centers in the West are indisputably superior” to indigenous 
ones.
971
 These valorized artifacts, images and ideas, tied to homogenizing consumerist gender 
identities, are sold across the globe. North and South, they result in political debilitation. 
Further, the “unlovable … fallout” of industrialization, namely “the ethic of austere 
individualism,”972 could not be more at odds with the communitarian vision of ubuntu. Its 
ecological fallout similarly flies in the face of an indigenous grasp of the interconnectedness 
of nature and humans-as-nature,
973
 which ensured subsistence-based survival for millennia. 
The twenty-first-century global crises of climate change and biodiversity loss show that the 
social and ecological insights of an indigenous African ethic will be critical in reconstructing 
the future of life on Earth. 
It is imperative to resist the neoliberal hegemony through forms of “truly human … 
conscious, social activity.”974 However, simply resuscitating a body of indigenous African 
concepts and practices risks aestheticizing pre-industrial African civilization. Also, such an 
approach is insensitive to the globalized nature of contemporary human experience.
975
 
Instead, the point is to discover “legitimate starting points for the production of 
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developmentally relevant knowledge and skills.”976 A qualified way forward, attuned to the 
relational orientation of human beings and to their embeddedness in precarious physical 
environments, necessitates “subject[ing] … Africa’s local knowledges … to critical and 
constant appraisal and modification.”977 Significant strides have been made by African and 
Africanist philosophers who are drawing a core ethical framework from indigenous 
knowledges that opposes the neoliberal mores. Equally important are their criticisms of unjust 
aspects of old African culture, such as arranged child marriages, gender discrimination,
978
 and 
the tyranny of village elders justified on the basis “of the practice of tradition.”979 
How to engender appreciation for an ethic that poses such a strong critique of the 
neoliberal paradigm? This question is pertinent particularly because the indigenous African 
ethic detailed above asks the individual to sacrifice personal wants for the common good.
980
 
At a local level, appreciation for this ethic might be cultivated through emphasizing its 
indigeneity, in the sense that Africans should take pride in the moral, political, and ecological 
value of ‘their’ indigenous ethical framework in a globalizing era marked by social and 
environmental precariousness. As the American feminist theorist Drucilla Cornell suggests, 
what is promising is “the widespread use of [the word] ubuntu, everywhere from beauty shops 
to television,” which “at least signal[s] its political and ethical potency.”981 However, most 
people are oblivious to the philosophical substance of the term. A pragmatic approach might 
be to place this indigenous ethic in dialogue with resonant movements globally, particularly 
those with a firm standing in alternative globalization politics. Such ‘transversalism’982 can 
provide opportunities for comparative and critical reflection by each movement on its own 
politics and on that of others. This, in turn, might reveal neglected areas to be remedied, as 
well as addressing potentials for alliance building.
983
 A recent attempt at theoretical 
transversalism involving the normative indigenous African ethic of ubuntu, was undertaken 
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by the Africanist thinker Thaddeus Metz and the Canadian philosopher Daniel Bell. They 
engaged in a parallel research comparison between ubuntu and Confucianism, in reference to 
community, partiality, and age. Their study uncovered certain affinities between these 
traditions, but revealed that Confucianism lacks the reconciliatory spirit of ubuntu, while the 
latter lacks emphasis on self-development through education.
984
 They expressed the hope that 
these “preliminary reflections can inspire further … dialogues between long-standing and 
large-scale non-Western traditions … as non-Western societies assume greater importance in 
the global system and as the search continues for a ‘global ethic.’”985 Parallels exist between 
the ubuntu ethic and other schools of thought as well. For instance, the perspective of the 
American philosopher and sociologist George Herbert Mead resonates with ubuntu when it 
comes to “the complex interdependence of self and society,” because for him “humans have 
no ‘original and independent existence’ apart from others,” and “become social only through 
contact with others.”986 The Mead proponent Hans Joas also discloses a parallel between 
Mead’s vision and the ontological dimension of ubuntu community. He explains that “[f]or 
Mead, the assumption of a pre-social substantial self was one of the cornerstones of the 
possessive individualism which he was combating on both a moral and a political level and 
which made societies appear to be groupings of atomistic individuals.”987 Parallels can also be 
drawn between ubuntu and the indigenous Andean philosophy of vivir bien – living well – 
which is life “in balance with all other elements of … the universe … according to the basic 
principles of … relatedness, complementarity, correspondence, reciprocity and cyclicality.”988 
Such transversal engagements are possible and indeed imperative at this juncture, if the 
neoliberal hegemony is to be countered and another future is to be sought. With the intention 
of widening this important global politics of transversalism, this chapter brings the indigenous 
African ethic as outlined above into a dialogue with ecological feminism. This gendered, and 
often racialized ‘other’ political perspective, shares the ubuntu interest in non-dualism, caring 
labor, communality and sustainable subsistence. 
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These convergencies suggest that a potential alliance among these “subordinated 
others” and “minority voices” may enhance both perspectives and become powerful in 
contesting the neoliberal monologue.
989
 A tacit invitation to such transversal bridging is 
already affirmed by Ramose, when he makes reference to how women, like indigenous 
peoples, have been, and continue to be, subordinated and exploited in the capitalist world 
system.
990
 
 
A transversal dialogue with ecological feminism 
 
As noted at the beginning of this thesis, transversal practice may occur at several levels. It 
may imply a transdisciplinary critique within academia; it may take place between distinct 
activist strands in the political arena; or it may involve a critique of academic theory guided 
by that same political praxis. Either way, it always involves a dialectic between the universal 
and the particular. The latter form of transversality is demonstrated in a number of books 
about women’s initiatives for change, texts that draw lessons from grassroots political 
struggles and apply these in critiques of science, economics and ethics, as these fields have 
unwittingly served neoliberal expansion. Materialist ecofeminists such as Maria Mies, 
Vandana Shiva, Ariel Salleh, and Mary Mellor, are invariably both activists and thinkers.
991
 
Indeed, the idea of an ecological feminist philosophy and politics was inspired by the activism 
of women across the globe in reaction to the exploitation of their bodies and the parallel-
resourcing of nature. This concern was manifest in material issues as varied as the nuclear 
question, reproductive technologies, forest conservation and processed foods.
992
 The common 
thread was the protection of livelihood and community justice. Ecofeminist politics has grown 
in activist momentum throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, and women thinkers have 
interpreted it using whatever cultural frameworks were at hand.
993
 The seminal text 
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Ecofeminism, co-authored by Maria Mies with Vandana Shiva, has already run through five 
impressions and two editions. It is clear from this remarkable analysis that by identifying 
commonalities between life-affirming knowledges in both the global North and South, bridges 
can be built and new alliances formed. These bridges already transcend differences of gender, 
race, and class by identifying the colonizing exploitation of women and indigenous peoples – 
both diminished as ‘nature’ – while at the same time remaining sensitive to the specificities of 
local discriminations.
994
 Ecofeminism may be said to have an ‘Africanist’ tenor, given the 
extent to which its formulations overlap with ubuntu, in thematizing non-dualistic thought, 
caring labor as meaning giving, and humanity-nature interdependence. Conversely, it may be 
said that ubuntu seems to resonate with a global ‘womanist’ voice, even though its current 
theoretical production is dominated by men. Certainly, there is a real need to hear more voices 
from Africanist women thinkers, particularly ones such as Sophie Oluwole, advancing that 
“[t]he African pursuit of humanism as a concern for human behavior and existence is its 
greatest cultural heritage to the whole world.” 995  Yet, in global North and South, 
predominantly it has been men who are the academic theorists, movement leaders and experts, 
while women ‘do the activism,’ yet another unacknowledged and unvalorized service role. 
This happened in fights for racial equality in 1960s America, for indigenous rights in 
Australia, for environmental justice in the US during the 1990s, as well as in the anti-
apartheid struggle in South Africa.
996
 In any event, ecological feminists endorse that the 
overlap of “a ‘womanist’ sensibility … with Third World and indigenous knowledges”997 now 
makes hybrid, post-gendered political alliances a long overdue step. Forging these links is 
particularly urgent as both African radicals and materialist ecofeminists are themselves still 
marginalized in much conventional socialist and ecological politics.
998
 
What follows is a deeper look at the themes of non-dualistic logic, caring and 
subsistence labor, and material embodiment of humans within nature – all of which are 
anathema to the neoliberal framework.  
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Non-dualistic logic 
 
Like the African philosophers Kwasi Wiredu, Dismas Masolo, Mogobe Ramose and 
Valentin-Yves Mudimbe, ecofeminists are extremely critical of dualistic reasoning. This is 
because dualisms justify the dominant essentialized capitalist patriarchal conception of the 
masculine individual, his sovereign identity and independence from sustaining ‘others.’ These 
freely gifting sustainers may be reproducing women, laboring indigenes, or environmental 
processes. Dualistic thought is deeply imbricated in this gendered logic of domination, as has 
been demonstrated by the colonial enterprise and later neoliberal globalization. One 
materialist ecofeminist, Ariel Salleh, draws on the critical cultural marxism of the Frankfurt 
School to describe the Eurocentric dualism as originating in 
 
the ancient splitting of the so called higher faculties from immediate sensuous experience; the 
predilection for the static visual and manipulable properties of objects; their formal objectification in 
specular terms and representation through binary analytics as against dialectical logic; the cogito; the 
ostensible dissociation of pure fact from value; and the productivist thrust towards instrumental mastery 
of the material environment culminating with modern industrialization and science.
999
   
 
Like most ecological feminists, Salleh judges dualism to be central to the interlocking 
domination of women and ‘other living natures,’ capturing this idea in her formulation 
M/W=N. This mock formula caricatures “the triangular ideological dynamic between iconic 
‘men,’ ‘women,’ and ‘nature,’”1000 as ‘economic’ man dominates both ‘nature’ so called and 
women’s ‘bodies-as-nature.’ Exposing the workings of this hegemonic M/W=N configuration 
does more than just indicate the disembodied and essentializing character of the capitalist 
patriarchal perspective, groomed as it has been by the philosophies of Plato, Descartes, and 
Bacon. This transversal activist critique – at once feminist, socialist, and ecological – draws 
attention to the fact that the regenerative caring labor for which women are predominantly 
responsible has been a free resource of the capitalist system – even more so now, with the 
dismantling of state services under neoliberalism. Indigenous peoples – their bodies, lands, 
and knowledges – are resourced in a similar fashion. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
European colonists, for instance, exploited indigenous peoples and natural resources in the 
Third World, paralleling the exploitation of their wives as reproducers and free labor at home. 
Accordingly, Maria Mies observes that the power dynamic of the ‘little colony’ of the nuclear 
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family, had its counterpart in the ‘big colonies’ abroad.1001 Among African philosophers, 
Kwasi Wiredu and Mogobe Ramose claim that the domination of indigenes is ‘legitimated’ 
by framing them as inferior on the basis of dualisms such as mind/body and reason/emotion – 
permitting their exploitation as sub-human, ‘natural resources.’ Ecofeminists likewise contest 
the legitimacy of the mind/body, logos/mythos and reason/emotion dualisms. They reveal that 
the operation of these binaries serves as a license to dominate and exploit women as well. 
Ecological feminists indicate that in patriarchal societies women have been associated 
with ‘body,’ and men with ‘mind,’ paving the way for resourcing of women as sexual objects 
and free reproductive work sites. However, ecofeminists contest the mind/body dualism, by 
pointing out that people are already nature in embodied form,
1002
 and that body and mind 
likewise are inseparable. Salleh argues that materially embodied identities are biologically 
and historically overdetermined. Thus, what is most relevant to the economic context of this 
thesis is the way in which discursive dualisms determine the traditional labor forms carried 
out by women. In the global North, the practices of humanity-nature bridging – cleaning, 
cooking, birthing – belong to household work. In the global South, parallel forms of 
ecosystem management are the responsibility of indigenous communities. People whose labor 
routinely encounters natural processes, cannot easily think of themselves as separate from 
their environment.
1003
 Ecofeminist arguments are not essentialist accounts of fixed sex-gender 
types. Neither are they accounts of gender as a discursively learned performance.
1004
 Rather, 
materialist ecofeminists adopt a critical realist approach, whereby sensuous interaction with 
the world is understood to shape learning, perception, attitudes, skills, and vice versa. 
Ecofeminist analyses of household labor may raise the ire of equality feminists, who 
claim that this glorifies ‘motherhood’ and so impedes women’s liberation.1005 However, such 
attacks disclose a typically modernist one-dimensionality on the part of liberal feminists, one 
that is complicit with capitalism. Significantly, this blind spot has been noted by the South 
African ubuntu philosopher Ramose.
1006
 Ecological feminists also observe how women, like 
indigenous peoples, have been discriminated against on the basis of the logos/mythos binary. 
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Colonists and missionaries in Africa deemed indigenous peoples deficient for ostensibly 
harboring only a false, mythical understanding of existence. This was paralleled in the 
persecution of knowledgeable and independent women during the European witch hunts of 
the twelfth to the seventeenth century.
1007
 As Mies puts it, “[t]he counterpart of the slave raids 
in Africa was the witch hunt in Europe.”1008 Just as the African, supposedly lacking logos, 
could not “qualify as a human being,”1009 the woman, ostensibly lacking rationality, could not 
be construed “as a properly human presence” and so was accorded “prehuman” status.1010 
Like indigenes, then, women could be exploited without casting any doubt on the moral 
legitimacy of their oppressors. Rendering women inferior cowed them into purely subservient 
roles as sites of reproduction and “agent[s] of consumption” for the bourgeois home.1011 Such 
subjugation was also facilitated by the reason/emotion binary. The idea was that women’s 
rational capacity was also considered tainted by their emotionality. On the grounds of 
women’s ‘sexual saturation’ and their ‘proclivity’ for wild emotional outbursts, they were 
pathologized and hysterized by medical professionals. The latter consequently claimed that 
the only position that a woman – a most “nervous” creature – could safely occupy was “the 
family space … [and] the life of children.” 1012  Ecological feminists, like radical African 
thinkers such as Léopold Senghor and Mogobe Ramose, maintain that reason and emotion are 
complementary rather than opposed, ungendered, and both are required in proper judgment. 
For instance, it would not do simply to judge a person’s claims or actions in reference to a set 
of detached legalistic principles. Rather, to be fair one should incorporate a relational, care-
based approach, focusing on the “concrete individual” including his or her “concrete history, 
identity and affective-emotional constitution.”1013 
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Caring and subsistence labor 
 
Materialist ecofeminists share the African focus on the critical importance of caring relations 
to the constitution of personhood or humanness. However, whereas the Ghanaian-American 
philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah emphasizes that one’s understanding of personhood 
directly influences one’s behavior, 1014  as noted, Ariel Salleh stresses that “people’s 
experiences in the world shape their perceptions and knowledges” as well.1015 Thus, instead of 
promoting the social constructionist perspective that discourse dictates one’s self-
understanding and behavior, ecofeminists take the influence of embodied learning, 
particularly caring labor, just as seriously. The African philosophers suggest that from an 
indigenous perspective centered on ubuntu, to be a real man or a beautiful woman one needs 
to participate in “communal life through the discharge of the various obligations defined by 
one’s stations,” reflecting “a widened maturity of ethical sense.” 1016  But this exemplary 
humanness is not achieved for all time. Through engaging in ethical, reciprocal relations with 
others, one is continuously affirmed as human, one continuously becomes a person. It is an 
ongoing, ethical-relational process just as a caring labor is. This contrasts markedly with 
exaggerated neoliberal conceptions of masculinity and femininity, oriented around individual 
distinction at the expense of others. Certainly, achieving an exalted consumer identity is an 
ongoing process given the relentless shortening of fashion cycles. However, pursuit thereof is 
psychologically and socially destructive, as well as ecologically malign since it runs on 
unsustainable levels of natural resource appropriation. Conversely, the development of 
personhood, though ongoing, is meaning giving and given its independence from unnecessary 
resource use, ecological as well. 
Along similar lines, but stressing experientially developed understandings, ecological 
feminists maintain that reproductive labor and maintenance work in the household 
ideologically ‘relegated’ to women, provide insights challenging the shallow neoliberal idea 
of womanhood. Rather than encouraging a self-regarding attitude, care giving requires 
“immediate altruism,” since “it is carried out for only incidental personal gain (the pleasure of 
close personal relationships) and … it cannot be ‘put off’ or slotted into a work schedule.”1017 
Despite the life-affirming character of such labor, it is reviled in free market thought, while 
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the destructive activities of the so-called ‘productive’ economy are valorized, including the 
military-scientific complexes integral to capitalist patriarchal economies. In fact, regenerative 
care-giving work is not even seen as labor, but rather it is essentialized away as something 
that women ‘naturally’ do.1018 Despite this, the global economy depends on women to birth 
and raise children, provide support to workers, and take care of the elderly and precarious 
workers ejected from the system.
1019
 
Notwithstanding the denigration of women’s labor, such work shapes what Mary 
Mellor refers to as a ‘women’s-experience-reality’ and ‘WE’ economy. These entail intimate 
knowledge of the necessity of care to the sustenance of all life systems.
1020
 The ‘male-
experience-reality’ and ‘ME’ economy, in sharp contrast, consist in a paradigmatic approach 
involving belief in absolute autonomy from others and life processes,
1021
 generating a 
tremendously socially and ecologically disembedded attitude. This attitude, in turn, is near 
indispensable to men and women keen on distinction and success within the dominant 
discourses of contemporary globalizing societies. But from an ecological feminist as well as 
an Afro-communitarian perspective, this attitude dehumanizes because it entails an atomistic 
sense of self. So too, it informs debilitating gender identities which glorify competitive 
individualism based on consumption and display, and so precipitates unsustainable resource 
use as well as the domination of the unacknowledged care-giving class. As Mellor explains, 
women bent on neoliberal success might pursue the purely wealth-oriented, consumerist 
vision of femininity and reject all “domestic responsibilities … [and] pass them on to 
someone else … [–] usually another woman” of a ‘lesser’ class or race.1022  
The value of the relational, care-giving work, for which women predominantly are 
responsible, should be recognized. It evidences the growth of “subjectivity as a signification-
in-process, permanently forming and reforming itself in collision with the social order … 
based in a living and embodied materialism that defies the limits of bourgeois 
epistemology”1023 and the neoliberal mores developed upon it. At the same time, care-giving 
labor, the nurture of living metabolisms – in bodies or in ecologies – also encourages the 
development of a tentative and relational epistemological stance. This is the precautionary, 
‘barefoot epistemology’ of those who tread lightly on the Earth. Such labor manifests 
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sensitivity toward the fragility of life-sustaining systems, radically bridging the ideological 
divide between ‘humans’ and ‘nature.’ 1024  The false dualism between production versus 
reproduction explains why those who undertake care-giving labor, mainly women, are not 
remunerated under capitalist patriarchal economics. Just as an African indigenous ethic 
involves careful qualification of personhood, a materialist ecofeminist analysis of daily 
provisioning work discloses a grounded, ecologically responsive ethic from which all can 
learn.
1025
 The latter point is critical, because the argument deriving ethics from labor implies 
that men are equally capable of an embodied ecological rationality – particularly those 
“work[ing] … at the socially constructed margin where culture meets nature.” 1026  These 
alternative life-affirming practices of being and becoming a ‘person’ deserve serious 
consideration, since they diametrically oppose the atomization and mechanism of the globally 
dominant neoliberal hegemony. As the Finnish ecofeminist and UN worker Hilkka Pietilä 
writes:  
 
The world of nurturance and close human relationships is the sphere where the basic human needs are 
anchored and where models of humane alternatives can be found. This world, which has been carried 
forward mainly by women, is an existing alternative culture, a source of ideas and values for shaping an 
alternative path of development for nations and all humanity.
1027
 
 
Material embodiment of humans within nature 
 
Like those who speak for the indigenous African ethic of ubuntu, ecological feminists 
emphasize the importance of community. Most societies, even today, are organized in favor 
of masculine interests and rest on an invisible ideological foundation of unresolved attitudes 
toward the first care-givers. It is ideologically taken for granted as ‘common sense’ that 
women are relational or communal beings, both biologically as bearers of children, and in 
terms of their expected social roles. Their care giving entails constant negotiation with others 
and precludes insular, competitive attitudes. To ‘hold’ a relationship in place properly, a 
person must adapt to changing needs, intuit, and above all, relate. Accordingly, the many 
women actively engaged in caring labor learn to avoid the centralizing imperative of fixing, 
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hierarchizing or separating everything out. Instead, if given the opportunity they are more 
likely to “choose to work in small, intimate collectivities, where the spontaneous flow of 
communication ‘structures’ the situation.”1028 Their activities suggest an intuitive awareness 
of the fact that everything exists in a reciprocal dialectic. Thus many women do not require 
theoretical education to grasp that where instrumental rationality and mechanistic approaches 
enter, humaneness, caring adaptability and ecological integrity are lost.
1029
 
The communitarian aspects of relational, care-giving work have led some to regard it 
as socialist in orientation. Recall that this claim was also made of the indigenous African ethic 
on the basis of its similarly communal focus. Many thinkers in fact deem ecofeminism and 
eco-socialism to be “complementary … political strands.”1030 Yet, ecological feminists reject 
the productivist thrust of unexamined forms of socialism whose technological optimism 
threatens ecological sustainability to the same extent that industrial capitalism does.
1031
 And 
although eco-socialism, in virtue of its environmental emphasis, tends to avoid this 
shortcoming, many eco-socialists remain gender blind or refuse to take the link between 
nature’s and women’s exploitation seriously. In their turn, eco-socialists have criticized 
ecofeminists for ostensibly “privileg[ing] ‘body’ over mind,” dogmatically opposing 
technology and science, and overemphasizing a care ethic which diverts focus from the 
problem of capitalism.
1032
 The American social theorist Joel Kovel identifies this rift between 
ecofeminists and eco-socialists as theoretical apartheid.
1033
 There is in fact a major 
methodological difference between socialism and ecological feminism – the same as that 
between socialism and an indigenous African ethic. Ecofeminism is socially and 
environmentally embedded as it focuses on the daily practices routine to a large body of 
women, just as the indigenous ethic is grounded in earlier communal practices. On the other 
hand, much of Western humanism or socialism consists in intellectualist theorization designed 
for “education and civilization,” or for a politically elite vanguard.1034 This results in a ‘top 
down’ bias against valuing the everyday actions of people living relationally and sustainably. 
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Marx’s own disparagement of village life as idiotic and stagnant lives on in the urban 
industrial prejudice of the Left.
1035
 
For materialist ecofeminists, feminism, socialism, postcolonial struggle, and 
environmentalism should be grasped as one and the same politics. In advancing a relational 
and subsistence-oriented approach to human existence, based on long-standing low-carbon 
practices,
1036
 both ecofeminism and ubuntu are inherently ecological. Both affirm life rather 
than money. Recall Mogobe Ramose’s discussion, detailed earlier, of the indigenous maxim 
feta kgomo o tshware motho, which enjoins one to value life over material wealth. This is 
paralleled in ecological feminist criticism of capitalism as anti-life – it does not cherish 
“[l]iving things” precisely because it “does not value what it does not itself produce.”1037 
Ecofeminists suggest that care-giving labor does not defer to a life-denying economistic logic 
of exchange value. Instead, it involves going 
 
beyond dualistic structures by recognising that ecology and society form a relational web where 
everything flows bio-energetically in/out of everything else. This ontology of internal relations implies a 
both/and logic, which means that [the] … epistemology [is] … a dialectical one dealing with process and 
contradiction. The terms identity and non-identity refer to moments in the ongoing transformations of 
‘nature’s’ – always including our own – material embodiment.1038 
 
Such an understanding of existence as “cycles of energy, in which fields we as material 
beings are embedded,”1039 is also integral to indigenous African ontology, epistemology and 
ethics. As Ramose articulates it, “entities … [are understood] as the dimensions, forms and 
modes of the incessant flow of simultaneously multi-directional motion,”1040 and “being or 
the universe … [is regarded] as a complex whole-ness involving the multi-layered and 
incessant interaction of all entities.”1041 These ideas frame the human being as something de-
centered, because in a dialectical or reciprocally interrelated world, “no single human being 
nor any other entity is the centre of the universe,” as “[t]he universe is understood as the 
unceasing unfoldment of interaction and interdependence between and among all that there 
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is.”1042 While Ramose describes a sensibility that is found in the global South, the labors 
conventionally assigned to women in the global North similarly manifest “the fundamental 
reality of human existence, the body’s life in biological time[:] the time it takes to rest, 
recover, grow up and grow old.” 1043  For care-givers time is not money and so liberal 
emancipatory objectives miss the mark.  
Among other commonalities between an ecofeminist and indigenous African ethic is a 
shared perspective on weapons systems. The ubuntu theorist Ramose exposes the irrationality 
of the prospect of nuclear war, and critiques the ‘right’ of the few to nuclear armaments as an 
explicit form of neocolonialism. He also decries the increasing militarization of African ruling 
elites by arms companies, which take advantage of unstable postcolonial societies, 
guaranteeing their continued exploitation and poverty.
1044
 In the words of American 
ecofeminist Ynestra King: 
 
While technocratic experts (including feminists) argue the merits and demerits of weapons systems, 
ecofeminism approaches the disarmament issue on an intimate and moral level. Ecofeminism holds that a 
personalized, decentralized, life-affirming culture and politics of action are crucially needed to stop the 
arms race and transform the world’s priorities.1045 
 
Neoliberal monologue or meta-industrial diversity?  
 
Resonances between the indigenous African ethic and ecological feminist perspectives are too 
striking to dismiss or to treat merely as an intellectual curiosity. Neither movement can be 
reduced to the other, because their similarities have arisen out of “different circumstances 
relating to particular human experience.”1046 Yet, their common recognition of the inhumanity 
and ‘unnaturalness’ of the neoliberal capitalist system has something universal about it. 
Postmodern thinkers may balk at any hint of universalism,
1047
 but this multifaceted overlap of 
cultural visions cannot be denied. The particular as well as the universal are acknowledged, 
and a complex dialectical both/and logic is at work in this transversal dialogue. 
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Both subsistence-oriented African communities in the global South and many care-
giving women North and South, engage in struggles for recognition and validation, since the 
alternative ethic inscribed in their experiences continues to be belittled under the crushing 
hegemony of neoliberalism, underpinned as it is by modernist Western thought. In at least 
three broad respects these two ‘minority perspectives’ manifest astonishing convergence, and 
a strong possibility of fruitful transversal political alliance. An indigenous African ethic and a 
materialist ecofeminist politics each promote a relational non-dualism opposing 
discrimination against the ‘other;’ qualify personhood in reference to ethical human activity 
rather than narcissistic consumerist gender identities; and valorize human embodiment and 
interdependence over the monadic subjectivity of neoliberal individualism. 
The foregoing analysis proposes that women constitute a majority ally of marginalized 
indigenous communities in the fight against neoliberal hegemony. The labor usually allocated 
to women evidences an embodiment of ubuntu on both sides of the equator and both sides of 
the neoliberal divide. This insight builds on South African ubuntu theorist Ramose’s 
pioneering work on the common domination of women generally and Africans in particular as 
a violation of ubuntu. African philosophers of ubuntu,
1048
 as well as ecological feminists, 
recognize the importance of dialogue and cooperation between those “disadvantaged in the 
formal economic system, yet empowered by alternative knowledges and skills.” 1049  Both 
women and indigenous people “as colonised subjects … carry the discursive slur of being 
‘closer to nature.’” That is, even indigenous men, although traditionally positioned over 
indigenous women, “have never been fully accorded club membership in humanity.”1050 The 
voices of these “problematic marginals” are best situated to critique the neoliberal hegemony 
and propose models for another future,
1051
 and initiating collaboration between them is a 
matter of urgency. Even as the global capitalist patriarchal economy falters, neoliberalism 
continues to exacerbate social injustices and life-threatening environmental degradation, and 
the geographic margins of globalization are being obliterated by cultural homogenization.
1052
 
The more women in the global North and metropolitans of the global South are pulled out of 
relationally skilled provisioning and into the dehumanizing, consumerist neoliberal vortex, the 
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more care-giving and subsistence capacities are denigrated and lost.
1053
 Such de-skilling is 
precipitated further by corporate annexation of the commons or ‘land grabs’ in the global 
South, pushing livelihood-oriented people toward the cities where they seek paid 
employment. There, they succumb to the spell of neoliberal hegemony even though they are 
victims of this same political-economic system.
1054
 Indigenous politicians, business elites, and 
even some African academics, make matters worse by demeaning subsistence labor as 
‘backward’ and unbecoming of nations pursuing high-tech development.1055 
As the living environment of peoples everywhere is cut down by global industrial 
consumerism, who has the capacities and values needed to build life-affirming communities? 
What is promising is the fact that women, peasants, herders, fishers and gatherers constitute a 
skilled global majority, a meta-industrial labor class largely outside of the monetary 
system.
1056
 There are more women than men on Earth, and there are currently more rurally-
based indigenous people than metropolitans in the global South. As Ramose puts it, “even the 
blind can see that the largest majority of humanity lives by the side of and not through a 
globalizing economy … exist[ing] in the sphere of subsistence economy.” 1057  Further, 
Ramose recognizes that this section of humanity – “[w]omen, the African, the Amerindian 
and the Australasian [–] all have a common cause.”1058 They have historically been regarded 
as ‘not quite human’ on the basis of their apparent lack of rationality, their physicality, their 
emotionality and their supposedly deficient ontology and epistemology. This has been used to 
legitimate their subjection and exploitation at the hands of patriarchs, colonists, preachers, 
socialists, and most recently neoliberals.
1059
 However, this unnamed class may hold the key to 
an alternative future, beyond the “reductionist, fragmentative and empiricist rationality” that 
breaks “the precarious balance between the human being and its environment.” 1060  In 
Vandana Shiva’s words: their principles “stand … for ecological recovery and nature’s 
liberation, for women’s liberation and for the liberation of men who, in dominating nature and 
women, have sacrificed their own human-ness.”1061 
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Conclusion 
 
I begin my concluding remarks with a recapitulation of the five thesis chapters. Chapter 1 
adopted a political-economic approach. It outlined the ‘origin account’ of neoliberalism 
provided by scholars from the global North, and traced the globalization of neoliberalism as it 
was introduced to the world under the benevolent guise of ‘development.’ The Washington-
Wall Street policy alliance, which advocated development through deregulation, was 
scrutinized. After this, the chapter focus shifted to the spread of neoliberalism, facilitated by 
‘Washington Consensus’ reforms in the Third World via World Bank-IMF-WTO 
mechanisms. Finally, consideration was given to social and environmental damage resulting 
from neoliberal reforms. Chapter 2 examined the emergence and development of 
neoliberalism in South Africa, disclosing its neocolonial character. The colonial and apartheid 
periods were discussed, and their capitalist economic underpinnings highlighted. Thereafter, 
drawing on a detailed political economic critique of post-apartheid South Africa, the chapter 
considered the new ANC-led government alliance with global neoliberal institutions and 
businesses that had previously supported the apartheid regime. New indigenous governing 
elites quickly forgot the socialist promises of justice and independence made to the people 
during the anti-apartheid struggle. Chapter 3 introduced a ‘socio-cultural’ perspective on 
neoliberalism, stressing the role of ordinary people in the rise and maintenance of the 
neoliberal hegemony. The principal insight here was that political economy, consumerism and 
gender regimes are intimately interconnected. Important sociological, cultural and 
philosophical texts on consumer society were used to clarify the micro-macro 
interconnections. Key themes included worker alienation and loss of subjective autonomy 
through industrialization, and how consumerism becomes a compensatory mechanism for 
people stripped of dignity in the workplace. Attention was given to the powerful link between 
consumerism and ‘idealized’ types of masculinity and femininity promoted in the neoliberal 
mass media. Consumerism was shown to debilitate participating individuals politically. 
Chapter 4 took as its object of analysis the ‘South African Dream,’ based on the American 
Dream ideology of hyper-consumerism. The ideas of esteem and success promoted under its 
auspices disparage alternative visions of non-neoliberal indigenous economic and cultural 
independence. First, an overview was offered of indigenous South African battles for 
autonomy during colonial and apartheid times. The association of black liberation with 
consumer competence was noted, particularly from the last three decades of the twentieth 
century onward. Thereafter, the chapter reflected on the loss of indigenous self-conceptions, 
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including communally-oriented forms of gender identity. Chapter 5 proposed that the process 
of dismantling the neoliberal complex of politics, economics and socio-cultural organization 
may take as one of its starting points the critical appropriation of non-neoliberal Southern 
African indigenous perspectives. The alternative indigenous ethic that could be derived from 
this, could then gain strength by being placed in dialogue with resonant movements forming 
part of the alternative globalization struggle. Chapter 5 considered the indigenous ethic of 
ubuntu emphasizing embodied knowing, relational livelihood and personhood, and human 
embeddedness and dependency on nature. Ubuntu was then placed in dialogue with a cousin 
thought stream – ecological feminism – which likewise thematizes non-dualistic logic, caring 
and subsistence labor, and material embodiment of humans within nature. Such a dialogue 
connects environmental, postcolonial and gender concerns, manifesting the politics of 
transversalism needed to contest neoliberal hegemony. It also stands to guard against 
excessively anthropocentric and idealist tendencies in Western philosophy and perhaps 
sometimes in ubuntu, by joining the profoundly communal ethic of ubuntu thought with 
ecofeminism.  
The thesis has offered a critical reading of neoliberalism, with specific attention to its 
development and repercussions in post-apartheid South Africa. This system of domination, 
entailing “economic and social transformation under the sign of the free market,”1062 was 
shown to have aggravated socio-economic inequalities inherited from the apartheid regime, 
and damaged local environments through privatization, deregulation, and export-oriented 
trade. Further, under the neoliberal hegemony, South African citizens continue to suffer 
political debilitation as the notion of liberation has become equated with consumerism. The 
use of consumer goods to achieve ‘idealized’ types of masculinity and femininity has 
decimated culturally rich indigenous conceptions of personhood and humanness. Like earlier 
imperializing or colonizing practices, neoliberalism constitutes a system of social domination 
using local people and natural resources for profitable accumulation by regional and foreign 
financial elites. In view of its resourcing of humans, animals and environments, the 
globalizing free market system can be said to rest on a range of unacknowledged moral and 
material ‘debts,’ owed to workers, peasants and indigenous peoples, women, children, 
animals, and the living ecosystem. On the international political scene, there are many 
separate political movements attempting to conscientize people about such ‘debts,’ though in 
large part alternative globalization activists have been slow in coalition building. Socialist 
movements tend to focus on paid workers’ rights, postcolonial movements on the loss of 
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indigenous livelihoods, feminist groups on women’s continued subordination, the Animal 
Liberation movement on inter-species violence, environmental groups on ecological 
degradation, and so on. Yet, some are beginning to realize that these political dominations 
intersect. In the alternative globalization movement, one witnesses an ever greater synthesis 
of opposition against neoliberalism, and with this the coherent formulation of a common 
vision for the future. The World Social Forum (WSF) is particularly instrumental in this 
process, since it provides the platform needed for coalition building between seemingly 
divergent interest groups. Here, ethics, philosophy, human rights, ecology, gender, 
production, economics, consumption, commoning, governance, power, political subjectivity 
and other topics are given equal consideration. This transversal activity makes it possible to 
cultivate understanding of the interconnectedness of dominations of gender, race, class and 
nature under neoliberalism, facilitating in turn “openness for exchanging experiences and 
ideas across a variety of local fields of resistance.”1063 In the last analysis, transversalism is 
caring labor in action; peacemaking as a rehearsal for politics. 
As argued at the outset of this research, I believe that the transversalism emerging 
among alternative globalization movements is urgently required in academia as well. Thus, in 
this thesis, the respective chapters have related political economy to socio-cultural analysis, 
and these to critical philosophical reflection on neoliberal hegemony in South Africa. A 
‘general’ Northern account of neoliberalism provided the backdrop against which the 
specifics of its manifestation in South Africa could be identified and analyzed. It was 
important to focus on South Africa because this country constitutes a regional hegemon, and a 
so-called exemplar of what a developing African country should look like. In addition, it 
recently joined a powerful ‘sub-imperial’ economic alliance known as the BRICS, and has 
enduring associations with Washington and Wall Street, the World Bank, the IMF and the 
WTO. As Raewyn Connell points out, these institutions have been “used … as agents of the 
globalization of neoliberal doctrine and policies,” and contain their own neoliberal “gender 
regimes,” 1064  among other socio-cultural ‘norms.’ These socio-psychological regimes get 
communicated to publics in the global South through the mass media. In the case of South 
Africa, the neoliberal hegemony inculcated thereby threatens to politically neutralize citizens, 
immersed in the work-and-spend cycle of consumerism. The American sociologist William 
Robinson could not have been more right when he advanced that “the culture of global 
capitalism attempts to seduce the excluded and … channel their frustrated aspirations into 
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petty consumption and fantasy as an alternative to placing political demands on the system 
through collective mobilization.” 1065  This dynamic is increasingly playing out in South 
Africa, despite the fact that neoliberal reforms have led to the enrichment only of governing 
and business elites, to further impoverishment of the needy, and to the destruction of local 
environments that might have offered many a base for subsistence livelihoods. Recently, the 
Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe corroborated this thesis, by arguing that “[t]he 
single most important transformation brought about by the end of apartheid was an 
acceleration in turning South Africa … from a society of control into a society of 
consumption.” In his words: “the conflation of the form and substance of democracy and 
citizenship with the rule of consumption … has mistakenly been given the name of a 
transition to democracy.”1066 
  
                                                          
1065
 Robinson, “Global Capitalism and Its Anti-‘Human Face,’” 666-667. 
1066
 Achille Mbembe, “Class, Race and the New Native,” Mail & Guardian, September 26, 2014. Available at: 
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-09-25-class-race-and-the-new-native/. Date accessed: September 30, 2014. 
219 
 
Bibliography 
 
Action for South Africa (ACTSA). “International Pressures and Constraints.” In House of  
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. South Africa: Fifth Report of Session 2003-04. 
London: The Stationary Office Limited, 2004. 
Adams, Mary Louise. Artistic Impressions: Figure Skating, Masculinity, and the Limits of  
Sport. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011. 
Adomako, Akosua, and John Boateng. “Multiple Meanings of Manhood among Boys in  
Ghana.” In From Boys to Men: Social Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary 
Society, edited by Tamara Shefer et al. Lansdowne: UCT Press, 2007. 
Adorno, Theodor W., and Max Horkheimer. Dialectic of Enlightenment. London: Verso,  
1997. 
African National Congress. “Policy Framework: 2009 Election Manifesto,” African National  
Congress. Available at: 
http://www.anc.org.za/elections/2009/manifesto/policy_framework.html. Date 
accessed: October 15, 2012. 
———. The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Policy Framework.  
Johannesburg: Umanyano Publications, 1994. 
———. “The Role of Women in the Struggle against Apartheid,” African National Congress,  
July 15, 1980. Available at: 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=4667&t=Women`s%20Struggles. Date accessed: 
October 8, 2014. 
Ahmed, Sara. Differences That Matter: Feminist Theory and Postmodernism. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Alberti, Ludwig. Alberti’s Account of the Xhosa in 1807. Translated by W. Fehr. Cape Town:  
Balkema, 1968. 
Alexander, James. (1837), 1: 338. Cited in Jeffrey B. Peires. The House of Phalo: A History  
of the Xhosa People in the Days of Their Independence. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1982. 
Alexander, Neville. “National Liberation and Socialist Revolution.” In Between Apartheid  
and Capitalism: Conversations with South African Socialists, edited by Alex 
Callinicos. London: Bookmarks, 1992. 
Aliber, Michael, and Reuben Mokoena. Farmland Price Trends in South Africa, 1994-2003.  
Pretoria: HSRC Press, 2003. 
220 
 
Alverson, Marianne. Under the African Sun. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
Andreasson, Stefan. “The Resilience of Comprador Capitalism: ‘New’ Economic Groups in  
Southern Africa.” In Big Business and Economic Development: Conglomerates and 
Economic Groups in Developing Countries and Transition Economies under 
Globalisation, edited by Alex E. Fernández Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom. New 
York: Routledge, 2007. 
Andrews, Mercia, and George Dor. Cited in Patrick Bond. “Their Reforms and Ours: Balance  
of Forces and Economic Analysis in a New Global Financial Architecture.” In Global 
Finance: New Thinking on Regulating Speculative Capital Markets, edited by Walden 
Bello, Nicola Bullard and Kamal Malhotra. London: Zed Books, 2000. 
Anglo American Corporation of South Africa. “Profile: Charles V. Engelhard,” March 1966,  
Optima 16 (1966): 39-40. 
Anon. “Eight-Hour Movement.” In Workers in America: A Historical Encyclopedia, edited by  
Robert E. Weir and James P. Hanlan. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2013. 
———. “Hegemon.” In Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations  
Textbook for Africa, 3d ed., edited by Patrick J. McGowan, Scarlett Cornelissen and 
Philip Nel. Lansdowne: UCT Press, 2007. 
———. “The People Rise Up!,” African Communist 83 (Fourth Quarter 1980): 18. Cited in  
Bernard Magubane. “From Détente to the Rise of the Garrison State.” In The Road to 
Democracy in South Africa, vol. 2 (1970-1980), edited by South African Democracy 
Education Trust (SADET). Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2006. 
Appiah, Kwame A. “Akan and Euro-American Concepts of the Person.” In African  
Philosophy: New and Traditional Perspectives, edited by Lee M. Brown. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004. 
Atalay, Zeynep. “World Social Forum.” In International Encyclopedia of Civil Society, edited  
by Helmut K. Anheier and Stefan Toepler. New York: Springer, 2010. 
Atkinson, Doreen, and Lochner Marais. “Urbanisation and the Future Urban Agenda in South  
Africa.” In Democracy and Delivery: Urban Policy in South Africa, edited by Udesh 
Pillay, Richard Tomlinson and Jacques du Toit. Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006. 
Ayiro, Laban. “HIV/Aids and Its Impact on Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policy  
Initiatives and Challenges.” In The Impact of HIV/Aids on Education Worldwide, 
edited by Alexander W. Wiseman and Ryan N. Glover. Bingley: Emerald, 2012. 
Bandelj, Nina, and Elizabeth Sowers. Economy and State: A Sociological Perspective.  
Cambridge: Polity, 2010. 
Bank, Leslie, Langa Makubalo and Landiswa Maqasho. Housing Delivery and State  
221 
 
Subsidies. East London: Fort Hare Institute of Social and Economic Research 
(FHISER), 2010. 
Barber, James, and John Barratt. South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and  
Security, 1945-1988. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Barchiesi, Franco. “South Africa: Between Oppression and ‘Homegrown Structural  
Adjustment.’” In A Thousand Flowers: Social Struggles against Structural Adjustment 
in African Universities, edited by Silvia Federici, George Caffentzis and Ousseina 
Alidou. Trenton: Africa World Press, 2000. 
Barrett, Jane. Organizing in the Informal Economy: A Case Study of the Minibus Taxi  
Industry in South Africa. Geneva: International Labour Office, 2003. 
Baudrillard, Jean. Selected Writings, 2d ed. Edited by Mark Poster. Stanford: Stanford  
University Press, 2001. 
Bauman, Zygmunt. Freedom. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988. 
Beall, Jo, Owen Crankshaw and Susan Parnell. Uniting a Divided City: Governance and  
Social Exclusion in Johannesburg. London: Earthscan, 2002. 
Beck, Roger B. The History of South Africa. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000. 
Beecham, John. Colonization: Being Remarks on Colonization in General, with an  
Examination of the Proposals of the Association Which Has Been Formed for 
Colonizing New Zealand, 2d ed. London: Hatchards, 1838. 
Beinart, William. Twentieth-Century South Africa, 2d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
2001. 
———, and Saul Dubow. Introduction to Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century  
South Africa, edited by William Beinart and Saul Dubow. London: Routledge, 1995. 
Bell, Michael Mayerfeld. An Invitation to Environmental Sociology, 4th ed. Thousand Oaks:  
Sage, 2012. 
Bell, Richard H. Understanding African Philosophy: A Cross-Cultural Approach to Classical  
and Contemporary Issues. New York: Routledge, 2004. 
Bellah, Robert N., et al. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American  
Life. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. 
Bellamy Foster, John, Brett Clark and Richard York. The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War  
on the Earth. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2010. 
Bello, Walden. Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy. London: Zed Books, 2004. 
———. “The Iron Cage: The World Trade Organization, the Bretton Woods Institutions, and  
the South,” Capitalism Nature Socialism 11/1 (2000): 3-32. 
Bernal, J. D. Science in History: The Emergence of Science, vol. 1, 3d ed. Harmondsworth:  
222 
 
Penguin, 1969. 
———. Science in History: The Social Sciences: Conclusion, vol. 4, 3d ed. Harmondsworth:  
Penguin, 1969. 
Bernasconi, Robert. “Kant’s Third Thoughts on Race.” In Reading Kant’s Geography, edited  
by Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta. Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2011. 
Bernstein, Henry. “The Political Economy of the Maize Filière.” In The Agrarian Question in  
South Africa, edited by Henry Bernstein. Portland: Frank Cass, 1996. 
Bernstein, Hilda. For Their Triumphs and for Their Tears: Conditions and Resistance of  
Women in Apartheid South Africa. Cambridge: International Defence & Aid Fund, 
1975. 
Bewaji, John A. I. ‘Beyond Ethno-Philosophical Myopia: Critical Comments on Mogobe B.  
Ramose’s African Philosophy through Ubuntu.’ In John A. I. Bewaji and Mogobe B. 
Ramose, “The Bewaji, Van Binsbergen and Ramose Debate on Ubuntu,” South 
African Journal of Philosophy 22/4 (2003): 378-415. 
Biko, Steve. “Some African Cultural Concepts” (1971). In Steve Biko. I Write What I Like.  
Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2004. 
Blay, Yaba. “Get Light or Die Trying,” January 11, 2013. Available at:  
http://yabablay.com/get-light-or-die-trying/#more-1236. Date accessed: November 4, 
2013. 
———. “Skin Bleaching, Self-Hatred and ‘Colonial Mentality,’” January 2, 2013. Available  
at: http://yabablay.com/skin-bleaching-self-hatred-and-colonial-mentality/. Date 
accessed: November 4, 2013. 
Bond, Patrick. Against Global Apartheid: South Africa Meets the World Bank, IMF and  
International Finance, 2d ed. London: Zed Books, 2003. 
———. “BRICS and the Tendency to Sub-Imperialism,” Pambazuka News, April 10, 2014.  
Available at: http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category/features/91303. Date accessed: 
September 9, 2014. 
———. “Coega, Energy, Corporate Welfare and Climate Crisis.” In Development Challenges  
in the Eastern Cape, edited by Greg Ruiters. Pietermaritzburg: University of 
KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2011. 
———. Commanding Heights & Community Control: New Economics for a New South  
Africa. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1991. 
———. “Contradictions Subside Then Deepen: Accumulation and Class Conflict, 1994- 
223 
 
2000.” In John S. Saul and Patrick Bond. South Africa – The Present as History: From 
Mrs Ples to Mandela & Marikana. Woodbridge: James Currey, 2014. 
———. “Economic Growth, Ecological Modernization or Environmental Justice? Conflicting  
Discourses in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Capitalism Nature Socialism 11/1 
(March 2000): 33-61. 
———. Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa. Scottsville:  
University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005. 
———. Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation. London: Zed Books, 2006. 
———. South Africa and Global Apartheid: Continental and International Policies and  
Politics. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2004. 
———, and Ashwin Desai. “Explaining Uneven and Combined Development in South  
Africa.” In 100 Years of Permanent Revolution: Results and Prospects, edited by Bill 
Dunn and Hugo Radice. London: Pluto Press, 2006. 
———, and David Hallowes. “The Environment of Apartheid-Capitalism: Discourses and  
Issues.” In Patrick Bond. Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, Development, 
and Social Protest. London: The Merlin Press, 2002.  
———, et al. “Eco-Social Injustice for Working-Class Communities: The Making and  
Unmaking of Neoliberal Infrastructure Policy.” In Patrick Bond. Unsustainable South 
Africa: Environment, Development, and Social Protest. London: The Merlin Press, 
2002. 
———, Greg Ruiters and Robyn Stein. “Droughts and Floods: Water Prices and Values in the  
Time of Cholera.” In Patrick Bond. Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, 
Development, and Social Protest. London: The Merlin Press, 2002. 
———, Maj Fiil-Flynn and Stephen Greenberg. “Power to the Powerful: Energy, Electricity,  
Equity, and Environment.” In Patrick Bond. Unsustainable South Africa: 
Environment, Development, and Social Protest. London: The Merlin Press, 2002. 
Bonilla, Stephania. Odious Debt: Law-and-Economics Perspectives. Wiesbaden: Gabler  
Verlag, 2011. 
Bonnet, Alastair. “The Critical Traditionalism of Ashis Nandy: Occidentalism and the  
Dilemmas of Innocence,” Theory, Culture and Society 29/1 (2012): 138-157. 
Bonnin, Debby, Georgina Hamilton, Robert Morrell and Art Sitas. “The Struggle for Natal  
and KwaZulu: Workers, Township Dwellers and Inkatha, 1972-1985.” In Political 
Economy and Identities in KwaZulu-Natal: Historical and Social Perspectives, edited 
by Robert Morrell. Durban: Indicator Press, 1996. 
Boonzaier, Emile, et al. The Cape Herders: A History of the Khoikhoi of Southern Africa.  
224 
 
Cape Town: David Philip, 2000. 
Botha, P. W. “Rubicon Speech,” 1985. Cited in David F. Schmitz. The United States and  
Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Bowbrick, Peter. The Economics of Quality, Grades and Brands. London: Routledge, 1992. 
Bowker, John Mitford. Speeches, Letters and Selections from Important Papers.  
Grahamstown: Godlonton and Richards, 1864. 
Breazeale, Kenon. “In Spite of Women: Esquire Magazine and the Construction of the Male  
Consumer.” In Gender, Race, and Class in Media: A Text-Reader, 2d ed., edited by 
Gail Dines and Jean M. Humez. London: Sage, 2003. 
British Parliamentary Papers: Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British  
Settlements), reprint. Shannon: Irish University Press, 1968. Evidence of Rev. William 
Shaw. 
Britton, Hannah E. Women in the South African Parliament: From Resistance to Governance.  
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005. 
Brown, Carolyn A. “A ‘Man’ in the Village is a ‘Boy’ in the Workplace: Colonial Racism,  
Worker Militance, and Igbo Notions of Masculinity in the Nigerian Coal Industry, 
1930-1945.” In Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa, edited by Lisa A. Lindsay 
and Stephan F. Miescher. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2003. 
Brown, Lee M. Introduction to African Philosophy: New and Traditional Perspectives, edited  
by Lee M. Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
Bujo, Benezet. Foundations of an African Ethic. New York: Crosswood Publishing Company,  
2001. 
Bundy, Colin. “Reform in Historical Perspective.” In Between Apartheid and Capitalism:  
Conversations with South African Socialists, edited by Alex Callinicos. London: 
Bookmarks, 1992. 
Bunker, Stephen G., and Paul S. Ciccantell. East Asia and the Global Economy: Japan’s  
Ascent, with Implications for China’s Future. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2007. 
Buthelezi, Mangosuthu. Cited in Thembisa Waetjen. Workers and Warriors: Masculinity and  
the Struggle for Nation in South Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006. 
Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Femininity and the Subversion of Identity, 2d ed. New York:  
Routledge, 2010. 
Butler, Lee-Anne. “Punitive Power Charges: New Tariffs Already in Effect Could Mean Hike  
of 35%,” The Herald, July 2, 2012. 
Callinicos, Alex. An Anti-Capitalist Manifesto. Cambridge: Polity, 2003. 
225 
 
———. Bonfire of Illusions: The Twin Crises of the Liberal World. Cambridge: Polity, 2010. 
———. Introduction to Between Apartheid and Capitalism: Conversations with South  
African Socialists, edited by Alex Callinicos. London: Bookmarks, 1992. 
———. “Social Contract or Socialism? The Agenda of the South African Left.” In Between  
Apartheid and Capitalism: Conversations with South African Socialists, edited by 
Alex Callinicos. London: Bookmarks, 1992. 
———. South Africa between Reform and Revolution. London: Bookmarks, 1988. 
Callinicos, Luli. Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains. Cape Town: David Philip,  
2004. 
Campagna, Anthony S. The Economy in the Reagan Years: The Economic Consequences of  
the Reagan Administrations. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994. 
Campbell, John. Travels in South Africa. Cape Town: C. Struik, [1815] 1974. 
Casey, Terrence. The Social Context of Economic Change in Britain: Between Policy and  
Performance. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002. 
Caufield, Catherine. Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations.  
London: Macmillan, 1997. 
CEF Group of Companies. “South Africa’s Next Multi-Billion Rand Crude Oil Refinery,”  
Central Energy Fund, 2012. Available at: 
http://www.cef.org.za/index.php?view=article&id=50%3Asouth-africas-next-multi-
billion-rand. Date accessed: October 10, 2012. 
Césaire, Aimé. Discourse on Colonialism. Translated by Joan Pinkham. New York: Monthly  
Review Press, 2000. 
———. Lettre à Maurice Thorez, 1956. Cited in Paulin J. Hountondji. “An Alienated  
Literature.” In The African Philosophy Reader: A Text with Readings, 2d ed., edited 
by P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux. London: Routledge, 2005. 
Chauke, Amukelani, and T. J. Strydom. “Mine War: SA Bleeds,” The Times, August 16,  
2012. 
Chomsky, Noam, et al. “Open Letter to James Nxumalo, Senzo Mchunu and Jacob Zuma,”  
Mail & Guardian, October 4, 2013. 
Choules, John O., and Thomas Smith. The Origin and History of Missions: A Record of the  
Voyages, Travels, Labors, and Successes of the Various Missionaries, Who Have Been 
Sent Forth by Protestant Societies and Churches to Evangelize the Heathen, vol. 2, 
4th ed. Boston: Gould, Kendall and Lincoln/Crocker and Brewster, 1837. 
Christiansë, Yvette. “Passing Away: The Unspeakable (Losses) of Postapartheid South  
226 
 
Africa.” In Loss: The Politics of Mourning, edited by David L. Eng and David 
Kazanjian. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. 
City Press. “Brash Bling and Ghetto Fabulous,” City Press, October 6, 2012. Available at:  
http://www.citypress.co.za/lifestyle/brash-bling-and-ghetto-fabulous-20121006/. Date 
accessed: November 13, 2013. 
Clapp, Jennifer, and Peter Dauvergne. Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the  
Global Environment. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.  
Clarno, Andy. “A Tale of Two Walled Cities: Neo-Liberalization and Enclosure in  
Johannesburg and Jerusalem.” In Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 19, edited 
by Diane E. Davis and Christina Proenza-Coles. Bingley: JAI Press, 2008. 
Coega Development Corporation. “Coega Industrial Development Zone,” Coega  
Development Corporation, 2012. Available at: 
http://www.coega.co.za/Content2.aspx?objID=84. Date accessed: October 7, 2012. 
Collier, Paul, et al. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy.  
Washington: The World Bank, 1996. 
Connell, Raewyn W. Gender in World Perspective, 2d ed. Cambridge: Polity, 2010. 
———. “Global Tides: Market and Gender Dynamics on a World Scale,” Social Currents 1/1  
(2014): 5-12. 
———. Masculinities. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 
———. The Men and the Boys. St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 2000. 
———, and Nour Dados. “Where in the World Does Neoliberalism Come From? The Market  
Agenda in Southern Perspective,” Theory and Society 43/2 (2014): 117-138. 
Coontz, Stephanie. The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap.  
New York: Basic Books, 2000. 
Cornell, Drucilla. “Exploring Ubuntu: Tentative Reflections,” fehe.org. Available at:  
http://www.fehe.org/index.php?id=281. Date accessed: October 8, 2014. 
Cornwall, Andrea A. “To Be a Man is More Than a Day’s Work: Shifting Ideals of  
Masculinity in Ado-Odo, Southwestern Nigeria.” In Men and Masculinities in Modern 
Africa, edited by Lisa A. Lindsay and Stephan F. Miescher. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 
2003. 
COSATU. “Cosatu’s Submission on Proposed Labour Law Amendments,” politicsweb, July  
31, 2012. Available at:  
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page72308?oid=31654
1&sn=Marketingweb+detail&pid=90389. Date accessed: October 22, 2012. 
Cosser, Michael. “Race and Opportunity in the Transition from School to Higher Education in  
227 
 
South Africa.” In Discrimination in an Unequal World, edited by Miguel Angel 
Centeno and Katherine S. Newman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Costella, Gia. “Greater Intervention Needed to Tackle Acid Mine Drainage,” Mining Weekly,  
March 23, 2012. Available at: http://www.miningweekly.com/article/environmental-
risks-and-hazards-within-the-wits-goldfields-2012-03-23. Date accessed: October 22, 
2012. 
Crankshaw, Owen, Gavin Heron and Timothy Hart. “The Road to ‘Egoli’: Urbanization  
Histories from a Johannesburg Squatter Settlement.” In The Apartheid City and 
Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South Africa, edited by David M. Smith. 
London: Routledge, 2005. 
Cronin, Jeremy. “The Communist Party and the Left.” In Between Apartheid and Capitalism:  
Conversations with South African Socialists, edited by Alex Callinicos. London: 
Bookmarks, 1992. 
Cross, Gary. Time and Money: The Making of Consumer Culture. London: Routledge, 1993. 
Daly, Herman. Cited in Catherine Caufield. Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the  
Poverty of Nations. London: Macmillan, 1997. 
Darwin, John. The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830- 
1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
De Gorter, Harry, Lilian Ruiz and Merlinda D. Ingco. “Export Competition Policies.” In  
Agriculture and the WTO: Creating a Trading System for Development, edited by 
Merlinda D. Ingco and John D. Nash. Washington: The World Bank, 2004. 
De la Barra, Ximena. “The Dual Debt of Neoliberalism.” In Imperialism, Neoliberalism and  
Social Struggles in Latin America, edited by Richard A. Dello Buono and José Bell 
Lara. Leiden: Brill, 2007. 
De Lange, Riana. “Terugslag vir die Oos-Kaap: Coega-Smelter Geskrap,” Die Burger,  
October 16, 2009. 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). “South Africa in BRICS,”  
BRICS, 2014. Available at: http://www.brics5.co.za/about-brics/south-africa-in-brics/. 
Date accessed: August 5, 2014. 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). “SA Export Value HS8 (Annual),” The DTI, 2014.  
Available at: 
http://tradestats.thedti.gov.za/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=891. Date 
accessed: November 10, 2014.  
———. “SA Import Value HS8 (Annual),” The DTI, 2014. Available at:  
228 
 
http://tradestats.thedti.gov.za/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=894. Date 
accessed: November 10, 2014. 
Deppe, R. K. A Comparative Study of Motives Observed in Selected Pictorial Advertisements  
Directed at the Bantu. Pretoria: Bureau of Market Research/University of South 
Africa, 1974. 
Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and  
Replies. Edited by John Cottingham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Ditlhake, Abie. “Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa: Prospects and Challenges,”  
Southern African Political and Economic Monthly (October-November 1998): 10-11. 
Dlamini, Kuseni. “Deaths Reflect Badly on Leaders: Lonmin Killings Should Prompt a New  
Conversation About the Type of Society We Want to Be,” Sunday Times, August 19, 
2012. 
Doyle, Julie. Mediating Climate Change. Burlington: Ashgate, 2011. 
Driesen, David. “Alternatives to Regulation? Market Mechanisms and the Environment.” In  
The Oxford Handbook of Regulation, edited by Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and 
Martin Lodge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Dubow, Saul. A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Science, Sensibility, and White South Africa  
1820-2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Dugard, Jackie. “From Low Intensity War to Mafia War: Taxi Violence in South Africa  
(1987-2000),” Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, May 2001. 
Available at: http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/papvtp4.htm. Date accessed: October 
22, 2012. 
Dugard, John. International Law: A South African Perspective, 3d ed. Lansdowne: Juta, 2005. 
Dumbrell, John. American Foreign Policy: Carter to Clinton. London: Macmillan, 1997. 
Durrheim, Kevin, and John Dixon. Racial Encounter: The Social Psychology of Contact and  
Desegregation. Abingdon: Routledge, 2005. 
Eastern Cape Development Corporation (ECDC), “Infrastructure,” Eastern Cape  
Development Corporation, 2012. Available at: 
http://www.ecdc.co.za/about_the_eastern_cape/infrastructure. Date accessed: October 
10, 2012.  
Echenberg, Myron. Africa in the Time of Cholera: A History of Pandemics from 1817 to the  
Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Egerö, Bertil. South Africa’s Bantustans: From Dumping Grounds to Battlefronts. Uppsala:  
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1991. 
Ehrenreich, Barbara, and Deirdre English. Witches, Midwives and Nurses: A History of  
229 
 
Women Healers, 2d ed. New York: The Feminist Press, 2010. 
Elbourne, Elizabeth. Blood Ground: Colonialism, Missions, and the Contest for Christianity  
in the Cape Colony and Britain, 1799-1853. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2002. 
Emeagwali, Gloria. “The Neo-Liberal Agenda and the IMF/World Bank Structural  
Adjustment Programs with Reference to Africa.” In Critical Perspectives on 
Neoliberal Globalization, Development and Education in Africa and Asia, edited by 
Dip Kapoor. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2011. 
Entwistle, Harold. Antonio Gramsci: Conservative Schooling for Radical Politics. Abingdon:  
Routledge, 2010. 
Estermann, Josef. Cited in Pablo Solón. “Notes for the Debate: Vivir Bien / Buen Vivir,”  
Systemic Alternatives, July 30, 2014. Available at: 
https://systemicalternatives.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/buen-vivir-english-30-jul-
2014.pdf. Date accessed: September 29, 2014. 
Evans, Geoff, James Goodman and Nina Lansbury. “Politicising Finance.” In Moving  
Mountains: Communities Confront Mining and Globalisation, edited by Geoff Evans, 
James Goodman and Nina Lansbury. London: Zed Books, 2002. 
Evans, Ivan. Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa. Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1997. 
Faber, Ronald J. “The Urge to Buy: A Uses and Gratifications Perspective on Compulsive  
Buying.” In The Why of Consumption: Contemporary Perspectives on Consumer 
Motives, Goals, and Desires, edited by S. Ratneshwar, David Glen Mick and Cynthia 
Huffman. London: Routledge, 2005. 
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York: Grove  
Press, 2008. 
Faulks, Keith. Citizenship. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Federici, Silvia. “The Recolonization of African Education.” In A Thousand Flowers: Social  
Struggles against Structural Adjustment in African Universities, edited by Silvia 
Federici, George Caffentzis and Ousseina Alidou. Trenton: Africa World Press, 2000. 
Feeney, Patricia. Accountable Aid: Local Participation in Major Projects. Oxford: Oxfam,  
1999. 
Ferguson, Stephen C., II. “Philosophy in Africa and the African Diaspora.” In The Oxford  
Handbook of World Philosophy, edited by Jay L. Garfield and William Edelglass. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Fiske, John. Television Culture. London: Routledge, 2009. 
230 
 
Foucault, Michel. The Will to Knowledge: History of Sexuality, vol. 1. Translated by Robert  
Hurley. London: Penguin, 1998. 
Frank, Nathaniel, Brenda González-Hermosillo and Heiko Hesse. Transmission of Liquidity  
Shocks: Evidence from the 2007 Subprime Crisis. Washington: International Monetary 
Fund, 2008. 
Fraser, Nancy. “Rethinking Recognition,” New Left Review 3 (May/June 2000): 107-120. 
Fraterrigo, Elizabeth. Playboy and the Making of the Good Life in Modern America. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Freund, Bill. “Confrontation and Social Change: Natal and the Forging of Apartheid 1949- 
72.” In Political Economy and Identities in KwaZulu-Natal: Historical and Social 
Perspectives, edited by Robert Morrell. Durban: Indicator Press, 1996. 
Gabriel, Yiannis, and Tim Lang. The Unmanageable Consumer, 2d ed. London: Sage, 2006. 
Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Affluent Society. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969. 
Galbraith, John S. Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834- 
1854. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963. 
Gauntlett, David. Media, Gender and Identity: An Introduction, 2d ed. London: Routledge,  
2008. 
Gauteng Provincial Government. “What is Black Economic Empowerment?,” Guatengonline.  
Available at: http://www.gautengonline.gov.za/Business/Pages/FAQs.aspx. Date 
accessed: October 23, 2012. 
Gautney, Heather. Protest and Organization in the Alternative Globalization Era: NGOs,  
Social Movements, and Political Parties. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Gelb, Stephen. “The Politics of Macro-Economic Reform in South Africa.” Paper delivered at  
the University of the Witwatersrand history workshop, September 18, 1999. 
George, Susan. Cited in Alex Callinicos. An Anti-Capitalist Manifesto. Cambridge: Polity,  
2003. 
Gerretsen, Bronwyn. “ID Book Delay Drives Woman to Suicide,” IOL News, June 20, 2007.  
Available at: http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/id-book-delay-drives-woman-to-
suicide-1.358419#.UHAbAZhJP8w. Date accessed: October 6, 2012. 
Gibson, John H. Performance Versus Results: A Critique of Values in Contemporary Sport.  
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993. 
Gilbert, James. Perfect Cities: Chicago’s Utopias of 1893. Chicago: University of Chicago  
Press, 1993. 
Giliomee, Hermann. The Afrikaners: Biography of a People. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2003. 
Gingrich, Arnold. “The Art of Living and the New Leisure,” 1933. Cited in Faye Hammill  
231 
 
and Karen Leick. “Modernism and the Quality Magazines: Vanity Fair (1914-36); 
American Mercury (1924-81); New Yorker (1925- ); Esquire (1933- ).” In The Oxford 
Critical and Cultural History of Modernist Magazines, vol. 2 (North America 1894-
1960), edited by Peter Brooker and Andrew Thacker. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012. 
Glaser, Daryl. Politics and Society in South Africa. London: Sage, 2001. 
Goldman, Michael. “Imperial Science, Imperial Nature: Environmental Knowledge for the  
World (Bank).” In Earthly Politics: Local and Global in Environmental Governance, 
edited by Sheila Jasanoff and Marybeth Long Martello. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004. 
Goldman, Robert, Deborah Heath and Sharon L. Smith. “Commodity Feminism,” Critical  
Studies in Mass Communication 8 (1991): 333-351. 
Goss, Richard J. “Opening Address.” In The Urban Bantu Market: Understanding Its  
Complexities and Developing Its Potential. Proceedings of a 2-day seminar held in 
February 1969, Durban, Natal. Durban: The National Development and Management 
Foundation of South Africa, 1969. 
Gowan, Peter. The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance.  
London: Verso, 1999. 
———. “The Globalization Gamble: The Dollar-Wall Street Regime and Its Consequences,”  
1998, marxsite.com. Available at: 
http://marxsite.com/Gowan_DollarWallstreetRegime.pdf. Date accessed: October 5, 
2014. 
Graves, Joseph L., Jr. The Emperor’s New Clothes: Biological Theories of Race at the  
Millennium. Piscataway: Rutgers University Press, 2002. 
Greer, Germaine. The Whole Woman. London: Doubleday, 1999. 
Grey, George. Speech at the Opening of the Cape Parliament, 1859. Cited in John M’Kerrow.  
History of the Foreign Missions of the Secession and United Presbyterian Church. 
Edinburgh: Andrew Elliot, 1867. 
Griaule, Marcel. Conversations with Ogotemmêli: An Introduction to Dogon Religious Ideas.  
London: Oxford University Press, 1965. 
Grundy, Kenneth W. “South Africa: Transition to Majority Rule, Transformation to Stable  
Democracy.” In The Uncertain Promise of Southern Africa, edited by York Bradshaw 
and Stephen N. Ndegwa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. 
Gumede, William Mervin. Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC, rev. ed. Cape  
Town: Zebra Press, 2007. 
Guthrie, L. M. “Successes and Failures in Bantu Marketing: The Lessons to Be Learnt.” In  
232 
 
The Urban Bantu Market: Understanding Its Complexities and Developing Its 
Potential. Proceedings of a 2-day seminar held in February 1969, Durban, Natal. 
Durban: The National Development and Management Foundation of South Africa, 
1969. 
Gyekye, Kwame. An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme,  
rev. ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995. 
———. Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
Hadot, Pierre. The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature. Translated by  
Michael Chase. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006. 
Hall, Ruth. “Transforming Rural South Africa? Taking Stock of Land Reform.” In The Land  
Question in South Africa: The Challenge of Transformation and Redistribution, edited 
by Lungisile Ntsebeza and Ruth Hall. Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007. 
Hallen, Barry. A Short History of African Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,  
2002. 
Hames, Raymond. “The Ecologically Noble Savage Debate,” Annual Review of Anthropology  
36 (2007): 177-190. 
Hamminga, Bert. “Epistemology from the African Point of View.” In Knowledge Cultures:   
Comparative Western and African Epistemology, edited by Bert Hamminga. 
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005. 
———.“Language, Reality and Truth: The African Point of View.” In Knowledge Cultures:  
Comparative Western and African Epistemology, edited by Bert Hamminga. 
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005. 
Harris, Ian M. Messages Men Hear: Constructing Masculinities. London: Taylor & Francis,  
2005. 
Harrison, David. The White Tribe of Africa: South Africa in Perspective. Berkeley: University  
of California Press, 1981. 
Harrison, Faye V. Outsider Within: Reworking Anthropology in the Global Age. Urbana:  
University of Illinois Press, 2008. 
Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Havnevik, Kjell. “A Historical Framework for Analysing Current Tanzanian Transitions: The  
Post-Independence Model, Nyerere’s Ideas and Some Interpretations.” In Tanzania in 
Transition: From Nyerere to Mkapa, edited by Kjell Havnevik and Aida C. Isinika. 
Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2010. 
———, et al. African Agriculture and the World Bank: Development or Impoverishment?  
233 
 
Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2008. 
Hayward, Brian. “Two More Smelters in the Pipeline for Coega,” The Herald, May 25, 2012.  
Available at: http://www.peherald.com/news/article/6366. Date accessed: October 10, 
2012. 
Healy, Stephen, and Iain MacGill. “From Smart Grid to Smart Energy Use.” In Smart Grid:  
Integrating Renewable, Distributed, and Efficient Energy, edited by Fereidoon P. 
Sioshansi. Waltham: Academic Press, 2012. 
Heavens, Andrew. “Shell’s Nigeria Pollution Lawsuit Reaches the Hague,” The Huffington  
Post Green, October 11, 2012. Available at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/11/shell-pollution-lawsuit-nigeria-
africa_n_1956931.html. Date accessed: October 21, 2012. 
Hegel, G. W. F. Philosophy of Right. Translated by Samuel W. Dyde. New York: Prometheus  
Books, 1996. 
Heil, Dominik. Ontological Fundamentals for Ethical Management: Heidegger and the  
Corporate World. Dordrecht: Springer, 2011. 
Hellinger, Doug. Cited in Catherine Caufield. Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the  
Poverty of Nations. London: Macmillan, 1997. 
Herman, Edward S., and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of  
the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon Books, 2002. 
Hilton-Barber, Brett, and Lee R. Berger. Field Guide to the Cradle of Humankind:  
Sterkfontein, Swartkrans, Kromdraai & Environs World Heritage Site, 2d rev. ed. 
Cape Town: Struik Publishers, 2004. 
Hirschman, Elizabeth C., and Barbara B. Stern. “Representations of Women’s Identities and  
Goals: The Past Fifty Years in Film and Television.” In The Why of Consumption: 
Contemporary Perspectives on Consumer Motives, Goals, and Desires, edited by S. 
Ratneshwar, David Glen Mick and Cynthia Huffman. London: Routledge, 2005. 
Hoch, Paul. White Hero, Black Beast: Racism, Sexism and the Mask of Masculinity. London:  
Pluto Press, 1979. 
Hodgson, Dorothy L. “Being Maasai Men: Modernity and the Production of Maasai  
Masculinities.” In Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa, edited by Lisa A. Lindsay 
and Stephan F. Miescher. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2003. 
Hofstede, Geert. “A Case for Comparing Apples with Oranges: International Differences in  
Values.” In Values and Attitudes across Nations and Time, edited by Masamichi 
Sasaki. Leiden: Brill, 1998. 
Hogan, Michael J. The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western  
234 
 
Europe, 1947-1952. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Holmes, Thalia. “New Land Reform Bill – Dangerous or Not?,” Mail & Guardian, June 23,  
2014. Available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2014-06-23-new-land-expropriation-bill-
dangerous-or-appropriate. Date accessed: August 3, 2014. 
hooks, bell. Sisters of the Yam: Black Women and Self-Recovery. New York: Routledge,  
2015. 
Horkheimer, Max. Eclipse of Reason. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.  
Horton, Mark. “The Role of Fiscal Policy in Stabilization and Poverty Alleviation.” In Post- 
Apartheid South Africa: The First Ten Years, edited by Michael Nowak and Luca 
Antonio Ricci. Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2005. 
Hosseini, S. A. Hamed. “Occupy Cosmopolitanism: Ideological Transversalization in the Age  
of Global Economic Uncertainties,” Globalizations 10/3 (2013): 425-438. 
Hountondji, Paulin J. African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, 2d ed. Bloomington: Indiana  
University Press, 1996. 
———. “An Alienated Literature.” In The African Philosophy Reader: A Text with Readings,  
2d ed., edited by P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux. London: Routledge, 2005. 
———. “Knowledge as a Development Issue.” In A Companion to African Philosophy,  
edited by Kwasi Wiredu et al. Malden: Blackwell, 2004. 
———. “Reason and Tradition.” In Philosophy and Cultures, edited by Henry Odera Oruka  
and Dismas A. Masolo. Nairobi: Bookwise, 1983. 
Hovland, Roxanne, and Joyce M. Wolburg. Advertising, Society, and Consumer Culture. New  
York: M.E. Sharpe, 2010. 
Humphreys, Norman K. Historical Dictionary of the International Monetary Fund, 2d ed.,  
edited by Jon Woronoff. Lanham: Scarecrow Press EPub, 1999. 
Hyam, Ronald, and Peter Henshaw. The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa  
Since the Boer War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Hyman, Louis. Debtor Nation: The History of America in Red Ink. Princeton: Princeton  
University Press, 2011. 
Imbo, Samuel Oluoch. An Introduction to African Philosophy. Lanham: Rowman &  
Littlefield, 1998. 
Innes, Duncan. Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa. New York: Monthly  
Review Press, 1984. Cited in Patrick Bond. Against Global Apartheid: South Africa 
Meets the World Bank, IMF and International Finance, 2d ed. London: Zed Books, 
2003. 
International Monetary Fund. Lesotho: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Progress Report.  
235 
 
Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2003. 
———. South Africa: Staff Report for the 2007 Article IV Consultation. Washington:  
International Monetary Fund, 2007. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07274.pdf. Date accessed: October 12, 
2014. 
Irele, Abiola. “Contemporary Thought in French Speaking Africa.” In African Philosophy:  
Selected Readings, edited by Albert G. Mosley. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 
1995. 
Jackson, Michael, and Ivan Karp. Introduction to Personhood and Agency: The Experience of  
Self and Other in African Cultures, edited by Michael Jackson and Ivan Karp. 
Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1990. 
Jakobeit, Cord. “Nonstate Actors Leading the Way: Debt-for-Nature Swaps.” In Institutions  
for Environmental Aid, edited by Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy. Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1996. 
Jameson, Fredric. “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture,” Social Text 1 (Winter 1979):  
130-148. 
Jentzsch, Nicola. The Economics and Regulation of Financial Privacy: An International  
Comparison of Credit Reporting Systems. New York: Physica-Verlag Heidelberg, 
 2006. 
Joas, Hans. The Creativity of Action. Translated by Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast.  
Cambridge: Polity, 1996. 
Johnston, Harry H. A History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races, 2d ed. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Jolly, Richard, et al. UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice. Bloomington:  
Indiana University Press, 2004. 
Jonas, Mcebisi. “Eastern Cape Department of Economic Development and Environmental  
Affairs 2013/14 Budget Vote Speech,” South Africa Government Online, March 22, 
2012. Available at: 
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=26183&tid=62074. 
Date accessed: October 9, 2012. 
Jordan, Bobby. “SA’s Billion-Rand Arms Deal Subs are Left High and Dry,” Sunday Times,  
August 12, 2012. 
Kachipande, Sitinga. “Dying for Straight Hair: The Danger of Relaxers for African Women,”  
May 28, 2013. Available at: http://www.africaontheblog.com/dying-for-straight-hair-
the-danger-of-relaxers-for-african-women/. Date accessed: November 4, 2013. 
236 
 
Kain, Philip J. Hegel and the Other: A Study of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Albany: State  
University of New York Press, 2005. 
Kapur, Devesh. “The Common Pool Dilemma of Global Public Goods: Lessons from the  
World Bank’s Net Income and Reserves,” World Development 30/3 (2002): 337-354. 
Katona, George. The Mass Consumption Society. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 
Kernohan, Bob. “Coega Smelter Dream Over,” The Herald, October 16, 2009. 
Keynes, John Maynard. Cited in Catherine Caufield. Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and  
the Poverty of Nations. London: Macmillan, 1997. 
Kharem, Haroon. A Curriculum of Repression: A Pedagogy of Racial History in the United  
States. New York: Peter Lang, 2006. 
Kheel, Marti. Nature Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,  
2008. 
Kilbourne, William E., Suzanne C. Beckmann and Eva Thelen. “The Role of the Dominant  
Social Paradigm in Environmental Attitudes: A Multinational Examination,” Journal 
of Business Research 55/3 (2002): 193-204. 
Kimmel, Allan J. Psychological Foundations of Marketing. New York: Routledge, 2013. 
Kimmel, Michael. Manhood in America: A Cultural History. New York: Free Press, 1996. 
———. Misframing Men: The Politics of Contemporary Masculinities. New Brunswick:  
Rutgers University Press, 2010. 
King, Ynestra. “Toward an Ecological Feminism and a Feminist Ecology.” In Debating the  
Earth: The Environmental Politics Reader, 2d ed., edited by John S. Dryzek and 
David Schlosberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Kingpin, Muzi. Cited in Alexandre Capron. “‘Izikhothane’: South Africa’s Bizarre Money- 
Burning Trend,” France 24, September 9, 2013. Available at:  
http://observers.france24.com/content/20130909-burning-money-there%E2%80%99-
no-tomorrow-welcome-bizarre-world-%E2%80%9Cizikhothane%E2%80%9D. Date 
accessed: November 13, 2013. 
Kirsten, Johann, et al. “South Africa.” In Beyond Food Production: The Role of Agriculture in  
Poverty Reduction, edited by Fabrizio Bresciani and Alberto Valdés. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2007. 
Ki-Zerbo, Joseph. Cited in Aernout Zevenbergen. Spots of a Leopard: On Being a Man. Cape  
Town: Laughing Leopard, 2009. 
Klein, Naomi. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Henry Holt,  
2007. 
Krikler, Jeremy. The Rand Revolt: The 1922 Insurrection and Racial Killing in South Africa.  
237 
 
Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2005. 
Kunene, Obed. “Advertising.” In The Urban Bantu Market: Understanding Its Complexities  
and Developing Its Potential. Proceedings of a 2-day seminar held in February 1969, 
Durban, Natal. Durban: The National Development and Management Foundation of 
South Africa, 1969. 
Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon  
Press, 1992. 
Lagarde, Christine. “Statement by IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde at the  
Conclusion of Her Visit to South Africa,” International Monetary Fund, January 7, 
2012. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr1201.htm. Date 
accessed: October 6, 2014. 
Langman, Lauren. “Neon Cages: Shopping for Subjectivity.” In Lifestyle Shopping: The  
Subject of Consumption, edited by Rob Shields. London: Routledge, 1992. 
Langschmidt, Wally. “Some Characteristics of the Urban Bantu Market.” In The Urban Bantu  
Market: Understanding Its Complexities and Developing Its Potential. Proceedings of 
a 2-day seminar held in February 1969, Durban, Natal. Durban: The National 
Development and Management Foundation of South Africa, 1969. 
Large, Will. “Inverted Kantianism and Interiority: A Critical Comment on Milbank’s  
Theology.” In Explorations in Contemporary Continental Philosophy of Religion, 
edited by Deane-Peter Baker and Patrick Maxwell. New York: Rodopi, 2003. 
Leonard, Pauline. “Landscaping Privilege: Being British in South Africa.” In Geographies of  
Privilege, edited by France Winddance Twine and Bradley Gardener. New York: 
Routledge, 2013. 
Lester, Alan. Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth-Century South Africa and  
Britain. London: Routledge, 2005. 
———, Etienne Nel and Tony Binns. South Africa Past, Present and Future: Gold at the End  
of the Rainbow? Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000. 
Leysens, Anthony, and Lisa Thompson. “The Evolution of the Global Political Economy.” In  
Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa, 3d 
ed., edited by Patrick J. McGowan, Scarlett Cornelissen and Philip Nel. Lansdowne: 
UCT Press, 2007. 
Lindegger, Graham, and Justin Maxwell. “Teenage Masculinity: The Double Bind of  
Conformity to Hegemonic Standards.” In From Boys to Men: Social Constructions of 
Masculinity in Contemporary Society, edited by Tamara Shefer et al. Lansdowne: 
UCT Press, 2007. 
238 
 
Lindeman, Eduard. Learning Democracy: Eduard Lindeman on Adult Education and Social  
Change. Edited by Stephen Brookfield. Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1987. 
Lindsay, Lisa A. “Money, Marriage, and Masculinity on the Colonial Nigerian Railway.” In  
Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa, edited by Lisa A. Lindsay and Stephan F. 
Miescher. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2003. 
Lipton, Merle. Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1986. Cape Town: David  
Philip, 1989. 
Lodge, Tom. Sharpeville: A Massacre and Its Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 2011. 
Louw, P. Eric. The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid. Westport: Praeger, 2004. 
Loveland, Ian. By Due Process of Law? Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote in South  
Africa, 1855-1960. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999. 
Luger, Stan. Corporate Power, American Democracy, and the Automobile Industry. New  
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Lundahl, Mats, and Lena Mortiz. “Macroeconomic Stagnation and Structural Weaknesses in  
the South African Economy.” In Economic Crisis in Africa: Perspectives on Policy 
Responses, edited by Magnus Blomström and Mats Lundahl. London: Routledge, 
1993. 
———, Colin McCarthy and Lennart Petersson. In the Shadow of South Africa: Lesotho’s  
Economic Future. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. 
Luxemburg, Rosa. The Accumulation of Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press, [1913]  
1968. 
Mabin, Alan. “Dispossession, Exploitation and Struggle: An Historical Overview of South  
African Urbanization.” In The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization and Social 
Change in South Africa, edited by David M. Smith. London: Routledge, 2005. 
Maddock, Shane J. Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from  
World War II to the Present. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2010. 
Mafisa, Itumeleng. “Izikothane – Fashion Suicide,” The New Age Online, August 3, 2012.  
Available at: http://thenewage.co.za/58007-1007-53-Izikothane__fashion_suicide. 
Date accessed: November 13, 2013. 
Mager, Anne Kelk. Beer, Sociability, and Masculinity in South Africa. Bloomington: Indiana  
University Press, 2010. 
Maggs, T. M. O’C. Iron Age Communities of the Southern Highveld. Pietermaritzburg:  
Council of the Natal Museum, 1976. 
239 
 
Magone, José M. Contemporary European Politics: A Comparative Introduction. New York:  
Routledge, 2011. 
Magubane, Bernard M. The Making of a Racist State: British Imperialism and the Union of  
South Africa, 1875-1910. Trenton: Africa World Press, 1996. 
Magubane, Peter. Vanishing Cultures of South Africa: Changing Customs in a Changing  
World. London: Struik Publishers, 1998. 
Magubane, Zine. “Globalization and the South African Transformation: The Impact on Social  
Policy.” In Globalization and Social Policy in Africa, edited by Taid Akin Aina, 
Chachage Seithy L. Chachage and Elisabeth Annan-Yao. Dakar: Council for the 
Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2004. 
Makhulu, Anne-Maria. “The Question of Freedom: Post-Emancipation South Africa in a  
Neoliberal Age.” In Ethnographies of Neoliberalism, edited by Carol J. Greenhouse. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010. 
Makunga, Nwabisa. “Coega Refinery Bonanza,” The Herald, February 20, 2012. Available at:  
http://www.peherald.com/news/article/4883. Date accessed: October 9, 2012. 
Malan, F. S. “South Africa after the Union, 1910-1921.” In The Cambridge History of the  
British Empire, vol. 4, edited by Eric Anderson Walker. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1963. 
Mandela, Nelson R. Cited in Joshua S. Goldstein. War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the  
War System and Vice Versa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
———. Cited in Martin Meredith. Nelson Mandela: A Biography. London: Penguin, 1997. 
———. Cited in Patrick Bond, George Dor and Greg Ruiters. “Transformation in  
Infrastructure Policy from Apartheid to Democracy: Mandates for Change, 
Continuities in Ideology, Frictions in Delivery.” In Infrastructure Mandate for Change 
1994-1999, edited by Meshack Khosa. Pretoria: HSRC Press, 2000. 
———. Cited in Patrick Bond. “Global Financial Crisis: Why We Should Care, What We  
Should Do,” Indicator SA 15/3 (1998). 
Mansell, Wade, Belinda Meteyard and Alan Thomson. A Critical Introduction to Law, 2d ed.  
London: Cavendish Publishing, 1999. 
Marais, Hein. South Africa, Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transition. London:  
Zed Books, 2008. 
Marcus, Gill. “Statement of the Monetary Policy Committee,” South African Reserve Bank,  
January 29, 2014. Available at: 
https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/6075/M
PC%20Statement%20January%202014%20f.pdf. Date accessed: August 3, 2014. 
240 
 
Marcuse, Herbert. An Essay on Liberation. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973. 
Maregele, Barbara. “Teenage ‘Thief’ Necklaced,” Cape Times, November 19, 2012.  
Available at: http://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/teenage-thief-necklaced-
1.1425977#.VBk70vmSxqU. Date accessed: September 17, 2014.  
Marshall, Judith. “Building a United Front against Neoliberalism: South African  
Metalworkers Change Course,” Socialist Project, March 4, 2014. Available at: 
http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/944.php. Date accessed: August 5, 2014. 
Martin, Guy. African Political Thought. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
Martino, Wayne, and Maria Pallotta-Chiarolli. So What’s a Boy? Addressing Issues of  
Masculinity and Schooling. Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2003. 
Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 3 vols. Edited by Friedrich Engels.  
New York: Cosimo, [1867] 2007. 
———, and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. Peking: Foreign Languages Press,  
1968. 
Mashishi, Sekanyane Tys Daisy. “The Taxi Recapitilisation Programme: Some Perceptions of  
the Taxi Associations in Temba,” UJDigispace, October 2010. Available at: 
https://ujdigispace.uj.ac.za/handle/10210/3850. Date accessed: October 22, 2012. 
Masolo, Dismas A. “The Concept of the Person in Luo Modes of Thought.” In African  
Philosophy: New and Traditional Perspectives, edited by Lee M. Brown. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004. 
———. Self and Community in a Changing World. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,  
2010. 
May, Julian, and Nina Hunter. “Poverty, Inequality and the Social Wage.” In Democratising  
Development: The Politics of Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa, edited by Peris 
Jones and Kristian Stokke. Leiden: Brill, 2005. 
Mayekiso, Moses. “Socialists and the Trade Unions.” In Between Apartheid and Capitalism:  
Conversations with South African Socialists, edited by Alex Callinicos. London: 
Bookmarks, 1992. 
Maylie, Devon. “South African Platinum Miners Agree to End Strike,” The Wall Street  
Journal, June 23, 2014. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/articles/south-african-
miners-end-strike-1403538168. Date accessed: August 3, 2014. 
Mbanjwa, Khuleka. “Izikhotane a Ruinous Trait,” Pretoria News, August 13, 2012. Available  
at: http://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/opinion/izikhotane-a-ruinous-trait-
1.1361107#.UIOqlW9JP8w. Date accessed: October 21, 2012. 
———. “Why We Need a Dressing Down,” The Times, August 8, 2012. 
241 
 
Mbeki, Thabo. “Address to the Commonwealth Club, World Affairs Council and the US/SA  
Business Council Conference,” The Presidency Republic of South Africa, May 24, 
2000. Available at: http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=2637. Date 
accessed: October 19, 2012. 
———. Cited in Uma Shankar Jha. South Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement: Agenda for  
the Twenty-First Century. Delhi: Association of Indian Africanist, 2001. 
 ———. Cited in William Mervin Gumede. Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the  
ANC, rev. ed. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2007. 
———. “National General Council 2000: Keynote Address by President Thabo Mbeki – Port  
Elizabeth 12 July 2000,” African National Congress, 2011. Available at: 
www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2560. Date accessed: October 6, 2014. 
———. “Speech to the South African Communist Party Congress.” Johannesburg, July 2,  
1998. Cited in Patrick Bond. Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in 
South Africa. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005. 
———. “Statement at the XII Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Governments of the  
Non-Aligned Movement.” Durban, September 3, 1998. 
Mbembe, Achille. “Class, Race and the New Native,” Mail & Guardian, September 26, 2014.  
Available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2014-09-25-class-race-and-the-new-native/. Date 
accessed: September 30, 2014. 
McCarthy, Jeff. “Local and Regional Government: From Rigidity to Crisis to Flux.” In The  
Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South Africa, edited 
by David M. Smith. London: Routledge, 2005. 
McCracken, Grant. Culture and Consumption: New Approaches to the Symbolic Character of  
Consumer Goods and Activities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. 
McDonald, David A. World City Syndrome: Neoliberalism and Inequality in Cape Town.  
London: Routledge, 2009. 
McDonough, Terrence. “The Construction of Social Structures of Accumulation in US  
History.” In Social Structures of Accumulation: The Political Economy of Growth and 
Crisis, edited by David M. Kotz, Terrence McDonough and Michael Reich. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
McKendrick, Neil, John Brewer and J. H. Plumb. The Birth of a Consumer Society: The  
Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1982. 
McKittrick, Meredith. “Forsaking Their Fathers? Colonialism, Christianity, and the Coming  
242 
 
of Age in Ovamboland, Northern Namibia.” In Men and Masculinities in Modern 
Africa, edited by Lisa A. Lindsay and Stephan F. Miescher. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 
2003. 
McNamara, Robert. Cited in Wolfgang Sachs. Planet Dialectics: Explorations in  
Environment and Development. London: Zed Books, 1999. 
Mellor, Mary. Breaking the Boundaries: Towards a Feminist Green Socialism. London:  
Virago Press, 1992. 
———. “Eco-Feminism and Eco-Socialism: Dilemmas of Essentialism and Materialism,”  
Capitalism Nature Socialism 3/2 (1992): 43-62. 
———. “Ecofeminist Political Economy and the Politics of Money.” In Eco-Sufficiency and  
Global Justice: Women Write Political Ecology, edited by Ariel Salleh. London: Pluto 
Press, 2009. 
Mendieta, Eduardo. “Animal Is to Kantianism as Jew Is to Fascism: Adorno’s Bestiary.” In  
Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, edited by John Sanbonmatsu. Plymouth: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2011. 
Menkiti, Ifeanyi A. “Persons and Community in African Traditional Thought.” In African  
Philosophy: An Introduction, 3d ed., edited by Richard A. Wright. Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1984. 
———. “Physical and Metaphysical Understanding: Nature, Agency, and Causation in  
African Traditional Thought.” In African Philosophy: New and Traditional 
Perspectives, edited by Lee M. Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
Merchant, Carolyn. The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution. San  
Francisco: Harper, [1980] 1990. 
Merriam, Sharan B. Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation. San  
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2009. 
Metz, Thaddeus. “Toward an African Moral Theory,” The Journal of Political Philosophy  
15/3 (2007): 321-341. 
———. “Ubuntu as a Moral Theory: Reply to Four Critics,” South African Journal of  
Philosophy 26/4 (2007): 369-387.  
———, and Daniel A. Bell. “Confucianism and Ubuntu: Reflections on a Dialogue between  
Chinese and African Traditions,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38 (2011): 78-95. 
———, and Joseph B. R. Gaie. “The African Ethic of Ubuntu/Botho: Implications for  
Research on Morality,” Journal of Moral Education 39/3 (September 2010): 273-290. 
Mhlanga, Denise. “Foreigners Snap up Homes in Cape Town,” property24, April 3, 2012.  
243 
 
Available at: http://www.property24.com/articles/foreigners-snap-up-homes-in-cape-
town/15046. Date accessed: August 3, 2014. 
Mies, Maria. Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International  
Division of Labour. London: Zed Books, 1998. 
———, and Vandana Shiva. Ecofeminism. London: Zed Books, 1993. 
Miescher, Stephan F., and Lisa A. Lindsay. “Introduction: Men and Masculinities in Modern  
African History.” In Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa, edited by Lisa A. 
Lindsay and Stephan F. Miescher. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2003. 
Miles, Steven. Consumerism – As a Way of Life. London: Sage, 1998. 
Miller-Loessie, Karen, and John N. Parker. “Cross-Cultural Social Psychology.” In Handbook  
of Social Psychology, edited by John Delamater. New York: Springer, 2006. 
Minahan, James. Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups around  
the World, vol. 1 A-C. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002. 
Mitchley, Alex. “Mining Strike Could Hurt Us All Soon – Economist,” The Citizen, May 27,  
2014. Available at: http://citizen.co.za/185452/mining-strike-hurt-us-soon-economist/. 
Date accessed: August 3, 2014. 
Mkentane, Luyolo. “Cosatu Members, Teachers Protest in Bhisho,” The Herald, March 7,  
2012. 
Modisakeng, Keletso. “Celebrity Summer Hairstyles,” Bona, October 29, 2013. Available at:  
http://www.bona.co.za/index.php?p[IGcms_nodes][IGcms_nodesUID]%20=12889b70
ce06a8865092e65cb61750a7. Date accessed: November 13, 2013. 
———. “Shapely Legs,” Bona, October 8, 2013. Available at:  
http://www.bona.co.za/index.php?p[IGcms_nodes][IGcms_nodesUID]%20=e0bf3a3b
e01d46bc81fc8aac1484439a. Date accessed: November 13, 2013. 
Moe, Espen. Governance, Growth and Global Leadership: The Role of the State in  
Technological Progress, 1750-2000. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007.  
Montiel, Peter J. International Macroeconomics. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 
Moodie, T. Dunbar (with Vivienne Ndatshe). Going for Gold: Men, Mines, and Migration.  
Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2001. 
Moodley, Kogila. “South African Post-Apartheid Realities and Citizenship Education.” In  
Globalization, the Nation-State and the Citizen: Dilemmas and Directions for Civics 
and Citizenship Education, edited by Alan Reid, Judith Gill and Alan Sears. New 
York: Routledge, 2010. 
Morrell, Robert, John Wright and Sheila Meintjes. “Colonialism and the Establishment of  
244 
 
White Domination, 1840-1890.” In Political Economy and Identities in KwaZulu-
Natal: Historical and Social Perspectives, edited by Robert Morrell. Durban: Indicator 
Press, 1996. 
Morrione, Thomas J. Editor’s Introduction to Herbert Blumer. George Herbert Mead and  
Human Conduct, edited by Thomas J. Morrione. Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2004. 
Morris, Robin. Marketing to Black Townships: Practical Guidelines. Cape Town: Juta, 1992. 
Morton, Stephen. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. New York: Routledge, 2008. 
Mosse, George L. The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 1996. 
Mudimbe, Valentin-Yves. The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of  
Knowledge. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. 
Mulvey, Laura. Visual and Other Pleasures. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. 
Mwakikagile, Godfrey. South Africa and Its People. Pretoria: New Africa Press, 2008. 
Nakano Glenn, Evelyn. “Yearning for Lightness: Transnational Circuits in the Marketing and  
Consumption of Skin Lighteners.” In The Kaleidoscope of Gender: Prisms, Patterns, 
and Possibilities, 3d ed., edited by Joan Z. Spade and Catherine G. Valentine. 
Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 2011. 
Nandy, Ashis. The Intimate Enemy. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983. 
Nataraajan, Rajan, and Brent G. Goff. “Compulsive Buying: Toward a Reconceptualization,”  
Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 6/6 (1991): 307-328. 
Nathan, Laurie. “Troops in the Townships, 1984-1987.” In War and Society: The  
Militarisation of South Africa, edited by Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan. Cape 
Town: David Philip, 1989. 
Ndaba, Nhlalo. “Cheaters Never Prosper,” Drum, August 14, 2014. 
Ndima, Bobo Vusumuzi. Cited in Refiloe Lepere. “Meet ‘Bob’ the Stylist – Q&A,” Drum,  
November 11, 2013. Available at: http://drum.co.za/celebs/meet-bob-the-stylist-qa/. 
Date accessed: November 13, 2013. 
Ndiokwere, Nathaniel I. Search for Greener Pastures: Igbo and African Experience. Kearney:  
Morris Publishing, 1998. 
Ndlangisa, Amanda. “Success is in the Eye of the Beer Holder!,” Bona, August 2014. 
———. “The Women Behind SA’s Famous Men,” Bona, August 2014. 
Ndungane, Njongonkulu. A World with a Human Face: A Voice from Africa. Cape Town:  
David Philip, 2003. 
———. Cited in Patrick Bond. Against Global Apartheid: South Africa Meets the World  
Bank, IMF and International Finance, 2d ed. London: Zed Books, 2003. 
245 
 
Nederveen Pieterse, Jan. Globalization or Empire? New York: Routledge, 2004. 
Nel, P. A. Preface to Alice P. van der Reis. The Activities and Interests of Urban Black Men  
and Women. Pretoria: Bureau of Market Research/University of South Africa, 1974. 
Nelson, Julie A. “How Did ‘the Moral’ Get Split from ‘the Economic’?” In Toward a  
Feminist Philosophy of Economics, edited by Drucilla K. Barker and Edith Kuiper. 
London: Routledge, 2003. 
Neumark, S. Daniel. The South African Frontier: Economic Influences, 1652-1836. Stanford:  
Stanford University Press, 1957. 
Newton, Huey P. “The Black Panthers,” Ebony 24/10 (August 1969). 
Nicolson, Greg. “Labour Law Amendments Provoke Unions’ Ire,” Daily Maverick, April 5,  
2012. Available at: http://dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-04-05-labour-law-
amendments-provoke-unions-ire. Date accessed: October 22, 2012. 
Niehaus, Isak. “Masculine Domination in Sexual Violence: Interpreting Accounts of Three  
Cases of Rape in the South African Lowveld.” In Men Behaving Differently: South 
African Men Since 1994, edited by Graeme Reid and Liz Walker. Cape Town: Double 
Storey, 2005. 
Nixon, Sean. “Have You Got the Look? Masculinities and Shopping Spectacle.” In Lifestyle  
Shopping: The Subject of Consumption, edited by Rob Shields. London: Routledge, 
1992. 
Nkrumah, Kwame. Author’s Note to Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for  
Decolonization, 2d rev. ed. London: Heinemann, 1970. 
Non-Aligned Movement. “The Non-Aligned Movement: Description and History,” The Non- 
Aligned Movement (NAM), September 21, 2001. Available at: 
http://www.nam.gov.za/background/history.htm. Date accessed: October 6, 2014. 
Northern KwaZulu-Natal Courier. “Alleged Rapist Beaten to Death by Angry Mob,”  
northernnatalcourier.co.za, August 25, 2014. Available at: 
http://northernnatalcourier.co.za/17569/alleged-rapist-beaten-angry-mob/. Date 
accessed: September 17, 2014. 
Norval, Aletta J. Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse. London: Verso, 1996. 
Odell, John S. “Growing Trade and Growing Conflict between Latin America and the United  
States.” In The United States and Latin America in the 1980s, edited by Kevin J. 
Middlebrook and Carlos Rico. Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988. 
Olivier, Bert. Intersecting Philosophical Planes: Philosophical Essays. Bern: Peter Lang,  
2012. 
Oluwole, Sophie B. “The Africanness of a Philosophy.” In Postkoloniales Philosophieren:  
246 
 
Afrika, edited by Herta Nagl-Docekal and Franz M. Wimmer. Munich: R. Oldenbourg 
Verlag, 1992. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Environmental Impacts  
of Foreign Direct Investment in the Mining Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa. Paris: 
OECD Publishing, 2002. 
———. OECD Economic Surveys: South Africa 2010. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010. 
Oruka, Henry Odera. Introduction to Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern  
Debate on African Philosophy, edited by Henry Odera Oruka. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1990. 
———. “Philosophic Sagacity in African Philosophy.” In Sage Philosophy: Indigenous  
Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy, edited by Henry Odera Oruka. 
Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990. 
———. Practical Philosophy: In Search of an Ethical Minimum. Nairobi: East African  
Educational Publishers, 1997. 
Osgerby, Bill. Playboys in Paradise: Masculinity, Youth and Leisure-Style in Modern  
America. Oxford: Berg, 2001. 
Pakenham, Thomas. The Boer War. London: Abacus, 2006. 
———. The Scramble for Africa: 1876-1912. London: Abacus, 2005. 
Parnell, Susan. “State Intervention in Housing Provision in the 1980s.” In The Apartheid City  
and Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South Africa, edited by David M. 
Smith. London: Routledge, 2005. 
Patterson, James T. Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 1997. 
Pattman, Rob. “Researching and Working with Boys and Young Men in Southern Africa in  
the Context of HIV/Aids: A Radical Approach.” In From Boys to Men: Social 
Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary Society, edited by Tamara Shefer et al. 
Lansdowne: UCT Press, 2007. 
Peet, Richard. Geography of Power: The Making of Global Economic Policy. London: Zed  
Books, 2007. 
———. The Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO. London: Zed Books, 2003. 
Peires, Jeffrey B. The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing  
Movement of 1856-7. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. 
———. The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of Their  
Independence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982. 
Pendergast, Tom. Creating the Modern Man: American Magazines and Consumer Culture  
247 
 
1900-1950. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000. 
Phakamani. “Leonardo DiCaprio Celebrates Birthday with Kanye West,” Drum, November  
12, 2013. Available at: http://drum.co.za/celebs/leonardo-dicaprio-celebrates-birthday-
with-kanye-west/. Date accessed: November 13, 2013. 
Pietilä, Hilkka. “Alternative Development with Women in the North.” Paper given to Third  
International Interdisciplinary Congress of Women, Dublin, July 6-10. Also published 
in Alternativen Akademilitteratur, edited by Johan Galtung and Mars Friberg. 
Stockholm, 1986. 
Pillay, Devan, and Karl von Holdt. “Strategy and Tactics.” In Between Apartheid and  
Capitalism: Conversations with South African Socialists, edited by Alex Callinicos. 
London: Bookmarks, 1992. 
Pillay, Verashni. “Full Marx at Numsa’s Political School,” Mail & Guardian, February 7,  
2014. Available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-06-full-marx-at-the-numsa-school. 
Date accessed: August 5, 2014. 
Pirie, G. H. “Travelling Under Apartheid.” In The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization  
and Social Change in South Africa, edited by David M. Smith. London: Routledge, 
2005. 
Pirro, Robert C. The Politics of Tragedy and Democratic Citizenship. New York: Continuum,  
2011. 
Pithouse, Richard. “On Abahlali baseMjondolo Voting for the DA in Durban,” The South  
African Civil Society Information Service, May 9, 2014. Available at: 
http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/1999. Date accessed: August 5, 2014. 
Pope, Hugh. “South Africa Scraps Finrand,” The Guardian, March 11, 1995. Available at:  
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/south-africa-scraps-finrand-
1610946.html. Date accessed: October 7, 2012. 
Pope, Rob. The English Studies Book: An Introduction to Language, Literature and Culture,  
2d ed. London: Routledge, 2005. 
Porritt, Jonathon. Capitalism As If the World Matters. London: Earthscan, 2007. 
Posel, Deborah. “‘Baby Rape’: Unmaking Secrets of Sexual Violence in Post-Apartheid  
South Africa.” In Men Behaving Differently: South African Men Since 1994, edited by 
Graeme Reid and Liz Walker. Cape Town: Double Storey, 2005. 
Prakash, Gyan. “Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from  
Indian Historiography.” In Postcolonial Identities in Africa, edited by Richard 
Werbner and Terence Ranger. London: Zed Books, 1996. 
Prempeh, E. Osei Kwadwo. Against Global Capitalism: African Social Movements Confront  
248 
 
Neoliberal Globalization. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006. 
Princen, Thomas. The Logic of Sufficiency. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005. 
Prinsloo, Loni, and Jana Marais. “‘Huge’ Blow to SA Investment,” Sunday Times, August 19,  
2012. 
Provost, Claire, and Erick Kabendera. “Tanzania: ‘Large-Scale Farming Turns Small Farmers  
into Mere Labourers,’” The Guardian, February 18, 2014. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/feb/18/tanzania-large-scale-
farming-small-farmers-labourers. Date accessed: June 4, 2014. 
Public Protector South Africa. “Public Protector Rescues a Young Man’s Future While Home  
Affairs Moves to Get Its House in Order,” The Public Protector: The Official 
Newsletter of Public Protector South Africa II (2010): 5. Available at: 
http://www.pprotect.org/news/9981_public%20protector_final%20newsletter%20rf%
20.pdf. Date accessed: October 6, 2012. 
Pycroft, Christopher, and Barry Munslow. “Black Mine Workers in South Africa: Strategies  
of Co-option and Resistance.” In Third World Workers: Comparative International 
Labour Studies, edited by Peter C. W. Gutkind. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988. 
Quail, Christine, Kathalene A. Razzano and Loubna H. Skalli. “Buying and Selling Culture:  
Talk Show Content, Audience, and Labor as Commodities.” In Media Literacy: A 
Reader, edited by Donaldo Macedo and Shirley R. Steinberg. New York: Peter Lang, 
2007. 
Radner, Hilary. Shopping Around: Feminine Culture and the Pursuit of Pleasure. New York:  
Routledge, 1995. 
Ramose, Mogobe B. African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books, 1999. 
———. “But Hans Kelsen Was Not Born in Africa: A Reply to Thaddeus Metz,” South  
African Journal of Philosophy 26/4 (2007): 347-355. 
———. “The Death of Democracy and the Resurrection of Timocracy,” Journal of Moral  
Education 39/3 (2010): 291-303. 
———. “I Doubt, Therefore African Philosophy Exists,” South African Journal of  
Philosophy 22/2 (2003): 113-127. 
———. “Logos and Justice in Africa’s International Relations,” Dialogue and Universalism  
1-2 (2002): 27-38. 
———. ‘Reply to Bewaji and Van Binsbergen.’ In John A. I. Bewaji and Mogobe B.  
Ramose, “The Bewaji, Van Binsbergen and Ramose Debate on Ubuntu,” South 
African Journal of Philosophy 22/4 (2003): 378-415. 
Rao, Vijayendra, and Michael Woolcock. “Mixing Qualitative and Econometric Methods:  
249 
 
Community-Level Applications.” In Measuring Empowerment: Cross-Disciplinary 
Perspectives, edited by Deepa Narayan. Washington: The World Bank, 2005. 
Reader, John. Africa: A Biography of the Continent. London: Penguin, 1998. 
Representatives of the Republic of South Moluccas, “UNPO Member Reports.” In  
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization: Yearbook 1997. The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1998. 
Rich, Bruce. Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment and the  
Crisis of Development. London: Earthscan, 1994. 
———. “The World Bank under James Wolfensohn.” In Reinventing the World Bank, edited  
by Jonathan R. Pincus and Jeffrey A. Winters. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. 
Robinson, William I. “Global Capitalism and Its Anti-‘Human Face’: Organic Intellectuals  
and Interpretations of the Crisis,” Globalizations 10/5 (2013): 659-671. 
Rogerson, C. M. “The Absorptive Capacity of the Informal Sector in the South African City.”  
In The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South Africa, 
edited by David M. Smith. London: Routledge, 2005. 
Rose, Kenneth D. Myth and the Greatest Generation: A Social History of Americans in World  
War II. New York: Routledge, 2008. 
Rossides, Daniel W. American Society: An Introduction to Macrosociology. Dix Hills:  
General Hall, 1993. 
Rotberg, Robert I. Suffer the Future: Policy Choices in Southern Africa. Cambridge: Harvard  
University Press, 1980. 
Rupert, Mark, and M. Scott Solomon. Globalization and International Political Economy:  
The Politics of Alternative Futures. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. 
Russell, Diana E. H. “US Pornography Invades South Africa: A Content Analysis of Playboy  
and Penthouse.” In Radically Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed, edited by Diane Bell 
and Renate Klein. North Melbourne: Spinifex Press, 1997. 
Saba, Athandiwe, et al. “Never Forget,” City Press, September 9, 2012.  
SABC. “Hard-Pressed Consumers Face Massive Price Increases in July,” SABC, June 30,  
2014. Available at: 
http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/bed45b80448ec9ab87d5ff3bfe17c0b1/Hard-pressed-
consumers-face-massive-price-increases-in-July-20143006. Date accessed: August 3, 
2014. 
———. “Taxi Violence,” SABC Truth Commission Special Report, 2014. Available at:  
http://sabctrc.saha.org.za/glossary/taxi_violence.htm?tab=victims. Date accessed: 
August 3, 2014. 
250 
 
Sachs, Wolfgang. Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development. London:  
Zed Books, 1999. 
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1979. 
Salleh, Ariel. “Climate Strategy: Making the Choice between Ecological Modernisation or  
Living Well,” Journal of Australian Political Economy 66 (2011): 124-149. 
———. “Contribution to the Critique of Political Epistemology,” Thesis Eleven 8 (1984): 23- 
43. 
———. “Deeper than Deep Ecology: The Eco-Feminist Connection,” Environmental Ethics 6  
(Winter 1984): 339-345. 
———. Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx and the Postmodern. London: Zed Books,  
1997. 
———. “Ecological Debt: Embodied Debt.” In Eco-Sufficiency and Global Justice: Women  
Write Political Ecology, edited by Ariel Salleh. London: Pluto Press, 2009. 
———. “Eco-Socialism, Eco-Feminism,” Capitalism Nature Socialism 2/1 (1991): 129-134. 
———.“Embodied Materialism in Action: An Interview with Ariel Salleh,” Polygraph 22  
(2010): 183-199. 
———. “From Eco-Sufficiency to Global Justice.” In Eco-Sufficiency and Global Justice:  
Women Write Political Ecology, edited by Ariel Salleh. London: Pluto Press, 2009. 
———. “Global Alternatives and the Meta-Industrial Class.” In New Socialisms: Futures  
Beyond Globalization, edited by Robert Albritton, Shannon Bell, John R. Bell and 
Richard Westra. London: Routledge, 2004. 
———. “Moving to an Embodied Materialism,” Capitalism Nature Socialism 16/2 (June  
2005): 9-14. 
———.“Nature, Woman, Labor, Capital: Living the Deepest Contradiction,” Capitalism  
Nature Socialism 6/1 (1995): 21-39. 
———. “On Production and Reproduction, Identity and Nonidentity in Ecofeminist Theory,”  
Organization & Environment 12/2 (June 1999): 207-218. 
———. “Rio+20 and the Green Economy: Technocrats, Meta-industrials, WSF and Occupy,”  
Rio20.net, April 18, 2012. Available at: http://rio20.net/en/documentos/rio20-and-the-
green-economy-technocrats-meta-industrials-wsf-and-occupy/. Date accessed: 
September 8, 2014. 
Sandywell, Barry. Dictionary of Visual Discourse: A Dialectical Lexicon of Terms.  
Burlington: Ashgate, 2011. 
SAPA. “Land Reform Too Slow, Says Zuma,” News24, February 10, 2012. Available at:  
251 
 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Land-reform-too-slow-says-Zuma-
20120209. Date accessed: October 22, 2012. 
———. “Taxi was Carrying 55 Children – Police,” IOL News, September 13, 2011. Available  
at: http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/taxi-was-carrying-55-children-police-
1.1136909#.UIUx-G9JP8w. Date accessed: October 22, 2012. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. “Black Orpheus.” In Race, edited by Robert Bernasconi. Malden:  
Blackwell, 2001. 
Saul, John S. Recolonization and Resistance in Southern Africa in the 1990s. Trenton: Africa  
World Press, 1993. 
Schaller, Dominik J. “Genocide and Mass Violence in the ‘Heart of Darkness’: Africa in the  
Colonial Period.” In The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, edited by Donald 
Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Schanbacher, William D. The Politics of Food: The Global Conflict between Food Security  
and Food Sovereignty. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010. 
Schmaltz, Tad M. “Descartes and Cartesianism.” In The Oxford Companion to Christian  
Thought: Intellectual, Spiritual, and Moral Horizons of Christianity, edited by Adrian 
Hastings, Alistair Mason and Hugh Pyper. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Schmitz, David F. The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Schreiner, Mark, et al. “Racial Discrimination in Hire/Purchase Lending in Apartheid South  
Africa,” March 17, 1997. Paper submitted for presentation at the AAEA Annual 
Meeting, July 27-30, 1997, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, AgEcon Search. Available at: 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/21026/1/spschr01.pdf. Date accessed: October 
9, 2013. 
Schumer, Charles. Cited in Catherine Caufield. Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the  
Poverty of Nations. London: Macmillan, 1997. 
Schwella, Erwin. “Privatization in South Africa.” In International Handbook on Privatization,  
edited by David Parker and David Saal. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003. 
Scott, James M., and Jerel A. Rosati. “‘Such Other Functions and Duties:’ Covert Action and  
American Intelligence Policy.” In Strategic Intelligence: Covert Action, Behind the 
Veils of Secret Foreign Policy, vol. 3, edited by Loch K. Johnson. Westport: Praeger, 
2007. 
Scudder, Thayer. Cited in Catherine Caufield. Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the  
Poverty of Nations. London: Macmillan, 1997. 
Seekings, Jeremy. “The ‘Lost Generation’: South Africa’s ‘Youth Problem’ in the Early  
252 
 
1990s,” Transformation 29 (1996): 103-125. 
Seidman, Gay. “Armed Struggle in the South African Anti-Apartheid Movement.” In The  
Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts, 2d ed., edited by Jeff Goodwin and 
James M. Jasper. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 
Senghor, Léopold. Cited in Frantz Fanon. Black Skin, White Masks. Translated by Richard  
Philcox. New York: Grove Press, 2008. 
———. “The Revolution of 1889 and Leo Frobenius.” In Africa and the West: The Legacies  
of Empire, edited by Isaac J. Mowoe and Richard Bjornson. New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1986. 
Serequeberhan, Tsenay. The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy. London: Routledge, 1994. 
Shefer, Tamara, et al. “From Boys to Men: An Overview.” In From Boys to Men: Social  
Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary Society, edited by Tamara Shefer et al. 
Lansdowne: UCT Press, 2007. 
Sherwood, Marika. Origins of Pan-Africanism: Henry Sylvester Williams, Africa, and the  
African Diaspora. New York: Routledge, 2011. 
Shi, David E. The Simple Life: Plain Living and High Thinking in American Culture. Athens:  
The University of Georgia Press, 2007. 
Shields, Rob. “The Individual, Consumption Cultures and the Fate of Community.” In  
Lifestyle Shopping: The Subject of Consumption, edited by Rob Shields. London: 
Routledge, 1992. 
Shilowa, Sam. Business Day, April 7, 1998. 
Shiva, Vandana. Monocultures of the Mind: Perspectives on Biodiversity and Biotechnology.  
New York: Zed Books, 1997. 
———. Protect or Plunder? Understanding Intellectual Property Rights. London: Zed  
Books, 2001. 
———. Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development. London: Zed Books, 2002. 
Shore, Megan. Religion and Conflict Resolution: Christianity and South Africa’s Truth and  
Reconciliation Commission. Burlington: Ashgate, 2009. 
Sideris, Tina. “‘You Have to Change and You Don’t Know How!’: Contesting What It Means  
to Be a Man in a Rural Area of South Africa.”  In Men Behaving Differently: South 
African Men Since 1994, edited by Graeme Reid and Liz Walker. Cape Town: Double 
Storey, 2005. 
Simmel, Georg. “The Philosophy of Fashion” [1905] (1997), translated by Mark Ritter and  
David Frisby. In Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings, edited by David Frisby and 
Mike Featherstone. London: Sage, 2000. 
253 
 
Sizwe, No. One Azania, One Nation: The National Question in South Africa. London: Zed  
Press, 1979. 
Sklair, Leslie. Globalization: Capitalism and Its Alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 2002. 
Slater, Don. Consumer Culture and Modernity. Cambridge: Polity, 2003. 
———. “Consumer Culture and the Politics of Need.” In Buy This Book: Studies in  
Advertising and Consumption, edited by Mica Nava, Andrew Blake, Iain MacRury 
and Barry Richards. London: Routledge, 1997. 
Smallhorne, Mandi. “Offenders Must Be Punished,” Mail & Guardian, October 7, 2011. 
Smart, Barry. Consumer Society: Critical Issues and Environmental Consequences. London:  
Sage, 2010. 
Smit, Pieter Cornelis, et al. Economics: A Southern African Perspective. Lansdowne: Juta,  
2007. 
Smith, David. “Jacob Zuma’s Palatial Folly Sparks Anger and Resentment amid Poverty,”  
The Guardian, May 3, 2014. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/03/jacob-zuma-pleasure-dome-south-
africa-elections. Date accessed: August 5, 2014. 
Smith, David M. Introduction to The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization and Social  
Change in South Africa, edited by David M. Smith. London: Routledge, 2005. 
Smith, Harry. Cited in William D. Boyce. Notes on South-African Affairs. London: J. Mason,  
1839. 
Soni, Dhiru V. “The Apartheid State and Black Housing Struggles.” In The Apartheid City  
and Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South Africa, edited by David M. 
Smith. London: Routledge, 2005. 
Sonnenfeld, David A. “Global Electronics.” In Challenging the Chip: Labor Rights and  
Environmental Justice in the Global Electronics Industry, edited by Ted Smith, David 
A. Sonnenfeld and David Naguib Pellow. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
2006.  
Southall, Roger. Imperialism or Solidarity? International Labour and South African Trade  
Unions. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1995. 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). “Chapter 3: Investment Incentives,”  
Southern African Development Community, 2012. Available at: 
http://www.sadc.int/english/regional-integration/tifi/tax/chapter-3/south-africa/. Date 
accessed: October 7, 2012. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. New York:  
254 
 
Methuen, 1987. 
Stallings, Barbara. “International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and  
Structural Reform.” In The Politics of Economic Adjustment, edited by Stephan 
Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
Standing, Guy, John Sender and John Weeks. Restructuring the Labour Market: The South  
African Challenge. Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2000. 
Statistics South Africa. “Media Release: Mid-Year Population Estimates,” Statistics South  
Africa, 2014. Available at: http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/?p=2990. Date accessed: 
October 8, 2014. 
———. “Work & Labour Force,” Statistics South Africa, March 18, 2014. Available at:  
http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=737&id=1. Date accessed: August 3, 2014. 
Stein, Howard. Beyond the World Bank Agenda: An Institutional Approach to Development.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. 
Steinem, Gloria. Cited in Steven Watts. Mr. Playboy: Hugh Hefner and the American Dream.  
Hoboken: Wiley, 2008. 
Stevens, Robin, and Eric Akrofi. “South Africa: Indigenous Roots, Cultural Imposition and an  
Uncertain Future.” In The Origins and Foundations of Music Education: Cross-
Cultural Historical Studies of Music in Compulsory Schooling, edited by Gordon Cox 
and Robin Stevens. London: Continuum, 2010. 
Steyn, Lisa. “Doubts over Economic Zones Bill,” Mail & Guardian, January 20, 2012.  
Available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2012-01-20-doubts-over-economic-zones-bill/. 
Date accessed: October 10, 2012. 
Strauss, Susan, and Parastou Feiz. Discourse Analysis: A Multi-Perspective and Multi- 
Lingual Approach. New York: Routledge, 2014. 
Strobel, Christoph. The Testing Grounds of Modern Empire: The Making of Colonial Racial  
Order in the American Ohio Country and the South African Eastern Cape, 1770s to 
1850s. New York: Peter Lang, 2008. 
Sullivan, Marianne. Tainted Earth: Smelters, Public Health, and the Environment. New  
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2014. 
Sunter, Clem. Cited in Patrick Bond. Commanding Heights & Community Control: New  
Economics for a New South Africa. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1991. 
Susser, Ida. Aids, Sex, and Culture: Global Politics and Survival in Southern Africa. Malden:  
Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 
Suttner, Raymond. “Masculinities in the ANC-Led Liberation Movement.” In From Boys to  
255 
 
Men: Social Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary Society, edited by Tamara 
Shefer et al. Lansdowne: UCT Press, 2007. 
Swilling, Mark. “The Dynamics of Reform.” In Between Apartheid and Capitalism:  
Conversations with South African Socialists, edited by Alex Callinicos. London: 
Bookmarks, 1992. 
Syrotinski, Michael. Singular Performances: Reinscribing the Subject in Francophone  
African Writing. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002. 
Taylor, Ian. Stuck in the Middle GEAR: South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations.  
Westport: Praeger, 2001. 
Teffo, Lebisa J., and Abraham P. J. Roux. “Metaphysical Thinking in Africa.” In The African  
Philosophy Reader: A Text with Readings, 2d ed., edited by P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. 
Roux. London: Routledge, 2005. 
Tempels, Placide. Bantu Philosophy. Translated by Colin King. Paris: Présence Africaine,  
1959. 
Tevera, Daniel, and Admos Chimhowu. “Situating the Maputo Corridor: A Regional  
Perspective.” In Regionalism and Uneven Development in Southern Africa: The Case 
of the Maputo Development Corridor, edited by Fredrik Soderbaum and Ian Taylor. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. 
Thaver, Beverly. “Affirmative Action in South Africa: The Limits of History.” In Race and  
Inequality: World Perspectives on Affirmative Action, edited by Elaine Kennedy-
Dubourdieu. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006. 
Thompson, William R. “Global War and the Foundations of US Systemic Leadership.” In  
America, War and Power: Defining the State, 1775-2005, edited by Lawrence 
Sondhaus and A. James Fuller. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
Tiley, Alan. “Problems of Retailing to the Bantu Market: Part 2, Central Business Areas.” In  
The Urban Bantu Market: Understanding Its Complexities and Developing Its 
Potential. Proceedings of a 2-day seminar held in February 1969, Durban, Natal. 
Durban: The National Development and Management Foundation of South Africa, 
1969. 
Time 43 (1944): 88. Cited in Kenneth D. Rose. Myth and the Greatest Generation: A Social  
History of Americans in World War II. New York: Routledge, 2008. 
Tlhabi, Redi. “Verwoerd’s Work Goes On, Only Now It’s the ANC Crushing Black  
Children,” Sunday Times, July 29, 2012. 
Truman, Harry S. Cited in Catherine Caufield. Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the  
Poverty of Nations. London: Macmillan, 1997. 
256 
 
Tuttle, Kate. “Antiapartheid Movement.” In Encyclopedia of Africa, edited by Kwame A.  
Appiah and Henry L. Gates, Jr. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Ul Haq, Mahbub. Cited in Catherine Caufield. Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the  
Poverty of Nations. London: Macmillan, 1997. 
United Mine Workers of America. Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Constitutional Convention  
of the United Mine Workers of America (1940).  
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT). State of the World’s Cities  
2010/2011: Bridging the Urban Divide. London: Earthscan, 2010. 
US Treasury Department, Assessment of US Participation in the Multilateral Development  
Banks in the 1980s, 1982. Cited in Walden Bello. Deglobalization: Ideas for a New 
World Economy. London: Zed Books, 2004. 
Valls, Andrew. “‘A Lousy Empirical Scientist’: Reconsidering Hume’s Racism.” In Race and  
Racism in Modern Philosophy, edited by Andrew Valls. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2005. 
Van der Merwe, Willem L. “African Philosophy and Multiculturalism,” South African  
Journal of Philosophy 16/3 (1997): 73-78. 
Van der Reis, Alice P. The Activities and Interests of Urban Black Men and Women. Pretoria:  
Bureau of Market Research/University of South Africa, 1974. 
———, and Luke T. Mabaso. Aspirations, Values and Marketing Issues among Black Youth  
in Gauteng, 1995. Pretoria: Bureau of Market Research/University of South Africa, 
1995. 
Veblen, Thorstein. Theory of the Leisure Class. Bremen: Dogma, [1899] 2013. 
Viljoen, Stella. “The Aspirational Aesthetics of ‘Gentlemen’s Pornography.’” In Sex, Gender,  
Becoming: Post-Apartheid Reflections, edited by Karin van Marle. Pretoria: Pretoria 
University Law Press, 2006. 
Villa-Vicencio, Charles. “Mission Christianity.” In Living Faiths in South Africa, edited by  
Martin Prozesky and John de Gruchy. London: C. Hurst & Co., 1995. 
Von Benda-Beckmann, Franz. “Sago Law and Food Security.” In Franz von Benda- 
Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann. Social Security between Past and 
Future: Ambonese Networks of Care and Support. Münster: Lit Verlag, 2007. 
Von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet. “Law, Violence, and Peacemaking.” In Franz von Benda- 
Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann. Social Security between Past and 
Future: Ambonese Networks of Care and Support. Münster: Lit Verlag, 2007. 
Waetjen, Thembisa. Workers and Warriors: Masculinity and the Struggle for Nation in South  
Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006. 
257 
 
Walker, Cherryl. Women and Resistance in South Africa. Cape Town: David Philip, 1991. 
Walker, Liz. “Negotiating the Boundaries of Masculinity in Post-Apartheid South Africa.” In  
Men Behaving Differently: South African Men Since 1994, edited by Graeme Reid and 
Liz Walker. Cape Town: Double Storey, 2005. 
Walker, Susannah. “Black Dollar Power: Assessing African American Consumerism Since  
1945.” In African American Urban History Since World War II, edited by Kenneth L. 
Kusmer and Joe W. Trotter. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
Walsh, Kevin. The Representation of the Past: Museums and Heritage in the Post-Modern  
World. London: Routledge, 2002. 
Walton, James. African Village. Pretoria: J. L. Van Schaik, 1956. 
Wamba-dia-Wamba, Ernest. “Africa in Search of a New Mode of Politics.” In African  
Perspectives on Development, edited by Ulf Himmelstrand, Kabiru Kinyanjui and 
Edward Mburugu. London: James Currey, 1994. 
Ward, Kerry. Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Waring, Marilyn. Counting for Nothing: What Men Value and What Women Are Worth, 2d  
ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. 
———. “Policy and the Measure of Woman: Revisiting UNSNA, ISEW, HDI, and GPI.” In  
Eco-Sufficiency and Global Justice: Women Write Political Ecology, edited by Ariel 
Salleh. London: Pluto Press, 2009. 
Wasserman, Herman. Tabloid Journalism in South Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University  
Press, 2010. 
Waters, Malcolm. Globalization, 2d ed. London: Routledge, 2002. 
Watson, R. L. Slave Emancipation and Racial Attitudes in Nineteenth-Century South Africa.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
Weeks, John. “The BRICS Bank,” openDemocracy, July 15, 2014. Available at:  
https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/john-weeks/brics-bank. Date accessed: 
August 5, 2014. 
Wembe, Cedrain. Cited in Alexandre Capron. “‘Izikhothane’: South Africa’s Bizarre Money- 
Burning Trend,” France 24, September 9, 2013. Available at: 
http://observers.france24.com/content/20130909-burning-money-there%E2%80%99-
no-tomorrow-welcome-bizarre-world-%E2%80%9Cizikhothane%E2%80%9D. Date 
accessed: November 13, 2013. 
Wenzel, Jennifer. “Literacy and Futurity: Millennial Dreaming on the Nineteenth-Century  
258 
 
Southern African Frontier.” In Utopia/Dystopia: Conditions of Historical Possibility, 
edited by Michael D. Gordin, Helen Tilley and Gyan Prakash. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010. 
White, Leslie William, and W. D. Hussey. Government in Great Britain, the Empire, and the  
Commonwealth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961. 
Williams, Rosalind H. Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late Nineteenth-Century  
France. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.  
Williamson, John, 1990. Cited in Narcis Serra, Shari Spiegel and Joseph E. Stiglitz.  
“Introduction: From the Washington Consensus towards a New Global Governance.” 
In The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance, 
edited by Narcis Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008. 
———. “A Short History of the Washington Consensus.” In The Washington Consensus  
Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance, edited by Narcis Serra and Joseph 
E. Stiglitz. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
———. “The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development.” In  
Development Challenges in the 1990s: Leading Policymakers Speak from Experience, 
edited by Timothy Besley and Roberto Zagha. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005. 
Wilson, Bobby M. “Critically Understanding Race-Connected Practices: A Reading of W. E.  
B. du Bois and Richard Wright.” In Critical Geographies: A Collection of Readings, 
edited by Harald Bauder and Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro. Kelowna: Praxis (e)Press, 
2008. 
Wines, Michael. “Cartels Battle for Supremacy in South Africa’s Taxi Wars,” The New York  
Times, September 19, 2006. Available at: 
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=f&rct=j&url=http://travel2.nytimes.com/2006/09/17/
world/africa/17africa.html%3Fpagewanted%3Dall&q=cartels+battle+for+supremacy,
+wines&ei=LTOFUO_jL9GKhQf3lICgBw&usg=AFQjCNECyiJfjZ4JEqYTchOEzo
YQBBbIbA. Date accessed: October 22, 2012. 
Wiredu, Kwasi. “African Philosophy, Anglophone.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of  
Philosophy, vol. 1, edited by Edward Craig. London: Routledge, 1998. 
———. Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Bloomington: Indiana  
University Press, 1996. 
———. Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
Witz, Leslie. Apartheid’s Festival: Contesting South Africa’s National Pasts. Bloomington:  
259 
 
Indiana University Press, 2003. 
Wolpe, Harold. “Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segregation to  
Apartheid.” In Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South Africa, edited 
by William Beinart and Saul Dubow. London: Routledge, 1995. 
Woods, George. Cited in Catherine Caufield. Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the  
Poverty of Nations. London: Macmillan, 1997. 
Woods, Ngaire. The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers. Ithaca:  
Cornell University Press, 2006. 
World Bank, 1998. Cited in Michael Goldman. “Imperial Science, Imperial Nature:  
Environmental Knowledge for the World (Bank).” In Earthly Politics: Local and 
Global in Environmental Governance, edited by Sheila Jasanoff and Marybeth Long 
Martello. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004. 
———. Global Development Finance: External Debt of Developing Countries. Washington:  
The World Bank, 2012. 
———. “Poverty Overview,” worldbank.org, October 8, 2014. Available at:  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview. Date accessed: October 29,  
2014. 
———. “Terms of Use for Datasets Listed in the World Bank Data Catalog,”  
web.worldbank.org, 2013. Available at: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/0,,contentMDK:22547097~pagePK:
50016803~piPK:50016805~theSitePK:13,00.html. Date accessed: October 5, 2014. 
World Social Forum. “Another Future is Possible: Texts Drafted on the Basis of the Findings  
of the Thematic Groups of the Thematic Social Forum,” Rio20.net, June 10, 2012. 
Available at: http://rio20.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Another-Future-is-
Possible_english_web.pdf. Date accessed: September 8, 2014. 
Wylie, Diana. Starving on a Full Stomach: Hunger and the Triumph of Cultural Racism in  
Modern South Africa. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001. 
Young, Julian. Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
1998. 
Zegeye, Abebe, Ian Liebenberg and Gregory Houston. “Resisting Ethnicity from Above:  
Social Identities and Democracy in South Africa.” In Democracy and Governance 
Review: Mandela’s Legacy 1994-1999, edited by Yvonne G. Muthien, Meshack M. 
Khosa and Bernard M. Magubane. Pretoria: HSRC Press, 2000. 
Zevenbergen, Aernout. Spots of a Leopard: On Being a Man. Cape Town: Laughing Leopard,  
2009. 
260 
 
Zuma, Jacob. “Media Statement by President Jacob Zuma on the Conclusion of the Social  
Dialogue Meeting on the State of the Economy,” politicsweb, October 17, 2012. 
Available at: 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619/page71654?
oid=333397&sn=Detail&pid=71654. Date accessed: October 23, 2012. 
